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HISTORY

OF THE

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

AND OF THE

NINETEENTH

TILL THE OVERTHROW OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE,

WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO

MENTAL CULTIVATION AND PROGRESS.

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§ I.

FROM THE PEACE OF TILSIT TILL THE WAR WITH AUSTRIA  
IN 1809.

C.—PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA.

WE think we cannot better represent the state of affairs at the court of Prussia, and the influences by which the king was surrounded during and immediately after the negotiations respecting the peace of Tilsit, than in the language of the journal of a man who was a friend of the Baron von Stein, of Hardenberg, and other patriots, and who, together with them, openly denounced the miserable behaviour of their compeers in rank, the miserable policy of the ministers, who were only anxious about their estates and privileges, and the diplomacy of Kalkreuth and Knobelsdorf. Herr von Sladen, to whose journal we have so often referred, names the people who thronged around the king and queen; and, at the time of the negotiations at Tilsit, persuaded the latter to submit to humiliation, which was of no possible use. These were either weak men or knaves, because they grounded their hopes on the promises which the Emperor of the French had, according to their opinions, made to the queen at the humiliating dinner to which she had gone. Count Golz, however, immediately annihilated all these hopes by the reports

which he gave of the audience which he had had of the Emperor of the French on the 6th of July. The count was sent to conclude the peace, and on the 7th reported as follows:—That the Emperor Napoleon had very coolly declared to him that all he had said to the queen were merely phrases of courtly politeness, which bound him to nothing: that he was resolved to assign the Elbe to the king as the boundary of his territory; that there was no longer any questions about negotiations, for he had already come to an understanding on the whole subject with the Emperor Alexander, to whose friendship he attached a great value; that the king was indebted for his position to the generous attachment of that monarch, for had it not been for his interposition, his brother Jerome would have been King of Prussia, and the present dynasty have been expelled; that under these circumstances, it was merely through generosity that anything was left to the king. According to Von Sladen's report, the count still further stated, that Napoleon, after a long declamation, full of injuries and insults, requested him to go to M. de Talleyrand, who forthwith drew out of his pocket-book some small pieces of paper, on which the articles of the treaty which would be granted to the king were singly written down; that those articles were then read to him, but that he was scarcely allowed time to examine them carefully; that Talleyrand declared, that no modifications were to be expected, and that what he had read embodied the Emperor's will; that Talleyrand afterwards, after speaking much on various subjects, added, that it was the Emperor's wish to return as soon as possible to Paris,—and that, therefore, this business concerning the peace must be completed within two days.

The negotiation respecting the evacuation of Prussia by the French was conducted by a man of a very different stamp from Count Golz. Kalkreuth, who was employed on this affair, concluded an agreement either in the most ignorant, or in a most treacherous manner. When the subject of the restoration of the fortresses not ceded by the terms of the peace came to be considered, he wholly forgot to mention the artillery then in the fortresses, and consented that the French should be allowed to remain in quarters as before, east of the Elbe, till the end of November. As only Colberg, Graudenz, Glatz, and Cosel remained in the hands of the Prussians, and all the other Prussian fortresses occupied by the French were to remain in their power till the payment of the exorbitant contributions, they in fact retained dominion over the whole of Prussia; for a whole army was quartered in Danzig, and 6000 French in Stettin. Annoyances and insults not only continued to be employed,—forced contributions and the cost of troops on the march were not only laid as burdens on the Prussian provinces after the peace, but the French from time to time made themselves masters now of this and now of that piece of land given back to the Prussians at the conclusion of the peace, when the seizure suited their views, or could be made serviceable to any of their designs. In this way they took



possession of the circle of Michlau, seized upon a considerable tract of land near Danzig, and wrested from the Prussians several places between Waldau and Driesen; they occupied New Silesia and the lordship of Zmelin. These encroachments upon Prussia were so considerable that the conquests made in this way in the midst of peace amounted to some sixty square miles (German). The King of Westphalia, too, behaved towards the King of Prussia in the same manner as his brother, the Emperor. According to the conditions of peace, he ought to have recognised the Elbe as the boundary. He, however, went beyond the Elbe, and made the small stream called the Ehle his frontier, and thus robbed the King of Prussia of a wood estimated at half a million of dollars. For the purpose of dotations, the Emperor also made himself master of all the funds which belonged to public and private foundations in the Duchy of Warsaw; all this was in direct opposition to the 25th article of the peace of Tilsit. The amount of funds fraudulently seized upon in this way amounted to no less than 30,000,000 dollars.

The Saxons, too, in a most offensive manner, and one quite consistent with their well known petty covetousness, allowed themselves to violate the 11th article of the peace of Tilsit with respect to the Prussians who held public employments in the Duchy of Warsaw. The reason alleged by the King of Saxony, in the proclamation issued at Dresden on the 2nd of October, 1807, for allowing a great number of those unfortunate Germans to sink into the deepest misery, was in the highest degree miserably pettifogging. He alleged that at the time when the Duchy of Warsaw was allotted to him, the most of the Prussian *employés* had been already removed from their places; they had no claims, therefore, upon him, but should apply to the Emperor for compensation. It was a piece of good fortune that the King of Prussia, anxiously cleaving as he did to all traditional usages, at length became sensible that after having lost the one-half of his kingdom, the remaining half must be completely newly organised; and that in so doing he must act in a dictatorial spirit. This proved beneficial to the whole, when the two halves were subsequently united. For such a purpose the Baron von Stein was the very best instrument, for whilst he was harsh, despotic, proud, and rigidly orthodox, he was an honourable, able, fearless, and unselfish man. The king at length gave his confidence to the baron, till Napoleon drove him out of Prussia, to show his hatred to a man who was known as a firm friend of the English and Russians. A commission was appointed for the new organisation of the military force of the kingdom, in which Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Grolmann—men who rendered immortal services to Prussia, and thereby to all Germany, constituted the majority. A new feeling now sprang up in Prussia and throughout the whole of Germany; the idea of saving their nationality began at length to be cherished; government and people were brought into accord by their common misfortunes as soon as Frederick William III. sur-

rounded himself with the patriots, from whom he was once more obliged to separate at the close of 1808, on the command of Napoleon.

There was at that time, as we ourselves can testify from experience, no need of secret societies in order to separate the patriots from the mere official men of public life; the abhorrence felt for those cowards, traitors, and selfish men who had betrayed, and still continued to make merchandise of their country, bound all true German natures in one common bond. Napoleon, Savary, and Davoust, as military men, had as little faith in human nature as Wellington and Soult; according to their opinion, all the blame was to be ascribed to the *Tugendbund* and the conspirators; they therefore filled the country with spies, traitors, and bailiffs, and by this very means the number of conspirators continually increased. Unhappily, romanticism, mysticism, and fooleries with religion, and especially with the middle ages, were introduced by the secret societies of those days from their absurd attachment to what was old, and their aversion to the new forced upon their acceptance. Even Von Stein and his friends regarded knightly usages, and dynastic privileges, castles and mounds, as things worthy of admiration. They placed too unlimited confidence on civic associations and municipalities, in the narrow sense of the German jurists, on unimprovable princes expelled together with their families, upon the nobility, priestcraft, and blind faith of the old times, not themselves to have passed from one extreme to another. These secret associations against French dominion became, therefore, at a later period, associations in favour of feudality and hierarchy, and they themselves helped to destroy that inspiration for freedom which they had been earlier instrumental in exciting. How was it, indeed, to be expected that a Count Munster, a Freiherr von Stein, and a Niebuhr, honest and vigorous as he was, should have been able to keep themselves free from the prejudices of their class, from scholastic systems, and from a preference for a constitution fearfully oligarchical in practice—such as that of the English plutocracy, which had become an ideal of perfection since the time of Montesquieu, and justly to estimate the genuine and true sense of the French institutions? They did not see how easily what was unpractical in French constitutionalism, and what was egotistical and autocratic in Napoleon's counterfeit, might be separated from the French, and in the noblest sense cosmopolitan principles of the first (monarchical) national assemblies. We admit, however, that the indefinite feeling and poetical phase of the past then called forth, had a more powerful effect upon the people than any true historical knowledge, or clear and definite ideas would have had. We, therefore, willingly acknowledge the great use of the *Tugendbund* and its affiliations.

The improvements in administration which were commenced at this time, were first matured at a later period when Napoleon allowed the management of affairs to be again entrusted to Baron von Har-

denberg. Everything which related to military affairs was, however, immediately after the peace, admirably conducted by the three officers whose names have been already mentioned: Scharnhorst was afterwards appointed minister of war. The general obligation to military service was introduced instead of the system of recruiting; the privilege of the nobility to be alone appointed to all offices of the highest rank was taken away, although, as must be obvious, the nobles still had some preference in practice. The soldier was altogether delivered from subjection to the corporal's cane. Partly from economical reasons, and partly from the express desire of Napoleon, the standing army was limited to 40,000 men; but Scharnhorst's plans for the general arming and training of the people were so devised, that as early as 1811 the king might have said, that in case of need he could have got on foot 100,000—and some even say, 120,000—150,000 men. From time to time undisciplined militia were drafted into the regular army, and as soon as they were thoroughly trained, again dismissed, and others taken in their stead. All the old abuses in the constitution—clothing, superintendence, discipline, and conduct of the army, were abolished. As there was reason every moment to expect a struggle for life and death, means were taken to provide sufficient stores of arms and ammunition, in case of need, to be able to arm the whole population. These arms were partly made in the country itself, and partly purchased from Austrian manufacturers. Provision was also made for an adequate supply of field-pieces, and for this purpose the guns of the saved fortresses were for the most part recast and replaced by iron ones.

It would lead us too far from the history of events, and oblige us to enter too minutely into questions of political administration, to go into all the improvements made in the management of home affairs, on which, therefore, we shall only very briefly touch. The king dismissed the very costly ministry, consisting of Hoym, Goldbeck, Massow, Reden, Reck, Ingersleben, Thulemeier, and Buchholz, and committed the business of the state to a provisional ministry appointed in March. Of this provisional government, the Baron von Stein was named president, by a cabinet order of the 5th of October, 1807. He received the title of Prime Minister; and, together with the presidency of the government, undertook the administration of the treasury of the board of control, and of navigation affairs. The premier was besides commissioned to co-operate in the new military organisation, and in this department he was a firm supporter of Scharnhorst's plans; he was also to take part in all the deliberations on foreign affairs. For a complete account of the important services rendered to Prussia at this time by Baron von Stein, the nature of our work obliges us to refer our readers to other writers,\* and con-

\* See Woltmann's "*Geist der neuen preussischen Staats Organisation*." Leipzig and Züllichau, 1810. Pölitz, "*Geschichte des preussischen Staats*," pp. 518-521, in which other works are also referred to. Those, however, who wish for the best information, had better read the first hundred pages of the third volume of Manso's



fine ourselves to remarking, that in the midst of general weakness and indifference, Stein's obstinacy, his aversion to listen to any foreign counsel, his vehemence and pride were remarkably serviceable. Von Sladen, his warm admirer, was in Petersburg, and there worked upon the Emperor Alexander, who, however much he acted as if his aim were to promote French objects, still secretly cultivated a close union with Prussia and remotely with England,—and as a Martinist, and friend of Jung Stilling's school, his views were in full accordance with those of Stein, Arndt, and other patriots, who considered the salvation of Germany to rest upon a return and attachment to ancient piety. The French, to whom Napoleon at that time listened, and who served him like slaves as long as he was able to divide among them money, estates, dignities, and orders, filled his mind with the same ideas concerning the causes of discontent then universally prevailing, and concerning the secret societies, which robbed the existing governments, especially in Germany and Italy, of their best strength, and hampered their action, which have been infused into the minds of the German princes since 1815 by their flatterers. They took good care not to say that participation in these secret societies had increased, because the civilisation of our times will not suffer arbitrary and illegal conduct on the part of the governments—that these societies were therefore effects of the proceedings of the governments: this would have been highly displeasing to Napoleon as well as to the princes, and they therefore stated the reverse, that the operations of the societies were the causes of the discontent.

Napoleon's military police in Germany raged against the very noblest men in the nation, as against members of the *Tugendbund*; the only effect of this was, that the people adopted adventurers, to whom patriots and virtue were things altogether foreign, as their protectors and attached themselves to them. The very persons who were not persecuted were in reality the most dangerous. The real chiefs of the conspiracy were the knights and barons, who, from the Baltic to the Gulf of Venice, in Austria and in Russia, formed the kernel of these secret societies, or were rather their unknown heads. The aristocracy, as they have given proof since 1814, only chafed at having lost their privileges, their courts of justice, high offices of state, and estates. They were anxious for a return to all the old usages; the more intelligent of them, however, saw that this was only to be effected by means of the people, and they therefore spoke and acted as if they were really friends of the people. In Prussia, therefore, great steps in advance were made; rights were granted; privileges, rights of rank, and government limited by mere cabinet orders; the Emperor of the French, on the other hand, went daily

“*Geschichte des preussischen Staats.*” In the second and sixth volume of Schöll's “*Recueil des pièces officielles*” will be found all the documents connected with the oppression inflicted upon Prussia and its people by the French Government, their intendants, and other officials. In the fourth volume of Schöll's “*Recueil des Traités*” will be seen examples of the manner in which Soult and Rapp extorted concessions, or so called conventions.



backwards and braved the spirit of the age. When, in the year 1808, he pronounced his ban upon the Prussian ministry and abused its members, he did not see that he thereby, in fact, created leaders for the people, without whom nothing could have been accomplished in our days. The real influence of the associations formed during times of oppression, and of the transitory feelings in favour of liberty which are connected with them, only becomes apparent when the feelings then awakened have penetrated the whole mass of the people. The youth of that period were freed from those servile feelings, which had previously been branded upon children's minds from their earliest years by their parents, as the only means of success in life, and as a duty; for the old masters were either hunted out or showed themselves to be contemptible, and the new ones, both French and German, were despised. The learned, or rather the Germans, who visited universities, imbibed new ideas; for law and theology (very significantly called *bread sciences*—*Brodwissen-schaften*) could no longer be taught after the old customary way. Slumbering minds were roused into activity by Napoleon's romantic undertakings, inspired with patriotism and a love for intellectual culture by poetry and philosophy, and allured onward by the enticements of secret associations. The inspiration of the people, afterwards so mournfully deceived, and especially of the youth of the time, suffered no deliberation, otherwise one would have indeed asked, in 1809, whether such persons as the extravagant Schill, Doerenberg, a colonel of the Westphalian guard, the crack-brained Duke of Brunswick-Oels, or the old Elector of Hesse, besides many others whom we would rather not mention, ever did or would feel any zeal for virtue, law, and the rights and liberties of their nation?

In the mean time, Stein and his true friends put forth all their energies in favour of virtue, truth, and right. They succeeded in gaining in favour of the cause the minds of the young, whose German patriotism Davoust and Napoleon found as dangerous as it has been found by many of the princes of our own times, who are more disposed to forbear with every kind of vulgarity and sensuality in the feelings and conduct of youth, than with any love or zeal for the highest blessings and privileges of man. On the occasion of the persecution of Von Stein and his friends on the 28th of November, 1808, Marshal Davoust very plainly expressed it as his opinion, that he and Napoleon were the only supports of the old monarchical system of government, founded on the police, whilst the ministers of Prussia were promoting demagogy. In an order of the day of the above date, he says, though not indeed in express terms, that he and his master were intent upon restoring the autocracy of those times and countries, in which servile obedience was rendered in return for places, orders, money, and titles; at the same time he reproaches the Prussians, who were striving against foreign oppression, and nobly sacrificing their enjoyments and material interests of life for mental independence and progress, with favouring a dangerous,

revolutionary, and demagogic spirit. As early as August, 1808, Napoleon felt a great aversion to Stein, and was very uneasy about the affiliations of the patriotic societies throughout the whole of Germany, of which he was the protector. He was, however, most of all dissatisfied with the new Prussian army formed of the people themselves, and with its spirit, as with the free German model state, which Von Stein wished to place in opposition to the state machinery everywhere erected by Napoleon. He knew too well that he owed his own army and the clever men who were his instruments to the enthusiasm of a people conscious of its own strength, to suffer in Prussia, and through Prussia in Germany, a free people firmly united with their rulers to engage in a struggle against all exclusive rights and privileges. This would undoubtedly sooner or later put an end to the system prevalent in the whole vast territory of Napoleon's empire, in which men were moved like puppets, of which he managed the strings. These strings he continued to hold in his hand, whether he was in Paris, Vienna, or Berlin, in the council-room or in the field, and the French were never weary of expressing their admiration that he never forgot, wherever he was, by night or by day, to pull in or let out the strings of his autocracy.

The pains taken by the German aristocracy to rouse the people were long a matter of suspicion to the Emperor, and he was not mistaken in looking upon the prime minister of Prussia as the soul of the anti-Gallican movement. He was therefore very much pleased when the Duke of Auerstadt, then in command of the French troops in Germany, and his police found a pretence in the imprudence of a young member of the *Tugendbund*, to commence a course of arrests in Prussia. Among the persons arrested was privy-councillor Schmalz, a professor of political economy, who was said to be the author of a proclamation addressed to the people in order to call them to arms. Every one was astonished how such a man as Schmalz should come to entertain any feelings of enthusiasm and of sacrifice for the country; he was, however, very soon set at liberty again. A document again was thought to have been found in possession of an assessor Kopp, which might be used against Baron von Stein. A letter was found written by Von Stein which Kopp was to have conveyed to the Prince of Sayn Wittgenstein, then at the baths of Doberan. We shall not enter in this place into an examination of the contents of this letter, will not enumerate the partly very chimerical plans and projects of that time, or suffer ourselves to be involved in the labyrinth of the associations of the patriots and pretended patriots, because we must frequently return to those secret associations. The question is not at all of any one association. Napoleon, however, knew that he had no more impassioned opponent than Stein; and the tendency of all the new Prussian measures had not escaped his notice; the call, therefore, in this letter, to profit by the disturbances in Hesse, was treated as a con-

spiracy, and Napoleon caused the letter to be published in the *Moniteur* on the 8th of September, with a note appended, which obviously threatened the existence of the Prussian state. It ran thus: "LET THE LETTER BE A MEMORIAL OF THE CAUSES OF THE VIGOUR OF STATES AND OF THEIR FALL." In the *Journal de l'Empire*, another government organ, it was more distinctly said, that Stein and his administration of Prussia were regarded in Paris as wholly incompatible with a good understanding between France and Prussia. It was there stated, that as long as the King of Prussia was surrounded by his old ministers, his cabinet could inspire no confidence; that this cabinet had so directed him, that he had deceived everybody, and that Stein's letter was a proof that he still cherished the same principles. At this moment Napoleon had many reasons for sparing the Emperor Alexander, with whom he was desirous of having a personal interview in Erfurt; the affairs of Spain also were in a very perplexed condition. The persecution was not only put off, but, because the Emperor of the French was in need of his troops in September and October in Spain, an agreement was even entered into between France and Prussia concerning the withdrawal of the remaining part of the army still shut up in Prussia.

Three days after the Emperor of Russia left Petersburg to meet the Emperor of the French, at a conference to be held at Erfurt, that is, on the 17th of September, 1808, the French and Prussian ministers signed the treaty above referred to with respect to the withdrawal of the troops. This was therefore precisely at the same time in which the Emperor Alexander, on his journey southward, paid a visit to the king, who still remained in Prussia proper. The debt still due by Prussia to France was fixed at 140,000,000, which was to be paid partly in cash, and partly by monthly instalments of 6,000,000 each. These monthly payments were guaranteed by pledging the crown domains, and were to be completed in eighteen months; still, however, other burdensome financial conditions were added, which we pass over. On these conditions the French promised to evacuate the Prussian dominions in from thirty to forty days; but this, too, not unconditionally. Stettin, Glogau, and Küstrin were to remain in their hands till the whole sum was paid. We shall see, subsequently, how little attention was paid to the clause, that the French were to have only 3900 men in Stettin, 3300 in Glogau, and in 2800 in Küstrin. The insecurity of all princes, whose fortresses were at that time occupied by the French, may be learnt from the fact that the King of Prussia found it necessary to purchase the assurance that his territories should not be further diminished, by recognising Napoleon's brother Joseph as King of Spain.

At this time the relation between France and Russia appeared very close; but the turn which things had taken in Spain gave the English aristocracy, and the numerous members of the knightly and



German association, to which the prime minister of Prussia belonged, such an influence, that Napoleon thought it necessary to confirm his friendship with the Emperor Alexander by a personal conference. In Tilsit, Alexander felt and affected a strong attachment to Napoleon, which is very difficult to reconcile with his enthusiastic friendship for the King of Prussia, and with his ideal admiration of the queen. He appeared to enter into all the projects of his new friend, and therefore, as early as the 30th of August, 1807, removed from his councils, and the management of the foreign department, Baron von Budberg, who belonged to the Anglo-German aristocratical association. Rumanzoff, his successor, completely entered into the French system—of robbing all states in order to enrich two autocrats. Up till this time Alexander had in every way spared his unfortunate brother-in-law, Gustavus IV.: he now adopted the plan of making war upon and curtailing Sweden, in order to enlarge Russia; Napoleon, on his part, was to be allowed to consider and treat the republic of Ragusa and that of the seven islands as domains. Notwithstanding, or rather by virtue of the peace, Moldavia and Wallachia still continued to be occupied by the Russians; the French seized upon Stralsund and Swedish Pomerania, and the Russians on Finland, as far as Torneä. Russia entered even into Napoleon's continental system, after having previously offered its mediation to the English cabinet, and having also communicated to it the secret articles of the peace of Tilsit; this mediation was, however, declined. When the English undertook their predatory expedition against Copenhagen, Russia issued the vehement manifesto (dated the 7th of September, 1807) wherein it was declared that all treaties and agreements entered into with England were null, and at the same time made a new declaration of the validity of the principles respecting navigation put forth at the time of the armed neutrality. On the 16th of October a new and very hostile manifesto appeared; on the 6th of November war was declared, and still nothing really serious was intended.

In consequence of the complete stoppage of trade which followed the declaration of war, Russia suffered much more severely than England,\* and the Russian magnates, supported by the aversion of the emperor's mother to Napoleon, were very far from showing that attention to the French which their emperor showed to the Emperor of the French and his representatives. This was soon experienced by Savary, Duke of Rovigo, who, having been overloaded with marks of politeness by the emperor, at first found everything cold; and even at a later period, when the servile souls became a little warmer from fear of the emperor, he in reality proved unable to make any way amongst them. Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, was afterwards deceived for some years by appearances, and by Alexander's masterly act of dissimulation; but Napoleon soon came to experience in

\* Russian exports this year amounted to about 2,615,147 roubles; and its imports to about 13,672,793 roubles.



Spain that the personal proofs of friendship exhibited by the emperor were by no means always in accordance with the Russian policy. The Emperor Alexander himself, for example, on the urgent request of Caulaincourt, acknowledged Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain; whilst Strogonoff, the Russian ambassador in Madrid, alleged that he had no instructions to that effect, and corresponded with the insurgents. In the same way Admiral Siniavin, who, on the breaking out of war with England, had taken refuge in Lisbon with nine ships of the line and a frigate, not only refused to render any assistance to Marshal Junot, who was threatened in that city by the English, but even to make a demonstration as if he were prepared to assist him. The manner in which he afterwards capitulated, on the 3rd of September, 1808, to Admiral Cotton, who caused his ships to be taken to England, might indicate a very different disposition, especially as the ten ships were afterwards given back.

There was, indeed, no want of interchange of civilities between the two emperors. Whoever compares the attentions and proofs of regard shown by the one to the other which have been related to us with the secret intrigues which they were at the same moment weaving against each other in Turkey and Spain, and with the open enmity which was shown as early as 1811, will learn from such a comparison what the real nature of diplomatic proofs of regard and princely friendships are. The Emperor of Russia made presents to his imperial brother of vessels and ornaments of malachite and other precious stones, which the latter exhibited in the Salon du Paix in the Tuileries, in order to be able to boast of the friendship of the Emperor of Russia in presence of the circles of the Faubourg St. Germain. Busts of Alexander were manufactured in the imperial porcelain manufactory at Sèvres, and these busts were seen everywhere in the palace and rooms of the imperial family. All who had access to the court, or wished to make themselves agreeable to the Emperor, found it necessary to purchase these ornaments, and place them conspicuously in their houses. The friendship was so intimate that one of the Emperor of Russia's adjutants accompanied the Emperor of the French when he went to Bayonne to set aside the whole reigning family of Spain. This adjutant, however, was the same Tchernitcheff who was engaged in constantly travelling backwards and forwards between Petersburg and Paris, who surrounded Napoleon, in spite of all his police, with a net of Russian espionage, and bribed all the *employés* who were venal in order to obtain papers. He either won over or corrupted ladies to elicit secrets from them; and finally, in 1812, he even purchased a copy of the plan of operations for the war, when it was too late to change it completely.

Napoleon knew that Austria was thinking of taking advantage of the general discontent and the secret associations in Germany to frustrate the plans of France and Russia with respect to Poland and Turkey; he was therefore very desirous of assuring himself once

more of the Russian emperor before his journey to Spain. This was by no means difficult, for all whom Napoleon ever thought it worth while to treat with particular friendship, admit that he was irresistible, and especially women, and men with womanish minds like Alexander, were sure to fall before his arts. This last was a great cause of anxiety to the very numerous and distinguished partisans of the English and Prussian policy at the Russian court, when the question was raised of a conference between the two emperors in Erfurt. Von Sladen, the friend of the minister Von Stein, therefore gave a memorial to the Emperor Alexander shortly before his departure to Erfurt on the 7th of September, the contents of which are very worthy of notice in several respects. We subjoin in a note a passage of this memorial, in which Alexander was forewarned of all that would take place in Erfurt, and his attention called to every step which might be required of him to take.\* From this it will be seen that the Emperor of Russia was continually receiving secretly counsel and warning from the enemies of the French, and that he played his part in Erfurt more ably than Napoleon, from whom he separated, as even the French writers report, with all the outward signs of indescribable friendship and esteem, but inwardly full of distrust. Von Sladen says very freely to the emperor, that he had given him the advice laid down in his memorial, "in order that he might see through the sophisms, falsehoods, and deceptions which were prepared for him by Napoleon, and awaited him in Erfurt."

On his way to the congress, the emperor visited the King and Queen of Prussia in Königsberg, and arrived on the 26th of September in Weimar, where his brother Constantine had been staying since the 24th. On the 27th Napoleon entered Erfurt, and at one o'clock drove out a distance of several miles from the town to meet the Emperor of Russia, who was coming from Weimar. Our modest object does not permit us to incorporate in our prose the poetry of the subsequent festivities, nor in glowing language to commend the masters of ceremonies for their skill in getting up the festivities suitable to the occasion; this we leave to those who wish to write an artistic history; it is not our calling. That splendour enough was exhibited in Erfurt may be sufficiently

\* All Napoleon's preparations, he writes (*Preussen*, n. s. n., p. 305), do not give sufficient security to the emperor; he wishes first of all to impose upon Europe; secondly, to prevent a union between Austria and Russia, to occupy these two powers, and even, if possible, to cause a difference between them. He hopes to attain this object by a meeting with the Emperor Alexander. The very report of such a meeting secures him the power of these advantages; for he spreads the opinion that an outbreak in Spain is as little a matter of uneasiness or fear in his eyes as a change in the system of Russia; and he hopes to gain the second of these advantages at which he aims by a position of assurance, which he flatters himself he shall be able to extort from the emperor, and for which he purposes to secure some apparent advantages to Russia, and thereby he further hopes to bring about an alliance, which he will propose to him under the most innocent form.

gathered from the fact, that the four vassal-kings of the Confederation of the Rhine, thirty-four princes, twenty-four ministers of state, and thirty generals, were by express command to summon up everything which imagination could suggest in the way of courtly splendour and extravagance for the occasion. Talma and the Parisian company of actors had been sent to Erfurt; we cannot, however, but regret that the great man who gave this entertainment, was so little as to say to Talma, that he would act before a pit of kings—and to cause two arm-chairs to be placed for the Emperor Alexander and himself, whilst the other rulers sat behind them on common chairs.\* It would be still more pitiful, if the story, which was at that time in every mouth and related in all the French works written for effect, were really true, that the Emperor Alexander, whilst Talma was being applauded on the stage, played his part with Napoleon in the pit in quite as masterly a manner as Talma did his upon the stage. The latter, amidst immense applause, pronounced the following line:

*“L’amitié d’un grand homme est un bienfait de Dieu;”*

when the Emperor seized Napoleon’s hand, made a profound bow, and feelingly and pathetically exclaimed: “THAT I HAVE NEVER MORE TRULY FELT THAN AT THE PRESENT MOMENT.” The festivities continued from the 27th of September till the 14th of October, and furnished to the Germans the most melancholy spectacle of their princes and nobles conducting themselves publicly, not only as slaves of Napoleon, but even as servants and flatterers of all his generals and courtiers. Our readers will, no doubt, willingly spare a writer who loves his country and *noble* princes from entering into further particulars.

It appears from a conversation, which in the following year Count Metternich had with Champagny (Duc de Cadore), and which was at that time printed, that Austria and its government were deeply offended at not having been invited to this congress, and that the presence of Count Metternich had been expressly forbidden. Napoleon was at that time so full of anxiety lest Austria should avail itself of his presence in Spain to rouse the Germans to a resistance long since prepared, that he had raised new thousands of conscripts, and concentrated the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine in Bavaria. When the Emperor Francis afterwards sent General Vincent with a letter full of assurances of peace to Erfurt, the Emperor conducted himself in a manner wholly inconsistent with his zeal for court etiquette and for the Byzantine-Bourbon ceremonial, which he had again introduced. He behaved most rudely to the general, who had been constantly in his camp during the last war; he threw his hat upon the ground; that, however, was merely an

\* Even Thibaudeau condescends to the most minute descriptions. He informs us, that in the pit the emperors sat in arm-chairs—the kings upon chairs—and the marshals upon benches—what actors from Paris made their appearance, and how they played, &c., &c.



affected passion, which very soon cooled down. He satisfied himself, first of all, with very urgently demanding that the court of Vienna should put a stop to all military preparations; but he afterwards caused a declaration, couched in very threatening terms, to be given in to the Austrian government.\* In order to flatter the Emperor of Russia, Napoleon acted as if he had been influenced by Alexander's application in favour of Prussia; but in reality, as will subsequently appear, oppressed the king and his subjects afterwards just as before. He profited by Alexander's admiration and friendship, which was pushed even to the ridiculous, but on which he laid really no more stress than they deserved, in order to assume the appearance, as if he would willingly conclude a peace with England, and as if every misfortune and difficulty came from thence. From having written three times directly to the King of England, and having always been referred to the minister, he might have learned, that in that country the king's person and feelings can never be taken into account; notwithstanding, he prevailed upon the Emperor Alexander to unite with him in signing a letter addressed to King George. The result was such as might have been foreseen; the object, however, was attained; the letters and answers were printed, and officially commented upon in the journals.

The negotiations, properly speaking, were carried on personally in Erfurt between the two emperors themselves, and much was agreed upon which neither the one nor the other intended to observe; still, however, a written treaty of alliance was concluded by Rumanzoff and Champagny, which was calculated with a view to a new war with Austria. The conditions of this written treaty remained unknown to Thibaudeau; Bignon has communicated them in the eighth part of his history of Napoleon's diplomatic campaigns. The substance of the agreement consists in a closer alliance of the two powers against England, and the cession of Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia. Hitherto Napoleon had only been willing to concede this last point on conditions which referred to Silesia. In the fifth article of the treaty of Erfurt, which was kept strictly secret, the two emperors agreed to conclude a peace with England on condition only that that country should acknowledge Moldavia and Wallachia as a part of the Russian Empire. Then follow several articles on the cession of those Turkish provinces. In the eleventh article it is stated, that FURTHER negotiations were to be carried on respecting a FURTHER partition. It was agreed, too, that the treaty was to be kept secret for ten years. Buturlin boasts, with reason, that the Emperor Alexander in Erfurt, by his Greco-Sclavonian arts of deception, gained a victory over the Italo-Gallic talents of Napoleon; and, in fact, the very highest triumph is to outwit the deceiver.

Even as early as this Napoleon is said to have thrown out the idea

\*The French minister in Vienna was obliged to declare: "Que les corps des Français seraient renforcés et les troupes de la confédération remises en situation hostile toutes les fois, que l'Autriche ferait des armemens extraordinaires."



of a marriage with Catherine Paulowna, Alexander's sister, which must, of course, have contemplated a previous separation from the Empress Josephine. Alexander, on his part, is said to have raised difficulties on the question of religion, and to have referred the matter to his mother, who very speedily had the princess betrothed to Duke Peter of Oldenburg. Moreover, the reception of the Duke of Oldenburg into the Confederation of the Rhine was one of the results of the meeting in Erfurt.

The scenes in Erfurt, such as the ostentatious parade which the Emperor of Russia made of his friendship, were intended to blind the eyes of the French, who saw, with great dissatisfaction, what was going on in Spain. We think ourselves justified in drawing this conclusion, from the fact that of all the hundreds of writers who extolled with the meanest flattery everything which Napoleon did, there was not one who ventured to make a boast of the advantages gained in Spain. The language held by the Emperor in the Legislative Assembly, on the 26th of October, covertly referred to this dissatisfaction; on this occasion he observed, that the Emperor Alexander, in Erfurt, had approved of everything which he had undertaken in Spain.\*

He was extremely angry in Paris, and at a later period in Spain, respecting the combination of the minister Von Stein with Austria, in order to bring the secret associations of Germany to a determinate resistance, respecting the secret embassies of Austria to Spain, the plans which the Prussian patriots were maturing with Spain, and the very equivocal character which even Russia was playing with regard to the same country. The whole weight of resentment fell upon Baron von Stein, because they neither could nor dared to uncover the dreaded affiliations, nor to convert a hatred of the French into a crime. Von Stein, as Bonaparte alleged, in his influential office as prime minister of Prussia, appointed conspirators alone to public employment, and promoted none but enemies of the French. Then, for the first time, were used the letter which had been found as early as August, and other similar documents, in order to make a great alarm, and Von Stein found himself compelled to resign on the 26th of November, and to betake himself to some place where he should be safe from the threatening storm. His conduct towards the prime minister of a friendly monarch, and the contempt of all forms expressed in the lowest manner, prove, more than anything else, that the flattery and servility of princes, and good fortune, had led the Emperor of the French completely astray respecting the tone which it was his duty to adopt, and respecting propriety and right. He behaved towards the King of Prussia's prime minister precisely as his police would have dealt with a common vagabond. First, on the 29th of November, the Duke of

\* On the 26th of October he used the following language in the Legislative Body:—"L'Empereur de Russie et moi nous sommes d'accord et invariablement unis pour la paix comme pour la guerre."

Auerstadt issued the order of the day, to which we have so often referred, in which he represents himself and his emperor as the main supports of the old order of things, while the knights and admirers of the middle ages, and of its language, customs, and institutions—of which, undoubtedly, the most of the *Tugendbund* consisted—are represented as innovators and revolutionists. In the mean time, Napoleon himself had set out for Spain, and on the 15th of December issued a ban against Von Stein, couched in expressions which might rather have been expected from Augereau than from him. This violent manifesto served to make all the world aware of the fact, that his empire must be in a very bad condition when even men such as Von Stein promoted conspiracies, and when Napoleon was obliged to have recourse to such unexampled measures for his protection. We shall subjoin in a note the decree against Baron von Stein, who is distinguished by the laughable expression of *one Stein*.\*

It appeared as if at that time the undertaking against Spain, which was conducted in the manner of Eastern princes or of Mehemet Ali, had almost rooted out all feeling of regard to public opinion from the mind of a man who owed his greatness to opinion and nothing to birth, for at the very moment in which he was forcing a foreign king upon the Spaniards, and publishing a ban against the King of Prussia's minister, Von Stein, he declared very dryly in the *Moniteur* that he was *everything*, and the French nation *nothing*. This, at least was involved in the declaration, that no one, whether entitled or not, should venture, in his presence, to declare himself a representative of the nation. The occasion of this declaration was an answer, published in the *Moniteur*, and put into his wife's mouth, to a congratulatory address presented to her by the Legislative Assembly through their president on the 20th of November, in reference to a victory gained by her husband on the 12th. The Empress is made to say, that "*She was very much rejoiced that his Majesty's first thoughts after the victory had been for the men who were the representatives of the nation.*" The offensive expressions respecting this answer of his wife's, which he from Spain caused to be inserted in the *Moniteur*, prove, more than anything else, that, intoxicated by good fortune, he had entered upon a course which would infallibly lead him into the pit which he himself had digged, and we shall therefore give the passage from the *Moniteur* in a note.†

\* "Le nommé Stein cherchant à exciter des troubles en Allemagne est déclaré ennemi de la France, et de la Confédération du Rhin. Les biens, que le dit Stein posséderait, soit en France, soit dans la Confédération du Rhin, seront séquestrés. Le dit Stein sera saisi de sa personne partout où il pourra, ou par nos troupes ou celles de nos alliés."

† "Ce serait une prétention chimérique et même criminelle que de vouloir représenter la nation avant l'Empereur. Le corps législatif, improprement appelé de ce nom, devrait être appelé conseil législatif, puisqu'il n'a pas la faculté de faire des lois, n'ayant pas la proposition. Le conseil législatif est donc la réunion des mandataires des colleges electoraux; on les appelle députés des départemens parce-

The King of Prussia was so greatly harassed on account of the patriotic societies, of the secret negotiations of Stein, and of his friends who had gone to Austria and Russia, as well as on account of the understandings entered into, without his knowledge, with the English and discontented Spaniards, that he was obliged to become the servant of the imperial police. He, therefore, by an edict issued from Königsberg on the 16th of December, 1808, renewed the severe ordinance of the 20th of October, 1798, respecting the search for, guarding against, and punishment of, all secret associations; and he was even obliged to work against the noble spirit and patriotic feelings of those able men who had infused these feelings into the newly-organised army, no more got together by money and recruiting sergeants. By an order issued verbally in Berlin, all soldiers were forbidden to speak on political subjects. We shall hereafter see, as became obvious in the following year, that such ordinances, so utterly repugnant to public opinion, have always in reality an effect totally opposite to that intended to be produced.

#### D.—SPAIN AND PORTUGAL TILL MAY, 1809.

We have already observed in another place that Godoy, who, under an unexampled title, had been appointed by the king himself as in some measure his guardian, had made the kingdom of Spain since 1795 completely a province of France, as Portugal was a province of England. We have also stated, that in proportion as the king, the queen, and his miserable favourite, the Prince of the Peace, became from day to day more contemptible, the oppressions practised by the French grew more severe. In the year 1801 Spain was again obliged to give up Louisiana, and Bonaparte immediately sold it to the North Americans, who were most dangerous neighbours to Mexico. Since the breach of the peace of Amiens, the Spaniards were obliged to sacrifice 72,000,000 yearly, and to surrender their fleet at Trafalgar. Notwithstanding Godoy's alliance with France, he continued always to carry on a secret correspondence with the English cabinet through the instrumentality of the Portuguese minister; and in 1806, he thought he must avail himself of Napoleon's war with Prussia to withdraw himself from French dominion. He was therefore anxious to enter into an alliance with Russia and England, in which Portugal was to take part. Baron von Strogonoff, whose definite object was Madrid, therefore passed through Lisbon and opened the negotiation, which Godoy carried on in secret. When an English fleet, with troops on board, afterwards ran into the Tagus, Don Godoy declared that he was obliged to arm against these English and against Portugal, and

qu'ils sont nommés par les départemens. Dans l'ordre de notre hiérarchie constitutionnelle, le premier représentant de la nation est l'Empereur avec ses ministres, organes de ses décisions; la seconde autorité représentante est le sénat; la troisième le conseil d'état, qui a de véritables attributions législatives; le conseil législatif à la quatrième rang," &c.



actually, under this pretence, and to every one's astonishment, a proclamation appeared on the 14th of October—the very day on which the war with Prussia broke out, dated the 5th, wherein a sort of general arming was ordered in the name of the king, and reference was made to dangers of all kinds, of which no one knew anything. The proclamation was in fact drawn up in very indefinite language, and addressed to the Spaniards in very obscure and confused terms. On the 15th circulars were sent to the intendants, captains-general, bishops, and corregidores, in order to set the nobility in motion. It spoke of 60,000 recruits, and Sixto Espinosa, councillor of state, was commissioned to devise some suitable means of raising money for an extraordinary expenditure. Nothing, it is said, should be omitted to enable the nation to run this new course with glory; but what the new course was, was nowhere said.

The French ambassador in Madrid was long under the impression that this proclamation had reference to a war in Portugal;—he was at length, however, convinced of its object, and caused the Prince of the Peace to be very carefully watched. He soon learned that the prince spent his nights with Strogonoff, and at the house of Henri, the Prussian ambassador. When he at last asked for some explanation concerning the proclamation and the circular, Don Godoy was so wholly destitute of shame as to say, that the Emperor knew the whole matter—he knew that he must do the utmost to maintain himself against his opponents in Spain. The news of the battle of Jena no sooner reached Madrid than the whole was exploded;—Don Godoy alone was shameless enough to act as if he was greatly rejoiced, and to hasten with congratulations to the ambassador; the king behaved more worthily. On the occasion of the next *levée*, M. de Vandreuil expected that he should be overwhelmed with compliments on account of the victory; this, however, was not only omitted, but the king did not even speak a word to him. On the news of the first proclamation, Napoleon had commissioned the Senator Lamartillière to summon the national guards of the departments bordering on Spain. He soon saw that this was not necessary, for the Spanish government explained their proclamation in such a manner as if it had been in favour of the French, and sent instructions to the persons and authorities to whom the circulars had previously been addressed to pay no attention to the proclamation. Articles appeared in all the journals of Europe, which, in order to excuse the proclamation, explained it in a most extraordinary manner. The miserable Portuguese government, however, as we learn from the correspondence of M. de Reyneval, then French ambassador in Lisbon, betrayed the minister whom it had previously brought to the adoption of this course. Aranjó declared roundly, that the proclamation of the 5th of October had been intended against France, and Napoleon made himself master of the whole affair from the despatches of the Prussian minister in Madrid, of which he got possession after the battle of Jena.



The Emperor thought it advisable to allow the matter to be quiet; he satisfied himself with writing to his new ambassador in Madrid—the Marquis Francis de Beauharnais, that he should require all military preparations to be put a stop to, and obtain hostages and securities from the Spaniards. In this sense we look upon the demand of 4000 cavalry, 10,000 infantry, and 125 guns being placed at the disposal of the French, and six Spanish ships of the line being united with the Toulon fleet. The Emperor besides sent a whole army of Prussian prisoners to Spain, there to be provided for.

The miserable Godoy cheerfully submitted to everything; he most politely thanked the Emperor for the 20,000 Prussians, for whom his master was to provide, as if they had been a great favour; he sent the ships of the line, he caused the Marquis la Romana to march with 9000 men through France to the Elbe, and orders were also sent to O'Farrell to conduct thither the 5000 men, who had hitherto been in the service of the Queen of Etruria. In this way Spain was at once cunningly robbed of a fleet and an army, at the very moment in which Napoleon was resolving to drive out the Spanish and Portuguese royal families. In April, 1807, the Spaniards appeared on the Elbe, and were, at a later period, some of them sent to Jutland, and some of them quartered in the Danish islands. Immediately after the peace of Tilsit, preparations were made for carrying out the measures against Spain and Portugal, and using the Prince of the Peace as an instrument. On the 20th of July, Talleyrand was obliged to write to Beauharnais (who most ridiculously was made an opponent of the plan of driving the Bourbons from Spain) as follows:

“You must prevail upon the Prince of the Peace to sign an agreement in the name of his court, wherein it shall be determined that France and Spain will unite their strength, in order to determine the court of Lisbon to shut the harbours of Portugal against English ships, and, if possible, as early as the 1st of September. Should Portugal refuse to accede to this proposal, then the French and Spanish ministers are to leave, and both powers to declare war against Portugal. A French army of 20,000 men shall be assembled at Bayonne by the 1st of September, in order to join with the Spaniards.”

This treaty was, indeed, first concluded in October at Fontainebleau, although the promise to conclude it was given, and the Spanish ambassador (Campo Alange), with the French one, made the insolent demands above referred to on the 12th of August. As they insisted upon the severest conditions, the Prince Regent refused to consent to their unreasonable demands, after having already conceded more than was reasonable. We learn from the part of Rayneval's correspondence, which is now known, that he had express commands so to increase the demands that the Prince Regent should find it impossible to consent to them. When the Portuguese refused

unconditional acquiescence, Rayneval insolently broke off the negotiations, took his departure on the 1st of October from Lisbon, by way of Madrid, to Paris, where he arrived, after having come to an understanding with the Prince of the Peace in Madrid respecting the campaign.

Don Godoy had been previously loaded with new honours by the King of Spain; he had been named Admiral of Castille, and obtained the unheard-of title in Castille of SERENE HIGHNESS. Napoleon now allured him into his snares by promising to procure for him a sovereign principality in Portugal. The extravagantly pompous entry which the worthless favourite and squanderer made into Madrid in January, 1807, excited the indignation of all Spaniards, especially of the heir to the throne, the Prince of the Asturias, because it was rumoured that Godoy would next be appointed regent. The Prince of the Asturias possessed not even one of the good properties of his father; he sought an asylum from Napoleon against his own mother and her favourite. This prince had been educated by Canon Escoiquiz, so celebrated by his conversation with Napoleon in Bayonne, which he caused to be printed, because Napoleon in that conversation testified to his great capacity in the nicest intrigue. The canon had at that time prevailed upon the prince to offer his hand to a relation of the imperial house.

As early as 1797, Escoiquiz had been accused of wishing to serve the prince, by driving away the queen's favourite, and had been, therefore, obliged to go to Toledo; he had, however, always kept up a secret communication with the prince. When the latter, in 1803, was married to a daughter of the notorious Caroline of Naples, his influence increased, and with his influence cabals at court. After the death of the Princess of the Asturias, which took place in May, 1806, the court entertained the idea of marrying the prince to a sister of Godoy's wife, who also belonged to the royal family. In order to avoid this, the prince had recourse, by Escoiquiz's counsel, to the Emperor Napoleon, and thereby gave rise to endless intrigues, to which we can do no more than incidentally refer.\* Escoiquiz wrote a long letter, which the prince copied, in which, in the language of complaint and the meanest flattery, he begged the Emperor (on the 11th of October, 1807) to bestow upon him a wife of his choice and one of his family. The legitimist, Francis de Beaucharnais, French ambassador in Madrid, came to an understanding with the prince, because he and his sister-in-law, Josephine, were eager to seize the opportunity of making a relative Queen of Spain.

\* In this and the following sections we shall treat Spanish history as briefly as possible, because, were we to enter deeply into the subject, it would require whole volumes to unravel cabals and intrigues, and to throw any real light upon them. We have two histories of this part of the subject, both of some authority; one in favour of, and the other against, Napoleon. The former is Dr. Pradt's "*Mémoires Historiques sur la Revolution d'Espagne*," 1816, Paris. This is blustering, false, and boasting; but he gives the documents. The second is Thibaudeau's "*Histoire de l'Empire*," part iii., chap. xxxix.

Many writers, and even Bignon, to whom the archives were open, have alleged that Napoleon reproached the Marquis de Beauharnais for his conduct in this case; but there is no doubt whatever that there is no document in the archives of foreign affairs, which furnishes any proof of the fact. Escoiquiz even asserts that the Emperor himself induced the step. Napoleon always denied this, however; and who can venture to decide between men to whom policy was always dearer than truth? Beauharnais and his sister-in-law wished a Mademoiselle Tascher de la Pagerie, who afterwards concluded an unhappy marriage with the Duke of Arenberg, to be the lady chosen as wife for Prince Ferdinand; Napoleon thought for a moment of the daughter of his brother Lucien, but afterwards changed his mind, and then came to a complete separation from his brother.

At the same time in which the Prince of the Asturias wrote this letter, he suffered himself to be induced to send a serious representation to the king concerning the discontent of the people and the *grandees* at the amount of power entrusted to the Prince of the Peace. With this view he had formed a union with some of the first *grandees* of the kingdom, among whom the Ducs de l'Infantado and San Carlos may be named; in this representation the life, behaviour, and usurpations of Don Godoy were drawn in the strongest colours; and if not exaggerated, at least fully portrayed. The queen, who hated her son with a deadly hatred, and pursued him like a fury, and yet dared not speak to Napoleon of the letter, with which she was acquainted, availed herself of this circumstance to accuse him of a conspiracy against his father's life. The weak but vehement Charles IV., on the 29th of October, 1807, undertook personally the duties of a commissioner of police, and at Aranjuez, where the court then was, went into his son's apartments, made himself master of all his papers, required him to surrender his sword, and left him behind a prisoner in his own rooms under a strong guard. On the following day, the 30th, the people at large were informed, by means of a proclamation, that the Prince of the Asturias had been guilty of entering into a plot against his father's life, even in his own palace. Thanksgivings were forthwith ordered to be offered up in all the churches for the king's happy escape. The prince was afterwards placed as a criminal before a court-martial, which consisted of his bitterest enemies. This court was composed of the king, the queen, the ministers—that is, Godoy and his creatures—and the president of the council of Castille.

The unnatural mother assailed the prince like a raving fury, scolded him with vehemence, and accused him of conspiring against the life of his parents. This, indeed, he firmly denied, but in other respects he behaved in the meanest and most cowardly manner, offered to submit to every sort of humiliation, wrote a shameful declaration of his own guilt dictated by Godoy, and made false confessions and humble entreaties for grace. He betrayed all his



counsellors and friends, and pushed all the blame from his own shoulders to theirs. The prince was compelled to embody in two letters all the confessions, entreaties, and complaints dictated by Don Godoy—one addressed to the king, and the second to the queen—and these letters were then put into circulation by means of the newspapers.

By these means Godoy succeeded in making the successor to the crown contemptible and hateful throughout the whole of Europe, but did not attain the object of having his friends condemned. When the prince's letters were printed in November, the king caused them to be preceded by a decree, in which he assured his son of his forgiveness, but at the same time nominated a junta of eleven members, who were to act as judges of the men whom the prince had named as his friends and counsellors. The junta refused to be employed as Godoy's instrument, to his great vexation, and to condemn the members of the conspiracy when the chief criminal was allowed to escape. The trial lasted for three months—the accused were judicially acquitted—but banished by the cabinet to some of the most remote parts of Spain, at great distances from each other.

These affairs, which reduced the royal house of Bourbon in Spain to general contempt, appeared to arise at a time most favourable to Napoleon's plans respecting Spain and Portugal; for on the 27th of October he had caused the agreement to be concluded in Fontainebleau, which despoiled the house of Braganza in order to enrich Godoy, or, more properly speaking, to deceive and ruin him. This agreement was not negotiated with the Spanish ambassador, the Duke of Masserano, but with Yzquierdo, the creature of Don Godoy. The tricks, which on this occasion were employed in the most unworthy manner to allure the Prince of the Peace into the snare by the promise of a piece of Portugal, are often unjustly ascribed to Talleyrand. It appears to us, however, as unjust to make him the originator of the plans against Spain, as to allege on the other hand that he broke with Napoleon on account of his resistance to these plans. He was not the man ever to oppose his master when he saw him resolved; he therefore, as has been already observed, adopted all the preparatory measures which were necessary from the time of the peace of Tilsit. He was obliged in August to give up his office in consequence of the sale of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit; it was, however, too necessary for him to be well-informed of everything for him not to worm himself into the affair, if he were only endured; the agreement, therefore, cannot have been unknown to him, inasmuch as he was present at Fontainebleau the whole time the negotiations were being carried on with Yzquierdo. These negotiations, besides, were not conducted by Champagny, Duc de Cadore, minister of foreign affairs, but immediately by Napoleon. On this occasion he employed Duroc, whose brother-in-law, Herreras, was a Spanish grandee, educated in Paris. The agreement was first

signed by Champagne, when all the terms were agreed on; and it was not the Spanish ambassador, but Yzquierdo, who signed the document along with him. The treaty, moreover, was not concluded till the end of the apparent negotiations with Portugal concerning the acceptance of the French demands. Since August an army of 50,000 men had been assembled on the frontiers of Spain, under the name of the army of the Gironde, and we have already stated the manner in which, at the same time, the Prince Regent of Portugal was harassed, in order that an excuse might be found for declaring war against him. On the 12th of August the French and Spanish ambassadors, having obtained an audience of the prince, declared to him that all the continental powers had, according to the peace of Tilsit, taken and approved of the measures against England, and that, therefore, Portugal must do the same. To this the prince regent was willing to consent; he was, however, also required to declare war, and to act contrary to all usage, and in opposition to the rights of nations. He stopped; he hesitated; he was afraid; he wrote first, in terms of the demand, declared himself hostile to England, but afterwards recalled what he had promised, called in what he had published, and purposed to set sail for Brazil, but at length remained in Lisbon.

We have already remarked the manner in which the French and Spanish ambassadors renounced his friendship, and in which Rayneval, after he had agreed on measures with Godoy for the partition of Portugal, travelled through Madrid to Paris. The treaty of Fontainebleau, concluded on the 29th of October, 1807, contains all the decisions respecting the campaign against Portugal, and the partition of that kingdom. The Spaniards were to reinforce the army of the Gironde with 12,000 men; at the same time to invade the north of Portugal with 40,000 men; and to give orders for another army to enter the Algarves under Solano. In terms of the treaty, Lisbon and the whole centre of the country was to fall to the share of France, a part of the northern division was to be given as compensation to the Queen of Etruria, and a sovereign territory to be formed in the south for the Prince of the Peace. The part not allotted by the treaty to any of the three parties just mentioned was to be the subject of future negotiations, when possession of the whole was obtained.\*

\* From the treaty of the 27th of October, signed by Champagne and Maret, we shall select the first five articles, written down without any serious intention of ever being fulfilled:—1. Les provinces entre Douro et Minho, avec la ville d'Oporto, seront données, en toute propriété et souveraineté à S. M. le Roi d'Etrurie, sous le titre de roi de la Lusitanie septentrionale. 2. Le royaume d'Alentijo et les royaumes des Algarves seront données en toute propriété et souveraineté au Prince de la Paix pour en jouir sous le titre de Prince des Algarves. 3. Les provinces de Beira, Tras-os-montes, et l'Estremadure Portugaise, resteront en dépôt jusqu'à la paix générale, où il en sera disposé conformément aux circonstances et de la manière, qui sera alors déterminée par les hautes parties contractantes. 4. Le royaume de Lusitanie septentrionale sera possédé par les descendants héréditaires de S. M. le Roi d'Etrurie conformément aux loix de succession adoptées par la famille régnante de S. M. le Roi d'Espagne. 5. La principauté des Algarves sera héréditaire

Notwithstanding the imminent danger, the prince regent had neither taken measures for defence, made preparations for setting sail to Brazil, nor even for the removal of the rich stores in the arsenals and magazines of the capital. The prince and his whole court would have been taken by surprise in Lisbon by the French rapidly advancing on the capital through Beira, had not a swift-sailing English ship brought a copy of the *Moniteur* to Lisbon, in which Napoleon, who supposed that his army was long since in that city, too hastily expressed his triumph by the declaration that THE HOUSE OF BRAGANZA HAD CEASED TO REIGN.\*

The army of the Gironde was under the command of Marshal Junot, who gained his ensign's commission by an act of great presence of mind displayed under the eyes of Napoleon at the siege of Toulon, although he was in reality possessed of very small military capacity. He had been in Lisbon as ambassador, and still held that title, never having been formally recalled; the troops under his command, however, contained but very few men who could be thoroughly relied upon, for this army of the Gironde had been very hastily drawn together. The prime of the French army was at that time still in Germany (September, 1807), and in Prussia, and the first army, as well as that by which it was succeeded, consisted of a mixture of soldiers and officers, who, on the landing of the English and the outbreak of the Spanish rising, proved wholly unequal to maintain the glory gained by the grand army; this was not at first perceived. In Lisbon inactivity reigned; Prince John, who was acting as regent in the name of his deranged mother, was deceived and blinded by diplomatic acts till Junot entered Salamanca. There he wished to collect and organise his army, seeing it was composed of very different elements, when he suddenly received orders to march direct upon Lisbon in order to surprise the prince regent in his security. We may form some idea of the rapidity with which he prosecuted his march, from the fact that he took twenty-five days to march from Bayonne to Salamanca, where he arrived on the 12th of November; while, on the other hand, he reached Alcantara as early as the 17th, and was in Abrantes on the 23rd, about eighty miles from Lisbon.

The difficulty of the march, the pathless and rough character of the districts through which he led the army were indescribable; but no measures whatever were adopted by the Portuguese for resistance or even to increase the difficulty of the journey. A great portion of the army fell a sacrifice to the difficulties of the march, or to want, in neighbourhoods where no idea could be entertained

dans la descendance du Prince de la Paix, conformément aux loix de succession adoptées par la famille régnant de S. M. le Roi d'Espagne.

\* On the 12th of November, the army was at Salamanca; as early as the 13th the following appeared in the *Moniteur*:—"Le Prince Regent de Portugal perd son trône. . . . La chute de la maison de Bragance restera une nouvelle preuve de la perte de quiconque s'attache aux Anglais est inevitable." This news reached Lisbon on the 25th, and only then were the valuable effects put on shipboard.



of any kind of sustenance or cover. Many had fallen into pits, others perished in the attempt to cross running streams; but the immense loss in men was taken into no account whatever. As a reward for the rapidity of his march, Junot received the title of the Duc d'Abrantes, although he only reached Lisbon with a small part of his army at the end of November, and a long time elapsed before all the stragglers joined their respective corps.\*

The prince regent was at length induced, by the number of the *Moniteur* which was sent to him, to throw himself into the arms of the English, whose ships were lying in the Tagus, and, under their protection, to save himself by setting sail for Brazil. He took his departure from the Tagus on the 29th, under English convoy, with eight ships of the line, three frigates, three brigs, and a considerable number of transports, in order to remove the seat of his government to Brazil. The well-stored arsenal, from whose treasures the whole French army was afterwards clothed and provided, fell without diminution into the hands of the French, in consequence of his precipitate departure. Junot's advanced guard even reached Belem time enough to capture some ships of war which had been detained by contrary winds, and were still within reach of the guns of the fort. The second army, which was assembled at Bayonne to reinforce Junot's corps, was still stronger than the first; but the whole of Europe deeply condemned Napoleon's want of honour, and were angry with the French sophists and cringing flatterers who ventured to defend and to praise the Emperor's policy in the use of this army. At the very moment in which he concluded a treaty with Spain against Portugal, and was using one part of the Spanish army under Bernadotte in Denmark, and was alluring the second to Portugal, he caused a body of troops to be assembled at Bayonne, not to march against Portugal, as he had announced, but with the one part, under Dupont, to take possession of Valladolid, whilst the other, under Moncey, was engaged in conquering the north coast.

Dupont and Moncey put their troops in motion in December, 1807; other divisions in January of the following year took possession of the whole of the provinces lying north of the Ebro, under pretence of an exchange for provinces in Portugal. On the one hand, Pampeluna, San Sebastian, and other strong places, and upon the other Figuières and even Barcelona were taken by this cunning military device, because the Spanish generals and commandants suffered themselves to be deceived, and the miserable government was wholly incapable of adopting any energetic measures. It soon became obvious that the plan was to take possession of Spain in the midst of peace. The numbers of the French soon increased far above 40,000 men, and one corps after another marched into the country. Lecchi was sent with the Italian troops to Spain; Dupont

\* General Foy, at the end of the second part of his "*Histoire de la Guerre de l'Espagne et du Portugal*," has given a full account of the difficulties and losses of the march, and the countries through which the marshal led his army.

and Moncey were first marched, the latter to the Basque provinces, the former to Valladolid; Duhesme afterwards occupied Catalonia, and, last of all, Bessières appeared with what was called an army of reserve, on the Bidassoa. The supreme command of all the troops sent to Spain was eventually given to the Grand Duke of Berg, Godoy's protector. In his undertaking against Spain and Portugal the Emperor of the French calculated upon the total degeneracy of the reigning families, and upon the miserable character and egotism of the whole aristocracy. He paid no attention whatever to the mass of the people, and was therefore astonished at a later period, when the people came to their senses, at the resistance he experienced. In Portugal the queen was insane, and Prince John, who, since 1776, had reigned in her stead, was from time to time of weak mind, but always dull, ignorant, and childishly superstitious. The conduct of the government and its officers resembled that which had previously taken place in Italy and Germany; the French, therefore, found it uncommonly easy to establish a military government. The silly and monkish prince regent had himself prepared a way for them by appointing a temporary commission for administration; the men in public office and the rich went over to Junot in crowds, as they had formerly done to Napoleon as soon as he entered a German capital.\* The royal family of Spain was altogether as contemptible as that of Portugal—the aristocracy as deeply sunken and servile; the men in office excused themselves precisely after the fashion of the German jurists, who were ready to serve any master so that they might only continue to be useful, to prevent things from getting worse, to render great service in the formation of new arrangements,—to serve not the person but the thing, and such like other reasons as vanity and ambition prompt the learned to use; the people followed their own common sense, and behaved very differently. It happened very luckily for the Emperor of the French that at the very moment when his army on one side had got a firm footing in Biscay—on another were in occupation of Salamanca—on a third advancing towards Madrid—and on a fourth pushing forward through Catalonia and Aranjuez to Valencia, a new subject of scandal was furnished by the royal family.

The Prince of the Peace had looked on with perfect calmness, while first Figuières, then Barcelona, and even the citadel, as well as Fort Montjoui, were taken possession of by Duhesme. Duhesme, when reinforced by Chabran, had even practised bloody hostilities, and yet Don Godoy, as generalissimo, remained quiet when Pampe-luna was conquered and the whole of Navarre occupied; nay, he

\* We can give no better proof of this than by quoting Thibaudeau (vi., pp. 276-277):—"Des députés de la regence et de la ville vinrent complimenter Junot et lui annoncer le départ de la famille royale. Il les renvoya avec une proclamation, par laquelle il recommandait aux habitans d'être tranquils et sans crainte. Cependant à peine fut-il descendu de cheval, que le junte du gouvernement vint le complimenter dans les termes les plus obsequieux et les plus flatteurs; le corps et les autorités suivirent cet exemple."



even expressly commanded the Duke of Mahon, who was unwilling to admit the French into San Sebastian, to give up to them the fortress and the country. This was regarded as treason, while, in fact, it was mere cowardice. The whole of Catalonia was in the power of the French, a part of the army which was in occupation of Catalonia marched southward through Arragon to Valencia, whilst General Merle marched northward to Castille. The country was obliged to support all these Frenchmen, who made themselves masters everywhere of the artillery and ammunition. Godoy still appeared to slumber. At length he was wakened to a sense of the real state of affairs by a message from Yzquierdo, and a new and unexpected demand on the part of Napoleon. Napoleon had already proved, by a contribution of 100,000,000 francs, which was to be raised from all private property in Portugal, and by naming Junot governor-general of the country, that he had no idea of sharing with Spain. On the 8th of May, he wrote to his minister in Madrid, that first of all the plan could not be entertained of fully carrying out the treaty of Fontainebleau. About the same time Yzquierdo wrote to the Prince of the Peace that Champagny treated him very coolly, preferred the Duke of Masserano, that the Grand-Duke of Berg, who had always taken Godoy's part, had given him up; and that since his return from Italy, Napoleon continually abused him. At this very moment, in January, 1808, the senate, without any visible danger, passed a decree for anticipating the conscription for 1808, by levying 80,000 men. Godoy at length awoke, and all Spain was in motion.

Yzquierdo, the confidential friend of the Prince of the Peace, was at length, at the end of February, sent to Madrid with proposals for a very different treaty from that of Fontainebleau; but the wary intriguer had, in fact, discovered Napoleon's real views. He communicated verbally what he alone knew, and Don Godoy had the courage to send him back immediately to Paris, and to give him orders absolutely to decline the Emperor's new proposals. Should any one entertain a doubt that Talleyrand was actively engaged in Spanish affairs, he has only to bear this fact in mind, that he, who was not minister for foreign affairs, was the very man, in conjunction with Duroc, commissioned to lay these new proposals before Yzquierdo. These proposals were all most cunningly devised, for it was said, **THE SUCCESSION TO THE THRONE SHALL BE DEFINITELY SETTLED, AND THEN SPAIN SHALL CEDE THE PROVINCES NORTH OF THE EBRO, AND RECEIVE PORTUGAL INSTEAD.** Yzquierdo, in compliance with his instructions, declined the whole matter. Talleyrand insisted upon their unconditional acceptance; Yzquierdo was obliged to despatch a courier to Madrid, but, by the time he arrived there, Don Godoy had no longer the business in his hands, and Charles IV. was no longer upon the throne.

Bessières proceeded towards Vittoria with 35,000 men, and the whole army in Spain was said to amount to 100,000; the Emperor's brother-in-law was generalissimo of the French army in Spain on its



march to Madrid; it entered Burgos on the 18th of March, just as Godoy at length resolved to withdraw the person of the king at least from the hands of the French. The plan was similar to that adopted by the Prince Regent of Portugal, viz., to remove the seat of government to America; but the royal family was first of all to proceed to Seville, thence to negotiate with Napoleon, and all the troops were to be concentrated around that city. In fact, on the 16th of March, Solano's corps was recalled from Portugal, and single divisions of the army were so arranged at particular distances as to cover the king's journey to Seville. The court was at Aranjuez. Measures for the journey were taken, when a commotion sprang up amongst the people. The collection of troops in Aranjuez, and especially the march of the garrison of Madrid thither, excited general attention. On the morning of the 17th, armed multitudes gathered from a circuit of about thirty-two miles round the capital occupied the space around the palace. The people shouted, "Long live the king"—but, at the same time, "*Death to Godoy!*" Notwithstanding the violence of the masses, it was still resolved within the palace that the journey should be commenced on the night between the 17th and 18th. This resolution of the council was, indeed, opposed by the Prince of the Asturias, his brother Don Carlos, and his uncle Antonio Pascal. The infants were outvoted. The Prince of the Asturias, therefore, gave the signal of insurrection to the body guards. As he passed through the ante-room, he said to the guards, "THE PRINCE OF THE PEACE IS A TRAITOR; HE WISHES TO CARRY AWAY MY FATHER; PREVENT HIS DESIGN!" In the night the soldiers assembled, not, as had been ordered, to protect the departure of the king, but absolutely to prevent it; whilst the people, who filled all the streets, stormed the palace of the Prince of the Peace. Godoy's brother, who was colonel of the Spanish guards, was maltreated by his own soldiers, when he desired to lead them against the people; the palace was destroyed, and everything within knocked down and broken in pieces: the Prince of the Peace concealed himself. On the next morning, the king hoped to save him by removing him from all his offices; but when he was discovered in his palace at ten o'clock on the 19th, the people would have barbarously put him to death, had not the guards, and afterwards the Prince of the Asturias, taken him under their protection. They could only save him by taking him a prisoner, and promising that he should be regularly brought to trial. The prince took this step on the earnest entreaty of his father, who, to the great vexation of his wife, felt himself too weak to take any decisive measures whatever, and finally relinquished the government to his son.

The rage of the people against Godoy showed itself on the 18th and 19th in other cities, and especially in Madrid, in forms of still greater violence than in Aranjuez. In every place the property, furniture, and houses of the Prince of the Peace were utterly de-

stroyed; all his adherents, especially Soler, the minister of finance, and his colleague, Manuel Sixto Espinosa, were fiercely persecuted. The destruction perpetrated by the crowds rushing in from the neighbourhood of Madrid, at length became so great, that the governor-general of the province did not even venture to call out the two regiments which were lying there. The news, therefore, was received in Madrid with universal joy on the 20th, that Charles IV. had given up the government to his son. This event took place by means of an autograph letter, which was immediately published.\* However dissolute the life and behaviour of the old queen may have been, and however miserable the conduct of the king had been for years, and although both were alone to blame for all the scandalous treachery exercised by Godoy against Spain, yet not an evil or injurious word was uttered against them on the occasion of this probably got-up insurrection. Godoy alone was the object of universal execration; everything belonging to him was wasted and destroyed. We do not here venture to state how very little deserving of esteem the queen really was, or how extravagant her behaviour had been, inasmuch as all this has been already done by a serious diplomatist and historian (Lefebvre). Suffice it to remark, that the royal palace itself had been made a public place of forbidden pleasures. Notwithstanding this, the king himself on this occasion left no means untried to save the paramour of his degraded wife.

On the 20th, the council of Castille accepted the act of renunciation of the 19th as completely valid, and Ferdinand VII. was proclaimed king amidst universal rejoicings. One of Ferdinand's very first acts as a ruler, was to cause Godoy's estates to be confiscated, to declare him to be deprived of all honours, to give orders for his trial, and to recal all those who had been banished in consequence of the conspiracy of the preceding year. The new king, as well as the old royal family, conducted themselves on the occasion as if they had been subjects of the Emperor of the French. On the 20th, Ferdinand wrote an humble and contemptible letter, to notify his father's abdication and his own accession to the crown, which letter was conveyed to Paris by the Dukes of Frias and Medina Cœli, and Count Fernand Nugñez, three *grandees* of the highest class; the old king and queen, on the other hand, wrote to the Grand-Duke of Berg, who was only now a few days' march from Madrid, that their son

\* The royal decree published at Aranjuez on the 19th of March, is as follows:—"Seeing that the continuance of my illness no longer enables me to bear the heavy burden of the government of my kingdom; and since it is further necessary for the restoration of my health, that I should enjoy the retirement of private life in a milder climate, I have resolved, after the most mature consideration, to abdicate the crown, and to transfer the same to my son the Prince of the Asturias. My royal will, therefore, is, that he should be regarded as the natural lord of all my kingdoms and dominions, and that as such he should receive homage and obedience; and I further order that this my voluntary and free renunciation of the crown, in order to its full execution, should be forthwith communicated to the council of Castille and all whom it may concern."



had driven them from their throne by force, and entreated him to hasten his march in order to protect them against the ruinous plans of their enemies. The grand-duke did, in fact, accelerate his march, and arrived with his advanced guard as early as the 23rd; the new king made his solemn entry into the capital on the 24th. Murat had despatched General Monthyon immediately to Aranjuez to Charles IV. to persuade this weak though honourable prince to protest against his abdication, which protest the general was to bring to him, dated, not on the 23rd, but on the 21st of March. This has been so often and so clearly proved, that we do not think it necessary here to repeat the proofs.

The grand-duke was himself looking for the throne of Spain, and to him the dispute was remarkably seasonable; he therefore refused to recognise the new king, when Ferdinand, amidst indescribable rejoicings, made his solemn entry into Madrid on the 24th, although the Russian minister did not hesitate to salute him as king. The French minister (at that time still Beauharnais) was much better acquainted with Napoleon's views than the grand-duke; and what those views were, may be fully seen from the memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo. Long before Napoleon got possession either of King Charles's protest, or Ferdinand's letter, Savary had been sent to Madrid with instructions, of which he has given a very full account (vol. iii., ch. 18), but the real contents of which he himself has very briefly expressed in a single sentence—that the Emperor had commissioned him to make a clean house (*faire maison nette*), and to begin anew the work of Louis XIV. The Marquis de Beauharnais, who was obliged to act in the sense of his master, in his diplomatic correspondence, therefore, reports to the French ministry that he had addressed the Prince of the Asturias as the rightful heir to the throne, to whom his father had solemnly ceded the kingdom, whom the council of Castille acknowledged, and to whom all Spain had joyfully done homage, in the following words:—"Prince, at this moment you have only one resolution to adopt, and that is, to go and present yourself to the Emperor as Prince of the Asturias." On this occasion Ferdinand exhibited himself in all his meanness by answering, "SUCH IS PRECISELY MY DESIGN." On the 26th, the queen, as if with a view of making the whole royal family contemptible, commenced a correspondence through the instrumentality of her daughter, the late Queen of Etruria, now in Spain, which Napoleon afterwards caused to be published in February, 1810, in the *Moniteur*. The contents and expressions of these letters are so revolting, that we cannot find words to express our detestations of the recklessness of feeling therein expressed by this shameless fury against her own son; we shall therefore quote those of Lefebvre, who has taken a few of these letters into the text of his work.\* The grand-duke, in fact, took the part of the hateful

\* "Les Lettres de la reine Maria-Louisa à sa fille et à Mural resteront comme des monumens impérissables de la dégradation morale de cette famille. Il faut bien en



queen and her contemptible husband against their son. He prevented her from being sent to Badajoz, as the plan had at first been, and tried even to save his old friend, Don Godoy. With respect to him, he merely succeeded in having him brought from the prison of the village of Pinto to the castle of Villa Viciosa, but Ferdinand would not at first consent to his being set at liberty, and to the suppression of the trial.

The grand-duke, too, deceived himself greatly in his calculation, for Napoleon had no idea of making him King of Spain. The Emperor was no sooner informed of the events which had taken place at Aranjuez, than he saw an opportunity of displaying the part of arbitrator, and of alluring both the new and the old king out of their kingdoms. This was the object of Savary's mission, who did not, like the Marquis de Beauharnais and the Grand-Duke of Berg, refuse the prince the acknowledgment of his title, inasmuch as he was expressly sent to deceive him. On the 7th of April, when he arrived in Madrid, Savary brought a letter to the grand-duke from Napoleon, which the latter had put into his hands just when he was about to set out for Bayonne. In this letter the grand-duke was accused of having been too precipitate in offering himself as King of Spain, and was told, that King of Portugal he might indeed become. It appears, moreover, from this letter, that in Paris it was presumed the royal family had already taken their departure for America; for the question of taking possession of Spain is there discussed. Much of its meaning is left to be guessed by the learned diplomatists and jurists who are accustomed to explain historical documents, as philologists do their classics, or theologians their Bible—that is, by clinging to every word—even though the document should be the production of a monk of the middle ages, or proceed from a Talleyrand, or a Fouché.\* Napoleon was first of all to come to Madrid *in case of necessity*. The Spaniards were not to see his views, which, however, by word and deed, he

citer des fragmens, ne fut ce que pour faire connaitre dans quelles misérables mains étaient tombées les destinées du peuple Espagnol.”

\* The letter itself will be found in vol. iii. of “Les Mémoires du Duc de Rovigo,” and in Norvins’s “Histoire de Napoleon,” vol. iii., pp. 77 and 83, as well as in “Thibaudeau,” vol. iii., ch. ix. It has often been quoted as a proof of Napoleon’s *wisdom* and *foresight*. If, however, any one desires to see how very differently such writings can be explained, let him compare what we have said concerning it in the text with what De Pradt and other writers have said on the same subject. The judgment even of Napoleon’s eulogists, Norvins and Thibaudeau, are different. Norvins observes: “Cette lettre si importante fera mieux juger que toutes les reflexions quelle etait l’opinion ou plutôt l’incertitude de Napoleon sur les affaires de l’Espagne et sur sa propre position vis-à-vis de ce royaume à l’époque du 29 Mars.” Thibaudeau, on the other hand, observes: “Cette lettre prouve l’absurdité du reproche fait à l’Empereur d’avoir préparé ces événemens. On voit la profonde sagacité avec laquelle il jugea dès lors la situation du Péninsule, et prévint les difficultés sérieuses qu’il prevenait.” He is, however, sensible enough to add at the conclusion of the letter: “Après une aussi admirable que juste appréciation de l’état du Péninsule qui restera toujours comme monument remarquable de la pénétration et de la sagesse de Napoleon, on s’étonne de ce qu’il,” &c. &c. There the question lies; words are cheap.

made obvious to every one. He at last admits, that he knows not himself how it would be at the end. The old family in the mean time, by their mean and raving letters to the Grand-Duke of Berg against their son, anticipated Napoleon's wishes. In these letters the wish was expressed, that they might be allowed to bring their lives to a close in peace somewhere under the protection of the Emperor. The king and queen's complaints against their son were supported by Caballeros, minister of justice, who informs the Emperor as if he were the court of final appeal in Spanish affairs, that Ferdinand had compelled his parents to abdicate.

Savary behaved in Madrid in a manner quite consistent with his usual behaviour, and tried every means to allure Ferdinand, whose fall was decided on to France. He therefore gave him the title of majesty, but did not do this as the Emperor's adjutant, but merely in the character of a traveller. He assured him that the Emperor had set out from Paris on the 2nd April, was probably already arrived in Spain, and that it would be, therefore, becoming in him to go and meet him. He caused a report to be spread, that the Emperor had already arrived at Burgos; and Ferdinand therefore sent his brother, Don Carlos, to meet him. That Napoleon should have expressly selected the man who was at the head of his secret police, and suffered himself to be made the instrument of murdering the Duc d'Enghien, to destroy the Spanish dynasty, and that the letter which he wrote to the Grand-Duke of Berg contains nothing but untruths, is amply proved by a letter written by him on the 27th of March. In this letter, incorporated by Louis, King of Holland, in the second volume of his "Historical Documents and Considerations," respecting the government of that country, he offers his brother Louis the crown of Spain, and tries every means to induce him to accept it. On this occasion, the most cunning, as frequently happens, was most deceived; Escoiquiz advised the young king to follow Savary's advice, while Count Montijo and General O'Farrell did their best to dissuade him. As Cevallos also, as well as the Dukes de l'Infantado and San Carlos, advised Ferdinand to set out, he took the advice, and set out on the 10th of April, under the idea of meeting the Emperor between Burgos and Vittoria. It is scarcely possible to conceive his blindness, as his father, whom he urgently asked for a letter of introduction to the Emperor, gave him no answer, and he knew that Napoleon acknowledged him alone as king. Ferdinand was guilty of the folly of accepting Savary's escort without remembering that the latter had at his command the fearful militia of the great thief-catcher of France. As Tuscany had even then been offered him as a compensation for the loss of Spain, he should have seen what he risked when he entrusted himself to the French. He might easily have known that Savary had so posted different divisions of the French troops on the way to Vittoria, as to enable him to carry off the prince and his small suite at any moment.

Before Ferdinand left Madrid on the 10th of April, he appointed a regency, or junta, for the administration of the government, but was no little surprised when he arrived at Burgos on the 12th not to find the Emperor of the French. The whole population of the town and of the neighbourhood, however, opposed in every way the prosecution of his journey. He did not even find a letter in which the Emperor's arrival in Spain was announced, and yet he believed his adjutant that he would be found in Vittoria, and under his persuasion continued his journey. From Burgos to Vittoria Savary had placed wholly French troops, under the pretence of acting as a guard of honour to the king. All the representations and attempts of the people to detain Ferdinand proved vain, and to the great sorrow and vexation of all true Spaniards he pursued his way to Vittoria, but was so completely shut in by French troops, that his journey resembled the transport of a prisoner. Savary, moreover, had commanded the whole of Verdier's division to assemble at Vittoria, in order to prevent a rescue by violence. When the Emperor was again not found in Vittoria, all Spaniards entreated the young king not to pursue his journey. Urquijo, who had been formerly a minister of state and was banished to Bilboa, hastened from that city to Vittoria and offered the king the means of his deliverance; the brother-in-law of Duroc, Grand-Marshal of France and Duke of Friuli, who by Napoleon's command accompanied Savary, and therefore knew the French views, took the greatest possible pains to open the eyes of the king, and to warn him of his danger. But all in vain. The natural insight of this patriotic Spaniard was stronger than custom, education, and self-interest. He was the son of the Marquis of Almenara (*Joseph Hervoiz*), brought up and educated in Paris. Ferdinand remained some days in consequence in Vittoria. Thence he wrote a letter to the Emperor at Bayonne, and Savary undertook the duty of conveying it to its destination. Napoleon arrived in Bayonne in the night between the 14th and 15th, where Savary had anticipated him with Ferdinand's letter by about four-and-twenty hours. He was speedily sent back to Vittoria with a long answer. Any other man except Ferdinand, who was wholly destitute of all good qualities, would have been deterred from continuing the journey, from the fact that the letter to him was addressed merely to the Prince of the Asturias, and that its contents were very equivocal. The whole tenor of the letter bore against the claims of the prince and in favour of those of his parents. There was one passage alone at the conclusion which Savary was to employ in order to give confidence to Ferdinand. In this passage it was expressly declared that a marriage with a French princess was an object greatly desired by the Emperor, and one which would be very advantageous to Ferdinand.\* For the benefit of those for

\* "Le mariage d'une princesse Française avec V. A. R. s'accorde, dans mon opinion, parfaitement avec l'intérêt de mon peuple, et je le regarde plus spécialement



whom this history is written, and in order to show of what value the representations of French policy and of Napoleon's history given by such historians as Thiers, the memoir writers of St. Helena, and others, who have written merely for novel readers, are, we may observe, that in the copy of the letter in the *Moniteur*, this decisive passage is wholly and *designedly* omitted. Lefebvre has given the whole letter extracted from the French archives, and it is also to be found in the "*Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat*." Ferdinand, however, not only disregarded the warning which lay in the contents of this imperious letter, but did not suffer himself to be influenced by all the attempts of the inhabitants of Vittoria and the neighbourhood to detain him by force from proceeding on his journey. His cowardly mind was then no longer capable of meeting the emergency and defying the danger, because Bessières was in Burgos and Verdier's division in possession of Vittoria; and yet men who had many adherents at their command offered him their services. Manuel Razon Correa and Miguel Ricardo di Alava had the best of the border-guard at their service, and were eager to bring the king into a place of security; the Duke of Mahon, Governor of Guipascoa, and great grandson of the brave Crillon, wished to carry him off to Bilboa, and thence to sea; but he proved unable to come to any resolution, and suffered himself to be fooled by Savary. The Emperor himself, who took up his residence at the small château of Marrac, near Bayonne, is said to have been astonished, when informed, on the 20th of April, that Ferdinand had arrived in Bayonne. He invited him, together with his brother Don Carlos, to dinner, on the same day, without, however, addressing him as king, but retained Escoiquiz with him when the Infants retired. On this occasion he held that conversation with the canon concerning the removal of the Bourbons from the throne of Spain, which the latter afterwards published. On the 21st Escoiquiz first learned from the Emperor himself that it had been irrevocably resolved to remove the Bourbons from Spain, but that Ferdinand might have Tuscany as a compensation if he were willing to consent to the change. The Duke of Rovigo, who had so shamefully deceived Ferdinand, and allured him to his destruction, was bold enough to deliver this message in person. Lefebvre, who may deservedly be regarded as an honourable man, very justly observes, that Napoleon, having been so faithfully served by Savary in the murder of the Duc d'Enghien, might have spared him the conveyance of this message. Ferdinand rejected the proposal of an exchange, and wished to return, but it was announced to him on the 29th that he must remain, because his parents were expected; immediately afterwards the guards were doubled, and he was watched like a state prisoner. It was known from his despatches sent to Spain

comme une circonstance, qui m'unirait par de nouveaux nœuds à une maison, dont j'ai à me louer de toute manière pour la conduite, qu'elle a tenue depuis l'époque de mon avènement au trône."

and taken from his couriers, there everything that was prepared for an insurrection, and therefore he was watched with double vigilance.

Napoleon was helped out of his difficulty by the old king and queen. This difficulty arose from the necessity of preventing Ferdinand from taking his departure without having recourse to arrest or detention by force. On the 16th the Grand-Duke of Berg had already declared to the junta of government in Madrid, that King Charles IV. had protested against his removal from the throne, and that he himself, in obedience to the Emperor's command, could acknowledge him alone as King of Spain. At this time, too, Beauharnais was recalled, and Laforêt, who had been employed in Germany in 1803 in the course of plunder pursued against the German princes, and had afterwards been at the head of the French administration in Prussia, was sent to Madrid in his stead. Laforêt supported the declaration of the Grand-Duke of Berg, and Charles IV. himself wrote to his brother, who was president of the junta, that he resumed the government, but confirmed the junta. The junta, being thus placed in great perplexity, satisfied itself with the declaration that everything was to remain on the old footing till the whole affair should be arranged in Bayonne, whither the king and queen were desirous of going on the 25th of April. Since the 21st the grand-duke, who had been appointed his deputy by King Charles IV., had, by threats, compelled the junta, who tenaciously refused to set Godoy at liberty, to deliver him over to him, and had sent him to Bayonne. The king and queen, on the Emperor's invitation, travelled thither, and when they arrived on the 30th they found their worthless favourite already there.

Into the description of the scenes which now took place between the unnatural parents and their son, who was wholly incapable of any humane sentiments, the very equivocal character played by Napoleon, the means by which Ferdinand was brought to renounce all those claims to the throne he had gained by his father's abdication, and then to grant his rights, whatever they may have been, to the Spanish throne, to Napoleon, we cannot here enter at any length, but must satisfy ourselves with a brief outline of the general results. Before Ferdinand gave back the throne to his father, he wrote a letter to his uncle Antonio, which was taken possession of, and the duplicate only sent to Madrid. The contents of the letter contained directions "to do what seemed to them best for the good of the king and the kingdom, and to exercise the royal power according to their judgment, as if the king were really present." Two deputies from the junta, in disguise, had contrived to escape the French police; to these Ferdinand committed the letter, and gave orders on the 5th that he was wholly unable to do anything for the maintenance of the kingdom, but that the junta was to exercise full power, and to take the necessary measures for commencing hostilities as soon as the king should be removed into the interior of France.

On the very same day, the 5th of May, he caused a decree to be drawn up, in which he gave these directions: that the cortes should be assembled at some fitting place; that their first business should be the raising of an army, and providing money for the organisation of the means of defence for the kingdom; and that their sitting on this occasion should be perpetual. On the following day (the 6th) the old king ceded his right to the throne to Napoleon. On the 10th Ferdinand also approved of, and acquiesced in, the cession. From the knowledge of Ferdinand's character, which may be deduced from his later history, it could scarcely have been necessary to employ the language to obtain his consent which has been put into the Emperor's mouth on this occasion. Cevallos says, for example, that Napoleon exclaimed to him: "PRINCE, YOU HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN RENUNCIATION OF THE KINGDOM AND DEATH." The pension, castles, &c., which were to be secured to the deposed family of the Bourbons, we do not here mention, because we must return to the subject at a later period; the only remark we wish to make is this, that by a peculiar clause of the agreement in Bayonne, the rich domain of Abufera was secured to Don Godoy, and that Napoleon, without any attention to this contract, afterwards made a dukedom of this domain for Marshal Suchet.

Whilst in Bayonne and at the château of Marrac, cabals were carried on very similar to those which took place in the time of Pope Alexander VI. and his sons, or, in other words, in the time of the family of Borgia, in the 15th century in Italy, blood had already been shed in Madrid. The Grand-Duke of Berg, to whom Charles IV. had committed the office of governor-general, had enraged the people by extorting the release of Don Godoy from the junta. This feeling of indignation was so strong, that the junta only agreed to his liberation on condition of his never returning to Spain. In the same manner Joachim Murat at length compelled the junta, after repeated refusals, to consent that the last members of the royal family should be conveyed to Bayonne. These consisted of the Queen of Etruria, her son Prince Francis, now thirteen years old, and Antonio Pascal, president of the junta. They were to set out on the 2nd of May; the people, however, were already in vehement commotion, and filled all the streets and public places; still, however, the Queen of Etruria, who had no adherents, was allowed to take her departure amidst general execrations. But when the Infant was about to depart a great tumult took place. One of the grand-duke's adjutants was first personally ill-used, and saved from death with difficulty; the whole city was soon in active commotion, and the troops were obliged temporarily to give way. Two battalions of French troops with two pieces of artillery, it is true, at first drove the people back. The main body of the French were out of the capital, and the whole of the artillery in the Retiro. When, therefore, Murat marched the troops out of the city and then returned with the whole body of the army and with artillery as if to a campaign,



and began to cut down and fire on the people, the tumult was speedily stilled. On the same evening above eighty Spaniards were tried by court-martial and shot. The Infants Francis and Antonio also then, indeed, took their departure; the cruel Grouchy, the apologist of every kind of military violence, was appointed commandant of the city; Napoleon himself, however, admitted, when he was informed of the Madrid massacre of the 2nd of May, that from that moment there was war between him and the revengeful people of Spain.

The number of the French and Spaniards who fell on the 2nd of May in Madrid has been often greatly exaggerated. According to the Paris journals and official papers of that day, the Spaniards were to be reckoned by THOUSANDS, and yet, singularly enough, the balls and grape-shot hit only the refuse of the people. Napier states that the whole number of the Spaniards who fell was not greater than 150, including the 85 who had been condemned by court-martial and shot in cold blood. The number of French killed was, according to Napier, 700; according to Thibaudeau only 300: the main point, however, was the conviction that a long continued struggle with the nation was begun, instead of being able, as was expected, to settle the matter by agreement with the ruling classes, as had been done in Germany. Had the question depended upon the old king, the queen, and Don Godoy, things would have gone on in Spain precisely as they had done in Germany; for both these and Napoleon blamed and abused Ferdinand when they heard of the insurrection in Madrid and in many other Spanish towns, because they knew (what was, in fact, the case) that by his decree he had changed what was merely a popular outbreak into a regular war.

In order to deceive the Spaniards, or rather, as they had no sense of constitutional freedom, those visionaries of other countries, who believed in speeches and paper constitutions, and were already deceived by such fooleries in Italy, Germany, and Poland, Napoleon, immediately on taking possession of Spain, ceded to him by the proclamation of Charles IV., proceeded to take some apparently liberal and constitutional steps. He had taken some pains to separate the aristocracy from the people, for as early as the 13th of May he had brought the inquisition, the council of Castille, and the junta of government, to recognise his brother as king; and out of the suites of Charles and Ferdinand, and other Spaniards summoned to Bayonne, had contrived to get together in that city a thing which he called an assembly of Spanish notables. Napoleon had previously offered the kingdom to his brother Louis, King of Holland; he declined it; Joseph, however, suffered himself to be prevailed upon to change his kingdom of Naples for that of Spain. On his arrival in Bayonne on the 6th of June, his brother ceded to him the crown of Spain, and on the 7th he was recognised as king by the general junta, who assumed themselves for the occasion to be the plenipotentiaries of the Spanish nation. This assembly should have

consisted of 150 persons; only ninety-two, however, could be got together from Spain, and therefore all those were reckoned in who for any reason had come with the royal family to Bayonne, and in this manner they really assembled 125. Of the deputies who came from Spain, some were from the provinces and towns, or were appointed by particular corporations; others were compelled to travel on the summons and nomination of the Grand-Duke of Berg; and in order to have deputies from the American possessions also, the most distinguished Americans then in Madrid were taken and caused to proceed to Bayonne. This assembly consisting, according to De Pradt, of ninety members only, and not as we have said, from Savary's report, of 125, was to be consulted upon a new constitution, drawn up by French jurists and sophists according to the manner in use in Germany alone, and began its sittings on the 15th of June. It was obvious, however, as early as the 7th, that the absurdity of a Spanish National Assembly held on French ground would lead to nothing. The Duc de l'Infantado, who acted as speaker on the occasion, in his recognition of King Joseph in the name of the general junta, observed: "This recognition is only to be regarded as valid as far as the authority of the assembly of notables may reach, and its confirmation must be referred to the cortes of the kingdom." This remark Bonaparte did not allow to be printed among the documents, but merely the speech of Azanzas, which was altogether such as he desired.

We shall not dwell upon the debates respecting the constitution made for Spain by the French, partly because we do not enter into publicist or diplomatic discussions, and partly because this constitution was never really introduced, or obtained any practical significance. The French journals, and all the French books which represent the times of Napoleon as a period of wisdom, justice, and virtue, and himself as a Lycurgus or Solon, report, that this constitution was regularly considered and debated till the 6th of July, on which day it was accepted; and as they have much greater pleasure than we have in words and phrases, they have introduced a number of long and well-sounding speeches of the Spaniards into their accounts. In the mean time, King Joseph learned, however, that it was not possible to propose to the Spaniards to be governed by foreigners—a thing which was quite common at all times to the servile inhabitants of Italy and Germany; he therefore formed his court and ministry exclusively of Spaniards.

The new king having appointed well known and highly esteemed Spaniards as chiefs of his various ministerial departments, and formed a court of Spaniards, set out on the 9th of July to take possession of his kingdom, and was accompanied by two French regiments of veteran troops. The whole of Spain was already at that time in insurrection, and the council of Castille refused to take the oath of allegiance to King Joseph. The 27th of May, the feast of St. Ferdinand, constitutes an epoch in the history of Spain, being



the commencement of a regular war. From the 27th till the 30th of May, committees of government or juntas were formed in all quarters of Spain in order to organise means of resistance against the French dominion forced upon them by Napoleon. In Biscay the inhabitants flew to arms; in Asturia a junta was established at Oviedo, which formally declared war against the French, got an army on foot, gave the supreme command to the Marquis of Santa Croce, and sent a deputation to England to obtain support from the English government. This deputation was very favourably received in England, and the ministry, as early as the 4th of July, 1808, declared that England was not at war with the Spanish nation. The insurrection in the south was not only the most vehement, but also altogether legal, especially in Andalusia, where a body of troops was collected, and the people could reckon upon the army which Solano had led to Portugal, where there were no French near, and where a junta was assembled in Seville, which was not, like that in Madrid, under French influence. The junta in Seville was, in fact, the revival of the meeting of the cortes of the southern provinces, and its resistance to the commands issued from Madrid was founded upon a law passed in the war of the succession, when there were two pretenders to the crown of Spain. This law conferred upon the cortes assembled in Seville the right to act according to its discretion when Madrid was occupied by a foreign enemy.

Circumstances required the formation of central points in a variety of places, as it was impossible to have anything like a general government; it soon appeared obvious, also, that all the generals appointed by a generalissimo like Godoy, were altogether incapable, and the army itself demoralised. As soon, therefore, as Napoleon appeared in person and introduced unity into the government and regulation of his military power, and as soon as the Spanish troops ventured to measure their strength in the field with the French, their resistance was easily broken; but the great number of central points rendered the complete subjection of a people accustomed to blood, contention, and plunder even in times of peace very difficult, if not impossible. In Leon, Galicia, Castille, Arragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and Estremadura, the commands issued from Madrid were only obeyed in places immediately occupied by the French, who, however, did not venture to separate very widely, for fear of being fallen upon by the people. The Spanish troops under Cuesta, Blake, and Castagnos, declared in favour of the war against the French, and the Swiss regiments of the old Spanish government incorporated in King Joseph's army, made common cause with the insurgents whenever they had opportunity. Seville was the seat of the chief junta of the insurgents, or the chief seat of their revolutionary government.

The French suffered their first considerable loss in the harbour of Cadiz, where the Spaniards made themselves masters of the French ships of war which were there, and made prisoners of the 4000



sailors and soldiers who were on board. The Spanish army which was at St. Rochus, or rather its commander Castagnos, acknowledged the junta of Seville as the rightful Spanish government, and opened communications with Sir Hew Dalrymple, the English commander in Gibraltar.

The French armies in Spain were very much scattered, and as that part of the Spanish army which had previously occupied the north of Portugal returned to Spain in order to take part in the war against the French, Junot fell into great difficulties in Portugal. The regular Spanish troops returning from the north of Portugal, united with a still greater number of irregular militia, and a small army from Galicia soon found that they and their generals were by no means equal to the French and their leaders in the open field, however superior they might be in numbers. Blake and Castagnos, who were at the head of the very numerous but ill-disciplined army, knew that Joseph with his two regiments had set out from Bayonne on the 9th of July, and they marched off in all haste to Burgos to intercept him on his way to Madrid; this Bessières attempted to prevent. He quickly got together 20,000 men, and marched to meet the Spaniards; they met on the 14th at Rio Seco; the Spanish troops were defeated, and their whole hastily collected army dispersed. All the French authorities cast the blame of the battle of the Rio Seco not having decided the whole Spanish question upon the Duc de Rovigo. The Grand-Duke of Berg, for whom the vacant throne of Naples was destined, had, before his departure, given up the supreme command of the army in Spain to Savary. He, as the French allege, ought to have immediately strongly reinforced Bessières; and instead of allowing him to remain in the north and west, ought to have sent him to the south, so that, with his assistance, Dupont might have been able to reduce the whole of Andalusia. As the decision of such questions depends upon strategical knowledge, we merely profess to write what others have said; certain it is, that the French armies were separated and scattered, all their couriers taken, all their weak posts captured, and the communications between particular corps greatly interrupted.

Duhesme was at the head of an army of 15,000 men, which was called the army of the Eastern Pyrenees; he was, however, compelled to delay in Catalonia, in order to give the needed help at the siege of Saragossa, where the army of Arragon met with a vigorous resistance. The strongest army, called the ARMY OF THE OCEAN, was under the orders of Marshal Monecy; this force, however, he was obliged to divide, because he was to occupy both Murcia and Valencia. He made two attacks upon Valencia, in both of which he failed, and suffered considerable loss. Castagnos, who had given up his army to the junta of Seville, after the murder of Solano by the people, on account of his having been won over to the side of the French by the Grand-Duke of Berg, was opposed by Dupont, who left Toledo on the 24th with 23,000 men, crossed the Sierra Morena or

Black Mountains, on the 1st of June reached the Guadalquivir at Andujar; and on the 7th conquered Cordova, where he got possession of a very rich booty. It was alleged that he would be in Cadiz on the 21st, as he had taken the city of Cordova by storm without any considerable loss; but he delayed too long in a city which had been so scandalously maltreated and plundered by him and his forces.\*

The cruelties perpetrated in Cordova, and the booty collected, cost the French very dear; for they were so detained in their retreat by the labour of carrying with them to Madrid the golden and silver vessels which constituted the plunder of the churches and riches of all sorts, that they were surrounded by the Spaniards. Dupont had applied to Savary to send him reinforcements and orders; his messengers, however, and their messages fell into the hands of the enemy, in a country where there was a general insurrection, and he remained without directions. About the time at which he should have left Cordova, he learned that he was threatened in the rear, and that Castagnos, with 10,000 regular troops, and four times as many hastily collected forces, was marching against him. He therefore resolved to retreat, but did not set out from Cordova till the 17th of June. On the 19th he again reached Andujar, and on the same day General Vedel, with 7000 men, marched from Toledo in order to reinforce him. Vedel crossed the passes of the Sierra Morena, and formed a junction with the troops which Dupont had sent forward to meet him. Dupont, however, was generally blamed for not having set out with his whole forces from Andujar, but remaining there, whilst Vedel was separated from him and lay at Baylen. His army was daily weakened by the heat of the summer, the unhealthiness of the Upper Guadalquivir, want of wine and provisions, and the difficulties of a service against an enemy accustomed to the climate, the country, and the food—an enemy who was everywhere and nowhere. It is therefore surprising that departure was not thought of till the Spanish insurgents were threatening them on all hands. From the 9th of July, Castagnos had his head-quarters in Arjonilla, and Dupont remained as it were besieged in Andujar; on the 17th he marched towards Baylen, and Vedel, without having formed a junction with him, preceded him into the mountains. The Spaniards profited by the opportunity to make an attack upon Dupont, or rather to shut him up in Baylen. Vedel turned back; on the 19th of December he was about to form a junction with Dupont, after some hard fighting with the Spaniards, and, as the French allege, would have re-

\* General Foix, a witness above suspicion, says, with respect to this fact (vol. iii., livre iv.):—"L'antique capitale des Califs Ommiades, le séjour chéri de ces Abderames, les plus grand rois qu'aient eus l'Espagne, vit se renouveler des scènes d'horreur telles, qu'elle n'en avait pas vu de semblables depuis l'année de 1236, où les Maures en furent chassés par Ferdinand III., Roi de Castille et de Léon; scènes terribles, qui n'avaient pas d'excuse dans les pertes éprouvées par le vainqueur, car l'attaque de la ville ne leur avait pas coûté dix hommes, et le succès de la journée ne leur avait coûté que trent tués et quatre vingt blessés."



lieved him, had not one of Dupont's aides-de-camp brought him orders, in the middle of the fight, not to continue, because an armistice had been concluded. As we have often remarked, we do not enter into such questions, because the result alone is important to us, and the particulars cannot be in this place elucidated. The issue of the negotiation between Dupont and Castagnos was a capitulation altogether unexampled in the history of the French wars—a capitulation which can only be compared to that of General Mack in Ulm. This capitulation was signed on the 22nd at Andujar, and delivered into the hands of the insurgents not only Dupont's army, but Vedel's division, which might undoubtedly have escaped. The number of prisoners, according to Savary, was 23,000; to Foix, 17,000; and to Napier, 18,000 men. According to the terms of the capitulation, the troops under Dupont were to be sent back to France from Cadiz by sea, and Vedel's division were to be suffered to return by land; the junta of Seville, however, refused to ratify an agreement made without reserving their sanction, and treated the prisoners with severity. Napoleon was as much and bitterly affected by the news of the capitulation as Augustus by the victory of the Germans under Hermann, and raged as fiercely against Dupont as Augustus against Varus. Napoleon openly accused Dupont of having so shamefully sacrificed the army entrusted to him, from the hope of being able in this way to save his waggons loaded with stolen goods.

The consequence of the capitulation was the revolt of all those districts and towns heretofore in doubt; and it produced so disadvantageous an effect on those who believed in Napoleon's infallibility and invincibility, that he was also obliged to evacuate Portugal. Besides, the English now brought home the Spanish army which was in Denmark under La Romana. When the news of the events which had taken place in Andalusia reached Madrid, General Verdier was immediately recalled with his army from the siege of Saragossa; the French troops received orders to retire behind the Ebro; and on the 29th of July King Joseph withdrew from Madrid, where he had only arrived eight days before, and went to Vittoria.

The king protected himself against an attack from the insurgents, by calling to him Bessières and the army which had gained the victory of Rio Seco. Verdier was recalled from Saragossa at the very moment in which he was on the eve of victory. The inhabitants of the town and the garrison had heroically defended Saragossa from the beginning of July till August, and even when Verdier was within the city, appeared disposed to hold out to the last, when the besiegers were suddenly obliged to retire. The French destroyed their own magazines, threw their heavy battering artillery into the river, and retired to Tudela behind the Ebro. The assailants are reported to have lost during the siege 3000 men, and the besieged 2000.



The Spaniards who had assisted Junot in the conquest of Portugal having withdrawn into their own country, the French general had scattered his troops from Algarve to Oporto, and done every thing which could render the sojourn of the French in their country intolerable to the Portuguese.

Napoleon, as we have observed above, immediately laid a contribution of 100,000,000 on Portugal; the people were obliged, besides, to pay 600,000 francs to Junot, which the Emperor had assigned to him as governor-general; and Junot raised 5,000,000 more on his own account. Napoleon not only drew away the national troops from Portugal and took them into his own army, but appeared desirous of playing the same constitution-comedy with the Portuguese in Bayonne as he had played with the Spaniards. He sent for a number of the notables as deputies, but retained them as hostages; and they were afterwards placed in a very dangerous position, when, given up by him, they became suspected by their own countrymen. The only favour which he granted them, was to remit forty of the hundred millions of contribution which he had at first imposed. In small matters, every officer in Portugal played the despot and oppressor—and a rising, which first took place in Oporto, very quickly spread over the whole country; and upon the capitulation of Andujar and Baylen, the English, whose ships had constantly blockaded the harbours, sent an army to Portugal.

The English, whose foreign expeditions were at that time usually very ill-managed by Lord Castlereagh, either because he entrusted them to persons unequal to the task, or hampered and disturbed the plans of the commanders by his political plans and agents, had collected an army in Ireland. This army was embarked and committed to the care of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had distinguished himself in India and at Copenhagen, and since that time has gained for himself a military reputation equal, if not superior, to that of Bonaparte. Had Sir Arthur been the only leader, this first expedition would have had a very considerable influence upon Spanish affairs; but Lord Castlereagh did not wish to risk the glory and the strength of a nation which carefully calculates the cost of every step in an open struggle with the French; he therefore employed other generals besides Sir Arthur, who were older in rank, but much younger both in military and political insight. Sir Hew Dalrymple, who commanded in Gibraltar, was ordered to reinforce Sir Arthur with a number of troops, and to take the chief command. Next to him in military rank and age were Sir Harry Burrard and Sir John Moore; so that Sir Arthur Wellesley, with all his natural and acquired abilities, at first played only a very subordinate character. When he arrived in Portugal, and examined the state of things in Spain with the eye of an experienced chieftain, he found everything to be very different from what it had been described to him in London. He soon perceived that the instructions which Lord Castlereagh had given him could not be carried out, because

they were all founded upon false premises, and he was therefore obliged to judge for himself. He disembarked his troops under protection of the small fort of Figueira, now in the hands of a body of insurgents under the leading of Zagalo, a student of Coimbra, and which was afterwards entrusted to the safe keeping of a body of English mariners. This small fort was situated at the mouth of the river Mondego, and there the English landed on the very day on which King Joseph was obliged to leave Madrid.

Sir Arthur might, indeed, have reckoned upon the numerous Portuguese army under Freire which joined him; but with good reason he attached very little importance to untrained and undisciplined masses, however great might be their number, and marched along the coast, carefully keeping open his communications with the sea. As he advanced towards Lisbon, he would have met with two divisions sent out by Junot, had not Loison, with his corps, arrived too late, because he had been obliged to make an excursion to Badajoz to harass the Spaniards; the English general therefore only met with one division under Laborde. Not far from Rorica an engagement took place on the 17th of August, and after a bloody battle the French were obliged to retire. Immediately thereupon Junot resolved, when Loison had at length arrived, to encamp with his whole force over against the English.

This took place on the 19th, when the English had advanced as far as Vimiera. The French were in position at Torres Vedras, and there Sir Arthur wished to attack them as early as the 20th. Chance, however, so ordered it, that Sir Harry Burrard arrived at the very moment. The new general was of a different opinion; and on the 21st, Junot, on his side, attacked the English. The battle commenced at eight o'clock in the morning, and by twelve was decided in favour of the English. Had not Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived, and joined Sir Harry Burrard in preventing Wellesley's bold undertaking, this battle would have proved eminently more disadvantageous to the French than the loss of a few thousand men and twelve pieces of artillery. Immediately after the battle, Sir Arthur wished to advance to Torres Vedras, with a view to cut off Junot from Lisbon; but the two senior commanders insisted that no decisive step should be taken till the arrival of the 10,000 men under Moore, which were expected. Such were the orders of Sir Harry Burrard as soon as he took the command, and his views were confirmed by Sir Hew Dalrymple on his arrival on the 23rd.

In this way Junot remained master in Lisbon; he knew, however, that he could not long maintain his position, and sought a capitulation, by which his army and materials might be not only preserved, but landed in some place where it might be able to render more effectual service to the Emperor in his campaign against Spain than they could do in Portugal. Junot had not only the English before him, but he was every moment in dread of the population of Lisbon rising in his rear, and of the English fleet making an attack



by sea; for Siniavin, the Russian admiral, who was lying with a fleet in the harbour, showed no disposition to support the cause of his Emperor's ally. Siniavin not only refused to disembark the 6000 men whom he had on board, or in any other way to aid Junot, but would not even make a demonstration in his favour, and refused Junot's application to oppose the English should they attempt to force an entrance into the Tagus. Junot therefore caused a proposal for an armistice to be made to the English commander-in-chief, and offered to evacuate Portugal.

In the agreement into which the English entered with Junot concerning the evacuation, they granted him conditions of unexampled advantage, because everything to them depended on the French being as quickly as possible sent out of Portugal, in order that they might apply their troops to the aid of Spain. Into this capitulation was admitted even an article in favour of Siniavin's fleet, on condition, it is true, that it should be confirmed by Admiral Cotton. The admiral, however, took care not to give such a guarantee, because he foresaw that the English people would be in the highest degree dissatisfied with the conditions. He declared that he had nothing whatever to do with the capitulation, but was ready to negotiate with Siniavin on his own account. On this occasion it became evident, as a later period fully confirmed, that the hostility between Russia and England was merely apparent. The English admiral allowed the crews of the ships, amounting to 6000 men, to go directly to Russia, and the ships themselves he caused to be brought to England, where they were to be preserved and given back to the Russians at the close of the war. In consequence of Admiral Cotton's refusal to ratify the treaty, and the arrival of Sir John Moore with 10,000 troops, the capitulation was frustrated, and the English took possession of Torres Vedras; they were afraid, however, when Junot threatened to bury himself under the ruins of Lisbon, that he might have means of holding out still longer at the cost of the Portuguese, and they therefore renewed the negotiations. As early as the 30th of August a capitulation was indeed concluded, which was universally blamed in England by the people, by the newspapers, and in parliament. According to the terms of this capitulation, the French army, said to consist of 20,000 men, together with everything belonging to it, and its spoils collected in Portugal, with the single exception of the artillery which it had found there, was to be conveyed to France in English ships.\* This army was afterwards put on shore between Rochefort and Lorient, and formed the kernel of the army collected on the Garonne, which Napoleon destined against Spain. The agreement above referred

\* It was thought that Junot's army should have been made prisoners of war, or at least been required to disgorge its prey. The official account of the army at the time of its embarkation, gives 16,135 infantry and 1770 cavalry; 1036 artillerymen; 2136 detached; 3522 sick; 915 prisoners; 14 engineers; and 15 criminals; in all, 25,539; 10 pieces of 8-pounders; 19 pieces of 4-pounders; and 4 bombs.



to was called the **CAPITULATION OF CINTRA**, the seat of the English head-quarters, though it was really signed at Falus, at least thirty miles from Cintra. The feeling in England was so strong, that all the three commanders were recalled and tried by a court-martial, by which, however, they were honourably acquitted.

About this time La Romana with his army was brought home to Spain by the English. Castagnos and some members of the junta of Seville, immediately on their first interview with Sir Hew Dalrymple, then Governor of Gibraltar, called his attention to the 13,000 or 14,000 Spaniards who were serving under Bernadotte in Jutland and in the Danish islands. The question, then, was how to convey an intimation to the troops under the command of the Marquis la Romana of what was going on at home, and secretly to bring them home from Zeeland, Fünen, Langeland, and Jutland, where they were quartered. The first, the communication of the intelligence, was entrusted by the English government to a confidential agent, and the embarkation of the troops to Admirals Keats and Saumarez, who were at that time in the Baltic with a fleet. The matter was attended with some difficulty, for the troops had taken the oath of allegiance to King Joseph, and several attempts had been made in vain to inform the marquis of the general insurrection at home; however, at length Robertson, a Catholic priest, was persuaded to present himself, disguised as a merchant, as the representative of the English government, and to make the necessary arrangements. A Spanish officer went to Admiral Keats, who was cruising in the Belt, and who in conjunction with the Spaniards seized on all the small Danish vessels on the 9th of August. The Spaniards took military possession of the town and harbour of Nyborg, and on the 10th, with the assistance of Admirals Keats and Saumarez, succeeded in putting on board all the troops on Fünen and Langeland. In this way 9500 escaped; two Spanish regiments stationed in Zeeland were surrounded by the Danish troops and disarmed. Many of those who were in Jutland had hastened over to join their countrymen; but those of the Spanish troops who were at too great a distance from the coast were quickly shut in by the French and Dutch troops hastening to the scene of action from Holstein, disarmed, and sent as prisoners of war to France.

The troops under La Romana were landed at Santandor, and afterwards sent to reinforce the army under Blake operating in the Basque provinces. The Spaniards delayed long in following up their advantages, and when they at length, at the end of two months, made the necessary preparations to attack the French behind the Ebro, the latter were so completely ready to receive them, that if the Spanish generals had had better talents and armies than they really possessed, they would not have been in a condition to beat them in the open field. Since the beginning of August, Napoleon had been busy in concentrating all his old troops, and those of his German vassals, on the Spanish frontier, and everything was, as usual, so

arranged, that when he hastened from the meeting at Erfurt to Spain, one victory followed another, and, like a flash of lightning or a divinity, he threw down all opposition. Even then he showed his fear of being disturbed by Austria in his rear. The Archduke Charles had for some time been at the head of the whole military affairs of Austria; since 1806 he had completely reorganised the whole, and had at length broken through the old traditionary modes of management. As Scharnhorst at a later period did in Prussia, he succeeded in introducing conscriptions, and a general arming for defence into the Austrian hereditary provinces. A great alarm was then raised with respect to the military preparations in Austria, and the pretence of an impending war in Germany was used in order, in the midst of peace, to obtain at once a levy of 160,000 conscripts from the senate, which had already decreed one of 80,000 men in January.

That the designs of Austria were thought of appears from the message to the senate in September, 1808, to which were added two reports from the minister of foreign affairs. In these reports the war with Spain is not indeed made the chief ground for the demand of a new levy of conscripts, and, as usual, they contained a quantity of unmeasured abuse of the English; but Austria was also named. Austria, it was stated, had in recent times given most friendly assurances, but had, at the same time, made vast military preparations. Its military establishment was out of all proportion to its population and its finances. In reference, however, to the continually growing anxiety of Napoleon's own creatures from 1808 till 1814 at his measures, which constantly became bolder, and the dissatisfaction of the people (even of his own brothers), we must remark, that on this occasion some difficulties were raised in the senate. This body, however, issued a decree on the 12th of September, by virtue of which 80,000 conscripts of the years from 1806 to 1809 were immediately to be raised, and preparations were to be made for raising 80,000 more for the year 1810. These measures compelled youths of eighteen to nineteen, instead of young men from twenty to twenty-one, to undergo the severest and most burdensome service. The newly-raised conscripts were first sent to be disciplined in Germany; and there the subjects of the princes belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine were compelled to maintain the soldiers, to make life agreeable to the officers, and to enrich the generals. In order to keep Austria in a state of fear, Bavaria and Saxony were obliged to unite their armies in camps.

In the mean time, the prevailing anarchy in Spain, which made it impossible for the French to rule the Spaniards as they had done the Germans, by the hierarchy of their own public men, obstructed the formation of an interim government for the whole kingdom. The council of Castille assumed the appearance of having the right to command, and yet was not obeyed; the junta of Seville quarrelled

with General Castagnos, and General Cuesta was even arrested, though subsequently liberated. The sums of money paid by the English were lost without any one knowing what really became of them; the stores and materials of war furnished by England were badly applied, and the counsel of the English agents despised. It cannot, therefore, be any subject of wonder that the English, made distrustful by the boasting and false accounts of the Spaniards, only first resolved in October, when it was too late, to send their troops to the support of the Spanish army. On the 5th of September, it is true, the Spanish generals, Castagnos, Cuesta, Blake, and Palafox, held a conference with Llamas and De l'Infantado in Madrid, to choose a commander-in-chief, and to agree upon a general plan of a campaign. This consultation, however, ended without leading to any result, and the English plenipotentiary learned that all the considerable sums which England had contributed had disappeared. Then, indeed, a general junta, consisting of forty-two members, was named, the only remaining prince of the royal family in Spain, the old and stupid Cardinal Archbishop Don Louis de Bourbon, was appointed its president, and Aranjuez was chosen as its place of sitting; but by this step the confusion became still worse. The general junta, many-headed as it was, consulted continually, and never came to any resolution; whilst the junta of Seville, supported by the cortes of the southern provinces, paid no attention whatever to its advice; nor did the other juntas and generals.

The new French government in Spain possessed as little unity and sincerity as that of the insurgents; it was only when Napoleon was present, and as long as he was present, that anything proceeded from one head and was directed to one object, and hence, so long, his universal victory and success. He was by no means satisfied with the measures adopted by his brother, or with the assistance of Marshal Jourdan, whom he had given him as an adviser. He was deeply offended with both for having remained quiet in Vittoria during the whole of the months of September and October, although they had at their command a power quite sufficient to justify them in carrying on hostilities. As early as three weeks after his departure from Madrid, King Joseph had, besides the 17,000 men of the army of Catalonia and the divisions scattered about in various places, which he had concentrated around him, 50,000 under Moncey, Bessières, and Ney, who had at a later period been sent from Paris to oppose the insurgents, who had nothing which could properly be called an army. He, nevertheless, remained quiet; and his brother himself afterwards gave orders to delay the attack. Napoleon wished to appear suddenly, and in an instant to work wonders, and have them trumpeted abroad. In the mean time the Spaniards boasted, placed their confidence in the great numbers of their people, and facilitated the Emperor's plans by attacking him before the arrival of the English general with his small army, better than all the Spanish armies together.



The most numerous Spanish army was in the Basque provinces under Blake, who was to be joined by La Romana with his 10,000 well-disciplined soldiers. Count Belvedere, a young man wholly inexperienced in war, marched with an army, which after the Spanish fashion was called 20,000 strong, from Estremadura to Burgos. This army was intended to join the English, who at the moment when the Spaniards were advancing, had scarcely crossed the frontiers of Portugal; Castagnos was in position from Calahorra to Tudela with some 30,000 men; in Madrid lay, with 10,000 troops, the miserable Morla, who afterwards sold himself; Palafox, a much younger man, was in Saragossa, and although he had most heroically defended that city, was yet no general. To lead such armies against the French was irrational—but it appears even ridiculous, when the names of the Spanish generals, who were afterwards all of them more or less remarkable for their treachery or incapacity, are compared with the names of the generals to whom they were opposed, under the personal superintendence of such a distinguished military leader as Napoleon.\* The French army, which was collected by Napoleon in the midst of November for the occupation of Spain, was superior to the Spanish even in numbers. It is quite certain that the 330,000 men had no *real* existence except in the lists of the French; but Napoleon had, no doubt, on foot 250,000 infantry, 50,000 cavalry, and 400 pieces of artillery, when, accompanied by Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, and Lannes, Duke of Montebello, he opened the campaign in Spain. He set out from Paris on the 29th of October, and arrived on the 3rd of November at Bayonne; as early as the 10th, Belvedere was completely defeated by Soult at Gamonal, not far from Burgos, and about the same time the Spanish armies under Blake were easily conquered at Espinosa by Victor, Duke of Belluno. La Romana's army was driven in all directions. The whole north of Spain was brought into subjection to the French by Soult and Bessières within the brief space of ten days. Lannes, who had been sent to Arragon, gained a decisive victory there over Castagnos and Palafox, to which we shall subsequently refer.

Sir John Moore, who was on his march with the English army, learned just at the right time that Madrid was given up to the French, and Castagnos' army scattered; he changed his line of march, by which the entire subjection of Spain was accidentally prevented: the main force of the French was drawn in pursuit of the English to Galicia; and time was thus given to Seville and Cadiz to make preparations before they were attacked, instead, as would otherwise have been the case, of the French overrunning the whole of Andalusia.

\* The corps had their numbers, and from a list of the generals it will be seen that it was impossible for the incapable Spanish generals to withstand them. 1. Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno. 2. Marshal Bessières, Duke of Istria. 3. Marshal Mincey, Duke of Conegliano. 4. Marshal Lefebvre, Duke of Danzig. 5. Marshal Mortier, Duke of Treviso. 6. Marshal Ney, Duke of Elchingen. 7. General Gouvion St. Cyr. 8. General Junot, Duke of Abrantes.

On this occasion, also, the Emperor of the French gave indisputable proofs of the great qualities of a commander, of that superiority of mind, perseverance and capacity of bearing every labour, which had always distinguished him. He was everywhere first in the strife; but unfortunately he was much too great for times such as those in which we live. Victor and Soult having beaten Belvedere and La Romana, he immediately hastened to the lofty and cold mountains of the Somma Sierra, over which the road leads to Madrid. The heights, covered with snow, were occupied by 12,000 Spaniards, and the passes protected by batteries; but Napoleon despised the Spanish troops too much to pay any regard to their resistance, and himself led on the troops which were to storm the batteries. He always calculated on the impression which such bold undertakings would make upon his soldiers, and which the accounts of them would afterwards make upon the public; and on this occasion the storming of the batteries, which was undoubtedly a remarkable and astonishing feat, was by its mode of telling converted into something like a miracle. The troops employed for the storming of these batteries were Polish lancers; De Pradt, however, informs us that the ground was not remarkably steep, but a mountain plateau; nevertheless, had not Bonaparte wished to show his opinion of the miserable character of the Spanish soldiers and his great contempt for them, he would scarcely have so recklessly sacrificed the lives of the people whom he employed. Napier is of opinion, that though the boldness of the undertaking was justified by its success, the mode of storming a battery by cavalry is in the highest degree extravagant. The horsemen, it is true, took the batteries; but of eighty men only nine were uninjured, and Philip de Segur, who was of the party, received nine wounds; Napoleon himself approached within range. He had, however, very properly calculated that the 12,000 Spaniards who were to bar his way, would be so much surprised by the unexpected assault, as quickly to run away; and so in fact they did, for no prisoners were made.\*

Napoleon arrived as early as the 2nd of December before Madrid, whither his brother Joseph had preceded him; it appeared, however, as if the people were disposed to dispute his entrance into the capital, because, besides the troops, thousands of country people had flocked in from the districts around the city. The streets were literally crammed, and there was no inconsiderable number of guns in the town. The defence of their capital, however, appeared useless to the Spaniards, and the French were anxious to spare the palace; the parties did not, therefore, come into actual collision, and particularly as two of the commanders had been gained over. These were General Morla, who had once before been a traitor, and the Prince of Castelfranco. These two concluded a capitulation, which,

\* The best account of this event on the Somma Sierra may be found in De Pradt, "*Mémoires Historiques sur la Révolution d'Espagne*," pp. 186-199.

however, Castellar, captain-general and president of the military junta, refused to ratify; and he, with 6000 men and sixteen guns, was suffered peaceably to withdraw. The general junta fled to Badajoz, and afterwards repaired to Seville.

The English army, 25,000 strong, under Sir John Moore, which was to march to Spain, had been obliged to delay long in Portugal, because Sir John was obliged to reduce everything to order, seeing his government had cared for nothing when he set out; he was obliged to take the heavy road to Almeida, because Sir David Baird was to land with 10,000 men at Corunna and form a junction with Sir John from the north. The expedition to Spain, which cost the life of General Moore, was admired by all military men, because, within the space of six weeks, this able officer organised and armed his men, secured provisions, and marched a distance of 400 miles, partly over a cross and almost impassable country. Having at first directed his march upon Madrid, in hopes of forming a junction with Castagnos' army, which was afterwards beaten in Arragon, he left one column of his army and the artillery under General Hope to follow the course of the Tagus, and to proceed to the Escorial, whilst he himself, with the remaining two columns, marched through Almeida to Salamanca. He was obliged to wait for General Baird, who did not arrive till the 11th of November; the effect of this delay was, that the Spanish armies were scattered before he could reach them. Before he could again unite the column under Hope with himself, and had been joined by Baird's corps, he learned that the Spanish army under Blake was scattered, Belvedere defeated, and that La Romana, who had collected the remains of Blake's troops and taken the command, was in a condition to render him little aid; he then resolved to return to Portugal, but suddenly changed his mind. With his 25,000 men he hoped to surprise Soult, who was in the valley of Carrion; the latter, however, had given orders to General Mathieu Dumas, who was in Burgos, to direct the whole of Junot's corps, destined vigorously to renew the siege of Saragossa, to Valladolid. In consequence of this, Sir John was placed in a very dangerous situation—but, on the other hand, the siege of Saragossa could not at first be prosecuted with vigour, and even Valencia was for a time left in quiet.

In the middle of a severe winter, Napoleon set out from Madrid and hastened to meet the English, in order to cut them off from Portugal. On this occasion he repeated the venture he had made in crossing the St. Bernard, and recently in surmounting the heights of the Somma Sierra. His present exploit was, in a season of great severity, through snow, ice, and dreadful cold, to climb the heights of the Sierra Guadarama, with his army and heavy baggage. He reached the summit on the 23rd of December; but it was impossible to proceed further until thousands, encouraged by his presence and addresses, and after inexpressible labour and loss of men, falling a



sacrifice to cold, want, and exertion, made a way before him.\* In the mean time, Sir John Moore, having learned that Junot's corps was ordered to Valladolid, gave up his march against Soult, and entered upon his retreat to Portugal; as soon, however, as he heard that Napoleon was in Madrid, and before he knew of the passage of the Sierra Guadarama, he had altered the direction of his march, and sought to reach one of the three harbours of Galicia—Vigo, Ferrol, or Corunna.

When Napoleon crossed the Douro, on the 25th of December, at Tordesillas, he thought he had reached the English, who were at Valderas;† Sir John, however, had crossed the Esla, which flows in a deep channel, blown up two arches of the bridge, and collected his whole force in Astorga. The French were over-anxious in the pursuit, but soon learned, from the losses they suffered, that it was a very different thing to have to deal with English and with Spanish troops. They ventured with a few battalions to cross the Esla, but 2000 English cavalry speedily drove them back across the river, and took General Lefebure Desnouettes a prisoner. In the mean time Soult had got together an army of 80,000 men for the pursuit of the English; and Napoleon himself had followed them as far as Benavente, when he received intelligence of the plan of the Austrians, which was formed on the expectation of a general rising, and the desertion of Napoleon by the oppressed and harassed Germans. In the beginning of the year 1809, Napoleon, when on horseback to advance, received the courier, who brought despatches which induced him to leave the pursuit of the English to Marshals Ney and Soult, and immediately to return himself; he remained, however, still eight days in Spain to put everything in order. On the 9th of January, 1809, he came to Valladolid, and worked, as usual, day and night, to prepare everything possible for the guidance of affairs in Spain; he was, however, altogether dissatisfied with his brother Joseph. From Spain he issued orders to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine for the raising of troops, immediately gave directions for arming 80,000 conscripts for 1810, and by the 28th of January was back in Paris.

In the mean time, Sir John Moore found himself close pressed on one side by Ney and on the other by Soult, losing a great number of men in his marches through the mountains and pathless countries, and obstructed by an immense train of baggage and camp-followers which accompanied his army. With an army recruited from all sorts of people, he was not indeed in a condition to guard

\* Mathieu Dumas alleges that the march across the Sierra Guadarama was more difficult, and attended by a greater loss of men, than that over the St. Bernard or the Splügen.

† After this passage, Napoleon wrote to Soult:—"L'avangarde de la cavalerie est déjà à Benavente. Si les Anglais passent la journée dans leur position, ils sont perdus; si au contraire, ils vous attaquent avec toutes leurs forces, repliez vous à un jour de marche; plus loin ils iront, tant mieux pour nous; s'ils se retirent serrez les de près."

against every kind of disorder; but he was generally admired because, notwithstanding the rapidity of the retreat, he kept his army in such order that the pursuing enemy did not venture to attack till they thought themselves sure of having a great superiority in force. This appeared at Lugo, where he halted, and offered battle to that portion of the French army which was close in his rear. The offer, however, was not accepted, the English reached the harbours where their ships were lying, and Sir John crowned this most glorious retreat by a victory over the French in pursuit of him.

Napoleon's marshals were, in his absence, filled with jealousy of one another, which proved ruinous to the French in the Spanish war; this feeling showed itself on this occasion, immediately after his departure. Soult and Ney were not agreed respecting the march through Galicia; the latter halted at Villa Franca, and Soult accused him of having prevented him from profiting by the opportunity of a battle offered him on the 8th and 9th of January at Lugo: Ney ought, he alleged, to have marched through the valley of Orense to St. Jago di Compostella, and sent after him the whole division which he wished for, and without the assistance of which he was unable to accept the offer of battle made to him at Lugo.

In this way Sir John reached the bay and town of Corunna with 14,000 men, after having sent off 3000 to Vigo, there to be embarked: Soult was close upon his heels. The termination of this laborious march was, however, as honourable to the English general as its commencement and progress had been.

Sir John had marched for eleven days in deep snow and on the worst possible mountain roads; his army had often remained the whole night through under arms in intense cold, had fought seven engagements with the enemy, and had at last, in two marches, cleared a distance of thirty hours. When arrived at Corunna the transports were not there, because they had been detained by contrary winds in Vigo; every one, therefore, thought the English would be obliged to purchase their embarkation by a capitulation. Sir John, however, firmly refused to enter into any negotiations. The enemy appeared on the heights round the town, and the ships arrived on the 14th. On the 15th and 16th all the materials of war were successfully put on board, and the enemy at last pressed forward in such force, that it became necessary either to march out, give them battle before the town, and drive them back, or to expect an attack during embarkation. Sir John resolved upon the former, and on the 16th drew up his army in order of battle without the town.

A bloody battle was fought. Sir John Moore, the commanding officer, fell; General Baird, the second in command, was severely wounded; and Hope was obliged to take the chief command. The French, however, were compelled to give way. Mathieu Dumas has tried in vain to dispute the victory of the English, crowned by the heroic death of General Moore; for although they were not able to continue the contest with the French, whose army kept increasing

every day by the arrival of fresh troops, they prevented the enemy from forcing their way into the town till the 18th. That portion of the troops which had covered the embarkation remained till all the sick were put on board; and the Spaniards afterwards kept off the French till the ships were beyond the range of their guns.

However little we, like the French, believe that Napoleon knew everything, and was able to do everything, it does, however, appear to us, that had he remained in Spain after the removal of the English, both Portugal and Andalusia would have been reduced to subjection. He alone was superior to all the others together; his brother was incapable, and his marshals not agreed. This, after his departure, prevented the execution of his plans. The different corps distinguished by numbers were scattered over the whole of Spain, and orders were given to them as to the manner in which they should co-operate with one another. The seventh corps, under Gouvion St. Cyr, was in Catalonia, and remained there; the third and fourth were united under Marshal Lannes, in order to push forward with all expedition the siege of Saragossa, because from 12,000 to 15,000 men of Castagnos' army had thrown themselves into this city. On the fall of Saragossa the remainder was to undertake the reduction of Arragon. Bessières' corps was in Biscay, and scattered through the provinces of Burgos and Valladolid; to this corps, too, belonged the division under General Bonnet which had occupied Santandar, and was to observe the Asturias; and Lefebvre was with his corps in the province of La Mancha. Soult, with the main army, with which he had followed the English, was to occupy Portugal; and Ney, who was with the sixth corps in Galicia, was to march thither from the north as soon as Soult had set out for Lisbon. At the same time Victor, Duke of Belluno, who commanded the first corps, was to encamp on the frontiers of Portugal, to call to him a division of the fourth corps, and to march from Badajoz to Lisbon. As soon as Lisbon should be in the power of the French, Victor was to occupy Andalusia.

On Napoleon's arrival in Madrid, he found his brother Joseph there, whom, as the French contemptuously say, he had left behind with the rest of the baggage at Burgos, but who had now been in his palace since the 22nd of December. Joseph was, undoubtedly, not equal to the circumstances; that, his brother knew, but, as he had made him a king, he thought it necessary to uphold him in honour. When, therefore, he himself left Madrid, he left him the supreme command of all the French troops in Spain. Old Marshal Jourdan, whom he left for his adviser, enjoyed quite as little respect in the army as King Joseph himself.



## § II.

FROM THE WAR WITH AUSTRIA IN 1809 TILL THE WAR WITH  
RUSSIA IN 1812.

## A.—GERMANY TILL THE BATTLE OF ASPERN.

## 1.—POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC EVENTS OF 1809.

BOTH French and German writers agree that in the new war waged by Austria against France in 1808, the anti-French feeling prevailing throughout all Germany entered into the calculation; we must, therefore, in this place, give as short an account as possible of the influence of the national spirit already mentioned upon all minds of the better class throughout Germany. In order to do this, we ought to go at some length into the history of the patriotic associations protected by the minister Von Stein, and promoted by him even after his banishment from his native country, for the maintenance of German customs, integrity, and traditional modes of life, or of what was called the *Tugendbund*; this, however, would involve us in a labyrinth from which we have not the proper thread for extrication. We shall, therefore, limit ourselves to generally known facts, and expressly give pre-eminence to the efforts made by the distinguished circle which assembled around Rasumowski in Vienna, to use this feeling for objects not quite consistent with German patriotism. Rasumowski had long ceased to be Russian minister in Vienna, but he still continued to keep up an intimate connexion with Count Munster, the whole of the English aristocracy, the Empress-Dowager of Russia, and the ladies of the imperial house of Austria; and in the circles assembled at his house, apparently composed of idlers, met for the enjoyment of the most frivolous pleasures, plans were hewn out, in which the good German people were to co-operate. At this house the noble conspirators assembled, and thither Count Stadion brought Gentz and Schlegel, who were to excite our good-natured but oft-deceived people in favour of everything old; thither, too, went Metternich after his return from Paris. All that sprang from that assembly must be carefully distinguished from what happened in and came out of Prussia.

In Prussia, men of the first rank, and occupying the first offices, began at length quietly to stimulate the people; not as they had formerly been accustomed to do—to put them to sleep and oppress them: learned men who had formerly been confined to their studies, and flatterers of every little despot and his courtiers, recalled the people to self-consciousness, and scoffed at German servility. In this relation, we may mention the names of Arndt, Fichte and

Schleiermacher. Persons like Schill, Justus Gruner, Katt, and others, belong to a different category; but as the French revolution needed its Robespierres and Dantons, the German revolution was not to be worked out by men of pure morality. In the background there were statesmen and men of military genius against whom the fall of the old Prussian system barred the way to all promotion—such as Hardenberg, Schladen, Niebuhr, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, and others. The feeling then universally awakened, was strongest in the members of the *Tugenbund*, which became an object of alarm to the French, as it was at a later period to the servile generation of those who began again to yearn after the customs and usages of olden times. This it was which gave to these secret associations their importance; the noise which Napoleon raised about them, lent them political significance; the cruel persecutions which Napoleon, the Prince of Eckmühl and his bailiffs and spies organised in Germany, embittered the minds of the people; and when the Prussians were compelled to forbid the existence of such associations (1809) every secret society received a new charm.

The number of the members of a society zealous for the maintenance of German intellectual life, now unfortunately sinking under mere efforts after material progress, which partook of none of the characteristics of a conspiracy, and to which even William von Humboldt, ambassador in Vienna, belonged, continually increased, notwithstanding all the persecution of the years 1809 and 1810; and it became a peculiar business of the French ambassadors to search out all those who belonged to the *Tugendbund*. Bignon, who resided in Warsaw in 1811, gives us a list which he had purchased from his spies, and which we shall give below, though it is neither complete nor does it contain the most important names.\* That the people were merely used as tools on the occasion is a thing established. The old nobility and the Austrian aristocracy, who pretended to be so patriotic, troubled themselves very little about the well-being of the people, or the improvement of its condition and relations, and particularly about the limitation of the usurpations of the privileged classes; they wished rather designedly to deceive the people, and use them as a means to restore the old order of things, and to recover their old privileges. These gentlemen concealed their views under a pretended patriotism—hatred towards the French and their Emperor. Such was the distinguished society which gathered around Rasumowski in Vienna, and whom Gentz and Schlegel served in 1809, who had no credit in Berlin, because men like

\* Bignon, vol. x., p. 133. "En 1811 me fut remis et j'envoys au ministère une liste des principaux membres de cette société. J'ai eu bien depuis de reconnaître qu'elle était exacte. Elle portait en première ligne, le Baron de Stein, le Chancelier de Beyme, le Général Blücher, et le Général Scharnhorst, ensuite venaient le Major de Clausewitz, le Major Tiedemann, le Colonel Ziethen, le Colonel Gneisenau conseiller d'état, le conseiller d'état Justus Gruner, et Professeur Schmalz (ohé!), le président Merkel, les frères Comtes de Roeder, le conseiller Stegemann, le conseiller privé Rudiger, le Major Chazot, de Thiele, aid-de-camp du Roi, le Major de Rudolf, les capitaines de Dohna et Heidemann," &c., &c.

Stein, Arndt, and others, then despised the frivolous and sophistical defenders of what was old. Rasumowski kept a splendid house, which at a later period was daily frequented by Metternich; he was half an Englishman; Stadion and he were closely connected with Count Munster, and when their own wits could carry them no further, they sought counsel from Pozzo di Borgo, Napoleon's countryman and the enemy of his family, who had great influence with the Emperor Alexander. As early as the years 1809 and 1810 the people in the Tyrol and elsewhere were scandalously misled by those distinguished people and their flattering sophists, for they roused their enthusiasm, and caused a love of freedom to be proclaimed, but gave themselves very little trouble as to what became of the people led astray by these proclamations and agitations.

Even in other districts the enthusiasm in favour of virtue and right were of a very equivocal character. What had the ablest and most estimable men, such as the feudal lord and knight Von Stein, the two Humboldts, Borstel, Nugent, Chazot, Doerenberg, Steigen-tesch, the aristocratic Niebuhr, proud of his learning, Stadion, Metternich, Count Munster, and others, in common with the people? Were not the people urged and driven to take up arms for the Elector of Hesse, as if his rule were the salvation of Germany? Was not the wild and dissolute son of the Duke of Brunswick, mortally wounded at Jena, regarded as a martyr for the good cause? Was not Schill idolised for his doings, which we shall hereafter describe? It can therefore excite no surprise that the society in Vienna, clever in its way, so characteristically described by Otto, the French ambassador, a serious and religious man, in his letters to his Emperor, in 1811, should have caused this enthusiasm to be excited and stimulated by Gentz, Schlegel, and Hormayr, and then have laughed at the enthusiasts.

Stadion's letters, found in the *Lebensbildern*, show, that in Austria, even more than in Prussia, the leading men calculated upon the general dislike to Bonaparte's increasing boldness, and his resolution to substitute might for right, and to do to-day this and to-morrow that, with princes and people who were in his power. In 1809, Gentz played a distinguished character, as in 1811—1812, as a demagogue, for promoting the advantage of feudal rights. We think it, therefore, a duty to make some extracts from the letters written by Otto from Vienna to Paris, concerning the career of Gentz, and the people who were then (in 1811) his instruments, as they had previously been in 1809. He reports that Count Rasumowski and Baron Novosilzoff, who was afterwards at the head of Constantine's dreadful police and inquisition in Poland, performed the service in Vienna of entertaining high society, of making conversational parties, and enlivening their conservatism by means of the ladies. Otto, who was a severe moralist, expresses a strong dislike to this society, in which, in 1811, Stadion and Metternich were together, instead of Stadion alone, who before 1809 was sole manager of these anti-Gallican



cabals. By Rasumowski's recommendation, an opening was made for Gentz, the Prussian, into this previously inaccessible circle, which consisted of the high aristocracy then conspiring with the Russian and English nobility. The manner in which this introduction took place is related by Otto, in a manner by no means honourable; and whatever is wanting in him is amply supplied by Bignon, by whose book we are made acquainted with Otto's correspondence.\* We are very far from placing unconditional belief in the two Frenchmen, or from feeling any wish to deny to Gentz and Fred. von Schlegel, because they were flatterers and self-seekers, any merit which they may have had; the passages are therefore quoted, not in a biographical but in a purely historical relation. We ask, to what any movement of the people, such as that of 1809, could have led, under the guidance of men who were so completely strange to the people and their modes of life as the Austrian circle of Count Stadion and the *doctrinaires* of whom he made use in 1809 and 1811? Could it be hoped that the distinguished aristocracy, who from 1808—1814 employed such means, and used people like the men whom the French regarded in the light we have shown; of whom the King of Prussia had availed himself for his wretched manifesto, and whom now (in 1809) Count Stadion employed; or as the man whom the Archduke Charles cherished in his camp, would restore virtue and justice? Can it be wondered at, that after the victory they paid no real attention even to Baron von Stein? They suspected others of similar designs to themselves, and therefore never rested after the peace of Paris and Vienna till the distinguished members of the *Tugendbund* were frightened, and the humble and imprudent ones outlawed.

Bignon states that he had been acquainted with Gentz in Berlin, and that at that time he was in the enjoyment of a pension from England as a reward for his work upon the English finances; this pension, however, being but small, he had contracted debts, and was in very bad circumstances. After the peace of Amiens (in 1802), when all feelings of hatred had disappeared, he had been admitted into the diplomatic circles in Berlin, and as Bignon remarks that he never paid his losses at play in these high circles, and the man's pen was cheap, he had advised the First Consul to purchase his services. Napoleon did not think the matter worth his attention. He was then bought by Stadion, and taken by him to Vienna. We know not why Otto calls Gentz, who by his nature and education was a genuine diplomatist, a heavy pedant, but he remarks upon it as something singular, that Count Stadion should have introduced him into the high aristocratic circle at Rasumowski's, consisting of ladies and gentlemen who spent their time in flirting, dancing, and acting

\* Bignon's words are: "Au moment de la paix d'Amiens, qui fit cesser un moment toutes les haines, Gentz se trouva admis dans quelques maisons du corps diplomatique à Berlin, il jouait avec nous perdait souvent et ne payait presque jamais. C'était un homme tout au fait disponible qui eut volontiers livré sa plume à la France. Nous en fîmes la proposition à Paris; on ne nous répondit pas. M. de Stadion le prit à son compte et ensuite l'emmena à Vienne."

ballets and comedies, and for which he thinks he was not at all fitted. When Stadion gave up the ministry, the same circle met at Prince Metternich's, and here, too, Gentz was introduced by his purchaser. In 1808, Gentz was obliged, at Bonaparte's earnest desire, to retire for a time from the circle at Rasumowski's, which formed the point of union between the Russians and English, at that time apparently very hostile to each other, and to go from Vienna to Prague. In Prague he connected himself with the Prussian societies, united against French interests, and wrote a number of patriotic essays, which produced a great effect wherever the author was not personally known. It appears to us quite superfluous in this place to follow out Frederick Schlegel's private history, as the life of a man who ranks among the class of distinguished German writers cannot be unknown to our readers. We only think it necessary to remark, that Stadion had also taken him under his protection, and recommended him to the Archduke Charles, who reckoned that the German princes might be so worked upon by Gentz, and the people by Schlegel, that the Austrian army would everywhere find a friendly reception. He acted as court secretary in the Archduke's camp, and composed those patriotic proclamations which the Archduke caused to be widely circulated. How little was to be expected for the people from the Rasumowskis, Novosilzoffs, Stadions, Metternichs, and the whole of the loose aristocratic society which gave such offence to the mind of Otto by their trivial conduct, General Pelet, in the passage\* quoted below, has admirably shown. He must not, however, be allowed to persuade us that his Napoleon was the representative of the French enthusiasm and cosmopolitan feeling of the constituent assembly of 1789.

The French Emperor, moreover, was thoroughly well-informed by a great number of his partisans of all that was going on in Vienna, and of the threads by which the distinguished society at Rasumowski and Stadion's was connected with the Tyrol, the whole of Italy, Prussia, and all the malcontents in Germany; he even knew that Austria had entered into diplomatic relations with the insurgent Spaniards. Colonel Cossard, one of Napoleon's bitterest enemies, had been sent by Austria to Spain; in his memoirs, however, he has taken good care not to give a minute account either of his mission

\* "Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809," par le Général Pelet, vol. i., p. 3 :—"Il serait bien aisé de prouver que dès 1789, depuis que les intérêts de l'aristocratie ont été menacé dans tous les pays, elle s'est coalisée aussi contre les droits des peuples, qu'elle n'a cessé d'attaquer par toutes sortes de moyens la France nouvelle, centre et foyer d'institutions populaires. Dans ces moments de danger les classes privilégiées s'étaient réunis à la ligne des ministres, qui sous l'influence de l'Angleterre dominaient les cours de l'Europe; qui a constamment soutenu la coalition des souverains, et lui a imprimé sa politique tenace et implacable contre la France, qui dirige encore ses projets contre les droits des nations. Mais la danger passé ces classes privilégiées, qui ne voient qu'elles dans l'état, qui ne travaillent que pour elles, se sont bientôt séparés des ministères, annoncent leurs prétentions anciennes et nouvelles, réclamant leur représentation isolée et leur part active dans les gouvernements; si bien que dans certains pays on les craint maintenant autant et plus que les masses du peuple. C'est par ces classes qu'on doit attendre un jour les régimes absolus."

or its object. We merely refer to this mission, as we must leave it to our readers to get a thorough knowledge of the numerous and opposing cabals as related in the sketches of the War of Liberation, and shall merely briefly advert to a few striking points. A number of adventurers, fortune-hunters, sophists, and courtiers, made a trade of the zeal for what was called legitimate government, whether that of Ferdinand VII. of Spain, or of the Elector of Hesse, which may be seen on the one hand in Cossard, and on the other in Colonel Dörenberg in Westphalia, and Stadion's creatures were busy in the most different ways. From the documents given in the sketches, it appears how at one time he was busy in promoting cabals in Constantinople against France and Russia, and again employed every possible means to induce Russia and Prussia professedly to become the defenders of oppressed humanity, but in reality to co-operate with Austria in the restoration of the whole former condition, the good time of privileges and the privileged classes. We shall see, that in this war, it became clear that the time for cabals was past, that the old modes of the Austrian government, and the pedantry of the systematic, benumbed administration of the war department was by no means equal to the rapidly advancing French, enlivened and stimulated by Napoleon's spirit, however great the services rendered by the Archduke Charles to the Austrian army in the last two years. How could he carry out his plans, where even at the present day the military code of discipline is a labyrinth through which no man can find Ariadne's thread? How could he give efficiency to the discipline which made the French army so terrible, among staff-officers, when princes, counts, and barons, archdukes, and privileged persons of all kinds regarded themselves as altogether above the law, which was only made for subalterns?

In the year 1808, when the whole management of military affairs was put into the hands of the Archduke Charles, he adopted measures similar to those which had been adopted by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in Prussia, in order, in case of necessity, to enable the whole mass of the population to act as a national militia. The levy was introduced instead of the system of recruiting, and by an ordinance of the 12th of May the army was at once increased a third.\* An additional battalion of new-raised soldiers was added to every regiment, in order that the recruits might in this way be properly disciplined, and be ready when necessary to fill up the deficiencies in the other two battalions. On the 9th of June, 1808, appeared an ordinance on the organisation of the militia, whose different divisions were named according to the provinces to which they respectively belonged. This step excited the attention of the French diplomatic agents, whose chief business consisted in keeping a careful watch upon everything done by the conquered princes in their own terri-

\* Everything relating to the army will be found in the work of General von Stattenheim: "La Guerre de l'An 1809 entre la France et l'Autriche," vol. i., première Partie. Vienne, 1811.



stories.\* The servility of the German vassals of France was at that time more active than even the French quadruple police. Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and the Germans who served the King of Westphalia, warned the French; and Herr von Linden was almost more active in Berlin for Napoleon than his own ambassador, Bignon.†

The new plans and measures proposed by the Archduke Charles were rendered peculiarly suspicious to the Emperor of the French, by his giving up, in consequence of his bad health, the conduct of military affairs to General Grüne, well-known as one of the most zealous members of the conspiracy of the whole of the ancient nobility throughout Europe against Napoleon and his new empire; and by the incessant journeys of Pozzo di Borgo from Petersburg to Vienna, and from Vienna to Petersburg. In reference to the conspiracy just mentioned, we must remind our readers, that the Prussian minister Von Stein's letter, found in the possession of Assessor Koppe, and afterwards printed by command of Napoleon, was addressed to the Prince of Wittgenstein, who resided long as Prussian minister at Cassel, and worked against Bignon. In this letter Wittgenstein received some hints of the necessity of promoting and feeding the discontents in Hesse and in Germany in general. Before, therefore, Napoleon set out to Bayonne in 1808, to enter upon the arrangement of Spanish affairs, he knew that the Austrians were in connexion with the Prussian patriots, who had entered into a conspiracy against him and his Frenchmen. He had, therefore, given utterance to some strong declarations even before the meeting in Erfurt, and behaved so unpolitely to Metternich, then Austrian ambassador in Paris, that it was believed he wished to begin a new war with Austria, and the more especially when he called upon the princes belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine to reinforce their armies and to collect them in camps, and sent his conscripts across the Rhine to exercise them, because he wished to use his old troops in Spain.

On the journey to Bayonne, in April, 1808, Napoleon's minister of foreign affairs, who accompanied the Emperor, was obliged to write a very offensively-expressed letter to Count Metternich in Paris, and in an insolent and authoritative tone required him to give an account of the preparations and armaments which were being made by General Grüne. The answer was such as was suitable to the position of Austria in reference to France—humble

\* Bignon, vol. vii., p. 329, in a note boasts as follows:—"De Berlin où je remplissais, alors les fonctions d'administrateur général j'envoyais à Toeplitz et à Carlsbad des voyageurs, qui constatèrent les grandes mesures d'armement, prises par le gouvernement Autrichien, comme pour une guerre prête à éclater."

† Von Linden's letter (then Westphalian ambassador in Paris) to the minister of foreign affairs in Cassel, may be found in the third volume of the "Sketches of the War of Liberation," and in the first part of Pelet's "*Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809.*" It will, however, be better to consult the work published in 1817 (Altenburg and Leipzig), under the title "Das Heer von Inner-Oestreich unter dem Befehle des Erzherzog's Johann im Kriege von 1809 in Italien, Tirol und Ungarn;" in which will also be found Grüne's letters, as well as those of others.

and yielding; there however grew out of it a correspondence which was very ambiguous, and which Napoleon, when he really began the war in the following year, caused to be printed in No. 115 of the *Moniteur*. After his return from Bayonne a breach appeared unavoidable, particularly after the unexampled treatment which Metternich had experienced at a public audience on the 15th of August. Metternich, who was a complete master of the easy tone which prevailed in Rasumowski's circle, brought this tone with him into the Faubourg St. Germain—most foolishly an object of dread to Napoleon, and from whence it originally sprang—and in the legitimist and other circles he raised amongst the grandes and ambassadors discontented with Napoleon, by hints, jokes, and apparently innocent allusions against all that daily took place, such an amount of feeling, that the Emperor no sooner arrived in Paris than he sent for the minister. He did not complain of the minister's conduct, for no occasion was given, but of the preparations made by his court. This made the tone, expressions, and coarse and insolent words which he employed when he addressed the ambassador, doubly offensive. The manner and expressions were, indeed, greatly modified by Champagny, who was desired to write down the substance of what was said, and send it to Vienna, as well as to have it printed; but even in the form in which it is to be found in Thibaudeau's appendix to his history,\* it is altogether unexampled and offensive. A man must be as great a diplomatist as Metternich to be able to digest such language. Persons who were present, and had seen the same minister in the same place play the most supple courtier, have acknowledged to the author that they had never seen a similar instance in all their experience of court life. The author, however, sees from Bignon, who was an admirable courtier, as well as from Thibaudeau, who had nothing of the courtier in him, that he may be led astray by his more vulgar ideas, for both of these writers regard the matter as nothing unusual. Norvins strongly approves of a lesson having been read to the Emperor of Austria before a splendid and crowded court, mostly assembled to congratulate the emperor on his safe return. He considers it quite right that on such an occasion Napoleon should accuse him of ingratitude, and allege that the Emperor Francis, if he had been victorious, would not have been as magnanimous towards him, as he had been during his presence in Vienna.†

How great the number of the malcontents and traitors in the very highest circles was, may be seen, not only from Napoleon's dislike to Metternich's conciliatory speeches, but from the results of the Russian system of spies, of which Napoleon knew, and which he was wholly unable to prevent, as he himself publicly said to Prince

\* See Appendix, No. 1, of Thibaudeau's "*Histoire de l'Empire*."

† Norvins sees nothing wrong in the words of the Emperor to Metternich: "Croyez vous que le vainqueur d'une armée Française qui eût été maître de Paris eût agi avec cette moderation?"

Kurakin, in 1811. This system of espionage and bribery was first carried on by D'Oubril; then by Nesselrode, as secretary of the embassy to Tolstoy; next by Von Krafft, who held the same office; and finally by Tchernitcheff, who conducted it with the greatest success, paid immense sums, purchased Jomini, and many of the first official persons, travelled incessantly till 1812 between Paris and Petersburg, and thoroughly understood how to purchase secrets or obtain papers by means of ladies, or women of pleasure. Napoleon suspected his own ambassador, Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, of suffering himself, as a courtier, to be deceived by the courtly arts of the Emperor of Russia.\* As soon, therefore, as any serious difference arose, he sent one of his military servants (Lauriston), who then adopted a very different tone. At first the Russian friendship was still maintained, because Romanzoff was anxious to carry out the Russian objects in Turkey by means of French assistance. The Emperor of Russia played a double character, both within and without his empire. Within, he acted like Trajan, while his confidential councillor and chief of police acted like Nero; without, he kept up a good understanding with Napoleon, and at the same time was in constant, though indirect, communication with the Spaniards. At first he did not allow any resident of the insurgent party in his capital, but at a later period he gave permission to Zea Bermudez to live as a private man there; he previously availed himself of the former Neapolitan ambassador, the Duca de Serra Caprioli, to obtain news and to give encouragement. When the Spanish insurrection had made such progress that the French were driven across the Ebro, it gave rise to a whole series of diplomatic cabals, which we cannot pass unnoticed, because they prove that Napoleon justly placed no more confidence in the Russians than he did in the Austrians.

Metternich at that time held conferences with the deputies of the Spanish insurgents in Paris; but because his movements and his house were watched, he met them in the botanical gardens, or in the museum of natural history. He also conferred with the Prussian ambassador respecting what was going on in Spain, and Napoleon suspected that Tolstoy also knew of these cabals. He asked for his recal: Alexander consented, and sent in his stead Kurakin, who had been in Vienna. Matters were sooner effected with this Russian prince, and therefore Tchernitcheff was obliged to travel so often to Paris. In Petersburg afterwards, in the beginning of 1809, there was a species of double administration of foreign affairs, one with which Romanzoff was acquainted, and a second conducted by the emperor himself. That of which Romanzoff was the director was altogether French, and served to deceive Caulaincourt; in the second, the greatest influence was exercised by Baron von Stein from

\* The Emperor Alexander and his brother loaded Caulaincourt with civilities, which were all insincere. See Bignon's "*Histoire*," part vii., chapter vii.; especially page 329, in a note.



a distance, and from 1812 near at hand, and by the Empress-Mother, a passionate enemy of Napoleon. The latter was kept very secret. Through its instrumentality Alexander acknowledged, it is true, the Duca del Pardo as ambassador from Joseph of Spain, and the Duca di Mondragone from Joachim of Naples, but when the insurrection in Spain gained any degree of consistency, opened indirect negotiations with their plenipotentiary (Zea Bermudez), suffered to be in Petersburg as a private individual, and had them almost unconditionally carried on by means of the Duca di Serra Caprioli, formerly ambassador of Ferdinand, King of Naples and Sicily. At a later period Zea Bermudez appeared as a regular ambassador. At first, however, the Emperor Alexander was too well informed of the condition of things in Spain to enter openly into any negotiation with the insurgents.

When Admiral Siniavin gave his fleet for safe keeping to the English, or, in other words, capitulated to them, he sent Peter Politeka through Spain and France, in order to convey the information verbally to Petersburg. That, however, was merely a pretence, for, properly speaking, he was commissioned to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the state of affairs in Spain. His journey happened at a time when everything was in a bad state. Alexander, therefore, remained true to the alliance entered into at Tilsit, and accepted the offer of a friendly meeting with the Emperor of the French in Erfurt, in the autumn of 1808.

In another place we have stated that Napoleon did not wish Count Metternich to accompany him to Erfurt; that Austria, in fact, was not there represented; and that, at last, the Emperor Francis sent General Vincent thither with an autograph letter. Bignon says this colonel was just the man to have been sent with such a humiliating letter as that of which, on this occasion, he was the bearer. The emperor's letter was submissive and highly flattering to the pride of Napoleon, and the behaviour of the imperial ambassador was still more so; for it is impossible, on reading an account of the manner in which he conducted himself, not to feel heartily ashamed of General Vincent.\* The object of the mission was attained—that is, the outbreak of the war was delayed. The manner in which the Emperor of the French answered the letter was in the highest degree insolent and offensive. He declared himself satisfied, and, in

\* The letter is as follows:—"Mon ambassadeur à Paris m'apprend que V. M. I. se rend à Erfurt, où elle se rencontrera avec l'Empereur Alexandre. Je saisis avec empressement l'occasion, qui la rapproche de ma frontière, pour lui renouveler le témoignage de l'amitié et de la haute estime que je lui ai vouées; et j'envoie auprès d'elle mon lieutenant-général, le Baron de Vincent, pour vous porter l'assurance de mes sentimens invariables. Je me flatte que V. M. n'a jamais cessé d'en être convaincue, et que, si de fausses représentations qu'on avait repandues sur les institutions intérieures organiques que j'ai établies dans ma monarchie lui ont laissé pendant un moment des doutes sur la persévérance de mes intentions, les explications que le Comte de Metternich a présentées à ce sujet à vos ministres les auront entièrement dissipés. Le Baron de Vincent se trouve à même de confirmer à V. M. ces détails, et d'y ajouter toutes les éclaircissemens qu'elle pourra désirer."

fact, issued an order to the King of Bavaria and his other German vassals, on the 18th of October, to disperse the troops that had been collected together in Bavaria and elsewhere—with, however, this threatening addition, immediately to bring them together again should Austria adopt any new warlike preparations.\*

The Austrians continued quietly to make their preparations in the interior of the empire; and whilst Napoleon remained in Spain, till January, 1809, they availed themselves of the secret associations in and with Germany to support a general movement of all the discontented and oppressed with the army, under the command of the Archduke Charles, who was universally honoured throughout the whole of Germany. But King Maximilian and his Mongelas in Bavaria, and King Frederick and his courtiers in Wirtemberg, had much more to hope from the French than from any national feeling, or from such a strictly-honourable man as Von Stein. In spite of the apparent friendship which he manifested for Napoleon, the Emperor Alexander played a very equivocal character, which became much more equivocal during the war in which he was obliged to take part, in virtue of the alliance offensive and defensive into which he had entered with France.

As we see, from a great many documents made public since that time, and from various passages in the Sketches, he was urged from many quarters to attach himself to the conservative European aristocracy, at whose head shone Count Munster, Von Stein, Count Stadion, and Metternich, and who were supported by the English nobles and Rasumowski's intrigues; but Austria and England refused him what Napoleon in Tilsit, however cunningly and deceitfully, had conceded. Whilst the Austrian cabinet was taking all possible pains to make Russia favourable, and to keep it from taking any part in the impending war, it was zealously employed in Constantinople in counteracting the Russian designs.

Baron von Stürmur, the imperial representative at Constantinople, had, at an earlier period, contributed very much to the overthrow of

\* "V. M.," writes Napoleon to the King of Bavaria, "*est maitresse de lever ses camps et de remettre ses troupes dans les quartiers de la manière dont elle est accoutumée de le faire. Je pense qu'il est convenable que son ministre à Vienne reçoive pour instruction de tenir ce langage, que les camps seront reformés, et que les troupes de la confédération et du protecteur seront remises en situation hostile toutes les fois que l'Autriche ferait des armemens extraordinaires et inusitées,*" &c. We learn from Bignon how dearly the proudest court in the world was obliged to pay for the favour of Napoleon. The French historian informs us that Vincent, like Metternich, was obliged to suffer himself to be treated as a servant, not only by Napoleon, but also by Talleyrand. In vol. viii., p. 19, he says: "*Si la patience est une vertu en diplomatie, M. de Vincent peut se vanter d'avoir porté cette vertu plus loin que qui que ce soit. Dans les soirées libres il arrivait chez M. de Talleyrand, entre neuf et dix heures, moment où celui-ci était dans l'usage de rentrer. M. de Talleyrand arrivait, disait quelques mots, s'asseyait, et tout en causant, commençait à sommeiller. Nous étions là quelques personnes appartenant au ministère, et nous causions tout bas entre nous. M. de Vincent restait immobile, tenant ferme, pour trouver, au reveil, occasion de parler un peu, ou plutôt d'arracher à M. de Talleyrand quelques paroles. Nous nous disions que c'était une rude corvée que celle d'ambassadeur des explications.*"



the powerful vizier Mustapha Bairactar, and to the elevation of the miserable Sultan Mahmoud; but since the meeting in Erfurt, at which it was said that the partition of Turkey had been verbally resolved upon, he had taken all possible trouble to effect a renewal of the alliance of the Turks with England, to prevent the cession of Moldavia and Wallachia—that is, to disturb the agreements of the congress of Jassy, and to bring about a renewal of hostilities between the Russians and Turks. The English ministry, consisting of such men as Percival, Canning, and Castlereagh, therefore, very wisely availed themselves of the services of an intimate friend of their arch-enemy Fox, who, however, had been thoroughly acquainted with all the cabals in Vienna, to negotiate respecting a peace with the Turks. Sir Robert Adair, to whom the negotiations with the Turks were entrusted, had been in Vienna during the war, and his printed letters prove that he was the centre of all the cabals carried on by the whole aristocracy of Europe, and by all the old nobles and courtiers. These letters do not, however, contain the most secret things, and not a word of the large sums drawn from England, as appears from the account of Otto, the French ambassador, by Rasumowski and Stadion. Stadion, at that time Austrian minister of foreign affairs, lived, as Otto thinks, at an expense far beyond his means. Rasumowski bought large estates in 1814; but whence the money came to pay for them no one knows. These, indeed, furnish no decisive evidence. It is, however, very possible to conceive that Sir Robert Adair did what he never hesitated to do in Constantinople. He himself admits that it was only by the distribution of very large sums among the great men in Constantinople that he succeeded, in 1809, in bringing about a peace with England.

From the moment in which the Austrians succeeded in bringing about a peace between Turkey and England, a war between France and Austria became unavoidable. By means of this peace the French ambassador lost all that influence which he had previously enjoyed in Constantinople; and, besides, an anti-Gallican circle was formed in Vienna, which extended from Constantinople to Petersburg. In the bulletins annexed to his official correspondence, the French ambassador complains not only of the frivolous aristocratic circle connected with Rasumowski and Stadion, but especially of the political and reasoning ladies. At the head of the circle of ladies so accused stood the Empress-Mother of Russia and the Queen of Prussia; and among the others, the most remarkable were the Princess Bagration, Princess Lichnowsky, and Countess Kaunitz. The movement in Prussia was, in fact, national. Stein, Hardenberg, Niebuhr, and Humboldt, at a later period, proved that, notwithstanding the advantages of their rank or their *doctrinaire* conceit, they were anxious to help the people. In Austria, on the other hand, the whole matter was aristocratic. This was very obvious in the outbreak in Tyrol, of which the ignorant but faithful peasants were made a sacrifice.



King Maximilian and his Mongelas were desirous of introducing a completely new order of things into the Tyrol. The Tyrolese, however, like the inhabitants of the old cantons of Switzerland, were instinctively unfavourable to everything new, however good it might be. They were therefore heart and soul partly given up to the influence of the priests, who are always stationary, and partly of one mind with the knights and barons, who are never disposed to relinquish what they have progressively gained by usurpation. In Prussia and the rest of Germany things were quite different. Only the common hatred against strangers, love of their country, and dislike to the destruction of German life, united the citizens and aristocracy of the numerous German associations in one common bond. As soon as the enemy was driven out, the two parties separated, because their union had not been founded upon instinct or custom, but on the hope entertained by the better educated classes among the people that the aristocracy had really adopted better modes of thought. In this place, and subsequently, we touch upon the secret societies only in passing, because the whole of them in themselves were of no real importance, except in as far as they were signs of the times and manifestations of the general discontent which deserve to be remarked upon. We shall not, therefore, trouble our readers with any notice of the CONCORDISTS of Lang, of the blunt and often rude Jahn, of the KNIGHTS OF LOUISA of Baron von Nostitz, of the BLACK KNIGHTS, to whom the Queen of Prussia gave a silver chain as a mark of distinction. The high-minded men in Prussia, who attached themselves to Von Stein and Scharnhorst, had, moreover, prepared everything for a rising as early as 1808, and for a union with Austria. The King of Prussia had been obliged to bind himself not to increase his army above 42,000 men; but Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had taken care that besides this were to be raised 150,000 militia, for whose arming and due military equipment arrangements were made. Ever since the peace Scharnhorst had devoted himself to the restoration or replacing of all the materials of war, and it was neither his fault, nor that of Gneisenau and Blucher, that Prussia did not take the field contemporaneously with Austria. This was prevented by the Emperor of Russia, who, before he went to Erfurt, visited the King of Prussia, probably made him acquainted with his secret, and consoled him with the hope of better times. After his return from Erfurt he invited him to Petersburg. At the end of the year 1808, the king went thither, and from that time forward attached himself unconditionally to Russia, in return for which the Emperor Alexander granted him his interest with the Emperor Napoleon.

The memorials which Von Schladen, the Prussian minister, succeeded, by means of the empress-mother, in bringing under the notice of Alexander, and from which we shall hereafter quote some passages, show us the manner in which the Prussian patriots endeavoured to work upon the Emperor's mind, and Alexander himself,

at a later period, complained to Major Von Schöler, who had been sent on a special mission from the King of Prussia, of Von Schladen's want of caution, because his bold speeches against French rule were calculated to bring the King of Prussia into danger. Still he did not betray him. In one of these memorials Von Schladen proves that Austria was fully entitled to have recourse to arms, and that the Emperor of Russia, in order to save himself and his empire, must assuredly take part with Austria.\* These memorials of the Prussian ambassador in Petersburg have a particular historical value, because we may learn from them how partially and sophistically Bignon, Thibaudeau, and others, have represented the political relations of these times. It is clearly proved that the Emperor Alexander must either relinquish the system followed ever since the peace of Tilsit, or surrender the claim of being any longer regarded as having a decisive voice amongst the chief powers of Europe.

In 1809 the whole world began to be dissatisfied with the despotism of power exercised by a single great man, because, like a god, he alone wished to think and act for every one, and therefore wholly disallowed the absolute value of freedom; but how could Austria hope that the Germans would be simple enough to believe that such men as Metternich and Stadion were really in earnest when they proclaimed the gospel of freedom and justice? For the first time in two hundred years the house of Hapsburg sought to gain the favour of the German Protestants. Who could trust it? It also soon appeared, alas! that the Austrian aristocracy, and bureaucracy ever were the same as they still continue to be.

The differences between Austria and France had become more violent than ever, when Austria, during Napoleon's absence in Spain, had continued its warlike preparations, and entered into communications with the Spanish insurgents; the cry of alarm raised by the kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, threatened with an attack from the armies of Austria, caused the French Emperor to return to Paris

\* "Preussen in den Jahren 1806 und 1807," p. 318:—"I may here be permitted to repeat the memorable words of the Emperor of Russia, whose exalted virtues and distinguished qualities have made me his admirer, which must ever continue the foundation of my immovable confidence, and by which his majesty declared that he must always regard any close association with Napoleon as a diminution of his honour, and that he would renew the contest in the just cause even from the deserts of Siberia! As an admirer of the Emperor, I may then be permitted to cherish hopes, and to support them on the following grounds:—First, a peace between Austria and France, even for a short time, has become impossible to the former of these two powers; but at the same time a war between Austria and France makes the fall of the former only probable if it cannot reckon on the aid of Russia. Till the time of the meeting in Erfurt, Austria, vehemently threatened, could not lessen its means of defence, and since then no demand to that effect has been made. Ever since this meeting Austria's measures of defence were not increased till about six weeks ago, when France completely altered her tone, and caused some severe articles to be inserted against the court of Vienna in her journals. What other reason could this power have for so acting, than that motive by which she has always been actuated—that of overthrowing every other power which dares to maintain its independence, whenever a favourable opportunity offers, but before she proceeds to the attack, increasing the fear of it, and in the consequences of this fear, carefully raised by herself, to seek for a pretence for an attack?



in January, 1809. The French vassals had long before received orders to send their armies to the Danube, whither the Duke of Auerstadt was also to march with the French troops. It was universally believed that the Austrians, who had been long engaged in making preparations for the war, would now at least anticipate the French. This was also the opinion of the commanders; but they found themselves scandalously deceived. The Archduke Charles was at this time generalissimo, and under him commanded General Grüne. Neither of them was deficient in military talents, although the archduke's state of health often prevented his attention to the duties of his office. Both of them were anxious to open the campaign in March; but they found that the whole commissariat department had been grossly neglected, and the monies provided for it misapplied. Von Fassbender was at the head of the department, and for years had been engaged in robbery and deception. He laid violent hands on himself in the spring of 1809, at the very moment when the campaign ought to have been opened, and when, instead of provision having been made for all the wants of the army, it was found that everything was wanting. Those persons in Vienna on whom reliance was placed for exciting the people proved deceitful, and the measures adopted with this view, were no better than what had been done in the commissariat. We learn from a note [51] appended to the Archduke John's work on the campaign in the Tyrol, that it was calculated on that the people were to be raised against the French and French dominion by an unnatural union of the old aristocracy, and the raging fanatical admirers of Jacobinism in Dalmatia, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany.

Herr von Hormayr was destined for the Tyrol; from Apulia to the Alps, the anti-Gallican party calculated on the Carbonari and Adelphists, whose democratic enthusiasm was taken for mist, which was afterwards to be dissipated by the Austrian police. Genoa and Piedmont were to be raised by Major Santo Ambrogio, the Marchese Asseretto, and Lieutenant-Colonel Latour. Colonel Maccarelli, Major Dadowich, and Dorotich, provincial of the Franciscans, undertook Dalmatia and Albania; whilst Rudolph Paravicini, his brother Juvalta, and their friends who had influence among the mountaineers, were engaged in the mountains of the Valteline, and in the valleys of Camonica and Trompia. Were we to judge from Napoleon's conduct to Talleyrand—the most servile of his flatterers and creatures—and to Fouché, who had had letters of Napoleon's in his hands, which the latter was anxious to recover at any price, or even from his silent animosity against the trifling words thrown out by Metternich in the circles of Paris, the doings of the Vienna *noblesse*, and their secret unions at his court, excited the greatest anxiety. He was aware that the Empress-Mother of Russia, the Queen of Prussia, the Archduchess Beatrice, mother of the Emperor Francis' second wife, assembled around them the circle of his bitterest enemies, and that Rasumowski, Tâtischeff, Ouwaroff, were



constantly carrying on cabals in Russia. The organ of Napoleon's enemies, and their diplomatist in Vienna and Petersburg, was Pozzo di Borgo—a man of great powers of mind and very distinguished capacities, who was in constant movement hither and thither.

We shall be best able to learn the manner in which the Prussian patriots, without ever consulting, and even against the will of the timid, hesitating, Frederick William III., promoted the interests of the Viennese aristocracy at the court of Russia, in order to attain their own noble and patriotic objects, from the five memorials which Von Schladen, the Prussian ambassador, delivered to the Emperor of Russia from the 12th of February till the 18th of May, 1809. We shall, therefore, introduce some extracts from these papers into our text. We do this the more willingly as the papers themselves afford an indication of a deep knowledge of the then state of affairs, and are drawn up without prejudice or illusion. They are also calculated to show the good side of a German diplomatist, of whom, alas! we have usually nothing to say but what is bad. We cannot, indeed, coincide in the principle maintained by the Prussian ambassador, who, in order to persuade the Emperor of Russia not to keep his promise made at Erfurt, alleges that the inviolability of treaties can only be regarded as a sacred duty among legitimate princes; but that a ruler born to the inheritance of a throne, if he observes this principle towards a usurper, merely promotes his own overthrow. He is, however, quite right in his justification of the warlike preparations in Austria, and concerning the dangers impending over Russia, when he observes, "Never has a conqueror or a state, that has once felt an inclination to conquest, set limits to its success . . . Napoleon, like all his predecessors, will pursue his course to the uttermost parts of the earth, unless Providence should put an end to his career. Were he constrained to relinquish this favourite occupation of his imagination, to which he has devoted himself from his youth, it would be like a dissolution in his case—and this he will never voluntarily do. He is not noble minded enough to enable mankind to attribute his exertions to any exalted objects; he merely gratifies a passion like an architect, who often destroys a building merely to flatter his vanity, even before he has completed it. Austria and Russia are states against which Napoleon's attacks must presently be directed." The plan of operations which he proposes, shows the plans which the Prussian patriots even at that time entertained. "As soon," he observes, "as the Prussian troops can be at all got together, they, together with the Russians, must fall upon their proper enemy, now in the country, and destroy him. Then the Austrian troops, which are in Galicia, and a part of the Russians who are near them, should march to the Elbe and the Weser, whilst the remainder of the Russians should make themselves masters of Warsaw and the line of the Vistula." He has also well said, in reference to the results of the meeting at Erfurt up to February, 1809, "if attention is paid to the results which have sprung from the meeting at Erfurt,

we shall be satisfied that Russia itself is threatened with an impending danger. This feeling was not previously entertained by the Emperor Alexander himself; but now, by various expressions which have escaped from him since his return, it has been clearly manifested. Russia's application also in favour of Prussia, which, under the favourable circumstances brought about by Napoleon's false calculations, afforded this state a hope of a literal fulfilment of the treaty of Tilsit, or of similar advantages, intended to be secured to it, according to the Emperor Alexander's express declaration before his departure for Petersburg, because Russia would find therein her own advantage and security, has been made of no value through the importance attached to the well-known letter of the minister Von Stein, a mere private communication to which Russia should not have attached any importance at all. This proceeded so far that France, when she appeared to evacuate the Prussian states, secured for herself a firmer footing there before by the maintenance and arming of the fortresses."

In two other memorials, the minister leaves no means untried to refute the allegation of the emperor's Russian advisers, that Austria had not chosen the most favourable moment to commence the war, and that it most foolishly built its hopes of victory on the discontents prevailing in France and Germany.\* We shall also quote the words of a Russian, who looked upon things from a different point of view from that of Von Schladen and the Prussian patriots, at the decisive moment, when the war began—March, 1809—but in which it is expressly said that Napoleon's empire was undoubtedly rotten, and that operations must commence on the part of Russia, but only not at that moment. This appears to us of great importance in reference to the Russian war of 1812, and the diplomatic disputes which were carried on on this subject from December, 1810. The Russian of high birth, whom Von Schladen introduces speaking, says:

"It is certain that Napoleon's immediate attendants, the whole of Paris, and all France, are thoroughly dissatisfied with him, and that this dissatisfaction is daily increased by the war against Spain; there can be no doubt that the conscription, which has been again anticipated, has fallen upon youths of from eighteen to nineteen years of

\* "Whether France or Austria begin the struggle, it will happen that unless France can reckon with certainty upon Russia, Austria will occupy Silesia, and France the Marks, whilst the Prussian troops will be employed at the king's expense, and far from his own states. What is still more, should Russia continue to maintain its present relations with France, it cannot avoid complying with the usurper's demand, on its side to occupy some parts of the Prussian states; it will, therefore, cover itself with shame, by being a participator in the overthrow of its ally. The King of Prussia himself, impelled on the one hand by personal danger, and on the other by the unchangeable aversion of his people to the agreements entered into, which he cannot violate without some change in the politics of Russia, will, in spite of all his exertions, become an object of suspicion to France and to Austria, and whatever may be the issue of the war, will probably become its victim."

age; that the diminution of the population of France caused by the revolution and incessant wars, begins to be very sensibly felt, and that by two more conscriptions, the whole country will be exhausted of men capable of bearing arms. What now is Austria doing under such circumstances? By its armaments, which are not the result of its own determination, but of insinuations from England, which have been pushed so far by regular negotiation (as is well known to the Emperor Alexander), Austria furnishes the Emperor Napoleon with an opportunity of exciting the French people, in spite of its dislike to him, to make immense efforts so to humble Austria, that it may never have anything more to fear from this power. Instead of making these warlike preparations gradually in a solid way suited to the strength of the state, instead of prudently keeping them secret, and behaving the more civilly and quietly the more they increase, Austria precipitates her preparations, and pushes them so far, that it will soon be incapable of waiting for the really favourable moment; and on the appearance of any favourable circumstances suffers herself to be misled by the pride peculiar to her on every occasion and everywhere, by change in her language and actions, to raise the suspicion and wound the vanity of the Emperor Napoleon. Hence it arises that even the present moment which Austria considers favourable, although, according to the Emperor Alexander's opinion, *it will at a later period be more so*, has not been duly profited by, and that the Emperor Napoleon has had time enough to bring together a very considerable force in Germany; so that, being in a condition to unite his quick movements and to conceal his real designs, whilst he frustrates the plans of his opponents, he may hope to prove victorious, in spite of the superiority in force of his adversary. We shall see him, probably, and perhaps too soon, preparing the same fate for the Austrians which successively befel their various corps at Liegnitz, Breslau, and other places, although they were only two marches distant from each other."

From these words, it will be obvious, that the Russian patriots, as well as the distinguished conspirators in Austria, were altogether deceived as to the proper time of venturing to proceed to extremities; and that the capabilities of the Austrian commanders, and the nature of all the Austrian measures and institutions, were better known and judged of in Petersburg than in Vienna. From these Russian revelations, however, it is clear, that even at that time the Emperor Alexander had been brought to the resolution of throwing off the mask of friendship on the first convenient opportunity.

The discontents with respect to the undertaking in Spain, carried on in order to provide a throne for Joseph by the incessant conscriptions of young men, and the cruel severity against all that were refractory, as well as the continual progress towards the old monarchical system, became so serious during Napoleon's sojourn in Spain, that the reports of his secret police excited his violent indignation both against his monarchical and against his republican ministers,



whom he had made the chief instruments of his government. He did not satisfy himself with removing Talleyrand and Fouché from their occupations, but called them formally to account. Immediately on his return from Spain, both were sent for into his cabinet, and in the presence of Cambacérès, the high chancellor, of the high treasurer, and of Decrès, minister of marine, he treated them like servants. He addressed these supports of his throne, who had contrived to make themselves indispensable to him, however little confidence he had in them, as he had addressed Lord Whitworth, Markoff, the Neapolitan ambassador at the coronation in Milan, Metternich shortly before, and Prince Kurakin in 1811. Our readers will see from the apostrophising strain which he employed,\* how very different the tone which he assumed was from that courtly language and manners which he employed every possible means again to introduce; and what low modes of thought he attributed to both these officers, who occupied such an important position in his empire. Fouché remained minister of police, although strongly suspected at the close of the year of participating in the conspiracy formed by Bernadotte and other generals and democrats; Talleyrand lost his pay and honourable station as high chamberlain; both were watched night and day.

## 2.—THE HISTORY OF THE WAR TILL THE BATTLE OF ASPERN.

Napoleon's unexpectedly quick return from Spain in January, 1809, was indeed partly caused by reports of the secret machinations, which were being carried on in Paris, but chiefly by the urgency of the Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg. These contrived to find out what was going on in the secret assemblies in Vienna, and what movements were to be expected in Germany; and because they themselves had everything to fear and nothing to hope for, they urged him to hasten to their relief. The King of Wirtemberg had already warned him in October to put no trust whatever in the Austrians.† Bonaparte sojourned ten days in Valladolid; and there were prepared under his superintendence all the commands for the continuance of the war in Spain, all the preparations, marches, and plans were agreed upon for the war with Austria; from thence he

\* "Vos honneurs, vos biens, à qui les devez-vous? à moi seul. Comment pouvez vous les conserver? par moi seul. Regardez en arrière, examinez votre vie passée . . et vous tramez des complots? Il faut que vous soyez aussi insensés qu'ingrats, pour croire que tout autre que moi fût assez fort pour vous soutenir. S'il surviendrait une révolution nouvelle, quelque part que vous y eussiez prise elle vous écraserait les premiers."

† Von Hormayr in his "Sketches," part iii., p. 387, writes as follows: "Napoleon's correspondence confirms King Frederick's warnings, after the return from Erfurt, and the departure to Spain in *opposition* to Vincent's assurances of peace, and to his explanation of the continued, nay, increased military preparations of Austria. King Frederick, among the nobility of the empire recently subjected to him, and the officers transferred to his standard, knew where to find several *sauveteurs* completely acquainted with all that was going on in Vienna."

hastened to Paris with all the rapidity of a courier. He performed the first part of the journey on horseback, and on the first day rode twenty-six post-hours in six hours. It is alleged, that he had recourse to this rapidity of movement to escape the Spaniards lying in wait, who could not meet him in the field, but made all the roads insecure. From Valladolid, too, in addition to orders to the army, he wrote to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, which communications were forwarded either directly, or through the prince primate, afterwards Grand-duke of Frankfort. The Emperor addressed some reproaches to the Grand-duke of Darmstadt, on account of a regiment, of which he testified that it had fought with bravery against the Russians. This regiment, like the rest of the German troops, had showed very little zeal in Spain. In the following year, indeed, as appears by Napier's official reports, more than 8000 men at once fled to the English in Gibraltar. From Valladolid, commands were issued to Darmstadt to increase the forces to 8000 men. Carl von Dalberg, at that time become completely a slave, wrote very coolly to the princes of the confederation: "Your protector has *expressed his desire* from Spain, that you should *immediately and punctually* raise and equip your respective war contingents."

Although all the measures for war were duly taken on both sides, and the resolution embraced to commence the campaign, both the Austrians and French conducted themselves precisely as the French and Russians had done after 1811, for a whole year, as if they were really desirous of maintaining peace. As early, however, as the end of February, the Austrian army was placed upon a war footing; and yet Russia constantly acted as if she was desirous of mediation, although she had already declared that in case of a war, she must undoubtedly side with France. It is no part of our object to go through the labyrinths of negotiations and the archives of diplomatic notes; but we cannot omit observing that Napoleon, before he took the field, had a scene with Metternich still worse than that already mentioned, and which may serve as a proof, that he gave himself little trouble to suit his tone and manners to his high station. Andreossy, the French ambassador, had already taken his departure from Vienna, and left only a *chargé d'affaires* behind; when Napoleon, instead of simply sending his passport to Metternich, scolded and abused him and his court in a most ill-bred manner at an audience. We shall subjoin a portion of his address in a note, that our readers may judge on this subject for themselves.\*

In February things appeared as if the Austrians really designed

\* "Eh bien! Voilà du nouveau de Vienne. Qu'est ce que cela signifie? Est-on piqué de la tarantule? Qui est ce qui vous menace? A qui en voulez vous? Voulez-vous encore mettre le monde en combustion? Comment! Lorsque j'avais mon armée en Allemagne vous ne trouviez pas votre existence menacée, et c'est à présent qu'elle est en Espagne que vous la trouvez compromise! Voilà un étrange raisonnement. Que va-t-il resulter de cela? C'est que je vais armer, puisque vous armez; car enfin je dois craindre, et je suis payé pour être prudent."

on this occasion to take the foreway of the French. The Archduke Charles was appointed generalissimo; his army was to consist of eight corps; and, as far too confident a reliance was placed upon desertion and rising, it was to march either up the course of the Danube or down the Maine to the Rhine. The Archduke John, with two corps, was to support the rising in Istria, Dalmatia, and Lombardy, which was confidently reckoned on. The Marquis Chasteler, with a special corps, was to push forward through the Pusterthal into the Tyrol, to lead and support in a military manner the bodies called out and organised by Herr von Hormayr. The Archduke Ferdinand, with 35,000 men, was to occupy the Duchy of Warsaw, and, at the same time, keep watch upon the Russians. On this occasion the Austrian cabinet consulted the dying Cobenzl and Thugut in reference to the war, but both of them, as well as Wallis, the Prince de Ligne, and Manfredini, were opposed to war, because they were best acquainted with the whole condition of things in Austria, and knew that there was not a single resolute man among their commanders who could be compared to Napoleon or his generals; for even the Archduke Charles was hesitating. Two plans were proposed, the one drawn up by Mayer von Hohenfeld, who had taken a conspicuous share in the archduke's glorious campaign in 1796, and had been his quartermaster-general, and the other by General Grüne, who had served in the archduke's staff in 1805, and was now at the head of the war department. Grüne exhibits his own character by his correspondence with Count Stadion and the Prince de Ligne, specimens of which are to be found in Von Hormayr's sketches. The ideas which he entertained of the qualities of a general may be learned from his wish to have as general the Prince de Ligne, celebrated for his light French witticisms, writings, and conversation in the saloons of women of fashion, among diplomatists, princes, and nobles! His plan was to collect the army in Bohemia, and at once to march boldly to the Lower Rhine, in order to be reinforced from England, Hanover, and the whole of Germany; Mayer, on the other hand, wished to follow the line of the Danube. Each had his own and a very different system of attack and defence; both had partisans, who were favourable to their respective views, and trumpeted their praises. According to the Austrian fashion, time was spent in debating instead of action, till at length, on the 20th of February, a decision was come to in favour of General Grüne's plans. Mayer then received another destination and left the army. The troops were collected in Bohemia in order to march on the Maine, when a sudden change of opinion took place on the 20th of March, and it was resolved to follow Mayer's plan, for which no preparations had been made.

In order to deceive the Austrians, and to draw the Emperor Alexander fully into his views, Napoleon still continued to carry on negotiations in March, and to offer the guarantee of Russia to the Emperor of Austria, which the latter naturally declined. Although



Romanzoff, who was very favourable to the French alliance, was at that time in Paris, and negotiated personally with Metternich and by writing with Stadion, there was yet no expectation from the beginning that the Russian mediation would lead to any result. Napoleon, however, gained time to bring his armies from Spain. The Emperor of France understood the precise condition of things far better even from Spain, where he was already laying his plans in Valladolid, than the Austrian generals and their wise advisers, men and women, who were on the spot. This is proved by the numerous letters which he wrote in Valladolid, and the whole of the orders for the army, which were issued from Paris in the month of March. These documents and proofs of the superior sagacity and unwearied activity of the great man are to be found in Mathieu Dumas, and in the appendix to the first part of Pelet's "History of the War in 1809." The Austrians placed their confidence in Gentz and Schlegel's pamphlets and proclamations, upon the unions amongst the nobility and teutonism, for the revival of which Herr von Stein, who had come to Brünn in 1809, sojourned partly there and partly in Troppau and Prague till 1812, came to Vienna; Napoleon, on the other hand, trusted to swords and bayonets, to masterly arrangement of his troops and rapid action; the result could not be doubtful. This was obvious to the archduke as early as eight days after the opening of the campaign; he perceived that he had miscalculated and made proposals of peace.

On the 27th of March the Austrians issued a remarkably well drawn-up manifesto, which contains a great deal of truth, but could produce no effect upon any one except those who either could or would forget that it proceeded from Count Stadion and the Austrian aristocracy, and was composed by men who were admitted to their tables as toadies and flatterers. There is a great deal said about liberty, justice, rights of the people, and religion of the heart and not of the mouth; but that the house of Hapsburg and Lorraine could ever bring an army into the field to fight for such ideal privileges and blessings could only be believed by the Tyrolese, who were sunk in the ignorance of the middle ages. The rest of us believed not a word, however hopeful we might be of being delivered from the dominion of the French. We despised the doctrines of the Berlin sophists converted to Popery, issued from Vienna, because we knew that the only art thoroughly understood in the latter capital was the art of cookery.

In March, Marshal Bernadotte formed a junction between the troops of the King of Saxony—Saxons and Poles—and his own; and Napoleon, being anxious that the Austrians might begin the war before he himself had arrived, sent Berthier, as his quartermaster-general, to Strasburg. From Strasburg, in case of the Austrians commencing the war, Berthier was to send two large armies, one to each bank of the Danube—one under Masséna, and the other under Davoust—which were to march at the same time, and in close com-

munication with each other. Because Masséna and Davoust were to attack simultaneously, the united corps received the name of the ARMY OF GERMANY, and the Emperor himself took the chief command. Berthier was, as usual, quartermaster-general; Songis had the whole of the artillery under his orders; Bertrand the direction of the engineers; and Bessières commanded the cavalry. Napoleon was so certain of victory, and knew so confidently that a great variety of contributions, dues, and requisitions would have to be exacted, that he took with him his most experienced bloodsuckers. The harsh, inexorable, and coarse Darü, who had so fearfully harassed the Prussians, was appointed intendant-general; and Villemanzy, whom Napoleon had proved to be a most experienced extortioner on his first victories in Italy, and through whom he had exhausted the resources of Lombardy, was named inspector of income, and assigner and receiver of rents and contributions from the provinces to be occupied.

We shall not dwell upon particular incidents, neither respecting the movements of the troops nor the engagements, but refer to the chief events, and these only in general. We must, therefore, first observe that the Russians made no haste to render that assistance to the French which had been agreed upon by treaty, but, as we shall hereafter show, in spite of the declaration that they must take the field for France, came late, slowly, and with by no means a numerous army into the field, that therefore the Grand-duke Ferdinand drove back the Polish army and occupied Warsaw. Napoleon gave vent to his dissatisfaction with the Russians in the strongest terms. The Archduke John, who marched to Verona, found a very insignificant opponent in the Viceroy Eugene. He twice gained advantages in the field, and supported the rising in the Tyrol by troops led thither under the command of Chasteler and Jellalich. All the advantages, however, gained by the Archdukes Ferdinand and John proved vain when the capital fell into possession of the enemy. On the 9th of April the Archduke Charles formally declared war to the Duke of Danzig (Lefebvre), who was then in Munich, and in command of the Bavarian army; and instead of following the plan at first agreed upon, of marching through Franconia to the Maine, he advanced into Bavaria from the Inn. Napoleon was at that time greatly dissatisfied with Berthier's arrangements. He accused him of having divided the army too much, so that the archduke might have been able to defeat the corps one after another, had not his march been so slow. The grand-duke set out on the 8th, and did not reach the Isar till the 15th, being, therefore, seven days in marching about fifty miles. Berthier had hastened, by the Emperor's command, from Strasburg to Augsburg, and, in spite of all the representations to the contrary made to him by Masséna as well as Davoust, had given orders for the separation of the two armies, instead of keeping them together. The Archduke Charles was consequently generally blamed on account of the slow advance of his troops. The French

likewise blame the archduke's delay, but the victory is ascribed by them to the extraordinary ability of the general, who, having gained the battle of Auerstadt, continued to hold the whole Austrian army in check with a single division of the French army. On this point the Austrian and French generals who have written the history of the war agree, although they are of very different opinions concerning details, and the cause of the duke's defeat.\* To the great dissatisfaction of Napoleon, Davoust, with his corps, had been sent by Berthier to Ratisbon, and Masséna was left alone. Davoust afterwards found it advisable for a time to relinquish Ratisbon to the Austrians; but in the meanwhile he kept in check, between Ratisbon and Eeckmühl, the whole left wing of the Austrian army, with which the archduke was advancing with incomprehensible slowness, till the Emperor, who had joined the army, had repaired Berthier's fault, and brought the whole under his command. The Emperor had thrown himself, with the Bavarians and Wirtembergers, on the left wing of the Austrian army, which, under the Archduke Lewis and Field-marshal Hiller, was advancing as slowly as the right wing, under the Archduke Charles, in the direction of Landshut. As early as the 19th a bloody engagement was fought at Than and Pfaffenhofen, in which both sides boasted of the victory. The French, however, succeeded in completely separating the two wings of the enemy's army—or, more properly, the army under the Archduke Charles—from that under the Archduke Lewis and Marshal Hiller.

Hiller was attacked on the following day (the 20th), between Abensberg and Landshut, by the troops under the command of the Emperor himself, and, after an obstinate struggle, which the French call the battle of Abensberg, the Germans were compelled to retire. So much is certain; but the report that the French made 9000 prisoners, captured 30 pieces of cannon, and an immense number of

\* Pelet has availed himself of Stutternheim's book. He complains of only having been able to procure the first part of it. Stutternheim, however, died before the work was completed. Pelet, vol. i., pp. 202, 203, writes as follows: "Les Autrichiens prétendent être décidés aux changemens opérés dans leur premier plan d'après les avis de la concentration des forces Françaises à la rive droite du Danube. Ils ont même cru alors que nos armées devaient se réunir sur le Lech. Si tel était leur véritable motif, ils doivent avoir communication des ordres donnés à nos corps ou à nos alliés, car celui d'Oudinot arriva seul vers le fin de Février à Augsbourg, et il n'y eut de mouvement dans la position de l'armée Bavaoise que celui de la division de Wrede, portée d'Augsbourg à Strasburg. Le corps de Masséna ne fut rassemblé à Ulm que dans les derniers jours de Mars, et celui de Davoust arrivait à la même époque dans la Franconie. Ces rapports et les ordres auraient dû aller et revenir de la Bohême à Vienne, et le contremarche de l'armée ennemie a commencé le 19ème. Ces variations furent très préjudiciables aux intérêts de la maison d'Autriche. Cette puissance semble être tombée dans le piège où elle voulait précipiter son adversaire. Quand il faut agir pour la surprendre, elle hésite. Elle croit pouvoir à sa volonté commencer ou retarder la guerre, et changer, au moment de l'exécution, par une manœuvre de seize marches qui a employé vingt-et-un jours, un projet dont la réussite était dans la célérité. Grande faute de ce cabinet! sur laquelle on ne saurait trop insister, afin qu'elle serve de leçon pour toutes les circonstances de la guerre."



baggage and ammunition-waggons, is grossly exaggerated. The main thing was, that Napoleon gained his object; the Archduke Lewis and Hiller were obliged to make a rapid retreat, and the pursuit of them was relinquished to Bessières, who commanded the cavalry. Napoleon himself, and, under him, Lannes, Masséna, and Vandamme, hastened to the assistance of the Duke of Auerstadt, who had to contend against the whole left wing of the Austrian army. The duke fought for five days between Ratisbon and Eeckmühl, till at length Napoleon arrived, at a very favourable moment, on the 22nd, with a part of the troops which he had brought with him from the battle-field of Abensberg, and then the archduke was obliged to yield. During this continuous struggle of five days, both parties lost a great many men, and the result proves that the advantage remained with the French. There was, therefore, no occasion for the falsehoods and boasting of the bulletin. In the official bulletin it was stated that 20,000 Austrians had been made prisoners on the 22nd; while even Savary expressly assures us that the whole number of the Austrians made prisoners during the war did not amount to 20,000, but that as many French as Austrians had been made prisoners of war.

On the 23rd, a fearful struggle took place for possession of the town of Ratisbon, which the Austrians, after the shedding of much blood, and a most destructive fire of artillery, were obliged to evacuate. By this means the way to Vienna by the right bank of the Danube was opened to the French, because the Archduke was compelled to withdraw the whole of his army to the left bank, after the loss of the city, and in order to reinforce his army in Bohemia. The Archduke Lewis and Hiller were also constrained to go thither, because their remaining on the right bank would have completely cut them off from the Archduke Charles. Napoleon's march on the right bank was by no means difficult, because, incomprehensible as it is, no means had been taken so to fortify any single point that the enemy might be stopped or his march delayed. This, too, will explain the reason why such a thoroughly practical man as Bonaparte entertained so much contempt as he did in the year 1809 and 1811, and formerly in Italy in 1797, for prevailing opinions, and the spirit of the nation or people, as long as he was at the head of a victorious army. In 1809, as well as 1797, he had seen no effects whatever of the patriotism of the pamphlets and proclamations; the boasted enthusiasm appeared to be dissipated like mist, and he saw how proud the Bavarians and Wirtembergers were of the praise which he had given them in his bulletins for the share which they had taken in the events of the war. He easily succeeded in captivating the German soldiers and officers, by yielding them a share of the glory, of the titles of honour, and of the booty of the victories; and the princes he enriched by plundering those princes, counts, and imperial barons, who (doubtless from self-interest and prejudice) were unwilling to avail themselves of strangers in order to oppress their countrymen.

The estates of all those were now confiscated who had not conformed to the 7th and 31st articles of the act of confederation of the Rhine, and especially of all those who had continued in the Austrian service, and the booty divided between the *German* princes and their protector. The despotic and cruel King of Wirtemberg received Mergentheim, which had experienced no innovations from the time of the German knights till the peace of Presburg, and at this peace was given as compensation to the German grand master, the Archduke Anthony; it was then even confirmed in all its ancient rights, which it was now to lose. This took place in April. As early as June was commenced that fearful oppression which King Frederick exercised over his dominions, and which reduced Mergentheim, robbed of all its ancient rights, and disturbed in all its usages, to a state of open rebellion, which, from the well-known character of the king, must necessarily lead to its ruin. The inhabitants drove away the Wirtemberg officials, took the garrison prisoners, and restored the old Austrian aristocratic hereditary government. King Frederick forthwith sent his troops—inspired by Napoleon's speeches and praises, and declared to be worthy of the grand army—against the unfortunate and mad countrypeople in Mergentheim. The citizens defended themselves against the soldiers as the Spaniards had defended themselves in Saragossa. The Wirtembergers behaved in Mergentheim as they did in Poland in 1812, and whoever was spared by the swords and bayonets of the troops, was afterwards exposed to the tender mercies of the royal justice, which proved as cruel and unrelenting as the soldiers themselves.

Napoleon having brought with him to Ratisbon and Eeckmühl a portion of the troops with which he had gained the battle of Abensberg, the Bavarians in the mean time continued in close pursuit of Marshal Hiller. The marshal, however, had unexpectedly fallen in with Wrede's corps, driven it back, and thereby secured his passage over the Inn. Just at this moment came to light again the division between the Archduke Charles and the Austrian aristocracy, in consequence of their disinclination to a princely power calculated to place any bounds to their oligarchy. It was said that the Archduke's hesitation, change, and apprehensions at a moment when everything ought to have been risked, had a political foundation; that he had thrice opposed Stadion's plan of the war, and now only unwillingly resolved to issue the proclamations approved in the circles of Rasumowski and Stadion; that he was too well acquainted with the whole essence of Austrian affairs to place much confidence in them, did not wish to break wholly with Napoleon, was anxious to spare the army and materials of war, and had therefore adopted less decisive measures than he should have done; and besides, to the most violent of the proclamations he did not attach his name. From what he did on the 25th, it undoubtedly appears that he was not disposed to undertake a desperate struggle. As early as this date he wrote to his brother, the emperor, that he was unable to maintain



himself against a victorious enemy on the right bank of the Danube, that he was obliged to cross the river, and draw to himself the army commanded by Bellegarde. On the same day (the 25th) he wrote a most singular letter to the Emperor of the French, which the latter did not receive till later, because he had hastened after that part of the army which had retired behind the Inn. The letter is particularly surprising, inasmuch as its contents and language offer the greatest contrast to the contents of all the Austrian official declarations.\* Should Pelet be right, and it appear that the letter was not written on the 25th, as its date indicates, but on the 30th, when the Archduke was marching from Neumarkt to Budweis, its contents would be more easily explained.

Whilst the Archduke Charles was marching to Bohemia, the main body of the French army followed the Austrians, who were descending the right bank of the Danube; we, however, leave it to purely military writers to give an account of particular incidents, as nothing very considerable took place, in consequence of the great superiority of the French in all respects. One fact, however, we cannot overlook, because it was announced in a most ridiculously ostentatious manner in the fifth bulletin, although Napoleon greatly blamed Colonel Cohorn, who was rhetorically praised in the bulletin on account of that needless heroism which cost the life of so many men. Claparède's division, by command of Masséna, was ordered to force the passage over the Traun, and for that purpose to take possession of the bridge at Ebersdorf; this Colonel Cohorn attempted to do by force, although a little lower down, at Lambach, he might have passed without any considerable loss. At Ebersberg he met with a fierce resistance. The bridge was burnt, the town destroyed, and heaps of dead bodies choked up the bridge and the road.†

\* "Sire," writes the Archduke, "V. M. m'a annoncé son arrivée par un tonnerre d'artillerie, sans me laisser le tems de la complimenter. A peine informé de votre presence je pus la pressentir par les pertes que vous m'avez causées. Vous m'avez pris beaucoup de monde, sire; mes troupes ont fait aussi quelques milliers de prisonniers, là où vous ne dirigiez pas les opérations. Je propose à V. M. de les changer, homme pour homme, grade pour grade; si cette offre vous est agreeable, veuillez me faire savoir vos intentions sur la place destinée pour l'échange. Je me sens flatté, sire, de combattre avec le plus grand capitaine du monde. Je serais plus heureux si le destin m'avait choisi pour procurer à ma patrie le bienfait d'une paix honorable. Quels que puissent être les événemens de la guerre ou l'approche de la paix, je prie V. M. de croire que mon desir me conduit toujours au devant d'elle, et que je me tiens également honoré de trouver l'épée ou le rameau dans la main de V. M." In reference to this letter, Napoleon wrote to Davoust: "D'ici à huit jours, on pourra faire la réponse que les gens là sont aussi vils dans l'adversité qu'arrogans et hauts à la moindre lueur de prospérité."

† Venturini, p. 123, gives the following as the report of an eye-witness. If literally true, it does honour to the heart of Napoleon. "It was impossible to ride through the streets covered with ruins and horses. The Emperor therefore walked through the town. Dead and half-burnt men lay by hundreds in the streets; mutilated and burnt limbs obstructed the way at every step. Napoleon stood still, and looked with emotion to heaven. One of his companions said aloud that he had never seen such a dreadful spectacle. Napoleon looked at him quickly, a tear stood in his eye, he sighed out, 'Oh my God!'" Pelet adds that he had *le cœur navré de douleur*, and saw no one more during the whole evening.



Cadet de Gassicourt, at that time on the medical staff, in the account of a journey taken by him at a later period, states that Masséna, in order to clear the bridge and make the road passable, gave orders to throw the dead and dying together into the river Traun. This Pelet, Masséna's eulogist and client, altogether repudiates; but Savary, in his memoirs, gives an account so reasonable in itself, and so free from all military boasting, of the dreadful murder and burning near and in Ebersberg, that whoever has read what he has written on the subject, will find it difficult to approve of the cruel and loathsome deed. It may, moreover, well be attributed to such a man as Masséna, when we know what things he and Soult did in Genoa and elsewhere in 1809, although we by no means wish on this occasion to decide between Pelet and Gassicourt. The immediate object of Cohorn's boldness and Masséna's unsparing strategy, was no doubt gained; for Hiller, who had suffered considerable loss on his retreat, passed to the left bank at Stein, and left the road to Vienna completely free.

Hiller again formed a junction on the other side of the Danube with the Archduke Charles, and the Archduke Maximilian, who at first appeared as if they meant to defend the capital against the French, but soon relinquished the design: the bridges, indeed, were burnt down. On the 13th of May, the capital of Austria was for the second time occupied by the French. The Archduke Charles afterwards encamped on the wide plain on the other side of the Danube; the Emperor of the French knew well that the Austrians would begin to be alarmed the moment they lost a great battle, and it was therefore his object to bring the war to an end as quickly as possible; he made the greatest despatch in constructing a bridge, in order to cross to the other side of the river, and offer a battle. The construction of a bridge in the face of the main force of the Austrians, ready to accept the proffered challenge, was difficult; and the two armies lay for eight days between Salzburg and St. Pölten observing each other.

Between Salzburg and Innsbruck were the Bavarians, who, joined to some French troops, constituted the division of the Duke of Danzig. Next to the Bavarians stood the Wirtembergers, under Vandamme, in order to defend the bridge at Linz against the Austrians, who from thence continually threatened the rear of the French. In fact, Kollowrat made an attempt on the 17th to pass over the bridge, and get behind the French; the attempt, however, for two reasons, proved a failure. First, Kollowrat divided his troops instead of directing his whole force upon one point, and suddenly pushing through; so that the struggle was prolonged, till Bernadotte, who had the Saxons under his command, was able to come up and assist Vandamme. In Vienna lay the imperial guard, the grenadier corps under Oudinot, and those under Masséna and Lannes. The corps under Davoust was stationed from Vienna to St. Pölten. The occupation of the capital, and possession of the

whole right bank of the Danube, compelled the Archduke John also, who had driven the Viceroy Eugene out of his positions at Pordanone and Sacile, and pushed forward towards Verona, to retire under very unfavourable circumstances to the banks of the Danube, in order to march through Hungary, and form a junction with the main army. The viceroy having the assistance of such a general as Macdonald, the retreat could not possibly be effected without considerable loss, as Macdonald followed him quickly, and Marmont, with the army assembled in Dalmatia, had already entered Austrian Croatia in order to form a union with the army of Italy.

The adoption of quick and bold resolutions being altogether foreign to the whole system of Austrian education, government, and administration, the Archduke Maximilian had left behind him in Vienna for the enemy vast materials for the construction of a bridge; but notwithstanding this, the erection of a bridge over the Danube, which is there 2400 feet wide, was attended with great difficulty. As Pelet, who in other respects is to be regarded as the creature of the hateful Masséna, was himself employed in the erection, full information on this subject will be found in his book; we refer to the subject only in general, and give very summary accounts of such things. We must mention, however, that Pelet blames the archduke, because he neither obstructed the erection of the bridge, nor opposed the passage of the French; it, however, appears from all that took place, that he was anxious to bring the war to a termination by a decisive engagement, and preferred having the battle fought on the left bank of the river. For this engagement he had made all the necessary preparations, and during the battle he hoped to destroy the bridge, in order to drive the French into the Danube.\*

The Danube being divided into several branches by islands at Vienna, the French built three bridges, in order to avail themselves of the facilities offered by a large and a small island, both for the building of the bridge and the passage across. One bridge was constructed at Nussdorf, two miles above Vienna, where the bed of the river is very narrow, instead of at the capital, where its breadth attains a measure of 2400 feet. The second bridge was at Spitz, and the third at Ebersdorf, ten miles below Vienna. This bridge did not lead immediately to the left bank, but first of all to an island called Lobau, 2000 rods wide, 2400 long, and 8000 in circumference. A portion of the army was to be moved to this bushy and swampy island, till it could be transported thence to the other side over the smaller arm, which separates Lobau from Ebersdorf. The archduke made no opposition whatever to the crossing; he suffered

\* Pelet, vol. iii., p. 278, states that the archduke was well served by his spies, and then adds: "Le generalissime ne retira pas de ces divers avis les avantages qu'ils semblaient devoir produire. Il ne prit aucune disposition autour du saillant que l'isle de Lobau forme vis-à-vis d'Enzersdorf; en peu d'heures il pouvait l'entourer et le couvrir du feu de son artillerie. Nulle mesure ne fut prescrite pour nous empêcher de déboucher; nul ordre donné aux troupes (du moins à notre connaissance) pour les rapprocher des ponts."



the French to reach Ebersdorf, but on the 21st vigorously attacked that part of the army which had gained the left bank, before the whole force could be brought over. The great object of the battle fought on the 21st was possession of the village of Aspern, after which the Austrians name the battle, whilst the French call it the battle of Esling. Aspern was ten times taken and lost. Without going into any account of the indecisive engagement of the 21st, we must do the French the justice to say, that on the first day of the battle they defended the village of Aspern with a part of the French army against the main body of the Austrians. The bravery of their soldiers, and superior ability and experience of their generals, is universally acknowledged; one circumstance only we must bring prominently forward. It was shown by the murderous engagements of this battle, as well as in all the popular risings of that time, concerning which Pelet rages like a madman, and even preaches morality, that the French had no longer to deal with miserable governments, bureaucrats, and princely generals, but immediately with the whole strength and vigour of the people. No more thousands of prisoners were made, but an equal amount of blood was shed on both sides; and although Lannes kept possession of Esling, and Masséna maintained the ten times lost and captured Aspern, the Austrians remained still in possession of the churchyard of the village.

The battle was not decided on the 21st, because the bridge had been injured, and the French on the left bank, without additional aid, were not equal to the Austrians; in the mean time, however, they succeeded in effecting the necessary repairs, and the battle was renewed on the 22nd. For the first time the hero of the century failed in attaining his object; he had no longer to deal with mercenary troops, but with men whose hearts were full of thoughts of their prince, their country, and their honour. This the men who for poetry's sake make an idol of Bonaparte at all risks, will not admit; the bulletin furnished materials enough to people of this kind. According to their own accounts, the French gained a complete victory, and instead of 17,000 killed and wounded, lost only about as many hundreds.

Bold lying is always more or less successful, and therefore even the most absurd things which the manufacturers of the memoirs of St. Helena bring forward respecting this battle have passed current in most works on the subject.\* How ridiculous all these stories are may

\* On this occasion Thibaudeau shows himself truthful; and yet, like all the others, he was at once a rhetorician and boaster. In vol. iv., p. 293, he writes as follows:—"La France ne compte point la bataille d'Esling au nombre de ses victoires; moins riche pour ne pas dire pauvre en trophées militaires, l'Autriche la mit au rang de ses triomphes. Les faits répondent à cette présomption." To what extent the people who idolise Napoleon drive their nonsense, and what credit they receive, even when they contradict themselves three times in a breath, may be seen from the so-called *Mémoires de Napoleon*, by Montholon (Paris, 1823), vol. ii., note 10, pp. 79-86. It would be absurd to spend time on the subject; those who need any remarks will find them in the *Mémoires d'un homme d'Etat*, vol. x., p. 274, note.



be learned from the number of French general-officers killed and wounded on the 22nd. Lannes, St. Hilaire, Bessières, D'Espagne, and Lassale, were either killed or mortally wounded, and the Austrians succeeded in completely destroying the bridge, partly by fire-ships, and partly by boats and beams carried down by the force of the stream. The river, it is true, was considerably swollen, and the stream ran strong; the Viennese, however, laughed heartily at the simplicity of the French, who boast so much of their intelligence, since their Emperor, for their benefit on this occasion, ventured to give a fabulous account of the wonderful rapidity of the Danube, in order to excuse himself for having, though boasting of the victory, immediately drawn back his troops to the right bank of the river. He had crowded his troops together hastily upon the Island of Lobau, because the bridge between the island and the right bank was carried away, and this part of the army suffered great hardships from the 22nd till the 25th from want and bad weather.

After this battle and the destruction of the bridges, the two armies remained in their positions opposite each other for several weeks, apparently inactive, whilst the French were procuring and preparing everything necessary to build a new bridge. This, therefore, appears to us to be a suitable place to cast a glance on other contemporaneous events, which took place in the Tyrol, Germany, and Poland.

## B.—GERMANY AND FRANCE TILL THE PEACE OF SCHÖNBRUNN.

### 1.—SKETCHES OF THE WAR IN THE TYROL, GERMANY, AND POLAND.

We have already observed, that the German patriots, who from this year forward struggled so gloriously by word and deed for the advancement of their nation, were unable to procure anything for the people but the shells of those fruits, which only fell to the lot of those who from birth, intelligence, or wealth, were closely allied to the princes. This became a matter of experience to the rest of the Germans ten years later; the Tyrolese learned in 1809 and 1810, that their enthusiasm in favour of what was old had been abused, and that they had sacrificed property and life for a mere phantom. The Tyrolese, roused by enthusiasts like Hormayr and his friends, encouraged by Austria, and deceived by promises and demonstrations, rose *en masse*, but, as soon as Austria was defeated, were left a prey to the French and Bavarians. They learned, too, at a later period, when, after Napoleon's fall, they had again obtained the longed-for Austrian government, and reckoned on great gratitude, that the family of the Emperor, descended from the house of Lorraine, was as little disposed to acquiesce in their reasonable wishes as the kings of the house of Deuxponts had been.

In the three years since 1806, the Tyrolese, like the Bavarians, under Montgelas, had been obliged to enter upon the way of progress. Their constitution, laws, institutions, modes of taxation, and administration, had been all changed and regulated by French models. The very reverse, however, of what we see taking place in our days took place in the Tyrol. Governments are desirous of either standing still or retrograding, while the people are eager for advance; at that time in the Tyrol, the people were desirous of standing still, whilst the government was eager for progress, and compelled the people, who clung to priestcraft and the institutions of the middle ages, to do homage to what was new and unusual. The contest which the Tyrolese began and carried on heroically, or if the matter be regarded from another point of view, obstinately and perversely, like the cantons of the *Sonderbund*, cannot be so described by us, as we would describe them, if the prize for which they struggled appeared to us worth the contest. At that period we acknowledged and admired the perseverance of the Tyrolese, which afforded a very striking contrast to the indifference of the Germans and Italians, who also found the insolence of the French intolerable; and we rejoiced that the Spaniards and the Tyrolese proved to the much-admired hero that the people were of more value than he thought; time, however, has cooled us down. We shall now merely give a dry recital of the facts. Von Hormayr and others have described the war in the Tyrol with enthusiasm; we refer to their accounts, and merely observe that Napoleon showed much bitterness because Katt, Dörenberg, Schill, Brunswick-Oels, the Spanish war, and the rising in the Tyrol, as well as Bernadotte's loud complaints concerning the insults heaped upon his Saxons, and at a later period his conduct in Antwerp and his associations in Paris, were all signs of a general fermentation, of which he wished to know nothing, because he had been utterly spoiled by the idolatry, of which he had been the object.

Chasteler, who was desirous of being regarded as a Tyrolese, and Von Hormayr, who was really one, were at the head of a secret society in the Tyrol formed against Bavaria. Fanatical, and in all respects narrow-minded persons, such as Andreas Hofer, Joseph Haspinger the Capuchin, Speckbacher, Glarel, and the innkeepers Martin Schenk and Peter Mayer, went through the various districts and villages, and established a species of government among the people. Joseph Eisenstecker also, who was called Hofer's adjutant in 1808, already played a political part in this same year. Everything was arranged with the Austrian government, and in February, 1809, Hofer and others went to Vienna, in order to discuss or determine on the plans proposed in January. In March, Major Martin Teimer, of the Tyrolese militia, travelled over the whole province by command of Chasteler, in order to prepare measures for carrying out the insurrection already agreed upon. On the 9th of April, Chasteler, with his division, advanced into the

Puster Thal, and sent the Salzburg chasseurs over the steep mountains into the Ziller Thal; Nepomucenus von Kolb, who afterwards led thousands of fanatical peasants to the fight in the Puster Thal and at Brixen, distributed in all directions the summons to a general rising, which commences with the words "*Up! Tyrolese, up! The hour of deliverance is near.*" ("Auf! Tiroler, auf! Die Stunden der Erlösung ist nahe!") The cause of the insurrection was first promoted in the Voralberg by Von Hormayr, and afterwards carried on by Dr. Gries, Riedmüller, innkeeper in Pludenz, and especially by Dr. Schneider. Hofer, the innkeeper of Passeyer, possessed almost exclusively the confidence of his countrymen, and often stood at the head of thousands. The Bavarian General Kinkel, who lay in Innspruck, thought to be able to frighten them by severity, and issued an order that every citizen or countryman taken in arms should be immediately shot. This was the signal for all the horrors of a social war. Hofer gave directions to pay like with like; and in the Tyrol, both innocent and guilty fell a prey to the desperate passions of the antagonists.

Fortune at first favoured the insurgents; they drove the Bavarians out of the Tyrol, made about 6000 prisoners, took possession of Innspruck on the 14th of April, and on the 17th laid siege to Kufstein. The Bavarians were no sooner driven out than the Tyrolese sent three deputies to the Emperor Francis, in Vienna, who brought back a letter from him to their fellow-countrymen. The emperor, just as if he had never ceded the Tyrol, most singularly ordered the States to be summoned. They assembled according to ancient form, and drew up a reply to the emperor. This was not answered till after the battle of Aspern, about the end of May, when the Tyrolese, under Hofer, and their fanatical leaders had, without the help of the Austrians, maintained themselves against the French and Bavarians. The imperial letter was so expressed that the Tyrolese afterwards complained, with good reason, that the emperor had sacrificed them for the promotion of his own political objects. He assured them in his note "*that he would conclude no peace, except such as should connect the Tyrol and Voralberg indissolubly with his empire.*"\* The ministry in Vienna had previously, when the Archduke Charles marched towards Bohemia, and the French occupied Vienna, recalled the Archduke John and General Jellalich, who were to support the rising in South Tyrol by force of arms; and both of them made all possible haste to reach the Danube through Styria. Lieutenant-general the Marquis Chasteler remained in North Tyrol with a few Austrian troops, to assist the insurgents, who were encamped around Kufstein, and sent out parties as far as Bavaria. The troops under Chasteler's leading fought by no means unsuccessfully at Schwatz and Kufstein with the French and Bavarians; but as soon as Wrede could be spared from the Danube the

\* For this correspondence see *Lebensbilder*, vol. iii., No. XVII., pp. 375-382.



Tyrolese were obliged to yield, and Chasteler also was recalled, which, as we shall see hereafter, was a thing very much desired by him.

The inhabitants of the Voralberg were also in arms; Von Hormayr and Dr. Schneider organised the insurrection, and Riedmüller, innkeeper in Pludenz, made some forays even across the borders. When for a short time the Duke of Danzig's corps appeared indispensable on the Danube, he had succeeded in taking a Bavarian dépôt, in making himself master of their military chest, and in driving the Wirtembergers out of Landau. Wrede, with his Bavarians, supported by the French, marched first of all against the Tyrolese before Kufstein, with whom at that time Chasteler and the Austrians were united. The Bavarians, it is true, succeeded in relieving Kufstein, but with great loss in men, and drove the Tyrolese back. Chasteler afterwards, at the head of the militia, offered them battle at Soll and Würzel, on which occasion again the Bavarians were obliged to purchase the victory by a great loss of men, after a most obstinate contest.

The Bavarians pushed forward through the passes towards Innspruck, but met with vigorous resistance at every step. Immense stones were rolled down to block up the way, Tyrolese sharp-shooters occupied every position, and an ambuscade was to be dreaded in every gorge; and, besides, the war was attended with all the cruelties of civil strife. The Bavarians and Tyrolese in their turn exercised Spanish cruelties. At Rottenberg and Schwatz the Bavarians behaved like cannibals. Above a hundred men—none of whom had even been in arms—were hanged upon the trees; women and children were cut to pieces, and fourteen prosperous hamlets were burnt down. This took place at the time when Chasteler was recalled; shortly before these murderous scenes, therefore (3rd May), he offered to evacuate the Tyrol, and advised the insurgents to lay down their arms and to separate, if they were assured of exemption from punishment. Wrede not only bluntly declined the proposal, but at the same time sent a document to the Austrian general, which stands alone in its kind, and displays a higher degree of insolent assumption in the French idol than the decree of banishment issued against Baron von Stein. The decree which Napoleon issued against the Austro-Belgian marquis was directed against a very different man from Von Stein. The latter was bolder, more courageous, and enterprising; and whenever anything was undertaken against the French, never failed. The marquis, on the other hand, was frightened, trembled, and disappeared; and on all occasions, whenever he had an opportunity, showed that everything was forgotten and forgiven. Napoleon's decree, to which we have just referred, ran as follows:

"The person named Chasteler, who calls himself an Austrian general, the originator of the insurrection in the Tyrol, and instigator of the murder of French and Bavarian prisoners, seized and

imprisoned by the insurgents against the right of nations, shall, whenever found, be placed before a court-martial, and shot within twenty-four hours." The Emperor did not satisfy himself with this decree, as he was full of fury, because the people showed themselves to be something different in all corners of the country, from what he either could or would suppose them to be, from the conduct of the higher ranks, with whom alone he had hitherto had to do. He overwhelmed the Marquis Chasteler, in his eleventh bulletin, with a complete torrent of abusive words, the vehemence of which against a person of such rank would be quite inexplicable from a man who had brought counts, marquises, and barons again into fashion, did we not learn from Pelet, Savary, and, last of all, from Von Hormayr, that Cossard, the Austrian deputy to the Spanish insurgents, the Corsican Pozzo di Borgo, attached to the Russian ministry, and the Marquis Chasteler, were regarded as Napoleon's bitterest personal enemies?\*

Chasteler was a man of considerable importance in Vienna, both by birth and rank; whilst, therefore, the Emperor Francis gave himself no trouble whatever in reference to Hofer, he wrote a letter to the Archduke Charles, threatening reprisals in case of any injury being inflicted on Chasteler contrary to the law of nations. The archduke was ordered, should such a case arise, to pursue the same course towards two French general officers, who were prisoners of war.† Hormayr alleges that from that time Chasteler completely lost his presence of mind. Wrede having taken possession of Innsbruck since the 19th, and made a coarse, threatening speech from the balcony of the Town Hall to the people assembled in front of it, the whole Tyrol appeared to be reduced to quiet subjection. The battle of Aspern, however, not having terminated, as had been expected by the French, Lefebvre, to whose corps the Bavarians belonged, was obliged to withdraw to Salzburg, and Wrede, in like manner, to retreat from the banks of the Upper Inn to those of the Danube, before he had time to drive the insurgents, and the few Austrians associated with them, out of the high mountains of the Isel and other districts.

Wrede left General Deroy with 6000 men and 13 pieces of cannon in Innsbruck. The whole Tyrol rose upon them a second time. The people summoned to arms assembled on the further side of the Brenner, and, accompanied by a few thousand Austrians, marched

\* In vol. iii. of the *Lebensbilder*, Von Hormayr says: "From Pelet and Savary the real grounds of Napoleon's hatred have been first clearly known . . . . Bonaparte alleged, namely, that Chasteler was the author of a plan, betrayed to him by a double system of spies in 1808, of a counter-revolution for the restoration of the Bourbons. This declaration of outlawry made a scarcely credible impression upon the mind of a man of such intrepidity as Chasteler—a thing only to be explained by some great bodily excitement. . . . Louis Cossard, the bearer of these as well as many other thorny *mémoires* and back-breaking letters, was Chasteler's companion from his earliest years."

† In *Lebensbilder*, vol. iii., pp. 380-381, will be found the correspondence here mentioned.



from thence against the capital. According to common report, which it would not be worth while to verify, the number of the insurgents who marched against Innspruck amounted to some 20,000 men. A similar attack was made upon Count Arco, in Schwatz. Both generals were speedily cut off from their friends, left in the midst of a hostile country, and obliged to fight their way through to Upper Bavaria with great danger and loss of troops. In the course of the various engagements fought by the Bavarians during the honourable but destructive retreat, above 3000 Bavarians were partly slain and partly taken prisoners. From this moment Hofer of Passeyer, Speckbacher of Rinn, and Zoppele of Sarnthal, were regarded as heroes and saviours of their country's liberty, though, in fact, they were neither one nor the other. A greater degree of order prevailed in the Voralberg, where the influence of Von Hormayr and Dr. Schneider was predominant, than in the Tyrol, properly so called. From the Voralberg forays were made beyond Kempten. We stop here, because we must subsequently return to the Tyrol, and shall merely, in the mean time, remark that Von Hormayr, in a few sheets of his *Lebensbilder*, has most clearly shown that even then, as ever, cabals and party interests always had the foreway in Austria, and rendered the fruit of all noble efforts entirely useless. Persons who called the selfishness of their caste, policy, and despised men who were genuine patriots, sacrificed the honour of the reigning house to their own present humiliating advantages.\*

Before mentioning the unfortunate national movements in Germany, more or less caused by Austria, or at all events favoured by Austrian statesmen, we must direct attention very briefly to the Archduke Ferdinand's campaign in Poland. Napoleon sent the whole Saxon army to the Danube; Poniatowski, with the weak Polish army, was to defend the duchy of Warsaw; and the King of Saxony received a hint from the Emperor of the French, who was probably more afraid of Austrian cabals than of their military power, to leave Dresden. He first went to Leipsig, and afterwards even to Frankfort. Poniatowski, with the Poles whom he commanded, was not only to defend the duchy of Warsaw, but in conjunction with the Russian army which the Emperor Alexander was to send according to the terms of the treaty, to occupy the provinces of Galicia and Austrian Silesia. For a long time the Russians did not make their appearance at all, and it was generally said, that the Austrians had only moved forward so rapidly to Warsaw because they expected that Russia and Prussia would join their arms against France. This was the only explanation which could be given of what was otherwise a great strategical error of the Archduke Ferdinand, who, having driven Poniatowski across the Vistula and occupied Warsaw, scattered his troops as far as Thorn, seeing that Prince Gallizin, with two divisions of the Russian army,

\* See *Lebensbilder*, part iii., pp. 360-368.



were really within eight marches of Warsaw. As is now well-known, the archduke knew that Prince Gallizin would not of his own accord do him any injury. Poniatowski, too, who was at the same time minister of war in Warsaw, was also at first to be won over; and those who served under him could not, however, put any faith in the Austrians, although Poniatowski and the archduke had twice met. On the second occasion it was agreed that the Austrians should enter Warsaw on the 21st of April, whilst the Saxon troops then in the city, the French ambassador, and the commandant, should depart down the Vistula, and be afterwards allowed to proceed to the Danube. Neipperg tried all his diplomatic eloquence on Poniatowski in vain; the latter left the city, and encamped between the Bug and the suburb of Praga.

In order to explain the reason why the archduke directed the march of his forces towards Posen and Thorn, leaving Galicia wholly without protection, it is absolutely necessary to be made acquainted with the intrigues which were at that time set on foot by Von Golz, the Prussian minister, and the Prince of Orange. The fullest account of these intrigues, to which the King of Prussia was no stranger, and on account of which Colonel von Steigentesch had been sent from Vienna to Königsberg in June, the necessary information will be found in a report by Baron von Linden, Westphalian minister in Berlin, made to his own court respecting the results of his espionage, and in a letter from Count Stadion to Baron von Wessenberg, who was at that time Austrian minister in Berlin.\* These intrigues either failed for want of resolution on the part of the King of Prussia, or were frustrated by the diplomatic skill and activity of D'Oubril, the Russian minister. D'Oubril having too hastily concluded the treaty between France and Russia in 1806, which the emperor refused to ratify, remained for some time in disgrace, but had been again called into active service since the peace of Tilsit.

The Archduke Ferdinand still continued his advances towards Prussia, in which he was able to reckon confidently on the dislike of the people for the French, and on their patriotism up till May; in this month, however, he was threatened by the Poles and French under Poniatowski from Galicia. On the 14th of May, the Polish general took possession of Lublin, and on the 18th of Sandomir, whilst on the same day the archduke was causing an attack to be made upon Thorn. Immediately afterwards the archduke was obliged to relinquish all his conquests in the duchy of Warsaw, in order to draw nearer to the army under his brother the Archduke, Charles. From this moment no further idea could be entertained of Prussia taking any part in the war, because the King of Prussia himself had expressly declared to Colonel Steigentesch, that he could come to no conclusion till the Austrians had gained some decisive advantage.

\* Both documents are to be found in vol vii. of the "Correspondance inedit, officielle et confidentielle de Napoleon Bonaparte;" Baron Von Linden's Bericht, pp. 395-407; and Stadion's Letter, pp. 410-420.

The French were in the highest degree dissatisfied with the conduct of the Russians, and especially of Prince Gallizin, their commander, both before and after the retreat of the Archduke Ferdinand; and the Emperor of the French expressed himself so strongly on the subject, that it was suspected from that time forward that there was an end to the intimate friendship between the two emperors. Pelet, from a desire to accuse the Russians, states, that General Gortschakoff, who was with his troops at Brzesk, wrote a letter to the Archduke Ferdinand congratulating him on the success of an engagement with Poniatowski. This letter fell into the hands of the Polish general, and was sent through General Bronikowski to Napoleon. The Emperor of the French was vehemently enraged, made use of some very strong expressions, and complained bitterly to Tchernitcheff, who happened at that moment to be with him engaged in one of those spying operations in which he was so frequently employed by the Emperor Alexander, from 1808 till 1812.\* It appeared, indeed, as if Gallizin, by the position which he had taken up, was much more disposed to protect the Austrian territory against the Poles than to do any injury to the archduke. Gortschakoff's letter was sent to Petersburg, and as it was still found advisable to keep up feelings of friendship with the French, satisfaction was partly given by the recal of Gortschakoff. Gallizin, who, however, had by no means a numerous army, subsequently only showed himself active when it became necessary to occupy any town or district before or at the same time with the French and Poles.

The Russian commander-in-chief wrote repeatedly to the Emperor of the French, that he was about to march against Olmütz; and yet it is well known that he had express commands not to cross the Vistula, and to confine himself to the occupation of the districts around Cracow; and the Russians did not even advance as far as Cracow, till Poniatowski was about to take possession of the city. In order to anticipate him in this step, which he was about to execute at the head of 15,000 men, thirty Russian dragoons and sixty Cossacks suddenly dashed forward hastening before him into the city, and he had no sooner entered, than he was followed by 5000 Russians, in order to share the occupation of the city. In this way failed the third warlike undertaking of the Austrians, calculated upon the great dislike of the people to the French, and upon the secret societies in Germany, and especially in Prussia, called into action by the Prussian patriots. The mad attempts of a few adventurers to use for their own undertaking the popular hatred of the French, to which we must now refer, merely served to give the appearance of justice to the persecution of all the noble friends of the country.

\* Pelet. "Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809," vol. iii., p. 74., a note runs as follows: "Napoleon fut aussi courroucé qu'étonné de cette découverte. En se rendant d'Ebersdorf à Schoenbrunn (31 Mai), il questionnait sur la Russie un de ses aides-de-camp arrivé du Nord depuis quelque tems. D'après les réponses du général l'Empereur s'écria: 'IL ME FAUDRA DONC FAIRE ENCORE LA GUERRE AVEC ALEXANDRE.'"



The first attempt to originate a war in Germany against the French, such as that which was being carried on in Spain, was made by some Prussian officers and soldiers, who were filled with the love of military glory, by means of which the liberation of Germany from a *foreign yoke*, if not from *arbitrary dominion*, was afterwards effected. But this enthusiasm alone would have produced just as little effect in Spain as in Germany against regular and well-disciplined troops, as is proved by the shameful defeats of the Spanish armies, if English armies and administration had not introduced order into Spain, and Prussian and Russian armies brought it into Germany. In this respect Gneisenau judged very correctly; he attached but very small importance to the *Tugendbund*; he and his friends therefore worked zealously to give a popular character to the Prussian government and the whole system of military administration; and it was not their fault if it did not continue afterwards to retain that character. The adventurers, of whom it is our business here to speak, were of a different opinion. The Russian army and Prussian honour had been disparaged and disgraced, and they considered it their duty and privilege to save or to revenge them. They were not so anxious to take under their protection the rights of the people, and to maintain them against military power, as to struggle against and overcome French power by German. They were therefore able to rely for support on the English and Hanoverian aristocracy, on the old Elector of Hesse, with whom Austria, and all who had to do with him, were extremely dissatisfied, on William of Brunswick, Stadion, Rasumowski, and their partisans, and on the old Prussian spirit which still survived among the nobility; such men, however, were wholly incapable of rousing the feelings or spirit of the nation. The times, too, were unfavourable; and the King of Prussia was so little capable of adopting any bold resolution, that the men who enjoyed and deserved the confidence of the nation, and then filled the most important offices in Prussia, secretly promoted the undertakings of these adventurers, without any hope of their success, but merely with a view to prevail upon the king to take part with Austria in the war, and if it should succeed, in creating a general rising in Germany. As we have neither the inclination nor the means to enter into details, in order to show the manner in which these adventurers were borne with or aided by the Russian authorities, we shall merely refer to a few of those men who, at the time of these disturbances in Germany, were possessed of political or military power. Lestocq commanded the garrison of Berlin; Justus Gruner, of whose political usefulness Von Stein formed a correct estimate, but whom he too imprudently used in 1813 and 1814, was director of police; Tauenzien, governor of the Mark; and Scharnhorst at the head of the war department when Schill undertook his movement. This, however, was obliged to be relinquished; for at the time at which he commenced active proceedings, the Archduke Charles had been driven out of Bavaria.



Captain von Katt was the first who madly attempted, with a handful of people, to set the French power at defiance, without any hope of ultimate success. He had entered into an arrangement with the Duke of Brunswick-Oels, and was in connexion with the Austrians, although he entered upon his plans before the Austrians had made a declaration of war. Towards the 15th of April, Katt got together a considerable number of Russian soldiers, of whom in consequence of the reduction of the army, the country was at that time full—marched through the Old Mark, and directed his steps towards Magdeburg. He had some confederates in the fortress, and hoped to take it by surprise; but as he was opposed before he reached the city, his friends within proved useless to him. In Stendal and Burgstall he succeeded, it is true, in carrying off the Westphalian army-chests, but the prefects and General Michaud, who went from Magdeburg to meet him, frustrated his undertaking without trouble. He was obliged to save himself by taking refuge on the Prussian territory; and the Prussian government, in order to avoid the appearance of having taken any part in his undertaking, was obliged to send troops against him. His plunder was taken away from him, his people scattered, and he himself escaped to Bohemia, where at that time Duke William of Brunswick-Oels was engaged in recruiting a number of troops. Katt afterwards played a distinguished part among the bold people, whom the Duke afterwards collected, first in Bohemia, then in Silesia, and with whom at a later period he marched to the Weser.

Even before the Duke availed himself of the enthusiasm of the kindhearted southern Germans in favour of the old Hanoverian and Brunswick nobility, as well as the bureaucracy and administration of Byzantine law restored in 1815 in all its strictness, there was a man who had excited the good but narrow-minded inhabitants of Electoral Hesse in favour of the old elector, at whose expulsion every one rejoiced. Everything directed against the French was at that time considered as genuine patriotism, otherwise no man would have taken any part in a conspiracy set on foot by such a man as Herr von Dörenberg. The peasants of Hesse and Lower Saxony, who looked upon the present evils and mischief of foreign soldiers and commissioners as something intolerable, and did not attach any great value to the uncertain advantages of a complete change of things, assembled sometimes here and sometimes there, and formed themselves into military associations. The military commissions established in Cassel, Brunswick, and Magdeburg against the originators and promoters of disturbances, increased the anger of the people instead of cooling it down. These blood-thirsty commissions tormented the people and persecuted especially all those who had been in military service in Germany. They caused them to be watched like robbers, and all their movements to be closely observed. Katt's mad attempt gave rise to the appointment of those commissions, because the number of those who sympathised with him was not small.

In Hesse the noble ladies of the institution at Homberg, the members of the *Tugend-verein*, enthusiastic professors, students, and officers formerly in service, were the mere tools for the working of a plan, carved out by German officers in Jerome's guard, by some of his courtiers, and by a part of his immediate attendants. The soul of the whole undertaking was Herr von Dörenberg, who had arranged the affair with the Elector, who, when it failed, had the assurance to offer him a thousand dollars as a compensation. He was a colonel in the king's Westphalian guard, and had been treated by his majesty with particular distinction. His intention was to get up an insurrection among the peasants, and should the king, who had only between 1200 and 1300 men with him in Cassel, send out these to put down the tumult, then to make himself master of his person. There did, in fact, assemble immediately in Upper and Lower Hesse some thousands of peasants, of whom, according to Malchus, only a few hundreds were armed. The people of Lower Hesse, who honoured the Elector as the Russians do the Czar, were to take possession of Cassel; those of the upper province to seize upon Marburg; whilst it was hoped that the troops might be alienated from the king by means of officers, whose services were purchased by the elector, and who would make themselves masters of the king's person. The irregular and badly armed peasants of Wolfhagen and Homberg rushed towards Cassel, and were only about twelve miles from the town when the whole plot was discovered. Dörenberg proved unsuccessful in his attempt, made under the mask of patriotism, to induce the king's *jäger* guard to join in his shameful plot; only a very few joined him, accompanied by whom he fled to join the peasants. At the head of the peasants with whom he foolishly supposed he could act as with soldiers, he regularly attacked Cassel on two sides, from the Paderborn Gate and from Knallhütte, instead of allowing the people to fight after their own fashion. Eblé, the minister of war, ordered twenty cannon to be brought out of the arsenal, and with a few hundred men went out against thousands, who had now reached Knallhütte, within six miles of the town. The whole affair was over in about twenty minutes without bloodshed. The peasants were easily scattered and driven home, and Dörenberg obliged to seek safety in flight to Bohemia. As he was so meanly treated by the elector, he resolved, like Katt, to cast in his lot with Duke William.

The rising in Upper Hesse, directed against Marburg, proved much more considerable than this insurrection of the peasants about Homberg and Wolfhagen, afterwards joined by some others against Cassel. An accident enabled the government to bring together a greater number of troops in a short time there than in Cassel. The aged Marshal Kellermann happened to be at Frankfort in order to oversee the drilling of the French conscripts, to organise the old soldiers collected there from various quarters in battalions, and to



send them forward to the imperial army. Of these battalions he immediately sent some to Marburg and into those neighbourhoods where any symptoms of disturbance appeared. By this means the insurrection was nipped in the bud.

On this occasion King Jerome behaved in a very noble manner, as appears from his address to the officers of the troops summoned to the palace, and whom Dörenberg had attempted to seduce. After the victory, too, he showed great clemency towards the originators and promoters of the insurrection. We shall give in a note the manuscript refutation given us by Count Malchus of the calumniating account of the affair given by a Frenchman. Count Malchus was at that time, as is well-known, a minister in Cassel, and has assured us, not only that not a single life was lost, but that the young people of Dörenberg's family, who were being educated at the military academy in Brunswick, were allowed to remain there, and suffered no inconvenience whatever.\*

The undertakings of Schill and the Duke of Brunswick-Oels in Lower Germany, were of far greater historical importance than the very equivocal affairs to which we have just referred, set on foot either by ambitious or very light-minded persons, whose reasons appear to us very suspicious. They likewise failed, it is true; their originators were merely soldiers, and besides robbery and plunder, aimed at the restoration of what was old; but they gave an opportunity for bringing to light the general feelings of the Germans, proved that there was still a strong national sense, and that the Germans had not all fallen asleep like the Italians, with whom the French had to do. Hundreds had fought for life or death; they were celebrated as martyrs, and their cruel fall excited such an enthusiasm, that their characters were wholly overlooked, and their

\* Count Malchus in his annotations to page 113 of the "Royaume de Westphalie (Paris, 1820)," writes as follows:—"The whole story is incorrect. It is merely true, that there was no news in Cassel of the beginning of the insurrection, which is not much to the praise of the police. The first information of an assembling of the peasants arrived about the middle of the day fixed upon for the attack upon the town. At the same time came the certainty that Colonel Dörenberg of the guards was at the head of the whole affair. Dörenberg, formerly a captain in the Prussian service, had succeeded so far in ingratiating himself with the king, that he was rapidly promoted, and even made one of his adjutants; on his promotion to which office he had a few hours before taken the oath of fidelity to the king—scarcely three hours before the arrival of the news. He succeeded in escaping and joining the insurgents, whom, during the night, he led against the town. On their meeting with the troops sent against them, they were utterly dispersed in a quarter of an hour. Dörenberg's attempt to seduce the troops from their allegiance was fruitless, as he was joined by no more than seven cuirassiers. The rising in Marburg cost no life except that of a colonel on half-pay." The author of this history has read with sorrow the following passage in the third volume of the *Lebensbilder*, in reference to a man whom the Germans and the Swiss call their *Thucydides*, and who, by the favour of Bonaparte and Bassano, was minister of public instruction:—"It is known to few that Johannes von Müller was not actively engaged in the insurrection (for that he had not the courage), but WELL ACQUAINTED WITH DÖRENBERG'S PLANS, AND WITH EARNEST WISHES FOR ITS SUCCESS, FAITHFULLY KEPT THE SECRET (to bring back an old corporal and usurer)."



deaths produced a greater effect through the public sympathy than even a victory could have done under the then existing circumstances.

Lieutenant von Schill, by his defence of Colberg, and still more by the manner in which he was celebrated in Berlin, as the saviour of the honour of Prussian soldiers, had gained the distinction of a national hero—a German Horatius Cocles; he was made a major, and in December, 1808, removed to Berlin. He unfortunately, however, regarded himself as a general fit for command, while he was, in fact, merely a brave soldier. The Queen and the ladies of Berlin, as happens on such occasions, had raised this enthusiasm for Schill into a fashion, and thereby did great injury to the good cause in the minds of sensible people, while they misled a number of young people, who at another time might have been very useful to their country, to consider themselves called to make the impossible possible. The extent to which this idolatry of Schill prevailed may be learned from a work, which we shall quote below, and from which we shall merely select a passage as an example.\* Schill found in Berlin a number of bold young men in favour of his plan, to constrain the King of Prussia to go to war against his will, and for this purpose to profit by the removal of the French and German troops from the country between the Elbe and the Weser. He hoped that if one regiment carried away another with it, the king would have no alternative, if he were not willing to become a victim to Bonaparte, but to support a bold undertaking and call forth both army and people to a desperate struggle. He won the good-will of the soldiers under his command by his friendly demeanour, by taking the greatest care of their clothing and arms, and even by festivals which he arranged for them from time to time.

There can be no doubt, whatever, that he was secretly favoured by Scharnhorst, Lestocq, Tauenzien, and others; that the aristocratic alliance of Stein, Stadion, and Count Münster, were thoroughly informed of his views, and that he was brought immediately into communication with Duke William of Brunswick by the instrumentality of a noble lady in Berlin.

In April, 1809, when the war between France and Austria began, he resolved to avail himself of the opportunity, by means of a general rising, to drive the whole of the French out of North Germany, and to convert his little band into a numerous army. In order to lead astray the French and German spies in Napoleon's pay,

\* "Ferdinand von Schill. Eine Lebensbeschreibung nach Original-Papieren, herausgegeben von I. C. L. Haben. Leipzig, 2 Theile." The whole of the second part of this life is devoted to the year 1809: the adventure, however, is not in our opinion important enough to dwell upon. The very first pages give an account of the incredible enthusiasm in favour of a man, altogether insignificant in himself—nay, injurious to the cause of the people. At page 4 we find: "So great and general was the enthusiasm in favour of Schill and his exploits, that a less enlightened century might have felt itself tempted to believe that the miracle of the Maid of Orleans had been renewed, merely with the change of time and place."

of whom the country was full, or rather to be able to march unexpectedly from Berlin, the major led out his small troop from the city every morning to exercise, accompanied by their baggage, and furnished with their knapsacks. This practice was to be continued till Romberg, who tried to gain over the soldiers and officers in the Westphalian service, should give the signal. Romberg was detained in Magdeburg, and heavy complaints were made by the French authorities to the Prussian ones; and the major was reduced to the necessity of either immediately beginning his enterprise, or relinquishing the design. General Michaud had made himself master of Romberg's papers in Magdeburg, which he sent to Siméon, the minister in Cassel. The latter caused them to be forwarded through Von Küster, the Prussian minister, to Königsberg, and made some earnest remonstrances and bitter complaints to the king. Von Bothmer, referendary of the Westphalian minister, gave Major Schill a hint of what was going on, so that he was able to make his escape before any orders could be issued for his arrest.

On the 28th of April, Schill's regiment was taken out to exercise as usual; the major on this occasion rode in front of the men, made a very animated speech to the regiment, encouraged both officers and men to strike for the honour and liberties of their country, and found a well-disposed auditory. The whole followed his leading, and not one of them deserted on their march first to Potsdam and afterwards to Wittenberg. Major Zebelin, of the body guards, was sent after him from Berlin to call him back; as, however, the latter held only a private conference with Schill, and when he found him ready to persevere in his object, did not address himself to the officers or soldiers, they naturally presumed that the major was acting with the knowledge and approval of his superiors. The higher authorities were, therefore, and not without reason, accused of a passive participation in his undertaking. Wittenberg, indeed, he was not allowed to enter by the Saxons; but as the Saxon garrison was too weak to oppose him, he was suffered to cross the bridge leading to Dessau, Köthen, and Bernberg, though completely within the range of their guns. Three messages which reached him at this time, made him at first doubtful whether he should not relinquish the undertaking. First of all, he received a letter full of reproaches from General Lestocq; then news of the complete failure of Colonel Von Doerenberg's plan, which was a part of his scheme; and lastly, intelligence of the defeat of the Austrians in Bavaria. Schill, indeed, proposed to his officers to turn back even now—their enthusiasm, however, was too great. Herr Von Lützow, who afterwards became celebrated as the leader of a band of enthusiastic volunteers, gave them excellent advice as to the course which it was their duty to pursue, provided they persevered in their design; Schill, however, was of a different opinion. The latter insisted upon making an attempt to surprise Magdeburg; he, however, failed, as Katt had done before him. He approached within five miles of the fortress, which at that



time had a garrison of 2600 men, but unnecessarily made delays on the road. Those acquainted with such undertakings state, that, notwithstanding those delays, he would probably have taken the city if he had had some infantry with him, but his whole force was cavalry. The same authorities, however, add, that, under the then existing state of affairs, he would have gained nothing even if he had succeeded in getting possession of the city.

Michaud sent his adjutant, General Uslar, from Magdeburg against Schill, but gave him only a few hundred men under his command; these would have been defeated, because Uslar lost his presence of mind, had not a French colonel named Vautier, who was of the party, of his own accord assumed the command, continued the engagement, and at the head of his Frenchmen repelled Schill's attack. This skirmish took place at Dodendorf. Schill, finding himself unable to pass through the village, thought it better no longer to disturb Magdeburg; but his subsequent movements partook of the utter want of plan, which characterised the whole affair. He first turned off to Dömitz, and then to Stralsund, in the hope that some English ships cruising in the Baltic might receive him. It was at that time regarded as a misfortune to those who engaged in the enterprise, that Adolph von Lützow, who had much more military ability than Schill, had been wounded at Dodendorf, and was therefore obliged to separate from the regiment, whereby he was preserved for better times. Before Schill, with his band, reached Stralsund, he was at the same time pursued by the French, and in Prussia, not only he, but all those accused of having favoured him, were declared outlaws.

The King of Westphalia set a price upon Schill's head; the King of Prussia recalled Lestocq and the commandant of Berlin, and declared Schill and all his followers wicked deserters from the service. In the mean time, Schill's bands had increased to such an extent that his corps, on entering Stralsund, amounted to several thousand men; he had, however, lost much valuable time on the march from Dodendorf. He did not arrive at Dömitz till the 17th of May; the Danish and Dutch troops, therefore, which had been summoned to assist in repressing his undertaking, had time enough to hasten up, and followed him close from Dömitz to Stralsund. General d'Albignac, who had secured the favour of the King of Westphalia by the same means employed by many other unworthy persons, to the king's great disadvantage, was destined to take the field against Schill. He, however, showed himself so completely incapable, that General Gratien, who was in Hanover in command of the Dutch troops, was obliged to undertake the duty. He, too, was wholly unprepared, and some days elapsed before his soldiers were ready for the march—they did not reach the Elbe till the 20th. The Danes availed themselves of the pretence of some offence offered to a Danish officer to issue a sort of declaration of war against Schill, and their army under General Ewald appeared before Stralsund almost simul-



taneously with the Dutch troops under General Gratien. On the 25th, Schill took Stralsund, and sought to take up a position in the town; on the same day Ewald, with 1500 Danes, entered Lubeck, and on the 28th Gratien with his Dutch troops arrived at Rostock. As early as the 31st, Stralsund was taken by storm by the united forces. The bravery of the enthusiasts, who on this occasion were uselessly sacrificed for their country and their honour, continued to be manifested till the last moment, and the whole of Germany regarded them as martyrs. Schill's dead body was found in one of the streets, and many brave and honourable men, who loved their country and had followed him as officers, were taken prisoners. Those men were shot in Brunswick and in different French fortresses; the soldiers were treated by the French as brigands, and lauded by the Germans as martyrs for freedom and right. The harshness and cruelty displayed towards Schill's companions had a stronger influence than anything besides in awakening in the minds of the German youth the feeling of vengeance, by which it was animated in 1813. It was announced for some time in the Prussian newspapers, that Lestocq, Tauenzien, and Scharnhorst, had been dismissed, but nothing more was said on the subject after the battle of Aspern.

A third undertaking of a number of young enthusiastic men in favour of liberty and national honour, came whence it might, or at whatever price, ended less tragically than the two already mentioned, and showed at least that if Schill and Doerenberg's attempts had been made at the right time and in connection with Duke William of Brunswick, a most terrible rising might have been organised in the rear of the French. Austria acknowledged Duke William of Brunswick and of Oels in Silesia, son of the duke mortally wounded at the battle of Jena, as his successor, and suffered him—a sovereign prince supported by English money, to raise a corps of his own, which he assembled and trained to arms at Nachod in Bohemia. With the soldiers thus recruited he was anxious, in connexion with Schill, the insurgents, and the old soldiers and officers of Electoral Hesse, to attempt to reconquer his duchy. Had his preparations been completed at the end of April, the disturbances in Hesse and Schill's undertaking might have been attended with more important results; but he was not in a condition to take the field till the 14th of May.

The expedition which the duke was to lead from Bohemia into Germany, was also to be distinguished by outward symbols as an undertaking of vengeance; the duke's cavalry was to be clothed in black, and the front of the shako to be ornamented with a skull and cross bones. On this account the force was called the **BLACK LEGION**. On the whole, this description of patriotic inspiration received an evil look, partly from the character of the prince, whose avenger the legion was to be, and partly from the number of wild and dissolute young men whom it contained, and whom the duke had collected around him. The duke's companions, as well as him-

self, gave numerous and indisputable proofs of admirable courage and the greatest contempt for death; but they neither found the German nation accustomed nor inclined to overlook all other faults and even crimes for the sake of these two military qualities, as the French would have done. Among the officers, Katt, Doerenberg, Bernwitz, and Korfes, were those who rendered the best services in the formation of the legion. Finally, an Austrian general, at the head of 10,000 men, was to march into Saxony, in order to support by arms the rising among the people, for which the duke's undertaking was calculated.

The King of Saxony was in Leipzig, and his troops under Bernadotte on the Danube, when the BLACK LEGION, so called, and the Hessians, in the middle of May, invaded Lusatia; it became necessary, therefore, hastily to collect some troops in Dresden. The corps so assembled was under the command of Colonel Thielemann, who, since the time of the battle of Jena, had been extremely useful to the French by means of intrigues and negotiations, by articles in newspapers, and his activity in espionage, shown under the direction of Marshal Davoust. He had, in fact, proved so serviceable to Davoust, that when Bernadotte received the chief command in Saxony, Thielemann was placed on his staff. He was thoroughly fitted to frustrate the plan of the enthusiasts, for he was served by a number of persons whom he had either bought, or who voluntarily proposed to inform him of everything that was going on in Bohemia, or even consulted about. He succeeded in keeping off the incursion of the duke's corps into Saxony till the close of May—until they were at length supported by the Austrians.

Duke William had raised contributions in Saxony, a thing which could not give the Saxons any very good idea of his zeal for his country; Thielemann, however, had repulsed the Brunswickers at Zittau on the 30th of May, and the sum which had been extorted by the duke in Lusatia was replaced by a similar extortion in Bohemia, which brought the Austrians into Saxony. As early as the 11th of June, Duke William's forces were before Dresden; with the Austrians, said to have been about 10,000 men, which is probably exaggerated. Dresden was occupied, Lobowitz appointed commandant of the city, an embargo laid upon the treasury, and in the course of eight days afterwards several hundred men recruited for the Brunswickers. It appeared for a moment as if the German nation was about to assemble around the Austrian regular troops, to begin a system of military organisation, and to fight. The duke came to Leipzig, and Field-Marshal Kienmayer was named commander-in-chief of the army to be organised; every thing great, however, failed as usual in consequence of the tardiness of the Austrians. There was hesitation and delay, and the general proved himself at last so utterly incapable that Kienmayer left Dresden in disgust, and went back to Bohemia. On the news of the duke's undertaking, and of Kienmayer's appearance in Dresden, the King of



Westphalia, and the Dutch army under General Gratien, were sent for; and the former marched to Dresden with an army of Westphalian and Dutch troops, which it was thought right to call 20,000 men. With this army was General d'Albignac, the miserable favourite of King Jerome, who was accused not only of incapacity but of cowardice, and General Gratien, who, as he pleased, sometimes obeyed the king and sometimes refused to do so. Among all those who held commands in Saxony, Thielemann was indisputably the most active, and the general the most deserving of blame. The Austrians retreated to Bohemia; on the 30th, the combined army took possession of Dresden, and Thielemann pushed forward to Kommotau in Bohemia. He was immediately afterwards obliged to retire, because Ravidjevich, with another Austrian army, had made an incursion from Eger into Franconia. The Westphalian and Dutch troops were obliged to march to Franconia. Thielemann alone remained behind, but was not able to protect Saxony for any length of time. The general came again to Dresden on the 14th, and kept possession of the country till Austria concluded the shameful peace, by virtue of which the Tyrol and Duke William were left to their fate. Since the 14th of June, Ravidjevich had made an expedition to Bayreuth, which had always remained under French dominion since 1806, and had even sent out a foraging corps as far as Nuremberg; if, therefore, better support had been given to the brave and combined forces under Duke William, who were struggling for German honour and right, and were generally commended as heroes, the people would then have no doubt completely separated itself from its governments, as afterwards really took place.

The duke was with his troops at Zwickau, when he was informed that Austria could neither give him any further support, nor procure him any compensation for his losses; Kienmayer, indeed, is said to have proposed to him to make some terms for him in the negotiations for peace, provided he would only renounce all claim to his hereditary principality and to sovereignty. The latter he despised, and adopted the bold resolution of marching with his men to the Weser, and of saving himself and his soldiers on board the English ships, which were lying off the coast. This heroic expedition of the duke inspired with enthusiasm the minds of the Germans, who became afterwards convinced that their oppression was wholly owing to the feebleness and servility of their governments and their officials. From that time forward every man formed a closer alliance with the few patriots of the Prussian union, who were ready to venture everything in order to gain everything, or to fall with honour. That a thousand light cavalry should be able to force their way from Zwickau to Brake on the Lower Weser, without being prevented by the numerous Westphalian, Dutch, and French troops, or even by the Saxons, is like a miracle; the incapacity of their opponents, however, contributed no little to their success: the legion, too, was well received and favoured by the inhabitants of all the districts through



which they had to pass, and finally, what is most important of all, they were peculiarly favoured by fortune.

The duke himself was at the head of the cavalry, Bernewitz led the infantry, and Korfes commanded the artillery. When this force reached Halle from Zwickau on the 26th of July, General Reubel set out from Bremen, and General Gratien from Erfurt, in order to obstruct its way and drive it back. The fifth Westphalian regiment, under the command of Meyronnet, grand-marshal of the kingdom of Westphalia, and recently created Count von Wellingerode, was commissioned to cut off the duke from Brunswick. This regiment of infantry had marched from Magdeburg to Halberstadt, there to wait for the cavalry and artillery, which were to form a part of the force. The duke, however, was thoroughly well-informed of all the movements of the enemy, because the whole of the people were favourable to him, and felt a great dislike to those Westphalians led by the French: and he therefore resolved to fall upon them by surprise. On the evening of the 30th, about six o'clock, he suddenly appeared before Halberstadt. A fearful struggle took place in the streets, and 300 dead were found belonging about equally to the attackers and the attacked; the remainder of the regiment, 1400 strong, were obliged to surrender, in order not to be shot down by the artillery of the legion. The duke, however, durst not remain in Halberstadt, nor did he even enter Brunswick, in order not to compromise individuals, and to bring destruction upon the city in consequence of a recognition of his rights, for the Dutch troops were close behind him, and General Reubel with the Westphalians was already at Oelper, in order to make an attack upon him in front, at the head of 5000 men, in Brunswick. The duke did not wait for this attack; but, with 1500 men, did not hesitate to attack a force triple his own at Oelper on the 1st of August. He was fortunate enough to be able to compel the Westphalians to evacuate the field of battle.

The most intelligent among the duke's officers regarded the attempt which he was making as a mad undertaking, and urged upon him to avail himself of the advantages gained at Oelper to obtain an honourable capitulation; he, however, persevered in his determination. A number of his officers had no inclination to leave Germany; the majority of them, however, followed him to Hanover. He banqueted at Hanover on the 3rd of August, and as early as the 7th reached Elsfleth and Brake, which was at that time the port of Bremen. The duke made himself master of all the small ships and boats on the Weser—embarked his men, and had them conveyed on board the English ships, which were then blockading the river.

The whole of those undertakings, especially the war in the Tyrol and the duke's expedition, made such an impression on the minds of many persons in Germany, that the rashest attempts were made to deliver the country from a foreign yoke. The case of a young Saxon named Stabs may serve as an example. When Napoleon was in Vienna, or, more properly speaking, at Schönbrunn, Stabs was

anxious to play the part of Mucius Scaevola, and to slay the Emperor in the presence of the whole army. The disgrace which fell upon the army of Westphalia in consequence of the defeat at Oelper, and their want of energy in following the duke, compelled the king to dismiss Reubel, who was a great favourite. He was removed from all his offices, and the dismissal printed in the *Moniteur*. He went first to England, and afterwards to America.

## C.—END OF THE WAR—EXPEDITION TO WALCHEREN—THE TYROL.

### 1.—END OF THE WAR.

At the time of the battle of Aspern the princes and aristocrats of the old times, as well as Napoleon and his creatures, who boasted of having introduced a new order of things and a new species of monarchy, were playing a most contemptible game with the people. The former, for the first time in their lives, spoke of the rights of the people and liberty, promised golden mountains, shook hands with citizens and peasants, and addressed to them civilities of all kinds; the latter boasted of having founded new thrones, new etiquette, a new nobility and feudal rights, and both in speech, newspaper, articles and manifestoes, made use of the language of the lowest *sans-culottes*.\* The Emperor pronounced an outlawry against the Marquis Chasteler, by a decree, the expressions of which he himself regarded as so unseemly, that he ascribed it to others, when it was printed in the *Moniteur*. He called Duke William, whom he had robbed of his hereditary dominions, a robber. And when, as yet, there could be no reasonable expectation of the fall of the house of Austria, he declared that the house of Hapsburgh had ceased to reign. He caused Hofer and many of his countrymen to be shot, because they had appealed to the power of arms against him, and called them murderers, because they had risen against the Bavarians, while at the very moment he was making every possible effort to prevail upon the Magyars to rise in rebellion against Austria. In

\* All that appeared in the *Moniteur*, the bulletins, speeches, and proclamations, resembles what Napoleon addressed to his soldiers after their occupation of Vienna: "Un mois après que l'ennemie a passé l'Inn, au même jour, à la même heure, nous sommes entrés à Vienne. (Bignon, viii., p. 196, states that he had paid a visit in Darmstadt to Napoleon, who was on his way to the army, and continues: 'Se souvenant que j'avais été administrateur général de la Russe pendant l'occupation de 1807-1808, il me dit, qu'il m'appellerait bientôt pour remplir les mêmes fonctions à Vienne.') Les Land-wehrs—ses levées en masse, ses remparts, créés par la rage impuissante des Princes de la maison de Lorraine, n'ont point soutenues vos regards. Les princes de cette maison ont abandonné leur capital, non comme des soldats d'honneur qui cèdent aux circonstances et aux revers de la guerre, mais comme des PARJURES qui POURSUIVENT LEURS PROPRES REMORDS. EN FUYANT DE VIENNE LEURS ADIEUX AUX HABITANS ONT ETE LE NEUTRE ET L'INCENDIE; comme Médée ils ont de leurs propres mains egorgé leurs enfans." Compare this description of the attempted defence of Vienna by Archduke Maximilian with the inflated account of the defence of Paris in 1814.

this case, the Emperor was grossly deceived by his creatures, whom he employed for the execution of his plans everywhere. From the continual disputes in the Hungarian diets, and the vehemence shown on those occasions by the Magyars, his informants had drawn the false conclusion that the Magyars might be gained by the French; the Hungarians, however, were by far too prudent for that. When it was found impossible to urge them to rebellion, they were severely pressed on their own side of the Danube after the battle of Aspern, because, with self-sacrificing patriotism, they had voluntarily reinforced the army of Archduke John. The accounts given us of the conduct in this war of the Austrian generals and higher officers, who in Austria are always above the law, is worse than anything previously stated. In the main army the general was at last altogether destitute of shame; and many men of distinction served in the Archduke John's army, of whom Von Hormayr says the most incredible things. We have already stated, as a matter documentarily proved, that such a man as Chasteler, who had been a quartermaster general in Italy as early as 1799, lost all the moral bearing of a man and an officer on the publication of Napoleon's decree of outlawry; and on every occasion hesitated and showed the greatest fear and trepidation.

To his account of Chasteler's unmanly behaviour, Von Hormayr adds an anecdote respecting Jellalich, which places him in the same category with the Prussian generals and commandants of 1806. On the 25th of May, at St. Michael, he gave 4500 Austrians into the hands of the enemy by capitulation, although he stood in an open field, and was neither surrounded nor threatened by a superior force. The surrender of Laibach, according to Hormayr's testimony, was still more scandalous. The dishonourable commanders, who were instrumental in this shameful giving up of their brave countrymen, raised the public detestation against themselves to the highest degree; so that they were obliged to call in the French and Italians to protect them against the violence of the garrison which they had betrayed. We must add, however, to the honour of the brave Austrians, that the names of the traitors (Moitelle and Lefebvre) indicate a foreign origin, and that they were afterwards brought to the gallows. In all this, however, there is abundant evidence of the manner in which leaders were chosen in Austria; and that not only princes and barons, but their creatures, rendered the bravery of the people wholly useless. Another capitulation, which was concluded by a lieutenant-colonel, to whom an important post was entrusted for the protection of the Archduke John's retreat, is almost more shameful than even the surrender of Laibach. Lieutenant-Colonel Plunket, in command of three battalions of Austrian, and two of Styrian militia, was posted about three marches from the enemy when the latter came to Bruck; he immediately sent an officer and offered to capitulate. We shall give an account of the circum-



stances in a note,\* because we believe, that in no other service except the Austrian would one of the higher officers have dared to express himself in the presence of his soldiers as Plunket did. The behaviour of the lieutenant-colonel roused the indignation of Captain Napotnick of the Cillian militia, who warmly opposed the capitulation: whereupon Plunket publicly threatened TO GIVE HIM UP TO THE ENEMY AS A TRAITOR.

Among the distinguished persons, who, according to Austrian usage, like the Marquis Chasteler and Baron Jellalich, thought themselves above the law, was Ignatius Giulay, Ban of Croatia, who, instead of being punished for the cowardice, carelessness and intentional disobedience of which he had been guilty during the retreat of the Archduke John from Vienna to Comorn, in Hungary, was very splendidly rewarded. The ban was continually making preparations, but never ready, always promising, but never keeping his word; so that he failed just at the decisive moment when he was expected. Von Hormayr, therefore, brings a number of heavy charges against him; but he still continued to be honoured by the Emperor Francis. The slowness of the ban and the disunion of the Archduke Palatine and the Archduke John led also to the defeat of the latter on the 14th of June, at Raab, which was an evil omen of the issue of the war.

The Austrians had continued to maintain themselves throughout the month of May on the right bank of the Danube, near Presburg; but in the beginning of June, Davoust compelled them to relinquish their position; they, however, kept possession of an island in the river, where they were continually disturbed. At this time the archduke still continued with his army at Comorn, and was to form a junction upon the right bank with the Archduke Charles by Raab, which was to be occupied by Eugene Beauharnais, in order to prevent the junction. In order to force his way through, the archduke reckoned on the assistance of the Ban of Croatia, who was to arrive on the 13th of June. The ban did not, however, present himself till the 15th, and then not at Comorn, but at Marbach, which was at a considerable distance, so that at this decisive moment the archduke was left entirely to himself. On the 13th the archduke, having reckoned with certainty on the arrival of the ban, commenced his march from Comorn to Raab; but, unhappily, the views of his brother, the Palatine, whose army was to be united with his, were wholly different from his own. When, therefore, they were marching upon Raab and fell in with the viceroy's army, neither of the

\* *Lebensbilder*, vol. iii., p. 372. "Lieutenant-Colonel Plunket, who *was afraid* of the good spirit of his men, and restrained them with difficulty, caused them to deposit their arms in the town-square in Rottenman and to encamp themselves *without* the town, so as to be incapable of acting, if they should attempt to oppose the capitulation at the last moment!! An officer of the Austrian militia was sent as a courier by post to Bruck, to entreat the enemy to come, and to *show them the way!!* At length a piquet of thirty French cavalry, so eagerly invited, arrived, to carry away five battalions as prisoners of war, among whom were five staff-officers, who had seen a great deal of service."

two was disposed to obey the commands of the other. The armies met on the 14th of June at the village of Raab, which was protected by bastions and trenches, and a battle was fought, which terminated unfavourably to the Austrians. The archduke's fortified camp was taken, and he himself was compelled to retire to Comorn. The affair was so quickly decided, that Macdonald and Lasalle, who were coming to the help of the viceroy, had not time to arrive. When, however, Napoleon, in order to eulogise the viceroy, called the battle of Raab a grandson of Marengo, which was very ridiculous, he suffered himself, for the sake of a fine phrase, to be guilty of a most absurd exaggeration. The chief gain was, that the Archduke John was obliged to seek for a junction with his brother, the Archduke Charles, who was anxious to fight a decisive battle in June, on the left instead of the right bank of the river. The Archduke John, however (we know not whether with good reason), has been often blamed for having disarranged all his brother's plans, when unity and decision were everything, by delays and disinclination to act with him.

Immediately after the battle of Aspern, from the 25th till the 31st of May, Napoleon had directed General Bertrand to adopt the necessary means for the restoration and fixing of the bridge which connected the island of Lobau and the small islands with the right bank.\* From the 31st the Emperor himself undertook the chief conduct of affairs, and went daily to the island of Lobau, where he and Masséna indicated to Generals Fouchet and Rogniat, at what places and in what manner six bridges were to be built from the island to the left bank. In order to keep the enemy on the left bank at a distance, and to enable them to carry on the defences at the ends of the bridges, batteries of fifty guns and bomb proof magazines were erected, and the Austrians driven from one small island to another. In consequence of the plan chosen by the generalissimo, they laid no very great importance on the possession of the islands and the positions in the neighbourhood of the bank, because the archduke had neither intention nor desire to dispute the passage of the river with the French. They, however, did lay great stress on the possession of Presburg and the village of Raab; Napoleon, therefore, thought it worth while, even when all the preparations for passing the river were complete, on the 20th of June, to delay its execution till he had taken Raab, and prevented the further fortifications of Presburg.

However little we are disposed to worship the French idols, and

\* Pelet. "Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809," vol. iv., p. 79. "Quatre ponts stables furent construits sur le bras du Danube qui entoure la petite île, que devait servir plus tard de réduit à la Lobau. Ces ponts étaient couverts par autant de lunettes, flanquées de la rive opposée, liées par des retranchemens. En peu de jours ce ouvrages furent partés à la plus forte dimension et rendus susceptibles d'une grand défense. On a bâtit des tours avec un magasin. En même tems le Général Bertrand plantait à travers du fleuve des groupes de pilotis, pour servir d'abord d'estocade au pont de bateaux, et pour faire dans la suite plusieurs ponts de charpente à l'abri de tout accident."



conditionally to reproach the Germans with being indolent and hesitating, we nevertheless fully agree with Pelet, that almost on every occasion the tediousness and inattention to the orders of their superiors, and the old traditional usages followed by the Austrians, formed a surprising contrast to the activity of Napoleon and the sons of the revolution by whom he was surrounded, when measures were being adopted in the month of June for a decisive battle. Pelet, indeed, is a client and eulogist of Masséna and a blind worshipper of Bonaparte, which leads to no presumption in his favour as a historian; but every one who has read the fifth chapter of the fourth part of his *History of the War*, must admit that he has given the clearest proofs of the miserable nature of the Austrian preparations, and the masterly arts with which Napoleon, by his presence, his orders and notes, understood how to inspire the whole army with his own spirit by deeds, and not merely by words. For example, Raab was not sufficiently provided with ammunition by the Austrians; the garrison expected relief, and therefore on the 22nd concluded a capitulation, on conditions that the place should be surrendered on the 24th, unless it was previously relieved; as the relief did not arrive, it was on the day named given up to the French. In the mean time Bianchi was in Presburg, where he defended himself bravely against Davoust, by whom he was assailed; on the left bank the Archduke John scattered his troops as far as the March, so as only to be separated by this river from the Archduke Charles.

The Emperor Francis himself came to Presburg, encouraged the troops, and made some fresh additions to the fortifications, which greatly enraged the French. The latter could have no object whatever in destroying the city; it was therefore cruel and barbarous fiercely to bombard the town from the 26th till the 31st of June, till the finest part of the capital became a prey to the flames. When the Archduke Charles complained of this discreditable conduct on the part of the French, Napoleon, it is true, gave orders for the firing to cease, but excused the arbitrary destruction of the city very lamely, and, perhaps, an end was put to the bombardment, because Davoust had already received secret orders to join the main army as soon as it crossed the Danube.

We do not undertake to give an account of the passage of the French across the Danube, nor of the battle fought by the Archduke Charles on the left bank, because we are accustomed merely to indicate the results of military events; and we must leave our readers to compare for themselves the account given by military men on both sides. As to the French, Mathieu Dumas, Jomini, and Pelet, who were especially active under the orders of Masséna, have placed before the public the merits of their Emperor in directing everything by knowledge, clearness, unwearied personal activity, and universal presence, and partly proved how his subordinate officers rendered him very different service from that which the Archduke Charles received from those under his command. As to the latter, the cabals against



him were again very strong, and his strength of character never was very great. Hiller had previously often brought upon himself the reproach of not having faithfully executed what he had been commanded to do, which must always be regarded as a fault, whether he really knew better than the commander-in-chief, or only supposed he did. He soon gave up completely the command of his division of the army, at a time when the services of such a general were extremely important. The Archduke John, too, on this decisive day paid just as little attention to the orders of his brother as he had done before. At the moment in which Davoust began to retire from before Presburg, in order to draw men to Vienna, in consequence of the approaching passage of the Danube, he had received orders to construct a bridge, to pass again to the right bank of the river and to attack the French; he, however, hesitated, and delayed till the 4th of July, the very day on which the main body of the army crossed, and a decisive battle was to be fought. In this battle the Archduke John was to take a part, and was therefore summoned in all haste to join the army; he, however, arrived some nineteen hours too late. We borrow these remarks from military writers, without venturing to pronounce any opinion of our own; we must, however, add that the same writers accuse the Archduke Charles of a repetition of orders and counter orders altogether incapable of being justified. They state that on the 3rd of July he was anxious, by means of his brother's corps, to make a diversion in order to detain a part of the French at Presburg; that he next drew up his whole force in a defensive position at Aspern; that he did not resolve to attack till the 5th, and that then when he advanced he found the French already drawn up in order of battle.

Whatever may be the truth of these remarks, or of the reasonings on which they are founded, certain it is, that the archduke neither attempted to prevent the building of the bridge nor the passage of the French over the river by any very serious attacks, or by the use of such heavy artillery as that which would have been employed by the French. The erection of such a great number of bridges, and the rapidity with which they were completed, excited double astonishment in Austria, a country where nothing is ever effected with haste. The passage on the 4th and 5th was made across three bridges, the building of which would have been a subject of wonder even in a time of peace, especially as one of them consisted of sixty arches, and was broad enough to admit of three carriages abreast.

The archduke had chosen to wait for the French on the left bank, because he had resolved to give them battle between Wagram and the Danube; and he had been deceived up till the last moment as to the point at which the French would throw their bridges across the last arm of the river. The bridges were constructed in pieces on the island of Lobau, and made ready for being put together in a very short space of time. About 1200 ship carpenters and sailors had been brought for the purpose from Antwerp; and on the day of

the passage and the two following days of the battle, the Emperor himself was so extraordinarily active and observant of all that was going forward, that from the 4th till the 6th inclusive, he was sixty hours out of seventy-two on horseback. The archduke, moreover, began the battle on the plain between Wagram and the Danube as early as the evening of the 5th, before the French had completely formed their array. This vehement and bloody engagement, however, led to no decisive result, and the whole French army was able quietly to take up their positions for the new battle of the 6th of July.

In the battle of the 6th, called after the village of Wagram, no less than 300,000 men were engaged, and an unexampled quantity of artillery, some of the heaviest calibre, was employed; it cannot therefore be thought incredible that between 20,000 and 24,000 men were killed, especially when it is borne in mind that the firing was incessant for the whole day, from 800 pieces of heavy artillery.\* Men well acquainted with the subject, who were present in the battle, and Savary, who fully agrees with them, assure us, that in the battle of Wagram the defeat of the left wing of the French under Masséna, and especially of the divisions under St. Cyr, Legrand, and Boudet, of which the last lost the whole of its artillery, was very nearly deciding the victory against the French, had not Napoleon by a masterly movement regained the fortune of the day (*il fit opérer par le centre un changement de front*). As the result showed that the Austrians were dispirited after the battle, while the French became more courageous, and reaped all the advantages of a victory, it was at first of no use whatever, that the issue of the battle of Wagram, as well as that of Aspern, exhibited the Austrians in a very different light from that in which they had appeared in the result of all the battles since Marengo; from that time forward, however, the courage of the people increased, for they saw that it was possible, by perseverance in the struggle, to set bounds to the dominion of the West-Roman emperor, his pretorians, légates, and prefects.

The Archduke Charles retired from the field of battle in good order, so that nothing could be said of a defeat properly so called; he was, however, warmly attacked by the court, and particularly by the ladies of the Imperial family, and became dispirited. Napoleon on his part allowed his wounded to remain lying for two days in a dreadfully hot season on the battle field, in order quickly to follow the Austrians. We are firmly convinced, that all the necessary orders for the care of the wounded were duly given; but it is as certain that they were not obeyed. During the whole of these wars,

\* The Austrian account of the loss on this occasion is highly probable, the French is obviously full of lies and boasting. The Austrian states: that four of their general officers were killed, 120 staff and other higher officers, and others of higher rank; among them the generalissimo wounded; 22,900 men either killed or wounded, and 111 staff and other officers; 87,447 men are returned as *missing*, which probably means prisoners. But on the other hand they had taken 7000; and as a compensation for their 9 guns lost, 11 guns and 12 eagles and standards.

those of us who lived in Frankfort had abundant opportunities of seeing the course pursued towards the wounded, notwithstanding all the praises bestowed by the journals of the time. Several generals and colonels were wounded, but the boastings of the bulletins became more ridiculous than ever, so that even Thibaudeau considers it too bad to find the number of prisoners stated at 20,000 men. In reference to this point, we beg to remind our readers, that Savary, who accompanied the Emperor in this campaign, declares that the number of prisoners on each side was nearly equal, and did not amount in all to 20,000. The archduke retreated through Znaym, and the French in many places got before him, so that everything which was desired was as usual obtained from the anxious prudence of the Austrians. An armistice concluded at Znaym left Austria and Moravia in the hands of the enemy, who were therefore in a condition to prescribe the terms of a peace. The Archduke Charles was in favour of peace, whilst Stadion, Metternich, the English who were associated with them, and the ladies of the Imperial house, urged the continuance of the war. Fortune was now again favourable to Napoleon. A peace was at that time more necessary to him than ever; for a storm was gathering against him on all sides, to which, however, he always presented a bold front. It could not escape his notice that Germany, and particularly Prussia, was only waiting for a signal in order to rise against him; in Spain his armies were not fortunate; no confidence could be placed in the Emperor of Russia, and a heroic resolution of the Emperor of Austria might at once call the whole of the Hungarians to arms. The insurrection in the Tyrol became more dreadful every month, and threatened to spread from the south over the whole of Germany. In Paris, Talleyrand and Fouché, with their revolutionary tactics, formed an anti-Bonaparte faction by means of their old friends and creatures, who might be employed at their pleasure, either against Napoleon or in his favour. In the provinces, excited almost to rebellion by the conscription and the arbitrary rule of the police, the clergy announced that the Emperor was excommunicated, and Dastros, the vicar-general, was at a later period bold enough to cause the Pope's Bull to be fastened to the doors of Notre Dame. To all these dangers were added secret associations, whose number increased to such an extent in the army, that no attempts were made to take measures of repression or punishment against the founders or members of them. It has therefore been often stated, which is no doubt a gross calumny, but proves, nevertheless, that great importance was attached to those secret associations (according to the manner of the Carbonari), that Napoleon caused Colonel Oudet, who fell at Wagram, to be exposed to death, because he was the chief of the order of Philadelphians, then very extensive in the army. Napoleon's wishes were so favoured and promoted by the cabals and disputes of the princes and nobles in the Austrian army, that it appeared as if he granted a peace from grace and favour.



The Austrians were very hotly pursued, and found when they reached Znaym, that they were pressed on one hand by the enemy, and on the other given up by the commander-in-chief.

The archduke was constantly at issue with parties at court and with his brothers. Since the battle of Aspern, he had several times been desirous of laying down his command, and after the battle of Wagram, he became completely weary of his office. He knew that he was surrounded by persons upon whom he could not reckon in any heroic venture, and therefore, as soon as he arrived at Znaym, he caused proposals to be made for an armistice. Although Napoleon was anxious for such an event, he appeared at first not at all disposed to check the pursuit; he, however, hesitated only till Schwarzenberg, who made the proposal, assured him that the Prince of Lichtenstein, to whom the grand-duke had transferred the command of the army, would himself come into his camp and agree to whatever pledge he demanded as a security for peace. This actually took place, and on the 11th the respective parties came to an understanding on the conditions of the armistice, which at the same time constituted the preliminaries of the future peace. On this occasion the Emperor of Austria hesitated with good reason to ratify the conditions, yet he did so on the 18th, because he was in truth perplexed by a multitude of counsellors, and his generals proved to him that the want of discipline in the army and of union among the commanders, especially the archdukes, could not lead him to hope for an advantageous issue of the strife, and that, therefore, nothing remained but to get rid of the French as quickly as possible by acceding to their demands. Notwithstanding this, and even after the signing of the preliminaries and the Archduke Charles's resignation of the command, the Archduke John, Metternich, Lord Bathurst, and Walpole, who were then at Comorn, endeavoured to prevail upon the Emperor Francis to reject these disgraceful conditions; and Count Stadion went so far as to propose that the good Francis himself should put himself at the head of his army, by which, no doubt, the mischief would have become much worse.

The conditions prescribed by Napoleon to the Prince of Lichtenstein, who afterwards undertook the chief command of the Austrians, were admirably calculated for a double object. They gave the Austrian monarchy, before the peace, into his hands, so as to enable him to prescribe the conditions in which the peace should be concluded; and they justified before the whole world all the boastings respecting the victory of Wagram, and all the abuse and contempt thrown upon the miserable nature of the Austrian government. The armistice of Znaym was concluded for a period of two months; it was, however, prolonged as the negotiations respecting the peace required. A third of the Austrian monarchy remained in the hands of the French, and the Austrians were obliged to evacuate to them even the citadels of Brunn and Gratz, which were not previously in their power. All the magazines, arsenals, stores of

cloth and clothing in the places evacuated, were also required to be given up; and, besides, a vast amount of natural products and contributions in money was extorted. Some idea of the oppression exercised by particular generals and officers may be gathered from the fact that such shameless robbers and debauchees as Masséna and Davoust shone as the heroes of this war. The amount of money extorted from this oppressed country may be seen from a single remark; at the very first two hundred and thirty-seven millions of francs were demanded, and the implacable Daru, who extorted more than was demanded, presided over the raising of the money. The precipitate conclusion of the armistice of Znaim contributed not a little again to confirm the opinion of the duration of the colossal new-Roman empire of Napoleon, founded on such weak principles. This will be more obvious when we bear in mind that, during those events in Moravia, the war in the Tyrol broke out afresh with greater violence than before; that the English continued to push forward into Spain, and that they at length carried into execution their long-promised diversion on the Scheldt. This English expedition to Walcheren caused a dispute between Napoleon on the one hand, and Fouché, Bernadotte, and several generals and statesmen on the other, which was much more dangerous than all the English expeditions.

As regards Bernadotte, Napoleon had come completely to issue with him on the battle-field of Wagram, and this, too, at the very moment when he became reconciled to Macdonald, with whom he had been on very bad terms since the time of Moreau's prosecution. Napoleon and Bernadotte had, properly speaking, never been good friends, although Bernadotte was Joseph Bonaparte's brother-in-law. The Emperor embraced Macdonald on the battle-field as a sign of reconciliation, created him Duke of Tarento, and raised him, Oudinot, and Marmont, to the rank of marshals; on the other hand, he gave deep offence to Bernadotte, because he intentionally insulted the Saxons whom Bernadotte had led into the battle. We have already often referred to the disputes between the Emperor and the Gascon, whom, notwithstanding, he created Prince of Ponto-Corvo and a marshal. This dispute was very much aggravated since the battle of Auerstadt by the Prince of Eeckmühl, who was at the head of Napoleon's system of espionage, and who accused Bernadotte of having designedly neglected properly to support him. Bernadotte, therefore, regarded the Emperor's conduct on this occasion as an intentional injury done to himself and the corps under his command. He and the Saxons were left exposed to the continuous and hottest fire of the Austrians for the whole day on the field of Wagram. The Emperor also afterwards deeply offended the marshal by some bitter reproofs, which, if any credit can be attached to what is given as the conversation, Bernadotte as bitterly retorted. As in such cases there are no minutes, and these, if they existed, would be entitled to little credit, we attach very small importance to what is found in the best

works on this subject, and merely communicate it as it has been given to us.\* Certain it is that the Emperor and this general issued orders of the day wholly opposed to each other. Bernadotte ascribed the victory almost exclusively to himself and his Saxons; this enraged the Emperor. The latter on the 11th issued another proclamation which announced directly the reverse. In order, however, not directly to offend the Saxons, it was not printed. When Bernadotte wished afterwards to visit the Emperor, he was not admitted, whereupon he left the army and went to Paris.

## 2.—ENGLISH EXPEDITION AGAINST WALCHEREN.

At this time of the Austrian war the English aristocracy, though quietly, were not much less at variance with each other than the Austrian, and the two leading men of the day, Canning and Castlereagh, made their quarrels often as public, as was the case with the Archdukes Charles and John. The English generals were in the highest degree dissatisfied with Castlereagh's administration of the war, and Napier, in his "History of the Peninsular War," as well as all other writers who give an account of other undertakings of his, bitterly complain of his incapacity. Fortune, however, favoured him from the year 1808, as it had favoured the French Directory in 1796. Sir Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, showed the same talent which was conspicuous in Bonaparte. He was equal to him as a general—in one respect even superior—and in administration he was not his inferior. He repaired what the ministers destroyed. With his private character we have here as little to do as with the investigation of Napoleon's moral principles. Such men as Percival, Castlereagh, and Canning attained renown, therefore, by the victories of the English army in Spain, and the exploits of the greatest admirals of the nineteenth century at sea, just as the Directory had adorned themselves with the laurels of Bonaparte, Masséna, Soult, and others; and for the most part the one was as little entitled to the merit as the other.

We have already stated the manner in which the patchwork administration, or what was called the continuation of the Whig government which had been led by Fox, was completely dissolved in March, 1807, and on the 19th of that month the government transferred into the hands of the absolute friends and upholders of everything

\* The Saxons had been obliged to sustain the hottest of the fire, although they were not old soldiers. Bernadotte entreated in vain that they should not be left so exposed. Many of them fell; he is, therefore, said to have replied to Napoleon, who reproached him: "L'armée Française n'est plus en 1809 ce qu'elle étoit en 1795, les vieilles bandes ont disparu pour faire place aux conscrits qui, non moins braves que leurs prédécesseurs, ne peuvent cependant leur être comparés pour la force physique, qui fait supporter les fatigues de la guerre, l'habitude qui fait surmonter les dangers, et l'expérience qui ne s'apprend pas." Napoleon, it is said, answered him: "Mon armée est toujours la même; il n'y a de change que quelques hommes, que je ne reconnais plus."



old and antiquated, the so-called Tories. Lord Eldon became chancellor, Lord Mulgrave was at the head of the Admiralty, Lord Hawkesbury home-secretary, and Lord Castlereagh minister of war. Canning, then secretary of foreign affairs, had, however, the whole burden of this unfortunate time to bear. All the ports in Europe were closed against the English, Prussia occupied by the French, Russia in close alliance with France, and Sweden, because it remained faithful to England, on the very brink of destruction. The expedition to Copenhagen and the violent seizure of the Danish fleet, was made a subject of particular reproach to Lord Castlereagh, especially because he expressed himself in parliament respecting the treacherous manner of the surprise with all the indifference of a political profligate. Canning's policy was also blamed: he was accused of keeping a large army in Sicily. Sicily, it was alleged, could be defended by ships, and the whole of the English force should have been united in Spain. We merely advert to these points, but have no space for their examination, and give no opinion of our own.

What, however, is to us clearer than the preceding is, that England, following its own objects, did not support as it should the combined Russians and Prussians either with money or troops on the coasts of Germany, whereby the Emperor Alexander was rendered particularly indignant at the conduct of their government. Undoubtedly the dreadful expedition against Denmark would have been able some months earlier to have collected around it a considerable force of discontented Germans on the left bank of the Elbe. The blame, on the other hand, attributed on account of the removal of Sir John Moore away from the coasts of Sweden, appears to us altogether unjust, for this reason alone, that nothing could be undertaken with advantage in connexion with the unfortunate Gustavus IV. The general condemnation of the fitting out of the first expedition to Portugal, and of the instructions issued by the ministry, compelled the minister for foreign affairs to endeavour to throw the blame upon the commanders instead of the government. The whole three commanders were tried by court-martial, and all of them acquitted. Napier, in his "Peninsular War," has described in strong colours the nepotism of the English oligarchs, the disputes which existed before the appearance of Wellington between the government and the generals, the squandering of money and stores on the treacherous Spaniards, and the absurdity of the instructions and arrangements of the minister. Notwithstanding all this, the English generals and armies, even before Sir John Moore's expedition, which ended with his heroic death, presented a very different appearance in relation to the French, from that of all the Austrian generals till 1809, the Russians and Prussians in 1806 and 1807, or that of the Spanish armies and generals during the whole war. This is explained, when we bear in mind that in life and outward affairs, strength, perseverance, and daring always obtain the victory; and that morality and greatness of soul often operate as a means of hindrance. The three first qualities

were and are as characteristic of the English as of the Napoleon aristocracy. As to the morality of the orthodox and sabbatarian leading men of the English government of this time, including their chief and master the Prince of Wales, and the Duke of Wellington, the best accounts are furnished by the chronicles of scandal of the day; by the shameful prosecution instituted and carried on by George IV. after his father's death against his wife, and chiefly by the political and divorce suits of the ruling oligarchs of the time, of which the newspapers were full. Every one, besides, is acquainted with the stories of the notorious gambling-houses of the high aristocracy, which every now and then were exhibited before the public tribunals.

The fruitless prosecution of the Marquis of Wellesley, governor-general of India, and his brother Henry, who, together with their relations and acquaintances, practised every species of insolence, despotism, and extortion, constitutes one of the most scandalous events in English public life, whose clamour was satisfied by a pretended impartial tribunal; and the people, fed with the solemnities of justice, forms, and long speeches of counsel, were proud of the vapour of freedom and justice which arose before them. In the same category may be classed the trials on account of the unexampled abuses which had long been carried on by Trotter, paymaster-general of the forces, in connexion with Henry Dundas, who, under the name of Lord Melville, was at the head of the Admiralty. The ministers procured their acquittal, and their judges in the House of Lords, who might be in the same plight in their turn, regarded the abuses which were proved as merely such as were usual and innocent. This took place under Mr. Fox's administration, whose talents, mode of life, and morality, made him an English Mirabeau. Not until January, 1809, came the turn of the Duke of York, the prince regent's brother, who had numerous and powerful partisans in consequence of the many improvements effected in military administration under his direction, but especially of his care to give preferment occasionally to merit.

Letters and documents were constantly appearing in all the newspapers, from which it appeared that the duke, as commander-in-chief of the army, was guilty of greater abuses in the disposal of places in the army than had ever been perpetrated by Trotter and Lord Melville in the navy, and that he was shameless enough to favour those recommended to him by his mistresses, and to sell wholesale everything which could be sold. The government was at length compelled by the strength of public opinion to bring the duke's conduct before parliament. Being addicted to every species of dissoluteness, and immensely extravagant, he soon became overwhelmed with debts, and was completely under the dominion of a woman destitute of all shame. These scandalous stories, and a variety of scenes between a prince who was called Bishop of Osnaburg and a Mrs. Clarke, were not only brought before a secret committee, but before a general committee of the whole house. By their details of the duke's course



of life the English newspapers became very indecent reading, and we cannot but wonder that prudish English ladies, who are so zealous concerning the proprieties of life and euphemestic expressions, should have so diligently read these long columns of vulgar dissoluteness.

When the prince regent succeeded his father in 1812, and became George IV., he brought public charges of infidelity against his wife. She retorted upon him in kind, and the trial and hearing of witnesses lasted for weeks; the scandal became still worse than before. The whole, however, was a mere empty comedy. The king and queen lived after the trial as they had done before; the Duke of York was at first obliged to resign; the affair, however, was soon forgotten; he was again reinstated, and revelled as before, so that many of his creditors still remain unpaid. In 1809 the public voice was also against Lord Castlereagh. He was accused not only of committing the grossest mistakes in Spanish affairs, of employing worthless and unsuitable persons from oligarchical or selfish reasons, but was publicly accused in parliament of things respecting which his own colleague Canning admitted, that they were neither unimportant nor ungrounded.\* The expedition to Walcheren, which in 1809 was pretended to be a diversion in favour of Austria, constitutes one of the heaviest of Lord Castlereagh's sins against the people; for this expedition was dearly paid for with the blood, health, and life of thousands of the obeying and working classes.

The English had promised to appear with a military force in Belgium, Holland, and Lower Germany; this was the cause of the colossal preparations of the year 1809, which, in the end, was only of advantage to some of the rich merchants, who availed themselves of the opportunity to convey immense quantities of goods to the continent. A very brief notice of the advantages which the English derived from the misfortunes of the continental powers will show how much more the whole family of man had to fear from the cold calculations of the rich merchants, and their close allies the heads of the noble families in England, than from the colossal ideas of Napoleon respecting universal dominion and the rapacity of his generals. Every trace of Bonaparte's empire has disappeared,—England still holds every sea, coast, and island, with millions of Indian subjects, in military chains. In order to consider the immense growth of British power, we shall not go back as far as the battle of Austerlitz, which was equally ruinous to Russia and Austria, at the very time when the English annihilated the remains of the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar. We commence with 1806. First, after the peace of Tilsit, we see the Danish power destroyed, and its fleet carried off to England; Heligoland became a watch-tower and a place for the convenience of English smuggling, and still remains

\* He first says, "That he would by no means be thought to pronounce the case submitted to parliament not of any serious importance;" and yet he afterwards made a motion, carried by 264 against 167, "That the house, considering the whole of the case, saw no necessity for a criminatory resolution."



in the hands of Great Britain. It answers the same purpose for the North Sea as the Cape of Good Hope and St. Helena have done for the ocean, and Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu, for the Mediterranean, even after the English were obliged, after ten years' possession, to leave Sicily. The rock of Aden, at the extremity of Arabia, serves the same ends for the Red Sea, as Hong-Kong does for the Chinese seas and coasts. Siniavin's fleet was brought to England when the Prince of Portugal fled to Brazil, and the country was obliged to be surrendered to the enemy. England, with the help of the Spaniards, took St. Domingo for King Ferdinand VII., who was at the time a state prisoner in Valencay. English fleets wrested from the French their possessions on the Senegal, and in February, 1809, took possession also of Martinique and Cayenne.

The English delayed the expedition to Belgium, which ought to have been undertaken in May or June in favour of the Austrians, till, according to their mercantile calculations, they hoped to find their own advantage in its results; when the war at first appeared to take a turn unfavourable to the Austrians, Canning had even the boldness to deny all connexion between England and the court of Vienna. He afterwards, however, contributed a subsidy of three millions sterling, which went less to supply the necessities of the state than to enrich the court and the men of distinction who were at the helm of affairs. About the time in which Bonaparte's whole attention was directed to Germany, and especially to the advance of the Austrians into Bavaria, the English fleet appeared at Rochefort in order to annihilate eleven French ships of the line and four frigates, which thought themselves under the protection of the guns on the island of Aix; this was the first occasion on which the newly invented Congreve rockets were effectively employed. On the 11th and 12th of April they succeeded in destroying six ships of the line and two frigates, with their heavy guns and Congreve rockets. Admiral Gambier, who was in command of the expedition, was tried by a court-martial immediately on his return, for not having destroyed the whole.

The English expedition to Belgium was agreed upon with the Austrians, and Canning promised that an English army should appear in connexion with the discontented Dutch and Belgians on the Lower Rhine; for this reason the Archduke Charles should have opened the campaign, not in Bavaria, but in Franconia and on the Lower Rhine, in order to form a junction with the English, and to call the inhabitants of Lower Germany to arms. This plan, however, was given up. The English ministry could not afterwards be prevailed upon to send off their expedition, which had been long before prepared, at the proper and decisive moment, although Von Staremberg, the Austrian ambassador in London, repeatedly and urgently pressed the subject upon their attention. Three months were still consumed in preparations, in order to send out one of the greatest expeditions which had ever sailed from England, at a moment when neither of

the two objects which it was intended to effect could be accomplished. One of these objects was to draw away the French from Austria to the coast; that was now useless, as the negotiations for peace were already begun. The second was completely English, and that was to destroy the port and docks of Antwerp, as had been already done with Copenhagen, and earlier with the Dutch fleet; this might have been effected, had not the chief command been bestowed upon a member of an oligarchical and Tory family, and everything been disturbed by unpardonable delays. This English expedition might have brought the greatest evils upon the Hanoverians and inhabitants of Lower Germany in general, had they placed reliance on the report to which the English tried to give currency by a landing on the north coast of Germany, in order to mislead the public respecting the destination of the army and fleet which they were preparing. A squadron made its appearance off the mouths of the Weser and Elbe; and on the 7th and 8th of July small divisions of troops were disembarked in the district of Ritzebuttel, which gave themselves out to be the vanguard of the great army, which was soon to follow. These troops, however, only remained till the Duke of Brunswick-Oels, with his legion, arrived at the Weser, and then betook themselves to their ships, in which they were brought back to England at the very time when the expedition to Walcheren sailed.

The command of the English army sent to Walcheren was entrusted to Lord Chatham, the elder brother of Mr. Pitt, then dead, who might indeed have been a very good officer, but was wholly unequal to such a command as that now given him, as the event fully proved. The army consisted of 38,000 men, who carried with them immense stores of ammunition, heavy artillery, mortars, and howitzers. If sailors and marines be reckoned with the land forces, the fleet carried 60,000 men. The fleet itself consisted of thirty-four ships of the line, two of 50 guns, three of 44, twenty-two frigates, thirty-three sloops, five bomb ships, twenty-three gun boats, thirty-one cutters, and one hundred and sixty transports, under Admirals Gardner, Home Popham, Otway, Keats, and Strachan. The disembarkation was successfully effected on the 30th of July, 1809, on the island of Walcheren, which forms a part of the Dutch province of Zeeland; the main object, however, proved altogether a failure.\* It was by no means as much the object of the English to make a diversion in favour of Austria, as to take or destroy the French fleets lying at Flushing and ruin the ships and docks at Antwerp. The French admiral succeeded in rescuing the fleets, by throwing great quantities of his heavy guns overboard, and sailing further up the Scheldt; and Antwerp was delivered by the delays of the English commander-in-chief, and the measures so quickly adopted by the French.

Middleburg and ter Veere were, as early as the 2nd of August, in the

\* The island contains five towns, of which Middleburg, ter Veere, and Flushing, are the chief, and fourteen villages.

power of the English, who then directed their force against Flushing. This town had been no longer Dutch since November, 1807, when it was ceded to France because its excellent harbour was sufficient to contain eighty of the largest ships. The siege of this town was indeed immediately undertaken, but the English commanders were generally blamed for not availing themselves of the earliest moment to attack Antwerp instead of delaying to besiege Flushing. As there were neither French nor Dutch troops in the neighbourhood, they might easily have surprised Antwerp, and have withdrawn again before a sufficient force could have been assembled. The deliverance of the town by measures adopted in Paris, and carried out without the Emperor's orders and advice, caused him much greater anxiety than even the attack of the English itself. This is clear, even if we wish to lay no particular stress upon the accounts given of the secret combinations of Talleyrand, Fouché, Bernadotte, and their powerful friends of the revolutionary times. We shall merely advert to a few facts. As to secret societies, it was suspicious enough to Napoleon that the men who completely saw through him, whom he had raised to distinction, and endured, because he could not do without them, and who had always been objects of suspicion, were those who now provided for the deliverance of Antwerp and for the protection of the frontiers of France against a foreign enemy, when Napoleon himself had sent her armies to Spain, or detained them in Austria, where he himself still remained.

At the time of the landing on Walcheren, Crétet, minister of the interior, was sick, and Fouché managed his department along with his own; Clarke was minister of war, and Cambacérès, who was president of the council of ministers, saw very clearly how dangerous it might be for them to take any decisive steps; he wished to wait for Napoleon's commands; Fouché was of a different opinion. The measures which he adopted, right or wrong, appeared to the Emperor like a demonstration that the people knew how to defend themselves without him, and might, therefore, very well be able to defend themselves against him. Fouché caused the whole national guards of France to be put in motion, and in such a manner, that first of all only those of the threatened departments, and if necessary the others, according to a fixed order, should march. In his letters to the prefects, some expressions appear to have been so chosen, as to be intended to indicate that, in case of necessity, the nation could defend itself without the Emperor.\* Bernadotte, who had remained in Paris since the time of the scene on the battle-field of Wagram, had as early as the 3rd of August offered his services to the arch-chancellor to head the national guard; but this cautious jurist, and also the minister of war, at first declined his services, and this the more decidedly, as Clarke shortly before had received the angry

\* "Prouvons," he says, "à l'Europe que si le génie de Napoléon peut donner de l'éclat à la France, sa présence n'est pas nécessaire pour repousser l'ennemi."



order of the day, which was equally offensive to the Saxons and to the Prince of Ponte-Corvo.\*

Napoleon approved of Fouché's measures in themselves, for as soon as the news of the danger reached him on the 6th, he gave orders for calling out 40,000 national guards; and he also gave the command of the 24th military division, to which Antwerp belonged, to the Prince of Ponte-Corvo. In this case it is impossible to avoid admiring his tact in appointing not merely commanders-in-chief, but subordinates, a tact gained in the times of the revolution, and shown by forming an aristocracy out of partisans of the Bourbons, and the jurists and sophists of the reign of terror. His officers on this occasion were so chosen and mixed, that Bernadotte, if he had wished to undertake anything displeasing to the Emperor, would have been hindered and obstructed on every side. The prince hastened to Antwerp, but the command was again speedily taken from him. On the same day, the 15th of August, on which he arrived at Antwerp, Flushing capitulated; and it was said that the English had bought the place, because General Monnet, who commanded the Dutch, had, in a very suspicious manner, surrendered the fortress and 5000 troops to the enemy. He wrote a letter, indeed, to the minister of war, in which he tried to justify himself; the Emperor, however, was in the highest degree indignant at his conduct, and caused his case to be referred to a court-martial in December, while the general himself was a prisoner of state in England. Monnet was declared guilty, and condemned to death; he however remained in England till 1814, then returned home, and, like all those who had been at variance with Napoleon, was honourably restored to office. In the mean time such great and vigorous means of defence had been taken in Belgium, that Bernadotte was in a condition to issue a proclamation on the 30th, to announce that all danger was past. He himself, however, during the short period of his stay in Antwerp, had drawn down Bonaparte's displeasure anew. The Emperor caused to be tracked out the correspondence which Bernadotte carried on with Paris, set spies and listeners upon him, and accused him of collecting malcontents around him, and of keeping up a union with the evil-disposed, who leaned on Fouché as their head. It was regarded as a principal subject of offence in him that he did not acquiesce in the

\* The order of the day of the 11th of July begins as follows: "Sa majesté témoigne son mécontentement au Maréchal Prince de Ponte-Corvo pour son ordre du jour daté de Leopolds an le 7 Juillet, qui a été imprimé à la même époque presque dans tous les journaux. . . . Le corps du Prince de Ponte-Corvo ne pas été IMMOBILE COMME L'AIRAIN, il a battu le premier en retraite, sa majesté a été obligée de le faire couvrir par le corps du viceroy, par les divisions Broussier et Lamarque, commandés par le Maréchal Macdonald, par la division de grosse cavallerie aux ordres du Général Nansouty et par une partie de la cavallerie de la garde. C'est à ce Maréchal et à ses troupes, qu'est dû l'éloge que le Prince de Ponte-Corvo s'attribue. Sa majesté desire, que ce témoignage de son mécontentement serve d'exemple pour qu'aucun maréchal ne s'attribue la gloire qui appartient aux autres. . . ."

boasting tone which even now prevails in all the works of French writers on the times of the Empire. He had spoken the truth; and this seriously annoyed the Emperor, who was now ruined by flattery.

The English commander-in-chief in Walcheren never even made an attempt to attack Antwerp, although the possession of Flushing, which could not possibly be maintained, was not in any degree worth the trouble, cost, and loss of life, which was the result of the capture. It appeared as if it was of very small importance to the English commander-in-chief and the other oligarchs and conservatives, how many millions were squandered out of the taxes of a deeply burdened people, and how many lives of the humble classes of their countrymen were wasted by the unhealthy climate of Zeeland in the autumn, and by the endemic diseases of the swamps and morasses. The English ministry was at first undetermined whether they should retain possession of Flushing or give it up, and therefore sacrificed multitudes of lives to the autumnal fevers of the most unhealthy district in Europe. As early as the 11th of September, Lord Chatham, with the greater part of the fleet and the army, returned to England; there remained, however, not only more than 20,000 men in Walcheren, but a great number of engineers were sent thither in order to increase and strengthen the fortifications.

Magazines were erected, arsenals filled, artillery increased, and all the stores in Holland filled through the smuggling of the Dutch, favoured by the king, from the immense quantities of goods landed on the island. Sickness, however, so speedily carried away such a great number of men, and so weakened the rest, that towards the end of November they were obliged to think seriously of relinquishing their acquisition. With this view, measures were taken, before the removal of the troops on the 24th of December, to destroy the arsenals, stores, and everything which could be rapidly destroyed; the fortifications, however, were left, as had been formerly done by the Duke of York on the Helder and in Zyp, in a much better condition than they had been before. The results of this expedition called forth loud, if useless, complaints in England. It was alleged, that the whole of Spain might have been taken possession of by means of the money and men which were squandered away and lost in this foolish expedition. This useless armament added no less than twenty millions to the national debt, which is in itself evidence enough of the manner in which the oligarchs dealt with the properties and lives of the masses, important only at elections, or where public opinion is strong against the government; and of the 35,000 men who returned to England, not less than 12,000 were on the sick list, besides the thousands who had died. This is an indisputable fact, as appears from the English accounts themselves, to which must be conceded the praise that they are always and everywhere much more to be relied upon than the Austrian, Russian, and French.

We have already observed, that Bernadotte had been, as early as a few weeks after his nomination, removed from his command, and on the 24th of December it was transferred to Bessières.

By Bonaparte's command, Clarke (Duc de Feltre), the minister of war, was obliged to use some strong language of reproof to Bernadotte on account of the persons whom he collected around him, and the letters which he wrote to Paris, to men in that city, in whom the Emperor had no confidence, but with whom he could not dispense. What, however, vexed the Emperor more than anything else was, that Bernadotte, in order to prove that he could not act on the aggressive, openly admitted that he had only 15,000 under his command, when the Emperor would have it be alleged and supposed that he had 60,000 at his disposal. He was not suffered afterwards to remain in Paris, because Fouché and all the democrats of distinction regarded him as a man on whom they could lean; he therefore returned to Vienna. Much has been said of the disputes and angry discussions between him and the Emperor, who still remained on the Danube on account of the peace; the account of these things we leave to the biographers of the two heroes, with only this remark, that they never were good friends, but that the Emperor found it advisable to make up matters with the Prince of Pontecorvo, and the latter found it convenient to fall in with the arrangement. The yearly income which Bernadotte already derived from the domains reserved by the Emperor in Germany, Poland, and Italy, for the reward and provision of his officers and servants, was considerably increased; he himself was named governor of Rome, and as such was to receive an income of two million of francs. Bessières was as much indisposed as Bernadotte to allow himself to be made a tool in Antwerp, in order to obtain credit for the boastings of the official journals respecting the danger to which he was exposed. In order to refute by the fact Bernadotte's public confession that he had only 15,000 under his command, he received orders as early as October to attack the English; he declared, however, that, in order to be able to do so, three weeks must first be spent in making the necessary preparations, and that even then he would not make himself responsible for the result.\*

### 3.—PEACE OF SCHÖNBRUNN AND THE END OF THE WAR IN THE TYROL.

At the moment in which the English took Flushing, the issue of the negotiations respecting a peace, which had commenced immediately after the conclusion of the armistice, was still very uncertain;

\* Clarke having warmly insisted, in the Emperor's name, that Bessières should march before the 28th of November, the latter wrote back: "Que rien ne serait prêt pour le 20ième; que ce jour là il ferait attaquer si on l'exigeait, mais qu'il ne répondait de rien; qu'il était prêt à sacrifier ses titres, sa fortune, sa vie, plutôt que de dire ce qu'il ne pensait pas."



when at the end of September the greater part of the British fleet and army returned to England, its speedy conclusion was easy to be foreseen. The negotiations were at first undoubtedly delayed by the English expedition, because the English, as well as the continental powers, knew well, that in spite of the glory which surrounded the Emperor and his projects, the internal condition of France made a very long absence from France a matter of no inconsiderable danger to him. Bernadotte, and the seven generals who were his clients, had been obliged to be removed from Paris, and yet the Emperor did not order any investigation to be made openly concerning their correspondence, nor any measures to be taken against Fouché, who held all the threads in his hand, till he himself should be in Paris.

The history of the negotiations for peace is still very obscure, and as this work is not intended to set forth the results of any new investigations, we merely observe, that Lesebvre, in the fourth volume of his history of the Cabinets of Europe, may still furnish much, for we expect nothing from Thiers, although Bignon has already made large contributions to the subject from the archives of foreign affairs, of which Schöll could not avail himself in the tenth volume of his history of Treaties. We have it only in our power to give a few indications. We may first observe that both the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of Austria played very different parts in private and in public. They negotiated at the same time publicly through their ministers, and secretly by means of confidential agents. The conferences between the two ministers, Metternich and Champagny, took place at Altenburg, a small Hungarian town, and there the official protocols were written; what was then proposed and treated about proceeded from Count Stadion, who continued at the head of the department of foreign affairs, and who had no confidence in Napoleon, because he himself was the soul of all the English, German, and Russian plots and conspiracies which were formed against him. These negotiations were twice completely stopped, and even in September there was no probability of coming to any conclusion. At length, when Napoleon saw that the Austrian army was being daily strengthened, that the insurrection in the Tyrol was becoming more serious, and that the discontent of the provinces occupied by the French, and therefore harassed by Daru, was increasing to a dangerous extent, he so terrified the poor Emperor Francis, by means of Count Bubna and the Prince of Lichtenstein, that, in opposition to the will of his two most distinguished diplomatists, he caused negotiations to be opened by Lichtenstein. Count Bubna and the Prince of Lichtenstein had held a conference at Schönbrunn with Napoleon and his minister Maret (Duc de Bassano), on which occasion the Emperor, well knowing the persons with whom he had to deal, allowed himself to indulge in rudeness and threats, which were immediately conveyed by his friends to the terrified Emperor Francis. That this was done designedly, and that Napoleon knew well the characters of the men with whom he had to do, is

proved by the letter which he wrote to Champagny in Altenburg, in which he expresses himself very equivocally respecting Bellegarde. Among other things, it is said in this letter that Bellegarde did not see very clearly, and Lichtenstein was light-headed. To Bubna he intimated as a threat the partition of the Austrian monarchy, or the possibility in this way of setting the younger members of the imperial family against the elder.

Napoleon complained of the hollowness and inconstancy of the Emperor Francis; he threatened to separate the three crowns of the house of Hapsburg, and acted as if he would call upon the Emperor Francis to renounce the government; on this occasion he declared, with true Italian cunning, that if Francis resigned the crown to the Grand Duke of Würzburg, Austria would not be called upon to make any sacrifices in territory, and much to the same effect.\* As Bubna and Lichtenstein were favourites of the Emperor, who was residing in Totis, Napoleon's manner and the vehemence of his expressions, which neither were nor could be serious, were admirably calculated to remove all impediments by fear. The Emperor was at length brought by his two friends, at the end of September, to send for Metternich to come to Totis whilst Champagny went to Schönbrunn, and as early as the 14th of October the peace was signed at Schönbrunn by Champagny and Lichtenstein. The treaty was confirmed by the Emperor Francis on the 18th, and immediately after the signature Napoleon took his departure to Munich, and thence to Paris.

The Emperor of Austria was probably led to the acceptance of the burdensome conditions of the peace of Schönbrunn, after a war, in which his armies, except in the beginning, had never been conquered, from the hope opened up to him, that the unceded provinces of his empire would be evacuated by the enemy. In virtue of this treaty the Emperor Francis was obliged to pay, at fixed periods, the sum of eighty-five millions of francs in cash, and to cede 2058 square miles of territory, with three millions and a half of inhabitants, to France. The Emperor of the French, it is true, left the greatest part of the ceded territory to his vassals and allies, but in the same manner as he had done in Germany, Poland, and Italy, so that the shell and burden of the possession should fall to the share of the inhabitants and their new masters, whilst the kernel and all the advantages were reserved for the French. The most productive estates, forests, mines, lordships, and domains, were reserved, under the name of dotations, partly immediately for the Emperor, partly for rewards to French soldiers, officers, civil servants, diplomatists, and sophists,

\* Napoleon wrote to Champagny, that he had said to Bubna: "J'ai confiance dans le caractère et le bon esprit du grand duc de Würzburg. Je regarderai le repos du monde comme assuré si l'Empereur François lui cède le trône. Vous direz que j'ai foi dans la moralité de l'Empereur, mais qu'il est toujours de l'opinion du dernier qui lui parle, et que les hommes qui continueront à exercer de l'influence sur lui seront Balducci et Stadion."

and partly for principalities, counties, and lordships, and finally as funds for pensions and hospitals.\*

The second article of the peace of Schönbrunn was so drawn up, that Austria, without mention of their names, recognised all the kings of the Bonaparte family; in the fifteenth article, however, it was expressly stated, that it willingly consented to and acknowledged all the changes which had been made or might be made in Spain, Portugal, and Italy. This may be judged of on purely diplomatic principles—that is, the grounds and reasons may be coolly weighed apart from all other considerations; but that heartless, cowardly, miserable counsellors could prevail upon the Emperor Francis to make such a return for the blind, foolish, and almost mad fidelity of the Tyrolese peasants, as that with which Charles IV. had formerly rewarded the attachment of the Catalonians in the war of the succession, shows what subjects have to expect from the fatherly goodness of so-called patriarchal and unlimited monarchs. It was then obvious enough that Bavaria was in no condition to compel the Tyrolese, and yet Austria agreed that the people should be separated and torn asunder, and South Tyrol united with the kingdom of Italy, and therefore made subject to the French. The Tyrolese were not only punished for their fidelity to Austria, by being transferred partly to Italy and partly to Bavaria, but they were given up as victims to the vengeance of French hatred.

We are far from sharing or even approving of this kind of religious enthusiasm for country and worship, with which Haspinger the Capuchin, and his companions in the Tyrol, inspired the people, in the same manner as the Jesuits roused the Swiss fanaticism in favour of the Sonderbund; but we do honour an enthusiasm which makes peasants heroes, and preachers of fanaticism who have no dread of death. We by no means approve of the enthusiasm of the Tyrolese in favour of the imperial house, because this enthusiasm was founded on its toleration of every species of prejudice and superstition, and its cherishing of every kind of traditionary injustice; its obstruction of progress of every sort: we therefore feel no call upon us to commend the heroism of the Tyrolese peasants, innkeepers,

\* Salzburg, Berchtesgaden, and other places around them, were incorporated at this time with Bavaria; the Emperor Francis, in the name of the Archduke Anthony, renounced all claim to Mergentheim; the duchy of Warsaw received an increase of 1,500,000 inhabitants—viz., West or New Galicia, the circle and fortress of Zamosc, Podgorze, and Cracow, with the circumjacent territory. The saltworks of Wiclitzka were to be occupied by Austria and Saxony in common; and in the eastern part of Old Galicia Russia received 400,000 souls. Saxony received six Bohemian villages, situated within its territory; and in order that Baden might not go away empty, Würtemberg was obliged to cede the lordship of Nellenburg to Baden, in return for Mergentheim received from Austria. The circles of Villach, Carniola, Carinthia, Monte-Falcone, Görz, Trieste, six districts of military Croatia, a part of the province of Croatia, Fiume, and the coast belonging to Hungary, Austrian-Istria, Carina and the islands, the navigation of the Save, and the lordship of Razuns in the Grisons, were ceded to France for future arrangements. Austria was also obliged to adopt the same measures in reference to English trade which had been adopted by France and Russia.



and Capuchins, who, with the crucifix in their hands, preached insurrection against Bavaria. We shall give merely a brief notice of the issue of the war in the Tyrol, without going into particulars; this we leave to one who fully shares in the enthusiasm of the Tyrolese. We admire, it is true, enthusiasm, patriotism, attachment to the usages and manners of our people, perseverance, and heroic sacrifices from whatever source they spring; but we leave to Von Hormayr, who, properly speaking, played the chief part in these wars, and who, as we have been often told, would at last gladly have made the Archduke John Prince of the Tyrol, to praise according to their deserts the deeds of his countrymen. This he has done, and we refer to him the more readily as he has added subsequent contributions to this history of the war in the Tyrol.

We broke off the narrative of the war in the Tyrol at the point at which Wrede and Lefebvre believed that they had completely put down the insurrection by the garrisoning of Innsbruck (in the middle of May) and the announcement of an amnesty. With this view they had left behind them the Bavarian general Deroy, with his division, in Innsbruck, and had gone themselves to join the main army. Lefebvre and Wrede had no sooner gone to join the main army, than the Tyrolese again took up arms, after the battle of Aspern. Hofer, Speckbacher, Zöpplin, and Eisenstecher, led their countrymen in their attack upon the Bavarians lying in the country, who were about 3000 strong. These they either destroyed or drove out of the country, and made forays into Upper Bavaria, whilst Von Hormayr and his friends established an interim government in the Voralberg, and summoned a diet in Bregenz. Hofer was now at Innsbruck, and directed all the measures adopted for defence; that is, he caused all the passes and valleys to be stopped, stockades to be erected, the roads to be broken up, passes to be rendered impassable by rocks and chains, and heaps of stones to be collected in suitable places, to be rolled down on the heads of the enemy; the people of the Voralberg extended their operations to Germany. They attacked the Bavarians, French, and Wirtembergers, at Kempten and Lindau, and reached even to the neighbourhood of Augsburg.

Till the battle of Wagram the Tyrolese not only remained masters in their own country, but, notwithstanding their want of success at the siege of Kufstein, pushed forward into Bavaria and Suabia. Even at this time the poor peasants were the sport of the Machiavellian arts of Austrian instigators and diplomatists; for the Austrian commissioners delayed completing the conditions of the armistice of Znaym, by which the support of Austria was withdrawn from the Tyrol, as long as they possibly could. On the 29th of July they first made the armistice known and evacuated the Tyrol.

True it is, that Bavaria repeatedly offered pardon and oblivion of what was past, but the enraged and deceived country people rejected every offer. At length they became infuriated also against the Austrian agents, who now wished to induce them to peace, so that

even Von Hormayr escaped with great danger from their hands, and reached Hungary with the Austrian troops, which were still in the country. During the whole months of August and September, the insurgents maintained possession of the mountains from Roveredo to beyond Salzburg and Kufstein; at the end of September bands of them even pressed forward into Carinthia, and in the beginning of October they appeared also in the valley of the Drave. They drove General Ruska out of Villach, attacked General Payti, who was posted in the Levis, and pushed forward to the neighbourhood of Roveredo. On the signing of the peace of Schönbrunn, they were again peacefully and kindly urged to accept the proffered amnesty, but they were at the same moment attacked from the north, south, and east, by such an overwhelming force, that every one lamented their blindness in prolonging their resistance and making themselves martyrs without an object. Their hesitation in resolving even in October to yield to the circumstances is ascribed especially to two causes. First, they could not bring themselves to admit the idea that the Tyrol should be separated, the southern part to be united to the kingdom of Italy, and the northern to Bavaria; secondly, they were still used as tools by that party at the Austrian court which was discontented with the peace.

Stadion's friend Balducci, who, as Napoleon well knew, had great influence over the Emperor Francis, sent agents from time to time into the Tyrol, who, instead of advising the people to relinquish a useless resistance, rather encouraged them by all sorts of promises to a desperate prolongation of it. The manner in which this took place, and what is to be understood by an Austrian war party, our readers will most readily learn from the passage of the *Lebensbilder* given in the note.\* From the one side, Napoleon caused three divisions of Bavarians, one under the crown prince, a second under Wrede, and a third under Deroy, the whole commanded by Drouet, to march against Innspruck, whilst several divisions of the Italian army on the other side of the Brenner marched against the south of the Tyrol. On the 29th of October the Bavarians reached Innspruck; Hofer scorned to accept their conditions, and defended Mount Isel especially as if it had been a fortress. On the first of November, however, he was compelled, after a very obstinate con-

\* *Lebensbilder*, part 3, p. 399. . . . . "In Hormayr's stead, whose health and strength were completely exhausted, his deputy, Anthony von Roschman, whose services and resolution had been of great advantage on the Lower Inn and at the blockade of Kufstein, was sent by all sorts of cross and obscure roads to Hofer. *He left Warasdin at the same moment in which Prince John, Lichtenstein, and Bubna, set out for Vienna with the ultimatum for a peace.* He knew it, and went nevertheless! On the 14th of October, the day on which the peace was actually signed, Roschman reached Brixen, and Hofer's head-quarters at Innspruck on the 16th. Instructed only on one side by the war party, he could not do otherwise, and was obliged at that time to contradict the peace, and thus to increase the people's blindness and misfortunes. English money and influences served to prolong the war in the valleys, even after the peace was signed. Hofer became the victim of this policy, and of his own weakness and obstinate narrow-mindedness."

test, to evacuate the districts on the Inn, after having lost the whole of his artillery. He then marched to the Brenner, whither Wrede followed him; and there at length he began to perceive that it was foolish to desire any longer to defend himself in the mountains, among which his chief forces now lay, shut almost as in a prison. He laid down his arms, and caused it to be announced that his desire was—“*That the Tyrolese would yield to their destiny and accept the pardon offered them by the Emperor of the French. This he advised the more strongly, because, by so doing, the country would be soonest delivered from the French.*” In the valley of the Lower Inn there was now rest, whilst new murders were perpetrated in the valleys of the Puster and Passayr. The French pushed forward through the Pusterthal with three divisions, caused pardon and forgiveness to be proclaimed, but at the same time announced by a proclamation, issued on the 12th November, that every one who did not lay down his arms within twenty-four hours would be treated as a highway robber, and every village in which a Frenchman was insulted would be burnt down. The conduct of the spoilers accorded in all respects with the terms of the decree, and murder and burning began anew.

The cruelties perpetrated by the French roused the inhabitants to the renewal of a general rising, and when, on the 22nd of November, two battalions of the 13th and 33rd regiments were taken prisoners at St. Leonhard, in the upper valley of the Passayr, Hofer again appeared in arms, because, as he said, the promises made to his countrymen had not been observed. He called upon the inhabitants of the Passayr valley, of the Vingschgau, and the Upper Inn, to fight courageously, if they did not wish to see the whole of the Tyrol robbed of its youth within fourteen days, and their churches, altars, and convents utterly destroyed. From this moment Hofer was declared an outlaw, a reward was set upon his head, and Baraguay d’Hilliers behaved in the Tyrol as the Duke of Alba had formerly done in the Low Countries. Baraguay forced his way into the Tyrol with three divisions, and commenced a system of burning, hanging, and shooting, till at length, in the middle of December, the chiefs escaped by flight, and the peasants were compelled, in the midst of cold and snow, to remove to the mountain tops. When the insurrection was quelled, and the armed bands had been scattered, Baraguay and the other generals continued to follow up their system in the most horrible manner. Among other places, they caused a gallows to be erected in the valley of the Puster, on which those who had been shot by their orders were hung up, by compulsion, by the peasants themselves. Three parish priests, and Peter Mayer the innkeeper, were amongst the number of those who were executed, and at the very last seventy-five prisoners were to be shot. The most of these, however, were spared.

In the mean time, Hofer had taken refuge in an almost inaccessible hut on the heights of the Passayr mountain range, where he



would not have been reached had not one of his companions been guilty of a crime melancholy to think upon, much more to relate: he was betrayed by one of his most trusted partisans for 300 ducats. The immense difficulty of the paths, the glaciers, and snow six feet deep, were all insufficient to protect him against treachery. The mean and unnecessary vengeance perpetrated on Hofer by Napoleon's command, which indeed may be justified as criminal justice, made a most unfavourable impression even upon those who felt no sympathy with the Tyrolese peasants in their enthusiasm for the Emperor Francis, for monks, clergy, beads, and pilgrimages—nay, who could not even comprehend it. Hofer himself had never acted with cruelty or injustice; his friend Haspinger had even thrown his protection around the battalions of Bavarians who were taken prisoners, to shield them from the rage of his countrymen. Hofer's execution, therefore, was regarded throughout the whole of Europe as a demonstration against every one who should attempt to make any resistance with courage and perseverance to the dominion of the French forced upon them.

Hofer was arrested by Coutier, commander of a battalion, who carried him off on the night of the 27th of January, 1810. He was designedly led as a prisoner through the towns and villages of the Tyrol, in order to show that every hope of throwing off the French yoke had disappeared; as early as the 19th of February he was shot in Mantua. The King of Bavaria pursued a milder course in his part of the Tyrol than that followed by the French in the southern portion of the country, united to the kingdom of Italy. Persecutions ceased, and attempts were even made to improve the constitution and administration; still the military occupation of the country continued almost throughout the whole of the year 1810.

### § III.

FROM THE PEACE OF SCHÖNBRUNN IN 1809, TILL MAY, 1812.

A.—FRANCE—SPAIN—SWEDEN.

1.—CHANGE IN ALL THE INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE—APPROXIMATION TO THE OLD ABSOLUTE MONARCHIES BY MEANS OF THE HIGH POLICE—CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERATIONS—MARRIAGES—TITLES AND CEREMONIAL.

As most of the writers with whom we are acquainted are inexhaustible in their praises of all the institutions, ordinances, actions, and thoughts of Napoleon, whose superiority, in many respects, to all his contemporaries is indisputable, we may be allowed to premise that our readers, if we should lead them astray by our view of the subject, may readily find other views in almost every work which they

may take into their hands. We start from the conviction, that from the peace of Tilsit, Bonaparte began to prepare his fall, by making a Tower of Babel of his attempt to construct the edifice of a continental empire, without suffering himself to be duly warned by Nimrod's fate. In other words, he was seized with the aspirations of the founders of Oriental empires, haunted by the idea of Alexander, Cesar, the Caliphs, Charlemagne, Zenghiskhan, and Timour. This was obvious, as early as 1810, to Talleyrand, Fouché, and the most of those whom he had made great, and who trembled for fear of losing, through him, what they had already gained through him. Another idea was necessarily connected with this notion of a new Roman Empire, that states could be created and governed just as a man creates and governs an army—by orders. Now, because the execution of such an idea is impossible, we cannot agree in the admiration of the restless and incessant activity of Napoleon, and of the attention which he bestowed upon small and miserable things, as well as upon great and important events. We see him in the retirement of his palace, on campaigns, in the camp, on the Vistula, the Danube, and the Moskwa, sending forth decrees on the most heterogeneous subjects, reading and signing multitudes of papers laid before him by his ministers; and we cannot avoid asking ourselves whether Hesiod's proverb does not here absolutely hold good—that the half is often better than the whole? We cannot further prosecute this subject; we however advise the reflecting reader to ponder well the history of the Emperor Justinian, or to recal to mind the history of Russian ukases since the time of Peter the Great, which may be greatly facilitated by consulting the chronological view of the history of Russia by Von Wichmann, who has presented the subject in such a form as very much to facilitate the inquiry. The restless and impetuous desire of always creating something new, great, and ever greater, never suffered any seed to bear fruit before it was plucked up again; all the imperial edifices were pulled down, before completed, in order to make room and to furnish materials for new ones. That we may not weary our readers, we shall merely advert briefly to a few points of his restless activity; and in most of them we believe it would have been much better to improve, maintain, and watch over what was actually in existence, than always to be creating what was new. For this purpose, we shall first direct attention to his activity in matters lying without, and secondary to, those within the empire of France. In every case, it may be easily shown, that since the time of the peace of Tilsit, the eulogies of flatterers, and the foolish wish to be like those monarchs who assumed to be so by the grace of God, brought the Emperor altogether to mistake his relations to his age, and, by an attempt to introduce in all its essentials the *old régime*, to undermine his throne.

We cannot go further back than the peace of Tilsit, otherwise we should be obliged once more to refer to the institution of the Con-

federation of the Rhine, of the viceroyalty of Italy, the creation of the French kingdom of Naples, and the incorporation of Piedmont, Genoa, and Parma with the empire of France. We first observe, therefore, that the conditions of the act of federation of the Rhine were only strictly observed in those points which required the careful fulfilment of obligations towards the Protector. This act spoke, for instance, of an assembly of the states, and it appeared at first as if some measures were likely to be adopted; but Prussia was no sooner conquered, than nothing else was heard of but a government of force over the subjects, of independence of the princes among themselves, and of unconditional obedience to the Protector. This was, indeed, necessary, but formed no part of the first plan, and compelled the princes, in spite of all their constitutions, to become tyrants, in order to be able to send their subjects to Poland as soon as the new duchy of Warsaw was incorporated in the Confederation of the Rhine; immediately afterwards they were forced to send troops to Spain by thousands, without having had any reason whatever assigned. The people, who had been deceived by the child's play of paper constitutions of their great and small rulers, who were sovereign in reference to their subjects and the other princes, but degraded into the character of slaves to Napoleon and to the French of all kinds who had received dotations in their country, were summoned to arms, sometimes here and sometimes there, by a simple note from the Emperor. Thousands yearly took the field without even enjoying the honour of victory; for the German auxiliary troops were divided and separated, and even when they were allowed to remain together, their commander-in-chief was always a Frenchman.

The territories of the princes were sometimes enlarged and sometimes diminished, without any reference at all to early decisions respecting them or the protectorate, according as plans were altered; and the people were unremittingly harassed by the marchings and billetings of troops, and the Prince of Eckmühl's high police. The Protector called for contingents whenever and however he pleased. No attention whatever was paid to the early decisions with respect to the numbers of troops to be raised, and contingents were demanded as despotically from the German princes as conscripts from France, and even more so; the French were still allowed to be deceived by the form of a decree of the Senate, and not obliged to obey a simple note from the Emperor himself. At first, reception into the confederation was shamefully sought by entreaty, flattery, and even money, by its most important members; and at a later period the confederation was not even consulted respecting the admission of new members. Saxony, and even the duchy of Warsaw, Westphalia, the ducal houses of Saxony; the princes of Anhalt, Schwarzburg, Würzburg, Reuss, Lippe, Waldeck, the two duchies of Mecklenburg, and finally even Oldenburg, to please the Emperor Alexander, were received into the confederation without any security for



their existence, to say nothing of the integrity of their possessions. The fate of individual rulers and their territories was changed in a night, when some new, perhaps great, but often small, idea came into the Emperor's mind. We shall subsequently refer to this point, and here only intimate in general what is meant. When, for example, the Grand-Duke of Berg became King of Naples, instead of Joseph Bonaparte, transferred to Spain, Napoleon, in opposition to his most sacred promises not to take possession of anything on the right bank of the Rhine, took this duchy (in July, 1808) under his own immediate orders. This plan was again altered in 1810, without the new arrangement ever having been actually carried out. Louis, King of Holland, having unwillingly fled from his kingdom to Bohemia, his son was created Grand-Duke of Berg; but the territory itself remained under French administration. The Duke of Oldenburg, who had been restored in 1808, was obliged to submit to the incorporation of his duchy with France in 1810, without any previous dispute or negotiation. The prince-primate, who, in order to enrich his relations, the Prince von der Leyen and the Duke of Dalberg, Talleyrand's creature, had become Prince-Primate of the Confederation of the Rhine, and had accepted Cardinal Fesch, a Frenchman, as his successor in the archbishopric of Ratisbon, was obliged, in 1800, to relinquish his see to Bavaria, and to accept for himself a completely secular title. He was created Grand-Duke of Frankfort, and received Hanau and Fulda, but as his successor in this dukedom another Frenchman was appointed, who was neither old nor unmarried, like Cardinal Fesch. The Viceroy of Italy, having been deceived as to his expectations of the crown of that kingdom, was appointed successor to the former electoral arch-chancellor. The course of action pursued towards Hanover, as well as towards the territory which the Emperor had given up to his brother Jerome, was the same as would be followed with a private estate, which its owner sometimes causes to be given as a present, sometimes to be farmed or administers himself, sometimes divides into lots, which are to be cultivated and managed after different fashions. The country was completely exhausted, at first held back under pretence of providing for the case of a reconciliation with England, then at length united to Westphalia, and Lauenburg still reserved for a new exchange and new alterations. To those we shall hereafter return; the facts are merely mentioned here, in order to show that there was nowhere either fixity or continuance. Everything rested on the personal wishes of a single man, who held the key of all these changes. The army, which he wantonly sacrificed, first in Spain and then in Russia, was the only foundation of his colossal empire. Saxony and Bavaria were very much favoured; but every one saw that the one was to be used as an advanced guard against Austria, and the other against Russia, and that afterwards a word would restore Poland and annihilate Bavaria. The erection of the duchy of Warsaw was an oppressive burden for Saxony, and the intelligent portion of the

Poles perceived, by the manner in which the Emperor of the French parcelled out the most productive estates of the country as dotations, or used them as domains, and afterwards still more by his contradictory promises, that he had no idea whatever of restoring either their freedom or nationality, but aimed simply at converting Poland into a French province.

Napoleon's plans with respect to his vassals became obvious after the peace of Schönbrunn. Bavaria was obliged strongly to fortify Braunau and Passau—not for itself, but for the future plans of the Emperor of the French—and to cede Southern Tyrol in exchange for Ratisbon and Bayreuth, which had been completely exhausted of their wealth since 1806. Italy was treated precisely in the same way as Germany. King Joseph, who was well adapted for the throne of Naples, was not allowed to retain it, but obliged to migrate to Spain, for which he was not at all suited. The Pope was driven out of his dominions, and the States of the Church were made into French departments. Tuscany was first changed into the kingdom of Etruria, then clipped and pared down on all sides; and, finally, the third part of Portugal was promised to the queen and her son, who was a minor. There was not the least idea of keeping any promise, even in the moment of its utterance, for Tuscany was united to France, and, like Parma and Piedmont, divided into departments. Notwithstanding this, Napoleon's sister was made Grand-Duchess of Tuscany, and governor-general of the departments on the further side of the Alps. The course of conduct pursued towards Spain was revolting even to the fawning creatures in France, and struck the sophists dumb.

We shall not even advert to the miserable arts employed to allure Charles IV. and the Prince of the Peace into the snare, but merely call to mind, in reference to the change of plans of which we are now speaking, that the Emperor, at least for a moment, lent a favourable ear to Ferdinand's proposals respecting a French princess, and thought of giving him Lucien's daughter for a wife. When, however, he had the royal family completely in his power, the mask was thrown away, and the throne bestowed upon his brother Joseph. We shall see hereafter that he entertained the idea of a partition of the kingdom, and placed his brother under guardianship. The same unfixedness appears in the administration and government of the French Empire, and in the alteration of the institutions and ordinances of the National Constituent Assembly, at an earlier period introduced and approved of by Napoleon himself; but he now systematically took a retrograde direction. He constantly withdrew more and more from everything which made him great, and approximated to that form of government which he had always ridiculed and abused, and to which he uniformly and justly ascribed the decline of all those kingdoms which he had so easily annihilated. The completeness with which he had changed his views, and the admirable light in which all those people now appeared to him whom he

had previously so often abused in his proclamations and journals, he himself abundantly proves in the articles of the newspapers, and in his bulletins, in which, in 1809, he pours torrents of abuse, after his entry into Vienna, upon the councillors and courtiers of the Emperor of Austria. He forgets how, in times past, for years together, he had railed against such men as Thugut, Manfredini, Ludwig Cobenzl, and the Prince of Ligne, and even what all the world said of them. Now he magnifies them, appeals to what they had said, and reviles the patriots, who were eager to summon the whole country to arms, and exhorted to a steady prolongation of the war.

He acted, also, according to the same principles of narrow-minded policy in the changes made in those institutions of the state which he himself at first had made conformable to the wants of the age and the demands of a progressive civilisation. As we have already said elsewhere, he left remaining the mere shadow of all those rights which the nation had bought, since 1798, with so much blood, and of their hard-won share in the administration and government. Instead of submitting his ordinances to the representatives of the nation, and suffering them to change his proposals into laws, he satisfied himself with raising what were called the organic resolutions of his servile senate into laws. He gave more and more prominence to the old nobility, and to all the privileges of rank, because the men of the old *régime*, who thronged around him, were more easily moulded and better courtiers than the newly-created nobles. Even so, however, he did not gain the favour of the old aristocracy, who had early imbibed their prejudices, and looked upon themselves as allied to heaven; and, at the same time, he made a breach with the men who sprang from the revolution, who came to an understanding secretly among themselves. He put no real confidence in the old democrats, such as Fouché and Bernadotte, from the time he became surrounded by the old nobility, and yet did not venture to break with them altogether. He was obliged to double his spies and his police, and yet was in constant fear of being betrayed and sold. We have already shown how Talleyrand and Fouché conspired when he was in Spain; how, in July, 1809, he deprived Talleyrand of the dignity of grand chamberlain, and transferred it to M. de Montesquieu, who was at that time a member of the legislative body. We have further stated how, in the autumn of 1809, Fouché, Talleyrand, Bernadotte, and several generals, carried on a correspondence which Napoleon attributed as a great offence to the brother-in-law of King Joseph, and yet thought it better to come to an understanding than to break with him. The same was the case with Fouché, who was, at the first, removed from the ministry of the interior, which he managed together with that of police. In the middle of the year 1810 he was also removed from the administration of the police, which was transferred to the dreadful Duke of Rovigo. The Emperor did not venture to insult or remove Fouché altogether from office, though there was an open



feud between them. Fouché became anxious and unsettled. The account given in almost all works on this subject, of domiciliary visits at Fouché's house in Paris and at Château Ferrières, of the letters which Napoleon wished to recover and Fouché refused, is, according to the best information which we could acquire in Paris, either altogether false or greatly exaggerated. Certain it is that he was made governor of Rome, although he never entered on his office. He was obliged to leave Paris, and not allowed to remain on his estate, but went to Aix, whence he travelled to Italy. In the time of need he again became useful, and in 1813 was appointed governor of Illyria, in order that he might be quiet, and still continue at a distance from Paris.

As to Talleyrand, Napoleon was afraid of him for the same reason that he disliked the *coteries* of the Faubourg St. Germain. In reference to these assemblies, the French report that the Emperor, on his journey to his army in 1809, met with the King of Wirtemberg, to whom he complained bitterly of the conduct and prattle of this high society, who were indebted to him alone for being again in a condition to give society the tone. It is said that King Frederick advised him to deal with the ladies and gentlemen of Paris as he himself had done with the people of Mergentheim. Whether the king really employed the language which the French ascribe to him,\* we do not know, and can scarcely believe that he did so; but it is indisputable that it is quite in the spirit of his mode of thinking and acting. After his return, the Emperor appeared to be disposed to follow the king's advice, but without calling in the gallows and rack to his aid. He persecuted and banished Madame de Stüel, which may be explained and excused by the fact of her having always played a political character, and formed a sort of club in her house; but whoever has had an opportunity of knowing Madame Recamier personally, as we have, cannot but feel astonished that the hero of the century should have thought her worthy of his notice. It is as surprising that the Emperor should have employed the police against the assemblies of this polite but insignificant lady, as it is natural that she should have been inseparable from Monsieur de Chateaubriand, and that he should be the soul of her saloon. The manner in which the Emperor gave expression to his resentment against Madame de Chevreuse, who belonged to the court of his wife, reminds us of the times of Louis XV., both in reference to the importance which was laid upon rank and etiquette, and to the system of arbitrary police and justice. He banished her to a distance of 100 miles from Paris, abused her shamefully, and threatened her with a ridiculous prosecution with respect to her right to her estates; and all this because she refused, when the old Spanish royal family was sent to Compiègne, to perform the office of a court lady to the contemptible Queen Maria Louisa.

\* "La potence, les cachots, marquis et duchesses, tout irait pêle mêle au gibet; personne ne bougerait plus, et l'Angleterre en seroit là pour son or!!"

What has been stated might have been regarded as the results of hasty ebullitions on the part of a ruler accustomed to military command, had he not finally substituted his own arbitrary decisions for right and justice. He thereby did violence to his own legislation, and introduced Russian institutions, which were wholly inconsistent with French manners and with the constitution given by himself. Every government which does not wish to be regarded as wholly despotic must acknowledge the principle that personal arrests can only be suffered by legal process; but the imperial decree (*ukase*) of the 3rd of March, 1810, set this principle altogether at defiance. It appears, from this decree, that the number of those who had been imprisoned merely by police or cabinet commands, without having been placed before any legal tribunal, must have been very great. Not only is all that had been done maintained, as if it had been constitutional, but the number of prisons destined for the reception of those who were arbitrarily imprisoned is greatly increased. It is said in the decree, that eight state prisons shall be erected for *the safe custody of such prisoners as cannot conveniently be brought before the courts, nor yet allowed to be at liberty*. The castles of Saumur, Ham, Iff, Landskrone, Pierre Châtel, Fenestrelles, Campiano, and Vincennes, were appropriated for this purpose. Savary no sooner became minister of police, than a measure was adopted which had the appearance of law, but was still worse than the former royal *lettres de cachet*. It was decreed that the privy council should be fully authorised, on the requirement of the ministers of justice or police, to decide upon the liberties of every citizen; and at the same time the severest measures were prescribed for the safe keeping of the victims of the state police so imprisoned. The keepers, of whatever rank, connected with any of these state prisons, were made liable to loss of place and six weeks' imprisonment for either giving or receiving a letter to or from any of those who were under their care. And the operation of this newly founded despotism was extended even to the property of the imprisoned. From some, according to the clause in the letter of arrest, their property was wholly taken away; when this was not the case, and they were allowed to retain their estates, means for administration could only be adopted under the direction of the commandant; and finally, when money was to be paid to them, this could only be done in the presence and by the permission of the same functionary.

From the time of the battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon was clearly attacked by the same madness which had dazzled all the Roman emperors from Augustus, and all the princes of the eighteenth century; he placed his confidence wholly in the chief men of his Prætorians, and willingly lent his ear to the loathsome bombast of servile officers and courtiers. The opinions of all others were suppressed, so that the Emperor no longer knew what public opinion was, and felt as great a contempt for the people as all those princes are accustomed to do who recognise neither law nor morality. The people, it is true, were intoxicated by the glory gained under his

standards, and dazzled by the splendour of his deeds, buildings, and institutions; for the multitude live always in and for the present, and know nothing of the past. The people, therefore, enjoyed the moment, not being able, like the few who were acquainted with the history of events, to conjecture the nature of the future from what Napoleon and his creatures had already done. The multitude, therefore, continued to worship him like an idol; but the intelligent portion of the French suspected, as early as 1810, what were the real intentions of the Emperor, and the legislative body ventured to intimate, even in 1808, that it was not good to bind up the whole well-being of a people with the greatness of a single man, or to ground it upon it. This took place, not by means of any protest or declaration, but merely by a gentle hint; and yet it enraged the Emperor in the highest degree. All opposition to the propositions of the government having entirely ceased, the legislative body ventured to intimate that such an opposition might be useful. This gentle hint drove the Emperor into such a passion, that he gave utterance to the strongest feelings of contempt for the representatives of the people. He boldly and shamelessly pretended to forget that everything great which he had done or created had been only rendered possible by the Constituent Assembly having brought the French people from death to life. The legislative body conveyed the hint that it was time to assert at least the privilege of refusing the proposals of the government by rejecting a single proposal for a law, not for reasons assigned, but by the ballot-box. Thereupon the Emperor wrote the violent letter of the 27th of November, to whose contents we now refer, and from which we shall give an extract in a note.\*

In the person of their Emperor, the French, like the Russians with the Czar, idolised themselves, and for this reason he was unconditionally eulogised, though from very different reasons. Thus the whole history of his reign is one-sided. One writer followed and imitated another, and every one was regarded as an offender against the nation who shortened by a syllable the bombastic eulogies of their most splendid period. Even their public documents became on this account unworthy of confidence. The very diplomatist whom the Emperor specially selected to write the history of his reign, and who, in fact, tries to justify everything which took place under Napoleon, alleges that it was impossible to place implicit confidence in the rhetorical reports of the minister of the interior.† In every French writer, therefore, all those steps are

\* "Le corps législatif est composé de beaucoup d'individus qui voudraient se rendre importants, et qui ayant essayé la révolution se supposent encore un assemblée nationale."

† Bignon, "Histoire de France sous Napoleon," vol. viii., p. 101:—"Les expositions de la situation de l'Empire que les ministres de l'intérieur présentaient au corps législatif formeraient seules en quelque sorte un résumé du gouvernement impérial. CE SONT SANS CONTREDIT DES DOCUMENTS INSTRUCTIFS ET UTILES À CONSULTER, MAIS LEUR FORME ORATOIRE ATTESTE TROP, QU'ILS SONT MOINS UN RECIT, QU'UN PANÉGYRIQUE."



most absurdly eulogised which were taken by Napoleon on the advice of such men as Talleyrand, Fontanes, and others, to bring back the system of instruction, social habits, the court, and all the forms of outward life, to the condition of the old *régime*. We shall merely refer to a few points by way of illustration, and begin with education.

When Napoleon became First Consul he found education free, but science, perhaps, a little too unfavourably dealt with, especially when regard was had to the national character of the French. He therefore took a part of this freedom away, but showed somewhat more favour to science, and organised what had previously been conducted without organisation. In these decisions he followed wholly his own views, which, although they might have been erroneous, were nevertheless the results of earnest study and mathematical knowledge; in the reorganisation of 1808, he was completely under the influence of some narrow-minded rhetoricians and sophists of the old school. When he wished to reconstruct the whole system of education, and to make it suitable to his autocratic objects, he founded a sort of Chinese commission of education (a university), and thus brought the whole education of the country into the power of the imperial police, which also became master of the whole of the publishing trade of France. Even this, however, might not have been necessarily a retrograde movement, or a return to the Jesuitical system of the old schools, had not the Emperor placed at the head of its administration the men by whose bombast he was glorified. The smooth-tongued Fontanes, profoundly skilled in the art of praising and flattering, and the favourite of Napoleon's sister, Eliza, the Semiramis of Lucca, was placed at the head of this system of public instruction, and was assisted by two friends, of whom the one was a poetic visionary in favour of priestcraft, and the other a philosophical dialectician. The two men to whom Fontanes lent an ear were Chateaubriand and Monsieur de Bonald, a kind of new-fashioned scholastic.

Great retrograde movements in all respects, and an increasing attachment on the part of the Emperor to the old *régime*—really inimical to him—to its usages, prejudices of rank, and cabinet orders, gave rise to the dissolution of the Emperor's marriage. This was merely a public and splendid renunciation of the system of constitutional monarchy, and the new marriage a recognition of the principles of absolute monarchies. The union with an Austrian or Russian princess, which the Emperor had in view, could only be contemplated by a man of the people, from a desire to push himself into an alliance with the old system. A marriage with an Austrian princess was, besides, a connexion of evil omen, because the French people still remembered all the curses which had been poured forth upon the wife of Louis XVI. and her relations. A close union with a princess of an ancient house, accustomed to see around her none but persons belonging to what is called the high nobility, soon

produced the effect of replacing merit by birth, not only at court, but in offices of every description. Almost at the same moment as the Emperor contemplated a second marriage, he converted a considerable number of the children of the revolution into princes, dukes, counts, and barons, and restored their position to the old nobility. From this time forward, the old feudal nobles, by inter-marriage, ennobled the new stock, as Austria made the hero of the century more illustrious by the hand of Maria Louisa.\* The Emperor no sooner felt a desire not to derive his power and distinction from the people, but to ascribe both, like the old princes, to the grace of God, than he began to consider everything which he had gained by the help of the people and their blood as private property, and created ordinary and extraordinary imperial domains. Each of these three retrograde movements proved of ruinous consequences to the new system, and we shall therefore briefly notice each of them in particular.

As to the first—the Emperor's separation from a loving and beloved wife, who, along with many of the weaknesses of French women, possessed all that amiability, politeness, and womanly training, for which the French are distinguished—it was a separation from French gentleness and an approximation to German stiffness. He exchanged true love for a cold and formal fidelity; as the author of this history knows, from the manuscript memoirs of the Duchess of St. Leu, his second wife shrank back with dread when the daughter of the first wife alluded to the possibility of the Austrian princess accompanying her husband to Elba. The idea of a separation had been long entertained, and was in itself quite natural, however much the Empress Josephine had been shocked at it as early as the time of the Consulate. Consolidation and permanence could only be secured to the new dynasty by a son of the founder, to whom alone Napoleon could reckon upon the gratitude of the people and the obedience of the nobles whom he had created. The same man who compelled the proudest princes to acknowledge himself and his family as of equal rank with themselves, could also make his new wife equal to the old princes. It must, however, have been a painful humiliation to the French to think that the son of their Emperor was to be made more distinguished by an admixture of Russian or

\* Not to omit all reference to the subject, we subjoin the names of some of Napoleon's dignitaries, their titles and stations, but only in general, and without chronological order. The following were created princes: Berthier, of Neufchatel and Wagram—Talleyrand, of Benevento—Bernadotte, of Ponto-Corvo—Davoust, of Eckmühl, after having been Duke of Auerstadt. Dukes: Masséna, Duke of Rivoli, Prince of Essling—Cambacérès, Duke and Prince of Parma—Lebrün, of Piacenza—Ney, Duke of Elchingen, Prince of Moskwa—Moncey, of Conegliano—Augereau, of Castiglione—Sault, of Dalmatia—Junot, of Abrantes—Lannes, of Montebello—Mortier, of Treviso—Bessières, of Istria—Victor, of Belluno—Kellermann, of Valmy—Lefebvre, of Danzig—Marmont, of Ragusa—Regnier, of Massa and Carrara—Champagny, of Cadore—Gaudin, of Gaëta—Fouché, of Otranto—Clarke, of Feltre—Murat, of Bassano—Düroc, of Friuli—Caulaincourt, of Vicenza—Savary, of Rovigo.

Austrian blood. The idea of a union with a Russian princess preceded that of intermarriage with an Austrian one; the Emperor, however, who was not altogether destitute of human feelings, like so many other princes, hesitated very long before coming to the conclusion, come to first at the time of the war in Russia, of separating from his wife and contracting a new marriage. Fouché, even without being commissioned so to do, ventured to intimate the idea to the Empress Josephine, because the Bonaparte family wished for a new marriage in order to exclude Josephine's relations from the thrones, principalities, and duchies, which were to be distributed. Fouché was obliged to submit to severe reproach on account of this precipitate step.

Savary informs us, that when he was sent to Russia, immediately after the peace of Tilsit, he there made it to be clearly understood that the Emperor Napoleon was not indisposed to a union with a Russian princess. We have already remarked that the matter was a subject of formal discourse in Erfurt in 1808; and in Bignon's "History of French Diplomacy" will be found very full details of the correspondence and negotiations with Russia respecting a marriage with one of the younger Russian princesses, after the hasty betrothal of the elder, who was first spoken of, to Peter, Duke of Oldenburg. We cannot, however, in the least degree comprehend the meaning of the negotiations for a marriage carried on in Petersburg in January and February, 1810, because it is undoubtedly true that agreements were entered into with respect to the marriage of a daughter of the Emperor Francis with the Emperor of the French immediately after the armistice of Znaym was decided upon; and that special reference was made to the subject in a secret article of the peace of Schönbrunn.

Bignon has, however, given an account of the negotiations in Petersburg, which were carried on till the 6th of February, 1810, when they were suddenly broken off; and yet the agreement with Austria, in September, 1809, respecting the marriage, is not the less certain. It is remarkable that Baron von Thugut, who had brought so many misfortunes upon Austria, and had for years been the subject of so much reproach and abuse from Napoleon, is named as the very man who was mainly instrumental in promoting this union with a princess, who carried Pandora's box with her as her wedding present to Paris. Thugut was, indeed, no longer minister, but still held the office of privy-councillor to the emperor. As early as 1806, Thugut had perceived the possibility of such a marriage, and in 1809 visited Napoleon at his head-quarters, and, as it is said, and seems probable enough, on this occasion settled the terms of the union. Napoleon, therefore, had determined on a separation before his return from Vienna, but he still hesitated and delayed after that return to speak of it to his wife.

The manner in which the Emperor conducted himself, when he at length declared, on the 30th of November, 1809, that, for the



promotion of his great political objects, he had resolved on a separation, does his heart great honour ; but it is melancholy to see from that declaration of the necessity of a separation, and from all that was said by him before and after, what importance he attached to an unholy union with an ancient family, whose vigour was for the most part gone. On the 15th of December a sentimental rhetorical minute on the dissolution of the civil marriage was drawn up by Regnaud, of St. Jean d'Angely, in the presence of the whole imperial family and before the arch-chancellor of France, in which Napoleon and his wife stated their free resolution to separate. The reason assigned was, that the Emperor, for the well-being of the state, felt himself constrained to dissolve a marriage from which there was no longer any hope of issue. As a decree of the senate was desirable for form's sake, Eugene Beauharnais, who on this occasion took his place in the senate for the first time, made the proposition to the Assembly. Eighty-seven members were present, of whom only seven voted against the proposition, and four declined to vote at all ; Gregoire alone was anxious to make a speech against the proposition, but was not allowed. We give, in a note, the decree\* issued by the senate, because it contains also an account of the provision made for the Empress, who immediately retired to Malmaison.

In consequence of the Pope's dislike to the Emperor, there might have been some difficulties in the religious part of the question, had not Cardinal Fesch, in giving ecclesiastical validity in 1804 (when Josephine already feared that Napoleon would be persuaded to a separation) to the civil marriage of 1796, taken care so to perform the ceremony, as, by some trifling omission, to furnish a pretence for disputing its correctness. By an article of the Council of Trent, it is determined that no marriage shall be regarded as valid, unless celebrated in the presence of the clergyman of one of the two parties, or his vicar, and of two witnesses. The Empress Josephine herself had at the time called the attention of the cunning cardinal to this fact, and as he paid no attention to it, it was concluded, and not without good reason, that the neglect was intentional. The pretence was, in fact, now used in order to induce the spiritual court of the diocese of Paris to issue a declaration, on the 14th of January, 1810, that the Emperor's marriage had never been duly celebrated. This decision was afterwards approved of by a united commission of bishops and archbishops, and confirmed by the Archbishop of Paris. The Pope, however, afterwards disapproved of the whole course pursued. So much importance was attached to

\* The decree runs as follows: "1. Le mariage contracté entre l'Empereur Napoléon et l'Impératrice Josephine est dissout. 2. L'Impératrice Josephine conservera le titre et rang d'Impératrice couronnée. 3. Son douaire est fixé à une rente annuelle de deux millions de francs sur le trésor de l'état. 4. Toutes les dispositions quoi pourront être faites par l'Empereur en faveur de l'Impératrice sur les fonds de la liste civile seront obligatoires pour son successeur."

a speedy issue of the business in Vienna, that as soon as the solemn demand of the princess's hand was made on the part of the Emperor, no attention was paid, at least in the first instance, to the ecclesiastical scruples. Prince Metternich, who had then entered the ministry, made no inquiry after the ecclesiastical documents: this only took place when the Archbishop of Vienna insisted on seeing them.

The affair of the marriage was all arranged in so short a period of time, that everything relating to it must have been previously settled, and therefore the correspondence between Champagny and Caulaincourt in January and till the 6th of February, in reference to a Russian princess, was a mere device of Napoleon's diplomatists for the occasion. As early as the 7th of February, the Viceroy Eugene presented himself to Prince Schwartzberg, the Austrian ambassador in Paris, in order solemnly to sue for the hand of the imperial Princess Maria Louisa, and on the next day the marriage-contract was signed by the French minister of foreign affairs. On the 27th, a message was sent to the senate, that Berthier, Duke of Neufchatel and Prince of Wagram, was to proceed to Vienna, to conduct the Austrian princess, betrothed to the Emperor, to France. On the 4th of March, Berthier actually set out; on the 7th, he made a formal application to the same effect to the Emperor Francis; and on the 10th, the bride was entrusted to her uncle, the Archduke Charles, as Napoleon's selected substitute, and on the 13th set out on her journey to Paris.

Our object does not allow us to dwell on the various events and ceremonies which were rendered necessary for sake of form, nor on the pomp and splendour exhibited on the occasion, in order to give the ladies and gentlemen of the court an opportunity of exhibiting themselves in their splendour, or to dazzle the eyes of the multitude, who ran with equal eagerness to a marriage and an execution. We shall merely observe, that the civil marriage took place at St. Cloud on the 1st of April, that the newly-married couple made a splendid entry into Paris, and that on the 2nd the ecclesiastical service was performed by Cardinal Fesch, Napoleon's uncle. It is somewhat singular, that Napoleon thus celebrated by the instrumentality of the church his union with the legitimate houses, at the very time when the head of that church pronounced an excommunication against him, and when all the legitimate princes of Europe were conspiring against him! On this occasion he was labouring under the same error which induced him to found a new order of nobility, and to recal the old from death to life. He thought to find support in these things, and yet he himself was, properly speaking, the only support of a nobility and a monarchy which had long lost all its importance.

As to the regulation of the domains, he had even before this made their income wholly independent of the people. On this occasion, he, as it were, openly declared that he had carried on war

as a trade for his own advantage, and regarded his conscripts simply as instruments of his trade. Previously to this, on every occasion of a marriage, and of every favour sought by foreign states or private individuals of other nations from Napoleon, considerable presents had been expected by, and paid to, the ministers, courtiers, and civil servants of the Emperor; all such sums were now claimed by the Emperor himself, and their amount increased by the secularised estates of the clergy in conquered countries, by the regalia and domains of the princes, and the estates of banished or emigrated possessors, and finally, by the immense sums obtained from confiscated English and colonial goods, and the sale of licenses. We may learn from the speech made in the senate by Regnaud, of St. Jean d'Angely, on this occasion, when the property of the state was to be legally transferred to the private account of the Emperor, the manner in which the sophists and rhetoricians of the revolution eulogised every new step of absolute rule taken by the Emperor. "The decree," he said, "which he was about to propose, was one of political legislation for the person of the Emperor, as the new code was a civil code for every Frenchman." The resolution of the senate, which was passed into a law on the 30th of January, 1810, according to the recommendation of the imperial rhetorician, gave immense sums into the hand of a military ruler, and separated them completely from the national property. The first article determines what properties were to belong to the crown; the second, those which were to be classed under the name of extraordinary domains; and the third, those which were to belong to the Emperor's private estate. The last articles embrace immense estates and treasures, which, without ever consulting the nation, were to be handed over to the Emperor as his private property. Well, therefore, might he, on the occasion of a solemn audience, when Ney was cut off from him in 1812, and only succeeded in forming a junction again by wading through the Dnieper—well might he refer to the several hundred millions in cash which he had in his treasury.

## 2.—SPAIN FROM 1809—1812.

When Napoleon left Spain in 1809, there appeared no reason to believe that any successful resistance could be made against King Joseph; for Portugal was threatened by three French armies, and all the Spanish armies seemed to be annihilated. Of the three armies destined to operate against Portugal, one, under Soult, was already in the country; the second, under Lapisse, was at Salamanca; and the third, under Victor, on the Tagus. The Emperor's arrangements and orders, first to reduce Catalonia, Arragon, Valencia, and then Andalusia also, were admirable; but he did not bear in mind, that, all having been accustomed punctually to obey him alone, in his absence each of the princes and marshals, who



were now at the head of his armies, would desire to become independent.

The Emperor had left the supreme command over the French armies in Spain to his brother Joseph, and given him the aged Marshal Jourdan as his major-general, who, having been already twice defeated by the Archduke Charles, even before Napoleon became consul, had lost all authority and influence in military affairs; neither the king nor Jourdan could reckon on the obedience of the generals. The marshals were by no means agreed among themselves, and Ney, who was in Galicia, was not eager to assist Soult in the conquest of Portugal. Soult's behaviour was at that time so singular, and his delays so incomprehensible, that he was accused of calculating his measures less with a view to a rapid victory over the English, than to insuring for himself the crown of Portugal. As circumstances frustrated this plan of Soult's, if he entertained it, it is not worth while to examine the subject. Whilst the main body of the French army was directed against Portugal, Saragossa in the north withstood all the efforts of the armies of Catalonia and Arragon. The city had received within its walls the remains of the Spanish army defeated by the French at Tudela, and now maintained the defence of the city so much the more courageously, as they had formerly compelled the French hastily to relinquish the siege, even after they had reached the interior of the city. Since that time the fortifications had been increased and strengthened; Palafox, it was said, had then 40,000 men, and during the time of the former siege had succeeded in inspiring the citizens with a degree of heroic resolution unexampled in our days, and thereby proved that, though young and inexperienced in the field, he was an incomparable defender of a fortified town. This he fully established, for the siege of this single place kept a French army of 35,000 men four months before its walls. Lannes, who was to conduct the siege, fell sick; and afterwards Moncey, Mortier, and Suchet, all three belonging to the class of most distinguished generals of the Empire, were united before the town, but were sent to other destinations before the siege was formally commenced. On the 24th of December the town was at length completely invested. On the 29th the trenches were opened; but in January, 1809, when Moncey and Suchet were recalled, the chief command was given to Junot. Junot was not reckoned a distinguished general, although by the favour of the Emperor he was created Duke of Abrantes for his conduct in Portugal. On the 15th of January, 1809, he had only succeeded in obliging the besieged to confine themselves strictly within their walls. On the 22nd of January, Lannes had recovered from the illness which had previously prevented him from undertaking the direction of the siege. From this day forward commenced a struggle unexampled in our times, first for the possession of the town, then for that of every street, and finally for every house, convent, and public building.

Between the 23rd of January and the 1st of February all the outer works were taken; and from that day till the 19th a constant struggle was carried on for the streets and in them with naked swords and Catalonian knives, and single buildings which were bombproof were attacked and defended like fortresses. Mines and countermines were laid in the city itself, hundreds of men and noble buildings were blown up, and thousands carried off by infectious diseases. At length the part of the city still held by the people was taken by storm and a dreadful fire of artillery, and on the 18th and 19th of February the besieged surrendered by capitulation. The account of the losses suffered by both parties is dreadful; the scene presented to the victors by the ruins, streets covered with dead bodies and swimming in blood, was horrible; and the robberies perpetrated by Lannes, as well as all his colleagues in Spain, Moncey excepted, were revolting.\* The unexampled determination and perseverance of the citizens of Saragossa, and the tragical fate of their city, operated like an electric shock in stimulating the oppressed people to make a vigorous resistance to the French. The feeling of hatred became general, and even the Germans began to be ashamed of their own supineness, and encouraged one another in their secret societies to imitate and emulate the Spaniards. On the reduction of the city, Lannes was recalled to Vienna, and fell in the battle of Aspern. The best troops of the other corps were also drawn away to the Danube, and yet Suchet saved the honour of the French arms in Arragon, although he at first bitterly complained that his army was reduced to 12,000 men. He also found it advisable to retire for a short time to Saragossa. In Catalonia, Gouvion St. Cyr defeated the Spaniards as soon as they showed themselves in the field against the seventeenth corps, which was under his command; but the mountaineers continued to do him great injury by a system of petty attacks, and he was finally detained five months before Gerona. Don Marian Alvarez, the governor of this city, gained for himself similar renown to that which Palafox had gained in Saragossa, because he maintained himself in the citadel even when the town itself was completely in the hands of the enemy. Gouvion St. Cyr, in his memoirs, unjustly complains of the Emperor for having intentionally left him without the necessary means of success, because he entertained a feeling of dislike to him, similar to that which he felt towards Bernadotte; it is, however, undoubtedly true that his troops suffered a great deal from want of every kind, that he had very little artillery, was often deficient in ammunition, and far from being well provided with food and clothing. He was recalled by the Emperor, and Augereau ap-

\* It is said that 15,000 shells were thrown, 45,000lbs. of powder used in mines, 40,000 lives lost, and a number of buildings and streets blown up. As to Lannes, the Emperor made him a present of the precious stones in the treasury of our Lady of Pilar, which was plundered by him, and were valued at 1,120,000 francs.



pointed in his stead, who lay before Gerona from October till the 10th of December, 1809, when the city capitulated. Napoleon was vehemently angry at Gouvion St. Cyr's loud complaints. He soon, however, discovered that Augereau was not the man who could replace him; and, in fact, it was not Augereau, but General Verdier, to whom Gerona capitulated. Augereau, moreover, by the brutality and rudeness of his behaviour, deeply offended the Spaniards attached to Joseph's party who served under him, and was detained before Hostalrich in the same way that St. Cyr had been before Gerona. He besieged the town from January till May, suffered the discipline of his army to become completely relaxed, and lost a great many people by the repeated attempts of the Catalonians to relieve the town. Don Juan d'Estrada, who defended first the town and then the citadel for months against Augereau, entitled himself to the same honour as Palafox and Don Marian Alvarez. When the town was conquered, and the citadel reduced to extremities, Don Juan, at the head of the garrison, made a sally among the besiegers, and, by a desperate struggle, some hundreds of them cut their way through. About a month before, O'Donnel, at the head of his mountaineers, had made an attempt to relieve the city, and been beaten, but, nevertheless, killed several thousands of the French; so that the Emperor became finally extremely dissatisfied with the losses of all kinds suffered by the French before the town. He then withdrew the chief command from Augereau, but found as little satisfaction in Macdonald, to whom the command of the army of Catalonia was transferred in June, 1810, as he had previously found in St. Cyr and Augereau. Even Suchet's splendid undertakings were by no means decisive as to the issue of the war and the confirmation of the French dominion in Spain. Everything depended on the expulsion of the English, which Napoleon, in his absence from Spain, had entrusted to his three marshals—Soult, Ney, and Victor.

In 1809 the Emperor accused them all of inactivity. Soult, according to the French accounts, in order to gain the favour of the Portuguese, is said to have committed the great fault of pursuing too mild a course of action, and to have liberated his prisoners, who afterwards, in English pay, with English discipline, and under English officers, became an admirable body of troops under Lord Beresford. We shall not inquire whether the Emperor accused his generals with good reason or not, but merely briefly refer to the circumstances, which were favourable to the English and embarrassed the French. Napoleon, according to his custom, had predicted that Soult would be in Oporto on the 5th of January, and in Lisbon on the 16th. He did not, however, arrive before Oporto till the 27th of March, nor take the city by storm till the 29th. On this occasion the city was subjected to a course of plunder, murder, and wasting, such as had been perpetrated on Lübeck in November, 1806. The statement that 10,000 Portuguese lost their



lives, appears to us, however, greatly exaggerated. As Victor, about the same time, completely defeated the Spaniards under Cuesta at Medellin, on the Guadiana, it was indeed surprising, and to be ascribed to the failing lustre of Napoleon's star, that the two most illustrious of his generals continued inactive at the very time when Sir Arthur Wellesley—a man who alone among the generals of Europe deserved to be compared with Napoleon—received the chief command of the English. At the same time, a Portuguese army was organised and furnished with English officers, which afterwards proved itself as courageous as the English troops themselves.

Soult had under his command about 19,000 men, but caused his artillery and stores to be brought to Oporto, where he appeared to be occupied for some length of time with organising a Gallo-Portuguese government for himself. Victor, whose corps has been given at 30,000 men, remained wholly inactive after the battle of Medellin. Lassisse, on the one side, was to have marched by Ciudad Rodrigo to Campillo, and to have formed a junction with Victor; and, on the other, was to have stretched out his lines to Viseu, in order to form a junction with Soult; the English, however, anticipated his movements, because Soult did not arrive at the proper time. At that time the Portuguese government had conceded to the English the privilege of forming an army, according to their method, out of Portuguese troops. The English furnished arms, ammunition, and everything needful for equipment, on condition that this army should be placed under English officers and English administration. In March, 1809, Lord Beresford undertook the supreme command of this new Anglo-Portuguese army. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, would not accept the command of the English forces until he received very considerable reinforcements. The English in Portugal were at that time under the command of General Cradock, to whom reinforcements had previously been sent. As soon as the fresh troops arrived which Sir Arthur Wellesley had required, this general was sent to Gibraltar. On the 26th of April Sir Arthur took the command. The French, in order to lessen the personal merit of the new commander-in-chief, exaggerate the number of the troops under his orders.\*

The French refer at great length to the secret cabals in Victor's army, which obstructed his activity. Of these, however, we have no authentic information. It is indisputable that the English commander-in-chief availed himself of the discontent among some of the French generals to open all sorts of suspicious negotiations and correspondence, which, however, were not attended by any considerable results. They merely acted as a hindrance to the French,

\* It will be seen to what an extent the French, for political reasons, conceal the truth from their countrymen, from the fact that they not only make 40,000 of the 10,000 men sent as a reinforcement to Sir A. Wellesley, but that even the minister Montalivet, in his report of the 12th of December, 1809, gives this exaggeration on his official authority.

and compelled Napoleon to dismiss and arrest a number of officers. In the mean time, Sir Arthur favoured the spread of the insurrection among the mountain inhabitants of Beira and Tras los Montes, and introduced military organisation among the peasants, whilst Soult was spending his time in Oporto. King Joseph, it is true, as soon as he heard the news of the victory gained by Victor over Cuesta at Medellin, sent orders to that general to proceed with his whole corps to Portugal; but the whole month of April passed away before he put himself in motion. This delay is also attributed by Bignon to the dissatisfaction with the measures of the Emperor prevailing among many of the generals of the corps. As there is no documentary evidence for the establishment of this fact, we can do nothing more than refer to Bignon's testimony, when we state, that it was at that time generally said that the dissatisfaction of many of the generals belonging to the second corps, and their secret negotiations with the English, had been a subject of great anxiety to Victor; but that Ney, from a feeling of jealousy respecting Soult's speculation upon Portugal, did not manifest his usual energy. To this point we refer merely incidentally, and dwell upon facts alone. Whilst Victor and Soult hesitated and delayed, Sir Arthur adopted all the measures necessary to enable him to anticipate Soult, and suddenly broke up from Leiria on the 30th of April. The number of troops which the English general brought into the field was computed at 16,000 English, 3000 Anglo-Portuguese, and 3000 cavalry; and his first object was to fall by surprise on the division of Soult's army under Franzeschini, which was at Aveiro. This attempt failed on the 9th of May; the division was, however, driven from its position at Grija with loss on the 11th, and Sir Arthur crossed the Duero with such rapidity, that Soult was obliged to retreat so hastily as to resemble a flight, in order not to be shut up in Oporto. Because Soult saved his army by this movement, the retreat was regarded as a new proof of his military ability. He sacrificed his military chest, baggage, and artillery, in order to cross the steep mountains of the Sierra Catelina and reach Guimaranes. Lorges and Loison, too, were obliged to sacrifice their baggage and artillery, in order to be able to form a junction with Soult in Carvelho.

Soult reached Carvelho as early as the 15th of May; but before he arrived at Orense, on the 19th, he had lost, on this difficult and toilsome march, several thousand men, together with his baggage, ammunition, artillery, and stores. He afterwards reached Galicia again (as Sir Arthur was obliged to turn his operations against Victor, whom he drove up the Tagus), after he had been obliged to sacrifice the half of an army of 28,000 men whom he had led into Portugal. Ney, whom Soult now joined, had remained behind in Galicia. Ney called upon Soult either to remain in Galicia, in order to destroy the army which La Romagna had formed anew from the remains of the defeated Spanish army and the militia, or, in conjunction with him, to fall upon the English in Orense. Soult,

whose opinions did not coincide with those of Ney, rejected both proposals; whereupon they separated. The one marched to the north, the other to the south. Ney occupied Corunna and Ferrol, whilst Soult marched to Zamora to reinforce Victor, in order to prevent the English, who had now turned against the latter, from forcing their way up the course of the Tagus far into Spain. When Soult turned towards the Tagus, Ney evacuated Galicia, because regular armies were being again formed in the different provinces of Spain. These undisciplined and badly led Spanish troops, relying upon their numbers, often ventured upon regular battles, and naturally met with shameful defeats; the consequence was, the formation of a regular system of guerilla warfare, of which we shall speak more at length hereafter. This system was suitable to the nature of an insurrectionary war, and to the character of the Spanish nation, and in the end proved more destructive to the French than all the Spanish armies. At the time in which the French directed the whole of their force against Portugal and its army, the English did everything in their power to place the miserable Spanish generals in a condition to bring new regular armies into the field; the generals, however, only thought of themselves. Their intolerable boasting, and their presumption with regard to their own power, and that of their nation, made them both ridiculous and contemptible. Blake, as has been already stated, had led his army to Arragon, and Suchet found it advisable to withdraw to Saragossa, because he reckoned on the want of prudence and the insolence of the Spanish general. What he expected really took place. Blake appeared in a challenging manner on the plain of Saragossa, and offered battle to the French at Maria, on the Huerta. As might have been foreseen, he was defeated, but did not take warning. He again collected a body of peasants and militia, and wished to renew the fight at Belchite; but the thousands of people who had run together without order or discipline, and whom he did not know how to command, did not even await the enemy. The Spanish army left their artillery, baggage, generals, and officers, to their fate, and fled. Suchet was thenceforth able to advance in peace, for Blake's army had wholly disappeared.

The junta of Seville, which acted as if it constituted the real central government of Spain, insisted earnestly on Sir Arthur Wellesley's forming a junction with the Spanish armies under Cuesta and Vénegas. The fate of Blake's army, however, made this a step of very doubtful prudence in his mind. Some idea was entertained of placing the Spaniards under English command, and causing them to be trained after the English manner, like the Portuguese. This, no doubt, would have been a good military step, and for the moment the best which could have been taken. English writers have made it a matter of blame to the Spaniards that it was not done; it appears to us, however, that the Spaniards would have had as much to fear from the English in future, as they had from the attacks of the



French for the present. All the cities and countries in which the English succeed in gaining a footing lose their national existence, become English, and are ruled by persons placed and maintained in power by English aristocratic and plutocratic patrons. Admitting, as we willingly do, that the government in the English possessions is better than it was when the cities and countries were free, everything is, nevertheless, made subordinate to English interests, and every foreign peculiarity is looked upon with contempt. This was the universal experience of Portugal, Malta, the Ionian Islands, India, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Sicilians, in the years 1811 and 1812. The first object of regard is the interest of English commerce, and afterwards a care for other things. Unfortunately, moreover, at that time the English government was as incapable of the just direction of the war as the Spanish junta. Had the English government sent to Spain the troops thrown away in the expedition to Walcheren, and entrusted them to the greatest general which the nation in recent times possessed, instead of to the brother of the head of the Tories, Spain would soon have been cleared of the French.

However little confidence Sir Arthur placed in the Spanish armies or their generals, he resolved to call to his aid the two armies; the one of which hoped to annihilate Victor's corps, and the other was threatening Madrid from Aranjuez. The one was the army which Cuesta had collected after his defeat at Medellin, and which he estimated at 38,000 men, and the other the troops under Vénégas, which were to march from Aranjuez against Madrid, and were reckoned at 35,000. In order to form a junction as soon as possible with Cuesta, Sir Arthur marched up the banks of the Tagus; Napoleon, however, who was at that time on the Danube, from that great distance gave such directions for his troops as frustrated the Spanish plans. He wrote to Soult, and commanded him to order the two bodies under Ney and Mortier immediately to join him, and then to hasten to the aid of Victor. In the mean time the English, having formed a junction with Cuesta, had time to approach considerably nearer to Vénégas, because Ney was very tardy in his movements, so that Soult did not reach Palencia till the 18th of July. Sir Arthur and Cuesta had pushed forward to Talavera la Reyna, and might have attacked the French on the 22nd of July, had not Cuesta, under a most ridiculous pretence, refused at the decisive moment to take part in the battle. A victory on the 22nd would have been decisive, because Vénégas was still threatening Madrid, and King Joseph, with the 1st and 4th corps, had joined Victor. Soult was at this time already in Salamanca; he had sent General Franzeschini to King Joseph; he was taken prisoner on the way. At the same time, however, he had despatched General Foy to Victor, in order to concert some movements against the English, and for that reason Sir Arthur was anxious to have a battle on the 22nd. When Cuesta put forward his reasons for delay on the 22nd and 23rd, the English general resolved not to await Soult's approach,

and commenced his retreat to Portugal. Cuesta separated from him, and obstinately pursued his march to Madrid. As early at the 26th he fell in with 50,000 French at Alcabor, on the banks of the Alberche, and without even fighting a battle suffered a very considerable loss. As he was closely pursued, Sir Arthur turned back, for fear of the complete annihilation of the Spanish army. When he reached Talavera again, he took the command of the united armies, and fought an engagement which drew upon him the attention of all Europe, and procured him the same distinction in England which Bonaparte had gained from the French in 1797, in consequence of his first victories in Italy. Marshal Victor was generally blamed for having felt too great contempt for the Spaniards, because Cuesta's army on the 26th had been seized with a panic, as was previously the case at Medellin. It was further alleged that he did not wish to share the honour of the victory with Soult, and that, therefore, he gave no heed to Marshal Jourdan and King Joseph, who wished him to wait for Soult's arrival. He is also blamed, in a strategical point of view, for not having put off the engagement on the 27th, because on that day he was unable to make any use of the heights on the left of the English army, the possession of which was indispensable to the battle. The engagement was fought on the 28th, at about twelve miles from Talavera; and after a murderous contest of three hours the French were obliged to retreat to the heights of Salinas, behind the Alberche, with the loss of seventeen guns. This victory did honour to the English general; all England was loud in his applause; he received the thanks of both houses of parliament, and was created Viscount Wellington of Talavera; the battle, however, was followed by no result except honour.

Soult arrived at Joseph's army immediately after Wellington had withdrawn from the field of battle, and commenced his march to Portugal. He now took the supreme command, and attacked Cuesta, who most absurdly continued his march without the English. On the 8th of August Cuesta was completely defeated at Arzobispo, not far from Talavera, the whole of his artillery taken, and his army utterly dispersed. Vénégas was in no respect more fortunate than Cuesta; on the 13th of August he, too, was defeated at Almonévid by Sebastiani, and the remnant of his army fled to the Sierra Morena, where they were afterwards combined with the troops which Areizaga commanded in the province of La Mancha. Wellington escaped pursuit by a rapid march, crossed the Tagus at Almaruz, reached Portugal again through Truxillo and Merida, and afterwards, in order to be near the Spaniards, divided his army between Badajoz, Elvas, and Campo-Major. At this time, when the best troops had been sent from the Danube to the Tagus and the Ebro, Navarre, Biscay, and the two Castiles were reduced; at the end of the year, when Gerona and Hostalrich also fell, the possession of the whole of Arragon and Catalonia appeared to be secured. In the south of Spain, however, the insurgents, at the end of the year

1809, had still three regular armies in the field; one under the Duke of Albuquerque, a second under the Duke del Parque, and a third under Areizaga, in La Mancha. The last mentioned received orders from the central junta to form a junction with the other two, and to march to Madrid. These armies, however, were beaten in detail before they could form a junction. Del Parque and Albuquerque attempted in vain to effect a junction with Areizaga through Talavera in November, but the latter was completely defeated on the 19th of this month by Mortier and Sebastiani, at Ocagna, not far from Aranjuez. The same fate befel Del Parque and Albuquerque a week after, at Alba de Tormes, not far from Salamanca, where there was a French army under Kellermann.

Nothing was wanting to the entire subjection of Spain in 1810 but the expulsion of the English from Portugal; a very considerable army of veteran troops was collected for this purpose. All military writers are agreed, that Wellington would not have been able to maintain himself, had Napoleon himself gone to Spain; he was, however, detained elsewhere by his marriage and many other matters, to which we shall subsequently refer. Masséna was appointed to take the supreme command in his stead; a man whose distinguished abilities in the field were so overshadowed by the vulgarity and meanness of his behaviour and morals, that neither generals nor soldiers either respected or loved him. Sixty-six thousand infantry, to be afterwards supported by the army under Soult, by Victor's corps, and by Regnier, were collected under Ney and Junot; Soult, however, felt himself offended at being required to serve under Masséna. As King Joseph, who was aided by Soult in the administration of the war department, was as much dissatisfied with the nothingness, to which his brother had condemned him, as Soult was with the character which he was to play under Masséna, the latter prevailed upon the king to give him a commission to reduce Andalusia, and set out thither as much as three months before Masséna put his army in motion. As early as the 21st of January, the passes of the Sierra Morena were occupied, and the whole of Jaen and the city of Cordova conquered. On the 28th, Sebastiani entered Granada, and on the 1st of February Seville had fallen; the central junta having fled to Cadiz, Victor was sent against that fortress, and Mortier against Badajoz. There he was to be reinforced by Regnier, who was marching down the course of the Tagus.

In the mean time, a corresponding force of cavalry was added to the 66,000 infantry under Masséna; and even a part of the guards had arrived in Spain. It was said in Spain that the Emperor himself would have come, had he not at that time been fully occupied with the affairs of Holland and his brother Louis. Masséna commenced his campaign somewhat late—on the 26th of April. He then sent Bonnet against the Asturias, Boisson to occupy Astorga and Lugo, and Ney marched to Ciudad Rodrigo, in order to besiege that fortress. The trenches were opened before Ciudad Rodrigo on the



11th of June; but the government of the King of Spain, set up by the Emperor, became more and more enfeebled every day, for anarchy prevailed everywhere except in those places in which the French generals enforced martial law and practised plunder. The Spanish central government was altogether as powerless as the royal one of King Joseph. Neither the junta of Seville, which had at first usurped the government, the council of Castile, the general junta, nor, finally, the Cortes, assembled at the close of the year in Cadiz, with its regency dignified with the title of royal highness, saved the country, but Spain, like France in 1793, was delivered by anarchy alone. The people, left to themselves, stormed and raged; all moral order and security was, as formerly in France, at an end, and systematic oppression consequently became impossible. Napoleon was accused in Spain, as elsewhere, of having always overturned in one day what he had set up on the preceding one, and of having managed matters no better with his brother Joseph and the Spaniards than he had done with Louis and the Dutch, and of proposing finally to divide the provinces of Spain like satrapies among his generals. Preparations for this purpose were made as early as 1810; the best and most productive provinces were subjected immediately to the French government, and the burden of the expenses of the war was laid upon the other provinces, without paying any attention to the fact, that in this way all the civil and other officers of King Joseph must be reduced to a state of starvation. This, in fact, took place, as soon as the decrees of February, 1810, were issued.\* By virtue of a decree of the 8th of February, 1810, the four provinces of Catalonia, Arragon, Biscay, and Navarre were separated from Spain, and made into four French governments. The French commander was to be supreme in both civil and military affairs; and the administration of justice, police, and finances, to be dependent on his will. The ordinary and extraordinary revenues were all to be paid into the military chest. Something still more terrible than these measures were the satraps by whom they were to be carried out—Augereau in Catalonia, Suchet in Arragon, Dufour in Navarre, and Thouvenot in Biscay. No one could for a moment doubt to what these first steps were intended to lead. Even in the other provinces not affected by the decree, the administration of the finances was altogether taken out of the hands of King Joseph, who was the mere shadow of a king, because the whole income of the country was claimed for engineering expenses and the pay of the troops. The Spaniards

\* Savary, in his *Mémoires*, vol. v., p. 261, says: "Indépendamment des armées d'opérations il y avait une armée de réserve en Biscaye composée de deux bonnes divisions dont une était placée à Burgos. Le roi Joseph avait en outre à Madrid une forte réserve; malheureusement tant d'excellentes troupes étaient éparsées sous des commandans différens, indépendans les uns des autres sans centre d'autorité qui pût leur imprimer une action uniforme. Il en resulta, que tous les arrondissemens de chaque corps devinrent autant de petites viceroyautés qui administraient d'autant de manières différentes et qui ne reconnaissent pas plus l'autorité du roi d'Espagne que celle du roi de Maroc."

were to pay the French army, as the Emperor no longer contributed more than two millions of francs of his own for the payment of the troops serving in Spain. Although the object of this mode of proceeding was not to be mistaken, yet the French minister of foreign affairs did not think it superfluous to intimate in a letter to the King of Holland, through the French ambassador, what were the real views of the Emperor. In this letter, indeed, allusion is at first only made to a possible union of the country on the left bank of the Ebro, and as far as the Duero, with France; it was rather intimated than clearly announced.\* That the Emperor was really serious in his purpose of treating Spain as Poland had been treated, was made apparent by him at the end of May, at the moment when the English had proved themselves able to maintain their ground in an admirably fortified position in Portugal, and succeeded in organising a new system of resistance against the French in the seaports; for at this moment he added two new governments to those already incorporated with France.

The confusion in Spain, and the uncertainty who was to command and who to obey, was at this time indescribable. There was not only disunion between Soult and Masséna, but Ney also very unwillingly yielded obedience to the latter, because his life and character made him an object of detestation. This is alleged to have been the chief reason why Spain was not wholly subjugated in the year 1810. The complete subjection of the Spanish nation was, however, prevented by a variety of other circumstances. Of these the first mention is undoubtedly due to the fact, that the system of war upon a large scale was altogether given up, and a small, but universal, plan of predatory incursions, such as is possible in Spain alone, was organised. The roving bands of guerillas were put under skilful leaders, and carried on their system of plunder and annoyance with great success. All the roads became unsafe, all single travellers and messengers on foot or on horseback were detained, the movements of the enemy harassed, and all communication between different bodies rendered impossible, except kept open and protected by a considerable force. The generals of the regular army, and the people who made themselves masters of the government, were all of the old school; they were, therefore, indolent, and capable of every meanness, like those who from 1814 till the present time have had the management of affairs in Spain. This will be obvious, if we only cast a glance at the course pursued by the administrative councils of the southern provinces in the beginning of the year 1810.

At that time the French were seriously threatening the southerly

\* "Les principes de cette lettre," writes Champagny, referring to Holland and King Louis, "vous feront connaître quels sont les DEVOIRS des prières de l'Empereur, qu'il a élevés sur des trônes, envers le chef de l'Empire et de la dynastie, et quels sont les DANGERS auxquelles ils exposent, lorsqu'ils s'en écartent. C'est ce que vous pourrez rappeler au besoin."

towns of Andalusia, and yet the central junta and the old junta of Seville continued in a state of strife with one another, and the corporation of Cadiz considered itself independent of both. Cadiz would have been betrayed to the French had not Albuquerque, with his army, entered the city in February. Although the general, by this movement, prevented the French from gaining possession of the town, he finally fell into disputes with the general government, as it was called, and was obliged to leave the city. He was succeeded by the miserable General Blake, to whom then the English lent assistance. In March, a general meeting of the Cortes was called, but they did not assemble till September, when the fortune of war had changed, and then only about a hundred persons, who were acknowledged as the Cortes, although they had not been summoned in all respects according to ancient usage. This body at length adopted some measures to reduce the government and administration to something like order. As early as July, the English government had sent Admiral Keats with a fleet and some troops on board, the number of which was progressively increased to 8000 men. The Spanish regency had in like manner fitted out twenty ships, and given the command of them to Admiral Parvis. The resistance now became everywhere vigorous, and although, as we shall hereafter see, Valencia fell, Carthage and Alicante maintained themselves; everything, however, depended on the expulsion of Masséna from Portugal.

We have already stated above, that the grand army was not able to commence the campaign till late, and that Masséna was regarded with anything but good-will by Junot, Ney, and Regnier, who served under him. Junot took Astorga by storm on the 20th and 21st of April, and lost on the occasion a great many men. Ney and Montbrun did not appear before Ciudad Rodrigo till the 26th, and Regnier took up a position to their left on the Tagus, in order to keep the communication open. The formal siege commenced still later, for the trenches could not be opened till the 11th of June, and even then Herrasti, the commandant, defended the place for an entire month. Masséna, who by his presence had previously contributed much to the taking of Astorga, was also present at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and completely changed the system of attack; the city, however, did not fall till the 11th of July. The cavalry of the garrison, under Don Julian, a bold guerilla chief, cut their way through the enemy, and proceeded to Portugal. Immediately afterwards Masséna was considerably reinforced; Kellermann, who had previously been in the interior of Spain, and there, among other acts of violence, had plundered the old Spanish archives in Simancas, and sent the plunder to Paris, where the most of it still remains, had first pushed forward to Oporto, and about this time set out from thence with his 8000 men, in order to reinforce Masséna, and to form the left wing of the main army supported by the sea. The English had long since taken measures to convert the whole moun-



tainous district of Beira into a fortress, and to avail themselves of the mountains, gorges, and rivers, as natural defences, so that the enemy should be obliged to fight their way three times successively before they could proceed on their march. From the space between their works everything was driven away, men, cattle, and stores, and the dwellings were burned down in order that the French might find no shelter. As early as July they withdrew within the outward fortifications. These lines embraced a vast space, and were laid down with the help of the plans which Sir Charles Stuart had caused to be made in 1799; and not without attention to the work of Colonel Vincent, of the French engineers, which had been made for Junot. Throughout the vast extent of these lines, stockades and other fortifications were erected between the mountains, square redoubts were built, the rivers dammed up, and preparations made for inundating the country by sluices. When the English had marched into these lines through Coimbra, the Portuguese regency, on the 4th of August, Wellington, as general-in-chief of the English, and Beresford of the Portuguese troops, issued orders which were most strictly observed, that all the buildings should be burnt to the ground, the cattle and provisions removed, and the inhabitants distributed in the space within the lines. The country was made a desert; the French, who never brought stores with them, found neither provisions nor forage, protection nor shelter, whilst the English derived their supplies from the sea. Those who suffered most were the poor Portuguese, who had been crowded around Lisbon, and of whom no one took care.

Before Soult's army could attack the English in their lines, Almeida must be reduced. Its conquest was facilitated by an accident. At the very commencement of the siege a bomb fell into the great powder magazine, which was immediately blown up, carried away a part of the fortifications, and covered the town with ruins. The situation of the magazine was probably betrayed by one of the Portuguese in Almeida; and the town surrendered to the French by capitulation as early as the 27th of August. The English concluded that there was treachery in the case, from the fact, that by virtue of the capitulation the English troops alone were made prisoners, whilst the Portuguese were allowed to return to their homes. Almeida was no sooner in their hands, than Masséna, now joined by the second corps, set out on his march to Coimbra. He soon found that the square space lying behind the rivers Mondego and Tagus, and the wild mountains called the Sierra d'Estrella, formed a regular fortification. In order to go round the Sierra d'Estrella, Masséna directed his march northwards from Mondego through Viseu and Guarda, whilst Wellington encamped on a mountain plain at Buzaco, above the convent of the same name, commanding the road to Coimbra. Masséna wished to take this route in order to avoid the Sierra d'Estrella. He was consequently obliged to attempt the English position by storm. His reasons for

this determination were explained by him in a letter to Marshal Bessières, dated from Viseu, on the 19th of September.

In this letter he states, "We found nothing on our march but immense abysses, and passed through deserts, where there was not a soul to be seen. Every thing was forsaken, removed, or destroyed. The English had been barbarous enough to direct that every one who remained in his house should be shot; and the whole population, old men, women, and children, fled before us."

This attempt to open a way for themselves, however, altogether failed on the 27th, although the French at first succeeded in mounting the heights. They were repulsed with a loss which they themselves admit to have been 5000 men, and were thereby reduced to the greatest difficulties. At length they were fortunate enough to find a peasant, who showed them a narrow path over the mountains, passable only by men in single file. By this path Masséna tried to pass round the English position. His soldiers climbed one after another over the mountain chain of Caramuela for an hour and a half from Mortagoa to Bogalva. This chain forms a continuation of the Sierra de Buzaco, and the English left their position as soon as they found themselves outflanked on the left. From this time Masséna continued to besiege Wellington's army in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, shut up as it was within the lines of Torres Vedras. These lines consisted of a triple row of trenches, including three spaces, the last of which, on the coast, was to receive the army, provided it should be found necessary to re-embark. Before the English were completely shut in, they had contrived to draw to their assistance 8000 Spaniards under La Romagna; and in the mean time Masséna was threatened in the rear, and pressed upon by Portuguese levies organised by the English. The French general had omitted to leave a suitable covering for Coimbra, where he had left his sick and wounded, amounting, as it was said, to 5000. Colonel Trant availed himself of his neglect to fall with his Portuguese by surprise upon the town, and to deprive him of one position after another. In this way Masséna's communication with Spain was wholly cut off, and he had no choice left but to storm the lines at an enormous sacrifice of men. This was extremely difficult; for the passages were all filled up, streams conducted across the country, the roads torn up or obstructed by trenches, and the steep heights occupied everywhere by artillery. After he had made a careful *reconnaissance*, Masséna found that his army was too weak to justify him in venturing upon such a deadly storm. He next tried to blockade Wellington, but was in reality himself blockaded by Trant, Miller, and Wilson.

Whilst Masséna kept the English within their lines from the 14th of October till the 14th of November, both armies suffered extremely, not only from the severity of the service, as Wellington himself and all his troops were daily under arms as early as an hour before day-break, but from prevailing want. The unfortunate Portuguese, who had been partly driven together, and partly fled to Lisbon and its



neighbourhood, to the amount of many thousands, suffered most severely from hunger and misery, so that the Portuguese regency were even obliged to employ English troops to restrain the Portuguese from acts of criminal violence. Many thousands perished miserably, although the French gave most exaggerated accounts of the number of the dead, and failed to render that commendation to the English commander-in-chief which was his due; for even according to the testimony of the French, Wellington showed as much military skill and activity as Masséna, and was loved and honoured by his troops, as Napoleon was by his. He used all possible means in order to get supplies for his army, and to lessen, if he could not altogether remedy, the evils and sufferings of the Portuguese in and about Lisbon, whose number has been given at more than 40,000. For this purpose he caused corn to be brought from Algiers, Egypt, Ireland, and America, regardless of cost, and endeavoured to overcome all the obstructions laid in his way by cabals. All sorts of intrigues were carried on in Portugal against this energetic commander by the regency, in Rio Janeiro at the court which had taken refuge there, and in London by a portion of the ministry, which, however, felt that his services were indispensable. He therefore soon possessed dictatorial power in Portugal, as Napoleon had done in Italy in 1797. Masséna's low avarice, and his licentious mode of life, which had early destroyed his health, his meanness and want of dignity, had rendered it impossible for him to maintain any order or discipline in his army, so that he had, in fact, been four times removed from his command since 1798. In Portugal, also, he was far from obtaining the respect of his army. His troops were suffering from want of every description, because Masséna had laid up no stores of any kind, but had seized for his own use the monies intended for the support and clothing of his men.

As early as the 2nd of October, when Masséna had got possession of Coimbra, there was want of everything in his army; and from the 14th of October, the moment when he became convinced that the enemy's position was neither to be stormed nor passed, he was in much greater difficulties than Wellington, who always had the sea open, and in this way kept up free access to his army. About the beginning of November want among the French reached the highest point, because in their rear not only Trant, but Miller and Wilson, English officers at the head of the Portuguese insurgents, had effectually cut off all communication between them and Almeida, where stores for relief were to be found. We have already stated that Trant had made prisoners of several thousand French in Coimbra, and at a later period some thousands more were obliged to surrender by capitulation at Mondego.

General Pelet alleges, that notwithstanding all the reproaches cast upon him, Masséna displayed greater capacity as a commander in Portugal than ever he had done before. This, we, who have no special knowledge of military acts, neither can nor dare dispute; but we can-



not avoid noticing Pelet's great exaggeration of the force which Wellington was able to bring against the French. He appeals to the reports laid before the English parliament, when he alleges that Wellington's army amounted to 185,000 men. This body, however, did not all consist of soldiers, for were we to admit that the whole of the 51,000 Portuguese organised and commanded by English officers, and who afterwards were not much inferior to the English, were fully disciplined, yet the 80,000 Portuguese militia could only be employed under particular conditions. Masséna being thus threatened in the rear, and, after Mortier's withdrawal to the Sierra Morena, seeing himself in danger of being attacked from Spain, suddenly broke up his quarters on the 14th, and drew nearer Santarem, where he had caused some stores to be collected. The position of the French at Santarem was very difficult to be attacked. Wellington, who had followed him close, therefore took up a position of observation during the winter in and around Cartaxo, where his head-quarters were, and at Alcoentre and Azambuja.

The Emperor of the French was probably not very exactly acquainted with the state of affairs, because he issued one order after another to Masséna to attack the English, which he could not venture to do without great reinforcements. At length Masséna sent General Foix to Paris, to explain personally the real state of affairs, the result of which was that Drouet and Gardamne were sent with 12,000 men. At the end of December, also, 14,000 more from Mortier and Soult's corps joined Masséna, and still he did not feel himself strong enough to assume the offensive. Last of all, Bessières, who was tyrannising over Navarre, Biscay, and Asturia with an army of 60,000 men, received orders to reinforce Masséna; the French commander, however, did not think it advisable to await him in Santarem, when at length, on the 1st of March, an English fleet ran into the Tagus and brought to Wellington the long expected fresh troops. When Masséna broke up from his position at Santarem on the Tagus, in order to retire to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, a new insurrection had broken out in all corners of Spain, and new hostilities were commenced.

The Cortes, or at least a number of Spaniards who were to be regarded as such, and who had been called together in the spring, at length met on the 24th of September. By means of this assembly the institution of corps of guerillas, or roving parties, was at length officially proclaimed, or in other words, that particular kind of war was organised which was altogether suited to Spain and the Spaniards. Every man was invited to take up arms; and the junta of Badajoz earnestly advised the appointment of leaders to these bands in whom the people had confidence. The arms to be used were guns and short swords, and the object of their warfare was to lie in wait for straggling parties of the enemy, and to seize upon all messengers or bearers of despatches. All this was announced in various proclamations. Savary, whose report agrees with what is learnt from other

sources, has left no information of the result of these measures. He alleges that all communications of the respective commanders with France and with one another were so completely prevented, that whilst Masséna was in Portugal the Emperor was unable to get any intelligence of him, except what he was able to glean from the English newspapers. Even the communications between Soult and Masséna were altogether obstructed by the Spanish guerillas. In almost every province, men of a bold spirit, who were capable of every severity and cruelty, gained for themselves the glory of extirpators of the French, and the property of the latter was never safe. We only require to mention the names of a few of the celebrated leaders of the guerilla bands in 1811 and 1812, in order to show that scarcely any message or despatch of the French commanders ever reached its destination. The names of Campillo, Porlier, Longos, el Medico, el Franzesquito, and el Manch were already objects of dread; at a later period Don Julian Sanchez committed depredations in Old Castile, Espoz y Mina in Navarre, Santocildes in Leon, Marquisito in the Asturias, Villa Campa, Gayan, Duran, Mina, Baron d'Eroles and Frayle in Arragon and Catalonia, and Martin, who was an object of fear under the name of the Empecinado, in the mountains of Guadalaxara.

Bignon, in his history, or rather his eulogy, of the times of Napoleon, has left a whole series of extracts concerning the disputes of Napoleon with his brother Joseph, from the original correspondence. From these extracts it is obvious, that from the year 1810, Napoleon treated his brother Joseph and the Spaniards who acknowledged him as king, precisely as he had treated his brother Louis and the Dutch whom he governed. In the year 1811 he appeared desirous even of destroying the kingdom of Spain, as he had annihilated that of Holland in the previous year; and in the former half of this year King Joseph played a melancholy part.

Masséna and Soult, who ought to have taken the same direction, commenced their campaign in 1810, at the same time, but in a totally different direction. The former marched against Portugal, and the latter set out to reduce Andalusia and incidentally Estramadura; both were afterwards obliged to relinquish campaigns favourably opened—the one as early as 1811, and the other in 1812. We must, however, remark, that it was neither the Portuguese who prevented Masséna from reducing Lisbon, nor the Spaniards who saved Cadix and Tarifa, when these remote fortified points were assailed by Soult, but the English alone. In Portugal, the French were kept off by Wellington; in Andalusia, Graham, Skerret, and Campbell delivered the Spanish cities of refuge, threatened by the French. Whilst Masséna threatened their capital, the unfortunate Portuguese suffered alike from friends and enemies, not only whilst the French general lay before the lines of Torres Vedras, but as long as he remained at Santarem. The misery of the inhabitants of those districts where the armies lay exceeds all belief, and Wellington,

although he took all possible means, at least to provide for his army, was often compelled to leave the Portuguese serving under him to misery and want. Masséna quietly suffered them to starve and put the money into his pocket. The number of Portuguese who miserably perished whilst Masséna lay at Santarem, has been, perhaps, exaggerated, when given at 40,000. Napier states with respect to the Portuguese in the English service during the time of their being shut up within the lines of Torres Vedras, that 4000 perished from want and the exhaustion of a service of unexampled hardship, and that ten thousand deserted.

The sixth of Masséna's army was sick, and he was wholly without any information concerning Soult at the time when Wellington's reinforcements arrived in the Tagus. In the beginning of March, therefore, in order to avoid an attack, he broke up from Santarem suddenly, and retreated to Spain. He caused his heavy artillery and a great quantity of ammunition to be thrown into the Tagus, and gained four marches upon Wellington, who commenced his pursuit on the 6th of March. He proceeded through Estramadura, the same road by which he had entered Portugal, and collected his army at Pombal, as if he were about to offer battle, so that Wellington made a halt in order to get together his forces for the fight. On the 12th, when the English were advancing in battle array, and had taken all the French posts around the town, they saw the place left by the French in flames, and on the further side, Ney, who covered the retreat, took care that the English should be detained till the army had got clearly away. On the march from Pombal to the Spanish frontiers, Ney gained as great a reputation in covering the retreat of the French, as Wellington in their pursuit. On this occasion, too, Ney's renown was purchased by the exercise of unheard-of severity towards the Portuguese. In order to delay the English, all the towns and villages, as in the case of Pombal, were set on fire by the French when they left them, and yet they were frequently obliged, in places where the roads were heavy, to destroy their artillery, baggage, and ammunition, in order to facilitate their retreat. Wellington is entitled to special commendation, because he had to contend not only with the French, but also with the difficulties which were put in his way by his friends the Portuguese.

Masséna, who on this march often fell under the influence of that indolence into which his dissolute life had plunged him, was often in the greatest danger of being wholly cut off. As early as the 13th of March he was obliged to give up the plan of going to Coimbra across the Mondego, and to take another direction, two hours from the bridge of Coimbra, at Condeira. In the first week of April, his weary troops were very near being surrounded by the English on the Coa, not far from Sabugal.

This, however, was the last danger, for Sabugal lies at no great distance from Almeida, where they found safety under the protection of the guns of the fortress. There, on Portuguese ground, Masséna



wished to make a stand, and to wait for the reinforcements sent by Bessières. Ney, however, insisted that Portugal should be evacuated, and everything be left in the fortress of Almeida which could impede their march. Masséna here again experienced what had happened to him three or four times since 1798, when he played a miserable part in Rome. The generals who served under him despised his vulgarity, and refused him obedience, because he scandalously gratified his lowest passions. The contest between the two generals became so vehement, that Masséna sent away Ney from the army, and both parties appealed to Napoleon.

From Villa Franca, where a halt was made, the French army, after having supplied reinforcements to the garrison of Almeida, marched to the neighbourhood of Salamanca, where not only the troops sent by Bessières, but a ready access to provisions, was expected; for Bessières too was suffering from a deficiency of supplies. Wellington now immediately made preparations for the siege of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; he himself, however, went till the end of the month to the frontiers of Alentejo, where Beresford was at that time lending assistance to the Spaniards against Soult. In order to be able to form any correct opinion of the state of affairs in Spain at the time in which Soult was reducing one considerable place after another in Andalusia, and last of all Cadix, we must take a very brief notice of the condition of Spain in 1810.

The French marshals and generals were, as we have shown, as jealous of one another, and as disunited, as the Spanish ones, although they were much more skilful. They were quite as little satisfied with King Joseph and his major-general as the Spanish generals were with the juntas, or the juntas with them. Napoleon was so dissatisfied with his brother, that in 1810 he either caused whole provinces to be governed from France, or gave arbitrary rule to his generals in the respective districts in which their command lay. To his dispute with his brother we shall subsequently return, and we have already referred to the disputes of the different juntas of the insurgents. First of all, the junta of Seville, and the so-called central junta, had fallen into shameful collision. In the year 1810, when Soult took Seville, the central junta took refuge in Cadix, then immediately quarrelled with the municipality of the town, and were obliged to name a new commission of government, at the head of which Castagnos was placed. This government, named by the junta itself, was guilty of the most shameful dereliction of duty. They laid hands upon the public money and the English subsidies, and no one knew what had become of the ninety millions of dollars drawn from the American colonies, which first shook off the yoke of the mother country in 1811. The junta shamefully forsook their duty, and General Tilly, their president, had long since taken refuge in America.

The council of Castile was afterwards to occupy the place of the central junta till the Cortes called by the commission of government

in March could assemble. The election of this body, however, did not take place till September, 1810, and then the election in many places could not be made after the usual method; but the government were obliged to declare certain persons entitled to sit in the Cortes who had not been elected according to this method. The assembly, which should have consisted of 208 members, and have met in Cadix on the 25th September, 1810, was only at first composed of 150. The Cortes immediately laid claim to both legislative and executive powers—declared itself sovereign, and demanded to be addressed by the title of majesty. It at the same time recognised Ferdinand VII. as king, caused his bust to be placed in the hall of assembly, and declared that it only laid claim to sovereign power as long as King Ferdinand should remain a prisoner in Valençay.

The Cortes, however, did not, like the French Convention, desire so to unite the government and legislation in themselves, as immediately to exercise the former. They appointed a regency, to which they gave the appellation of a royal government, but one subordinate to their own. The regency was to be addressed as royal highness, but was obliged to take an oath of fidelity to the Cortes, and to be responsible to it for its administration. This was resolved upon in the very first sitting, and at the same time all the existing authorities were confirmed in their offices. On the first day of the opening of the Cortes, all its members, as parts of the sovereign power, were declared inviolable in person; and the whole of the measures adopted immediately afterwards appeared designed to prepare for a completely new political organisation of the kingdom, and for republican forms. This was undoubtedly a perversion, or rather the very opposite, of the system adopted by the Spartans and Romans, at a time when a dictatorship was more than ever necessary for the deliverance of the people. The claim of this new many-headed royalty to elect or appoint deputies, not only for the places occupied by the French, or substitutes for those who were chosen deputies and who could not attend, but to appoint deputies for the Spanish-American colonies, must have raised a strong suspicion against them in the minds of the Spaniards, who had been so long accustomed to absolutism and monarchy, both in spiritual and secular concerns. Liberty of the press was also proclaimed by the Cortes.

All the resolutions adopted by the Cortes in the year 1811, and even the plan of a constitution then proposed, indicated an intention to establish a constitutional, although not quite a democratic government. The effect of the decrees of the Cortes, and obedience to the commands of the regency appointed by them, extended only to the places in the neighbourhood of Cadiz. In other districts, the several juntas, the leaders of particular bands of guerillas, or predatory mobs, or the generals of the regular armies, acted completely according to their own discretion. It was, however, by virtue of the ordinance of the Cortes, in respect to the general duty of military service, and by means of their resolutions for raising of recruits, that new and



numerous regular armies were again got into the field in the year 1811. These, however, proved as useless in this year, as they had been in the preceding one. The chief enemies of the French were still to be found in the bands of guerillas, and in the unyielding temper of the Spanish people.

Soult, as we have already observed, had marched with the king's army to Andalusia, and succeeded in reducing all the towns as far as Cadiz, instead of doing, as he should have done, marching from the south through Estramadura and Alentejo to join Masséna, as soon as he heard that the latter was advancing from the north against the lines of Torres Vedras. He suffered the favourable moment for an expedition to Portugal to escape, because, at the end of the year 1810, he thought himself sure of reducing Cadiz, and of being able to drive away the Cortes. It soon, however, appeared that he was deceived; for he had not to deal in Cadiz with some miserable Spanish general, but with 8000 English, under General Graham.

The city of Cadiz is situated at the extremity of the Isle of Leon; and as the English had full command of the sea, the city might be easily threatened, and its communications with the country obstructed, but with great difficulty be reduced. Soult caused it to be shut in on the land side by semicircular lines, and mounted an immense quantity of artillery in the lines opposite the island. On his return from Badajoz, he opened a destructive fire from his batteries, rather from a feeling of anger and a desire of vengeance, than from any hope of being able to compel the city to surrender. His batteries consisted of 300 pieces of heavy artillery and mortars, some of which were calculated to throw shells to a distance of from 2500 to 3000 roods. When Masséna was at Santarem, Soult, however, received orders from the Emperor to change the siege of Cadiz for the present into a blockade, and to march to Estramadura, in order to reach the Tagus through Alentejo. Soult had sent forward Mortier to Estramadura as early as September, in order to reduce the fortified Spanish and Portuguese towns on the frontiers, which were intended to form magazines and arsenals in the expedition to Portugal. Of these places, Olivenza was taken on the 22nd of January, 1811; and on the 5th of February Soult himself set out in order to carry on the siege of Badajoz. He first, however, changed the siege of Cadiz into a blockade, gave the command to Victor, took care to protect Seville against a surprise, then marched to Estramadura, and on the 15th of February opened the trenches against Badajoz.

As soon as Wellington, who was watching Masséna at Santarem, received news of the siege of Badajoz, he despatched the Spanish army, which had joined him in Portugal under La Romana, and after Romana's sudden death was commanded by Mendizabal, to Badajoz, not to attempt to relieve the city, but to obstruct the siege till Beresford, with the Portuguese and English, might be able to arrive to its relief. With this view, Wellington had indicated to the Spanish general the heights of Fort Christoval as the place where he



might safely encamp with his army. Mendizabal at first occupied the ground which was pointed out, opened up communications with the besieged, and would have been safe from attack had he not changed his position as soon as a few shells fell in his camp, and thus made an opening for Mortier. The French general immediately took advantage of Mendizabal's fault; on the 18th of February he ordered six thousand men to ford the small river Gebora, attacked the Spanish general, defeated him, and routed his army. Mendizabal cannot well, however, as the French allege, have lost 10,000 prisoners, as his whole force was only 9000 strong.\* Notwithstanding this defeat on the Gebora, the brave commandant, Monacho, would probably have been able to hold the fortress, into which 3000 of Mendizabal's army had been thrown, till the arrival of Beresford, had he not been killed in a sally. His successor, Imas, sold this important place to the French, who entered it on the 10th of March.

At the same time as Soult arrived before Badajoz, Masséna set out from Santarem; Beresford, by Wellington's orders, hastened therefore to Estramadura, and Soult and Mortier had no longer any reason for undertaking an expedition into the interior of Portugal. Soult returned to Andalusia, where circumstances made his presence necessary, but made provision for the defence of Badajoz before he took his departure. Before Beresford's arrival, Mortier had taken possession of Campo-Major. This town was scarcely taken, on the 23rd of March, when Mortier was overtaken by Beresford. The latter immediately retook Campo-Major, but first crossed the Guadiana on the 25th, so that Mortier had time enough to place Badajoz in a good condition of defence before he himself took his departure for Seville. It appeared incomprehensible even to the English that he had left behind only 400 men in such a strong position as Olivenza. This small garrison was compelled to surrender unconditionally on the 15th of May. Wellington had followed Masséna to the Spanish frontiers, and whilst the latter delayed in Spain, with a view to be reinforced, and to return provided with stores, he hastened to Beresford for a short time, in order to consult and agree with him on the siege of Badajoz.

Had the Spaniards listened to the advice of General Graham, who commanded the English in Cadiz, Victor would have suffered a complete defeat during Soult and Mortier's absence; as, however, the Spanish general refused to support the English, he suffered only a considerable loss. Graham observed, that on Soult's withdrawal, Victor's army was too weak for the great extent of the lines, and that he himself was not watchful enough; he therefore agreed with the Spaniards to fall upon the French by surprise from Tarifa. In order to prevail upon the Spanish general La Pena to undertake the exploit, Graham even ventured to offer to serve under his command. Victor then left only 4000 men in the lines, and went

\* Mendizabal, as the French allege, lost 10,000 prisoners, his baggage, and artillery.

to meet the allies with a force of 7000. This army met the combined force of English and Spaniards advancing from Tarifa on the heights of Barossa. The English under General Graham made an immediate attack upon the French. Victor was completely defeated, lost one-third of his army, six guns, and five hundred prisoners; the English also, however, suffered severely. Graham now urged La Pena to finish the victory by an attack upon the lines; the latter refused, and the generals separated, dissatisfied with one another. The Cortes afterwards even approved of the cowardice of their general. The blockade of Cadiz was now continued, and the French revenged their defeat at Barossa by the dreadful destruction which, after Soult's return, they perpetrated in Cadiz by their immense bombs.

About this time Wellington was more fortunate before Almeida than Beresford before Badajoz. Masséna, by his departure to Salamanca in the beginning of April, had in the mean time left Almeida to itself, till he had provided himself with the necessary stores for his army in the district of Salamanca, and called to his aid Bessières with his troops. He no sooner took his departure than Wellington made preparations for besieging the fortress, and then went for a short time to Beresford, who was lying before Badajoz. At this time Masséna appeared again on the 25th of April at Ciudad Rodrigo, strengthened the garrison of that city, supplied them with stores, and appeared resolved to compel the English to raise the siege of Almeida. On the 28th of April Wellington also returned, and encamped at Fuentes Onoro, on the banks of the little river Duas Casas. In this position he was seriously threatened by Masséna and Bessières on the 2nd of May, and a battle was the result. This engagement proved indecisive, and both parties claimed the victory. Masséna did not, however, attain his object of relieving Almeida, although Wellington was obliged to give up his communication with the bridge over the Coa at Sabuega, and to take another position, which was by no means easy in the presence of the enemy. A new attack on the part of the French compelled the English to relinquish the lower part of the village of Fuentes Onoro; they, however, maintained the upper one, and continued the siege of Almeida. Masséna retired with his army to Salamanca, and General Brenier, who commanded in Almeida, found himself unable after his withdrawal to maintain the place. He did not, however, capitulate, but marched out at the head of the whole garrison, and cut his way through the enemy's lines on the 10th.

The complaints concerning Masséna became at length so urgent, that he was recalled by a letter from the Emperor on the 20th of April, and Marmont (Duke of Ragusa) appointed in his stead. Marmont was notorious as a luxurious *gourmand*, and surrounded as he was by confectioners, cooks, and other servants of luxury and effeminacy, formed a striking contrast to Masséna and Wellington. He had lived, swaggered, and revelled for eighteen months in

Laybach, as satrap of the Illyrian provinces, and oppressed the Slavonians and Germans; he was now, however, to begin a struggle with Wellington, whose table was one of the simplest in the world. After the reduction of Almeida, Wellington had gone for a short time to Beresford in Estramadura; the latter, after the commander-in-chief had retired again from the scene of action, had been engaged, since the end of April, in conjunction with the Spanish generals Castagnos, Ballasteros, and Blake, in pressing the siege of Badajoz. Soult was thereby compelled to leave Victor behind in the lines before Cadiz, in order to hasten with his army to the relief of the fortress of Badajoz; and on the 10th of May he appeared in the neighbourhood of the English general, who was encamped on the Spanish side of the Guadiana. Beresford did not think it advisable to wait for him on that side of the river, but preferred sacrificing a part of his heavy artillery, and passed to the other side on the 12th. On the 13th a council of war was summoned, and it was resolved to give the enemy battle. In the engagement which followed, at Albuera on the Gebora, both parties suffered about equal loss (the amount has been stated at 8000 men). Soult, however, was unable to keep possession of the field; and when Wellington, with his army, advanced from Almeida, he was obliged to submit to the recommencement of the siege of Badajoz. On this occasion, for once, two of the Emperor's marshals acted in concert. Marmont put off for a time the great undertaking against Portugal, which had been committed to him, and appeared in Estramadura, in order to support Soult, and in conjunction with him to attack Wellington, who was vigorously pressing the siege of Badajoz. This attack the English general did not think it prudent to wait for; and on the very day (the 18th of June) on which Marmont arrived at Merida, six hours' march from Badajoz, he raised the siege and retired to Portugal. Marmont followed him, and Soult returned to Andalusia.

Soult was now compelled again to turn his attention to Granada, and to turn his attention to Murcia also. However, in the year 1811, almost all the considerable or strong places were in the power of the French, except Carthagena, Alicante, and Cadiz. The condition of Spain was in the highest degree melancholy. Murder and devastation prevailed everywhere, and the quiet and peaceable citizens in various districts complained even more of the various bands of guerrillas and their leaders than of the French. It is true, that the Spanish insurgents recognised Ferdinand VII. as king, the Cortes as a national assembly, and the regency appointed by them as an executive authority; but there was no such thing as order. The English at length conceived the idea of carrying off Ferdinand VII. and bringing him to Spain; and Louis Philippe of Orleans, afterwards King of the French, set on foot a cabal, in order to fish in troubled waters in Spain, as he afterwards did in France. To this scheme we will first refer, and return at a later period to the English cabals.



The Spanish regency, which had been established by the Cortes, became alarmed at the republican tendencies of the assembly, and entered into a scheme with Louis Philippe, who was at that time in Sicily, where he had very recently married a daughter of the adventurous Queen Caroline of Naples, so notorious for her cruelty and immorality. The regency, without consulting the English, sent a frigate to Palermo, in order to convey Louis Philippe to Spain; the English, however, were not willing to allow such a cunning rival to the weak-minded Ferdinand to be set up. Louis Philippe no sooner reached the coast of Catalonia, where he first landed, than he learnt that the steps taken by the regency were generally disapproved; he nevertheless continued his journey to Cadiz, but was not even allowed to land. Not only the opponents of the regency, but the English also, were wholly opposed to his schemes, and there were intrigues enough on hand without his; he was, therefore, obliged immediately to sail back again to Palermo. The attempt of the English to restore unity to the cause of the Spanish insurrection by the instrumentality of Baron Kolli, an adventurer, and to set the miserable Ferdinand VII. at liberty, in order afterwards to act in his name, also failed. It would make too great a demand upon our space to give a full account of Kolli's adventure, and of the manner in which Napoleon availed himself of his papers in order to allure the miserable king, then a prisoner in Valençay, into a snare. We must, therefore, confine ourselves to a few of the leading facts of the case.

A Piedmontese baron named Kolli, sometimes a bold adventurer, and sometimes a penitent devotee, entertained as singular a predilection for the Spanish branch of the house of Bourbon as for the order of La Trappe, into which he had been received. He happened to be in Paris at the time in which the war in Spain broke out, but was there closely watched by the police as early as 1808. He afterwards betook himself to England, and submitted a plan to the ministry of rescuing Ferdinand VII. from his prison in Valençay, and bringing him to the coast. In London he arranged the plan with Lord Wellesley, and was furnished by the English ministry with money, and accredited by the necessary papers to Ferdinand. He succeeded in reaching France in safety, but was discovered after landing, and sent prisoner to Vincennes.

So far everything is clear, and may be confidently believed; certain it is, that he was also kept a close prisoner till the year 1814. The proper connexion, however, of the history of Kolli and the schemes of Fouché, are still matters of obscurity. For ourselves, we put no confidence either in the various documents which were afterwards published concerning this story, or in the memoirs of the baron himself, but give the affair as the baron has related it.

Kolli having refused to be made an instrument of the French police, in order to allure Ferdinand into a snare, the papers and letters found upon him, and given with a view to accredit him to Ferdinand VII., were given to one of the innumerable agents of the

secret police, who was enabled to gain access to Ferdinand at Valencay, and to present him with his letters of introduction from England. Ferdinand, however, was too cowardly to enter into any hazardous undertaking. Others allege that Kolli really suffered himself to be employed in this affair, although a testimonial from Fouché has declared the reverse. This testimony, however, which Kolli succeeded in obtaining in 1814 from Fouché, who had originated and directed the whole affair, would rather lead us to believe the very reverse of what it was alleged to prove. In order to justify Kolli, Fouché had the audacity to declare that the French government—that is, that he himself, had caused the whole of the papers then printed in the *Moniteur* to be fabricated for the occasion.

Of all the French generals whom Napoleon employed in Spain during the years 1811 and 1812, Suchet alone was fortunate in his undertakings, and maintained his conquests, even after the complete defeat which was sustained by Marmont's army. For this reason we shall first advert to his exploits, and then return to those of Soult and Marmont. Suchet, independently of Soult, commanded the army of Arragon, and first made an attempt against Valencia in March, 1811. This attempt failed, as well as the two attempts which had been previously made against the same city by Moncey. Suchet, however, completely defeated the army brought into the field by the Valencians at Santa Maria, and suddenly appeared before Valencia. He found that the works had been greatly strengthened since Moncey's attack, and thought it therefore wiser first to withdraw, in order to take possession of those places in Arragon which had either not been conquered or again wrested from the hands of the French.\*

In Catalonia, Macdonald was not more fortunate than his two predecessors St. Cyr and Augereau had been; Suchet, on the other hand, gained a series of successes in Arragon. He reduced Merida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, one after another, and at length formed a junction with Macdonald, in order that both united might lay siege to Tarragona. Macdonald was assuredly not to blame for the ill success of his army, although he was obliged to pay the penalty of failure—for the Emperor, in consequence, would not consent to his being united to Suchet in prosecuting the siege of Tarragona. He in fact took away two of his divisions, transferred them to Suchet, and gave the latter the entire direction of the siege. Immediately afterwards Macdonald was altogether recalled from Catalonia, and Decaen, his successor, placed under Suchet's command. The siege of Tarragona was commenced in the beginning of May, and on the 18th of June, as soon as the heavy artillery arrived, a breach was effected, and the siege terminated by a dreadful and murderous storm. On this occasion the French committed intentionally enormous slaughter, as the

\* All the documents, even the king's act of abdication, written by King Joseph, but never given in, may be seen in the Appendix III., vol. viii., of Napier's "History of the Peninsular War."

Romans were accustomed to do in order to inspire a salutary dread of their power. Thousands of unarmed persons, who had fled to the open strand, were shot down from the batteries, while others were hewn down in the town without distinction of age or sex. The same course was followed in other places conquered by Suchet, because he regarded it as a part of a general's duty towards his own soldiers to inflict the severest punishment on the enemy, in order to deter them from prolonging a defence when there was no longer any hope of being able to maintain the place. Suchet laid down this principle without reserve in his reports, as they were published in the *Moniteur*.

Monserrat and Figueras were afterwards taken in July and August, and the whole of Catalonia appeared to be reduced to subjection. Suchet, however, had scarcely turned his back, when Sarsfield, Rovira, Marso, and others, at the head of large bands of mountaineers, emerged from the gorges of the hills, cut off single detachments of the French, and took possession of towns. The French no sooner again appeared, than the leaders of these bands were obliged to give way; and Baron d'Eroles, with the force under him, was even compelled to take refuge on the further side of the Pyrenees; but spread terror even there in the southern departments, because there were no troops in the south of France. He extorted contributions in the former province of Languedoc, drove off herds of cattle, and recrossed the Pyrenees with his booty. In the mean time, Suchet had been created a marshal on the 8th of July, and exercised barbarous severity. The French commend him not only as a general but as an admirable ruler; and Napier, who, as is well known, was Soult's eulogist and friend, also praises his wisdom and *mildness*. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, to whose book we have frequently referred, in order to compare his account with Napier's, describes Suchet's conduct, on the other hand, as detestable, and justifies his opinion by the recital of the facts on which that opinion is founded.

The Catalonian army, under Decaen, had been no sooner placed under Suchet's orders, than the latter, for the second time, marched with an army of 25,000 men against Valencia. Without reducing Murviedro, the ancient Saguntum, which lay upon his road, Suchet was unable to carry his plan into execution. For this purpose he did not wait for the arrival of his heavy artillery, but caused the town to be attacked by storm as soon as he arrived under its walls. The first attempt proved unsuccessful, and he was driven back with loss; the French marshal, however, gave orders for a second attack on the arrival of his battering guns on the 18th of October, by which a breach was soon effected in the walls. But this second attempt also proved a failure, and the marshal was obliged to resolve upon a regular siege. The resistance of Murviedro furnished the regency in Cadix with time to get on foot an army for the assistance of Valencia. Blake embarked a number of troops at Cadix, and was



landed in Murcia, where the army of the district formed a junction with him. He afterwards obtained the chief command of the troops of Valencia, and approached Murviedro with an army of 30,000 men, about the time, the 24th of October, when Suchet had reduced the town to extremities. On this occasion Blake's army was not composed of undisciplined troops, militia, and peasants, like the most of the Spanish armies, of whom the French speak with such great contempt, but both the soldiers and officers had for the most part served in the old Spanish armies, and a portion of them had fought with bravery against Soult at Albuera. With this army, Blake attacked Suchet on the 25th of October at Puzol, near Murviedro, and fought a battle, which the French call the battle of Murviedro or Saguntum. Here, too, the French were victorious, but the victory was by no means as easy as usual, and the Spanish army was not, as had been heretofore the case, altogether destroyed. In the beginning of the engagement, the Spaniards had even the advantage; but Blake was no general; he committed a fault of which Suchet availed himself, because he possessed those talents in which Blake was deficient. The Spanish general suffered the centre of his line to be weakened; Suchet broke through, and the wings were then compelled to retire. The wings, and the troops which had been routed in the centre, succeeded, however, in again uniting, and in making good their retreat across the Guadalaviar. After Suchet's victory, Murviedro was compelled to capitulate; Blake, however, formed and occupied a fortified camp near the village of Quarte, at the mouth of the Guadalaviar, where Suchet did not venture to attack him till the considerable reinforcements which he expected were close at hand.

Reille, who was in command of these reinforcements, had been joined by Severoli's Italian division, and with his army of 15,000 men was now only a day's march from Suchet, when the latter crossed the Guadalaviar, and attacked Blake's fortified camp at Quarte by storm. The camp, baggage, and artillery fell a prey to the French; a part of the army saved itself by retiring to Murcia, and Blake, with the remainder, threw himself into the city of Valencia, surrounded by immensely strong works; and three days afterwards made an attempt, at the head of 10,000 men, to cut his way through the enemy's lines. This attempt having failed on the 28th of December, it soon appeared that the colossal fortifications of the city rendered its defence the more difficult. The works on these fortifications, which had employed several thousand men for two years, and were alleged to have cost twelve millions of reals, embraced an extent of six thousand roods, and were furnished with a hundred pieces of heavy artillery. The trenches were opened by order of the French general on the 1st of January, and Blake did not venture to defend the extensive outworks before the city, although he is stated to have had 20,000 men at his disposal. As early as the 4th, Blake withdrew into the city properly so called, which was afterwards bom-

barded for three days. The besieged returned the enemy's fire with great vigour, and Suchet afterwards found 374 pieces of artillery in the city. Measures were, however, no sooner taken for proceeding to storm the town than Blake capitulated. Frightened by Suchet's savage behaviour in other places, he hesitated to expose a city of 150,000 inhabitants to the fate of Tarragona and other towns in Catalonia. The capitulation was concluded on the 9th. The shells had already committed great destruction in the town, which did not possess houses like fortresses, cellars, and vaults, as was the case in Saragossa. Eighteen thousand regular infantry and 2000 cavalry were taken prisoners; whilst 390 cannon, 40,000 guns, and 18,000 cwt. of powder fell into the hands of the enemy. Domains, with a revenue of 200,000,000 of francs, were appropriated to the army of Catalonia, and Suchet was created Duke of Abufera, with the princely possessions attached to the name. In taking this step, Napoleon paid no attention whatever to the fact that he had previously conferred these domains on the Prince of Peace, and had, when they were taken from him by the insurgents, solemnly and by written documents secured them to him as soon as they should again fall into the hands of the French.

Not only the French, but the English also—that is, Napier—boast of the admirable manner in which the civil administration was carried on in the rich city of Valencia by Suchet, and allege that he was not only respected but willingly obeyed by the inhabitants of the place. His cruel severity may have been wholesome. This is as easily said as it is difficult to refute. Napoleon availed himself of the pretence, that a great many French had been formerly killed in Valencia, to demand a contribution, which, even according to Suchet's judgment, could not possibly be raised. It was, nevertheless, enforced, because the Emperor insisted upon it; the only remission was a year's time for the payment. Suchet wished also to reduce Alicant, and Marmont was obliged to part with 15,000 men of his army under General Montbrun for this expedition, which, nevertheless, proved a complete failure. The expedition against Alicant having failed of success, and having merely caused the works of the town to be strengthened, and the place itself to be better provisioned, Montbrun with his army, afterwards called the army of the centre, marched to King Joseph in Madrid. Suchet's attempt upon Pensacola proved more fortunate than his expedition against Alicant; for this well fortified city, provided with ninety pieces of cannon, and with all necessary stores, was shamefully sold to him by Navarvo, the governor, on the 4th of February. From the 12th of May Suchet was obliged to remain quiet, and was unable to march against Murcia, because Napoleon had withdrawn 40,000 men from Spain for the expedition to Russia, and with 15,000 troops Suchet was unequal to any considerable undertaking.

We have already observed that Marmont and Soult compelled the English to raise the siege of Badajoz; but even although their united force amounted to 70,000 men, they had not sufficient confi-

dence in themselves to force him to an engagement. They again separated, because it was impossible to find sustenance for so large an army in such a province as Estramadura. Marmont hastened back to cover Ciudad Rodrigo, and Wellington marched in the same direction, in order to attack that city, having left General Hill behind with a small division, on the borders of Alentejo. On the 10th of August, 1811, Wellington encamped in such a position at Fuente Guinaldo as to obstruct all access to Ciudad Rodrigo. Marmont marched to the district of Salamanca, but appeared again in the following month, after having drawn to himself the division under Dorsenne, in order to send such supplies into the city as the fortress might require. On the 24th of September he succeeded in throwing very considerable reinforcements, provisions, and ammunition into the fortress; and it was generally expected that he would attack the English in their position at Fuente Guinaldo. This he really did on the 26th and 27th. The affair, however, did not become a general battle, but ended in some detached and indecisive skirmishes, Wellington in the mean time having been induced to change his position. Marmont had succeeded in his object of providing for the wants of the garrison, and when he went back to Salamanca, Wellington changed the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo into a regular siege. This city lies on the Spanish bank of the river Agueda; the bridge from the river is commanded by the guns of the fortress, and it was extremely difficult to erect another. The provisions of the English army were nearly exhausted, and Wellington was obliged to make arrangements on a great scale for the supply of his troops. The Upper Douro was regarded as unnavigable, and there was not a barge in the neighbourhood. He therefore caused barges to be built, launched them boldly upon the Douro, put provisions and whatever else he needed on boats at the mouth of the Agueda, at its junction with the Douro, and thus conveyed them up the Agueda to the places where they were required.

In the mean time Hill took an opportunity in Estramadura to fall upon a division of Soult's army under the command of General Giraud. This general was marching hither and thither through the province, and extorting contributions, without having any suspicion of an enemy. The Spaniards, however, gave General Hill information of all his movements, and he was taken by surprise. Giraud himself and 1500 men escaped with great difficulty, leaving his artillery and military chest, with all the contributions, in the hands of the enemy; the rest of the division were either cut to pieces or taken prisoners. About this period (January, 1812), at which Napoleon was making preparations for his expedition to Russia, Wellington, in connexion with the newly-raised Spanish army, resolved on trying something decisive in Spain. For this purpose it was necessary to gain possession of the two fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz; he therefore resolved to make himself master of these places at any cost. He caused the second parallel to be opened before Ciudad



Rodrigo on the 15th of January, and on the 19th proceeded to storm the fortress. When he was on the walls, the French capitulated. Marmont was at that time very much weakened; he had been obliged to send the guards back to France; he was at strife with King Joseph, and obliged to give up one of his divisions to Suchet; he nevertheless collected all his forces and hastened to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo. When, however, he reached Fuente el Farno on the 20th, he learned that the city had capitulated on the previous day. He immediately turned round, and caused Salamanca to be fortified and surrounded with forts.

Even before the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, Wellington had secretly made all the necessary preparations for the siege of Badajoz; he was anxious to keep his measures from the knowledge of Soult, lest he might hasten from Andalusia, and for the third time frustrate his designs. An undertaking was given out as about to be made from Lisbon; the heavy artillery was then put on board ship, and landed again at Alcacer do Sal, whence it could be conveyed to the Guadiana without observation. It was given out that Elvas was to be more strongly fortified, in order to have everything prepared there which might be necessary for the siege of Badajoz. As soon as the works destroyed in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo had been in some measure restored, Wellington placed a garrison of Spaniards in the place, left a division of his army behind on the Agueda, in order to watch Marmont, marched to Elvas, and when all the necessary preparations had been made, unexpectedly commenced the siege of Badajoz on the 16th of March. The weather proved for a long time unfavourable to the prosecution of the works connected with the siege, and the storming could not be commenced till the 24th, when an attack was made upon the fort of Pecurino. The fort was carried at the expense of a great many lives, the whole of the garrison, amounting to 200 men, being put to the bayonet; the town continued, notwithstanding, to maintain its defence. The English lost a great many men by the murderous fire of the besieged; and a breach was no sooner effected than it was again closed and repaired by means of chevaux-de-frise. The garrison took up their ground behind those temporary defences, drawn up in double lines, and there awaited the enemy's assaults. Soult had been on the march since the 24th of March to relieve the garrison, when it was at length obliged to yield, after a fearful struggle, on the 6th of April.

The garrison at the time of its surrender was reduced to 4000 men; and, according to the testimony of Napier, the English lost 5000 men and six generals in the siege; even before the breach, 2000 had fallen. Colonel Jones, however, states the number of the English who were killed at 744 men and 59 officers, and the wounded at 2600 men and 258 officers. The town was given up to plunder and violence for four days. The rage of the soldiers at the resistance which had been made was so great, that they commenced

the slaughter and depredation even before they had made provision for the care of the wounded. Soult was generally blamed for not having started earlier from Andalusia to relieve the garrison; for he was only two days' march from Badajoz when he received the news of its fall. He afterwards returned to Seville without offering battle. Graham immediately sent troops which were to drive the French out of the whole of Estramadura.

In the mean time Marmont, as Savary informs us, had received positive orders from Paris to occupy the north of Portugal, and had sent troops to Asturia; this was the circumstance which induced Wellington to proceed to meet and oppose him at Salamanca. Savary gives it as his opinion that there were troops enough in Spain, but that order and co-operation were by no means maintained. Napoleon was extremely dissatisfied with Marmont, whilst the latter waited continually for the troops which had been promised to be sent to him from Paris and never came. King Joseph also failed to send him reinforcements. He had, however, caused the city of Salamanca to be strengthened, and had established three forts, St. Vincent, St. Gaetano, and that of the Royal College, to protect the town. Wellington had long delayed, and hesitated whether he should march against Soult or Marmont; at length, however, on the 13th of June, he crossed the Agueda, and on the 16th made his appearance in the districts of Salamanca. In order to make himself master of the town, he remained there throughout the whole remainder of the month, and lost many men, but succeeded in successively taking the three forts and the city. It was very fortunate for his subsequent undertakings that General Hill had in May made an expedition from Estramadura, through Merida on the Tagus, although he afterwards returned again to Estramadura. In this expedition Hill had destroyed the bridge over the Tagus at Almaruz, which compelled the French to take a circuitous route on their march, whilst the English advanced by a nearer road through Alcantara. The French reproach Marmont for not having offered battle to Wellington as early as the 24th; he, however, waited for reinforcements from Galicia and Asturias; and in fact, before he ventured on an engagement, General Bonnet, who was vainly attempting to keep back the Spanish armies, brought him 8000 men from Asturias.

By the first of July the forts and city of Salamanca had been taken, and there was then no reason why Marmont should be precipitate in coming to a decisive battle; and he was, therefore, reproached for not having waited for the 1500 cavalry and King Joseph, who was on his march with what was called the army of the centre. In Salamanca and the forts Wellington had made 700 prisoners, and captured thirty pieces of artillery, with all the provisions and clothing which Marmont had collected there for the use of his army. Marmont having retired to Tordesillas and Toro, the two generals remained in presence of each other fourteen days in the

Tormes; it would appear, therefore, that Marmont might still have waited for King Joseph, who had drawn General Drouet to himself; he, however, has shown that he was wholly unacquainted with the fact, because all the messengers were made prisoners. Bonnet having joined Marmont on the 7th of July, the latter advanced on the 16th; Wellington learned that General Clausel, with the light artillery and cavalry of the northern army, would reach Marmont on the 20th, and he, therefore, resolved upon an attack. The engagements were fought on the 16th and 19th, at Vallesa and Castrillo, and the issue proved unfavourable to the French. Clausel having afterwards arrived, Wellington retired across the Tormes, and Marmont followed him. At length, on the 22nd of July, was fought the battle known by the name of the battle of Salamanca, or that of the Arapiles, from the name of two insulated steep hills lying about 150 roods apart, and near the village of Arapiles. One of these heights was occupied by the French, and the other by the English. For several hours the battle was indecisive, till the French committed a fault, which Wellington, who was far superior to them in cavalry, turned to account in a masterly manner. The French had extended their left wing too far, and Wellington availed himself of the error to take one height after another. Marmont was severely wounded in his efforts to restore order and recover his positions, but the English reserve completed the victory. On Marmont's being wounded, the command was transferred to Bonnet, and he having also been disabled, it was assumed by Clausel. The fight was maintained till the French force was reduced to 20,000 men before Clausel ordered a retreat. Seven thousand prisoners were taken,—eleven guns and two eagles fell into the hands of the English,—the fugitives were thrown into complete confusion, and pursued till it was far in the night. We shall hereafter refer fully to the consequences of this battle in giving an account of Napoleon's expedition to Moscow. The Emperor undoubtedly gave proofs of great magnanimity, by making all the necessary arrangements for a gigantic engagement immediately after receiving the news of a defeat, whose consequences he must at once have seen in all their extent. He was at that time with his army on the Moskwa, and on the 6th of December had just mounted his horse to give directions for the battle of the Borodino, when Colonel Fabvier hastily rode up, and informed him of the issue of the battle of Salamanca. Soult's undertakings in the year 1812 were likewise attended with but indifferent success, and King Joseph, moreover, complained of him for having aimed at establishing an independent rule in Andalusia, and having negotiated with the Emperor of Morocco without paying attention to any of his commands issued from Madrid. General Hill, as has been already stated, had annihilated a whole division of Soult's army in Estramadura, and Soult himself, after his return from Badajoz, which he had vainly tried to save, had bombarded Cadiz with his gigantic mortars and dreadful artillery without any possible advantage. The city



was extremely injured and laid waste by his artillery, but there was still space enough in the island of Leon to protect the inhabitants from his fire, and the English troops and ships effectually obstructed every serious attempt to effect a landing upon the island. Soult, moreover, was obliged to separate his army, which was given at 45,000 men, and whole divisions which he sent away were either defeated or wholly destroyed. In order to explain this remark, we shall briefly notice two or three of his expeditions.

The fate of Girard's division in Estramadura has been already noticed; a similar one befel that of General Godinot in Andalusia. In the south of this province General Ballasteros had organised a species of guerilla warfare in the autumn of 1811 against single divisions of the French army, and had carried it on with success, supported as he was by the garrison of Gibraltar and the population of the country. The Spanish general became at length such an object of fear, that Soult was obliged to send against him a division of from eight to ten thousand men, under General Godinot. Ballasteros continued to prosecute the war, always carefully avoiding a pitched battle, till he was at last driven by Godinot under the protection of the cannon of Gibraltar. There he was lying on the 14th of October, 1811, when the English arrived, who had been brought thither from Cadiz to defend the fortified town of Tarifa against the French. Godinot was anxious to prevent this, and marched immediately towards Tarifa. The only road by which it was possible to convey artillery to this place lay close along the shore; the English gun-boats and transports, therefore, took advantage of the moment when Godinot was crossing the Pena to open such a murderous fire upon his troops as obliged him hastily to retreat with great loss. Ballasteros pursued the French on their retreat to Seville, and they twice suffered serious loss on their way. Godinot was so ashamed of his failure that he committed suicide after his return to Seville, in order to avoid being called to account for the unfortunate issue of the expedition.

Soult still continued his endeavours to carry out the plan of reducing the whole south of Spain, by the united operations of the 60,000 men whom he had under his command. The possession of Tarifa was absolutely necessary to enable him to realise this project, and therefore, whilst Victor still carried on the investment of Cadiz, Laval was ordered to undertake a new expedition against Tarifa. For this purpose Laval received 10,000 men, at the head of whom he commenced the siege on the 20th of December. There were no more than 1800 English in the town, the credit of whose noble defence is usually assigned to Colonel Skerret, who happened to be in command, and to Lord Proby, who served under him. Napier, however, ascribes this masterly defence to Charles Smith, of the Engineers; and the idea of defending the place to the uttermost to General Campbell, in Gibraltar, and not to General Cooke and Colonel Skerret, who regarded it as unimportant. Soult regarded

the possession of Tarifa as so important, that, as we learn from his intercepted and printed letters, he wrote on the 17th of April, 1812:—"The taking of Tarifa will be more injurious to the English, and to the defenders of Cadiz, than even the fall of Alicante or Badajoz could be, for I cannot march thither till I have covered my left by its capture."

The works connected with the siege of Tarifa were begun on the 22nd; but at a place against which the English engineer had previously especially directed his artillery. The French heavy guns did not arrive till the 27th, and on the 29th their fire was opened. Very little injury was done by the howitzers; but the old walls were soon battered to pieces by the 16-pounders, and a large breach was opened in the course of a few hours near the Gate Tower. The French found the defenders so active, and it proved so difficult to avail themselves of the breach, behind which the ground was fourteen feet lower than the bottom of the wall, that they renewed their fire on the 30th, and widened the breach till it became sixty feet in extent. The swelling of the mountain-stream, which flowed along the bottom of the wall, afterwards injured both the besiegers and the besieged: the water, however, fell as rapidly as it had risen, and the storming was undertaken on the 31st. This the English expected and waited for; they opened such a tremendous fire on the assailants, that the latter found it impossible to mount the breach, and in a very short time not only the declivity of the wall, but the bed of the stream, was covered with the dead bodies of the French. Ten wounded officers were carried into the fortress, only one of whom survived. General Laval, it is true, again renewed his fire, as if he purposed still further to widen the breach, and the English remained three days in expectation of another attempt to take the place by storm. On the 4th of January, 1812, however, the French general suddenly caused his heavy guns to be partly blown up and partly to be buried, and, without suffering much from the enemy, retired from before the town. On the way, he lost many of his men from want, the consequences of incessant rain and sickness, so that this unlucky expedition cost the French more than a thousand men.

### 3.—DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NAPOLEON AND HIS FAMILY, WITH THEIR CONSEQUENCES.

#### A.—KING JOSEPH'S DISPUTE WITH HIS BROTHER, WITH MARMONT, AND SOULT.

About the time (January, 1812) at which General Laval was defeated at Tarifa, Dombrowski also complained that he had not been suitably supported in Merida, and that he was therefore obliged to give up his positions, so that General Hill might seize upon his magazines, and from Merida threaten Marmont; King



Joseph, on the other hand, complained bitterly of Soult. The king, however, was not listened to, because the Emperor had now for a long time past treated him and his other brothers merely as prefects.

Had the Emperor in fact been desirous of founding a Roman or Carolingian Empire, he might have been right in regarding the princes of the nations conquered by him merely as satraps or instruments for carrying out his own designs. The people endured this with sorrow, because they were unable to alter it; and the German princes consoled themselves with the protection which he afforded them against the people, of whom they had been the oppressors; his brothers, however, and his brother-in-law resisted. The differences of the Emperor with his brothers, and the disputes between the eldest of them and the marshals, who were unwilling to recognise him as chief even in his own country, proved ruinous to Spain; these contributed materially to Marmont's defeat at Salamanca, and we must therefore give some attention to these quarrels and their consequences.

As early as the years 1810 and 1811, Masséna, on his expedition to Portugal, received his orders direct from Paris, and neither King Joseph nor Soult, who assisted him as major-general instead of Jourdan, showed any great zeal to forward his designs; he therefore failed in his object. King Joseph was dissatisfied with Soult from the very first, because this harshest and most covetous of Bonaparte's military *virtuosos*, who had become spoilers and robbers, laid claim to the whole income of the provinces occupied by the French for the military chest—that is, for himself—whilst Joseph's court and the Spanish authorities were left in a starving condition. At a late period, Soult was accused of the design of founding a kingdom in Andalusia, and of having therefore tried especially to obtain possession of Tarifa, opened up and carried on negotiations with the Emperor of Morocco, and failed to support Marmont at the decisive moment. We do not think it worth while to enter at any greater length into the reproaches uttered by King Joseph against Soult; the consequences, however, of the disputes between Napoleon and his brothers have been carefully examined and discussed both by Bignon and Napier. For this purpose, the former availed himself of the archives of the foreign department in France; and the latter, in the first chapter of the sixteenth book of his "History of the War in the Peninsula," of Joseph's correspondence, which fell into the hands of the English on the conquest of Vittoria. It was not merely occasional circumstances which led to these differences between Napoleon and his brothers and brother-in-law, the King of Naples, but radically different opinions and views respecting the new empire of Napoleon.

The Emperor wished to deal with the recently conquered nations as the Turks did with the Greeks, the Russians with the Poles, the ancient Romans with the whole world, the Spaniards with America,



and the English with India, that is, to preserve and govern, by military means, that which had been won by military power: his brothers, on the other hand, had some dreams regarding the rights and claims of the people, and occasionally thought about morality. Their declamations and demonstrations were turned into ridicule by Napoleon, who suffered them to act and write without paying the slightest attention to their opinions, till at length Joseph became weary of playing the character of a mere puppet-king. Don Marina Luis d'Urquijo, Joseph's Spanish minister, therefore, in September, 1810, caused it to be formally announced to the Emperor, by the Spanish ambassador in Paris, that his master was ready to lay down the crown, and King Joseph in reality set out for Paris in May, 1811, with the intention of carrying this resolution into effect. This, however, was by no means suited to Napoleon's plans; and he was very conscious that even the report of such an intention would make a great impression throughout all Europe. To obviate this, he caused it to be published in all the journals, that his brother had merely come to Paris in order to have a personal interview and consultation with him on the mode of carrying on the war. An agreement was at length come to, and the matters in dispute were arranged by a special treaty.

The treaty between the two brothers was concluded in due form after a diplomatic negotiation, before King Joseph returned to Spain, in July 1811; but no single article was ever carried strictly into effect. By virtue of this treaty, the influence of the French commanders and civil officers in Spain in domestic affairs was limited, the appointments and pay of officers, commissioners, and agents, definitively fixed, and an effectual bar placed to all further demands. In reference to military affairs, the king was to have an army, to be called the Army of the Centre, under his immediate command; Suchet and Soult, one of whom commanded from the boundary of Granada to the Pyrenees, and the other in the most northern provinces, were for form's sake to receive their orders from the king. Scarcely was this treaty concluded, when the system of administering Spanish provinces by French intendants, which had hitherto been limited to Catalonia, was extended to three other provinces. About this time Joseph's Spanish civil officers, and the whole of his court, who were to be maintained from the revenues of Spain, suffered almost destitution, and were in want of the commonest necessities of life; the Emperor appropriated 1,000,000 of francs monthly for his brother's personal use.

At last, precisely at the decisive moment, the Emperor again gave the supreme command over Marmont, Suchet, and Soult, to the King of Spain, although Soult remained in a condition of perpetual quarrel with the king, and was accused of never paying the smallest attention to his commands. Suchet also, and before him, Caffarelli and Dorsenne had never punctually obeyed King Joseph's commands. As to Marmont and Soult, the king ascribed all the misfor-

tunes which befel the former, partly to himself, because he did not wait for the reinforcements under the king's command before engaging in the battle of Salamanca, and partly to Soult's delay in carrying out the king's commands. A division of Soult's army, under the command of General Drouet, was posted in such a position that if it had crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, it could easily have formed a junction with Marmont; the bridge at Almaraz had, however, been previously destroyed by General Hill. King Joseph, therefore, complained, not altogether without reason, that if Soult had issued his orders at an earlier period, and Drouet been more expeditious in their execution, the bridge would not have been destroyed by the English general, nor would the communication between Marmont and Soult been wholly broken off. Soult, however, on his part, declared that not a single one of all the messengers sent to him had ever reached their destination, having all been taken prisoners by the Spaniards; and that the forces under Drouet were by no means strong enough to have undertaken the exploit. Napoleon, moreover, threw the whole blame upon his brother, and, when he received in Russia the news of Marmont's defeat, was informed that Wellington was about to march to Madrid.

On this occasion, too, Napoleon, as well as on the news of the irreconcilable quarrels between his brother and the marshals, evinced the character and bearing of a mind which bade defiance to fortune. The violent complaints made by his brother against Marmont and Soult were communicated to him by Colonel Desprez of the general staff of the Spanish army, at the very moment when he had marched out of Moscow, and his brother-in-law, Joachim, had fought an unsuccessful battle with the Russians.

At first the Emperor by no means approved of Marmont's conduct; he even recalled him from the army in Spain, and commissioned the minister of war to animadvert upon him, with a proper regard to his feelings, on points which he felt himself called upon to censure; at the same time, he laid no stress whatever upon the accusations made by his brother against Marmont with respect to the battle of Salamanca, which were, in fact, greatly exaggerated. In the letters sent by Desprez, the king alleged that the battle had been lost, because Marmont had not waited for his arrival, in order that he might not be compelled to share the command with him; Marmont, however, showed clearly, that he neither knew anything whatever of the king's march, nor of Soult's position, because all the messengers had fallen into the hands of the Spaniards. Napoleon, on the other hand, reproached the king for not having, instead of marching from Segovia to Madrid, formed a junction with Clausel, who was at Burgos with 20,000 men of Marmont's army, united the army of the north under Souham with his own, and marched against Wellington.

Soult and King Joseph were equally severe in their accusations of each other; the Emperor, however, would not listen to any complaints against Soult, and threw the whole blame on his brother.



The king first of all complained of Soult's disobedience, because he refused to march to Madrid, and to unite with him in proceeding to act against Wellington. The latter was unwilling to evacuate Andalusia, but rather urged the king to join him with the army of the centre, and also to allow Suchet to come to Andalusia. Joseph also made a special complaint respecting a letter which Soult had written to the Emperor. In this letter Soult tried to show that King Joseph was engaged in endeavouring to negotiate with the enemy a particular peace for himself and for Spain. The account of the interview between the Emperor and Colonel Desprez, as given by him to the king, clearly proves that Napoleon, to avail ourselves of a Homeric expression, looked upon his brothers, whom, however, he wished to make the founders of a new dynasty, as persons neither fit for war nor for council, and that he considered them as mere ciphers.

The Emperor said in so many words to the colonel, that the whole blame of this want of success belonged to the king, and ridiculed the complaints made against Soult as pitiful, as matters about which, in his present condition, he could not trouble himself the least, and added: "The blame of the unfavourable issue of the battle of Salamanca rests wholly with the king. He should have left Madrid an entire month earlier, and when this was not done, he should, immediately after the battle on the Douro, have marched in order to form a junction with Clausel." He gave his brother satisfaction in no single point, but, in reply to all his complaints, caused him to be dryly and coldly informed through Colonel Desprez, "That Marshal Soult was the only real military officer whom he had in Spain, and that he could not recal him without exposing his armies to the greatest danger." He did, indeed, afterwards recal him, but only for a very short time.

**B.—RELATION OF THE PROGRESSIVE AUTOCRACY OF NAPOLEON TO THE GENERALS, SOPHISTS, AND RELATIONS WHOM HE REGARDED AS THE SUPPORTS OF HIS EMPIRE—DIFFERENCES WITH HIS BROTHERS AND BROTHER-IN-LAW—BEHAVIOUR IN HOLLAND, AND TOWARDS THE CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE.**

Although the generals whom Napoleon so richly endowed after the battle of Jena with estates and revenues in Italy, Dalmatia, Illyria, Germany, Poland, Russia, and Spain derived this chief advantage from his undertakings, it was, however, in their case too long before they came into the possession of that which had been the sole object of their aim; as early therefore as from the years 1808-12, discontent and dissatisfaction were visible now here and now there. This fact we regard as indisputable, and think ourselves bound in this place to refer to it, although we do not venture to go into particulars. As examples, we may advert to what has been stated respecting the negotiations which at the time of Masséna's expedition to



Portugal, some of the staff-officers of his and Victor's corps carried on with the English. This was followed by removals and arrests, which prove that the affair was not so insignificant as it has been represented to have been. On the whole, however, it did but little mischief, inasmuch as both Spanish and Portuguese officers and civilians often betrayed the English. As to the unions which sprang out of the societies of *Carbonari*, *Philadelphians*, *Olympians*, and many others, we dwell as little upon them as on the affiliations and branches of the *Tugenbund*, and other patriotic associations in Germany. As regards Napoleon's fear of Colonel Oudet, the chief of the Philadelphians, and the murder which he perpetrated on him in the battle of Wagram, the matter belongs to the class of most detestable inventions. This has been established by documentary proofs by Desmarets (*Temoignages Historiques*, p. 320). In the same way the burden of the persecution of General Sarrazin does not rest upon the Emperor, for the source of his crime was neither political discontent nor zeal for liberty. He was, indeed, among those generals whom Napoleon accused of conspiring with Bernadotte at Antwerp, at the time of the landing of the English in Walcheren, but he, nevertheless, afterwards received a command in Boulogne, and there again, from the lowest motives, entered into communications with the English. This was discovered, and he saved himself by escaping in a fishing boat on the 10th of June, 1810, and taking refuge on board the English ships off the harbour. The whole of his subsequent conduct, when he returned in 1818, and his condemnation for a low offence, prove that his dissatisfaction with the Emperor can scarcely be attributed to any good motive.

What was far more important to the newly-established autocracy of Napoleon than all the conspiracies of some of his generals and the dissatisfaction of others, was the change in his relations to Fouché, who held all the threads of the democratic movements in his hand; and to Talleyrand, who knew and guided all the malcontents among the aristocracy. When, therefore, Bernadotte, in conjunction with those two, formed a circle of malcontents, the Emperor was at first seriously indignant, but afterwards considered it unadvisable to proceed with severity. Talleyrand was most unwillingly compelled to relinquish his ministerial office to Champagny (Duc de Cadore), who proved, probably, not laborious enough for the Emperor, and was therefore replaced by Maret (Duc de Bassano), at the very time in which Napoleon stood most in need of confidential advice. Maret was the mere instrument of the imperial will, a good and unwearied labourer in his office, but incapable of any thought of his own, the mere organ of foreign affairs, as Berthier was of Napoleon's wishes in the field.

The Emperor having been previously on bad terms with his brother Lucien also, after the peace of Schönbrunn, their differences amounted to a public breach. The two brothers met in Mantua, in 1807, as has been already related, and Napoleon again called upon Lucien to

separate from his wife, by whom he had children. His eulogists pretend that this was a proof of his zeal for female virtue; they, however, altogether forget that although the conduct of this lady before her marriage was very exceptionable, she afterwards gave much less reason for scandal than any of Napoleon's sisters. Lucien was still more offended when the negotiation for the marriage of his daughter with Ferdinand VII. of Spain was completely broken off, after it had been proposed by the Emperor, and he had set out with his daughter with a view to its settlement. Napoleon's acts of violence towards the Pope caused an open rupture between the two brothers, and Lucien resolved to leave Italy.\* The King of Naples placed a ship at the disposal of his brother-in-law, to convey him to America; Lucien, however, was by no means dissatisfied that the vessel was obliged to put into Malta, from whence he could sail to England.

In the very same year (1810) in which the Emperor again dissolved the kingdom of Holland, previously erected by him, and took whole provinces from Spain, he fell also into such a violent strife with his brother-in-law Joachim, as to feel himself compelled to adopt the harshest measures towards him, and to treat him with open contempt. Napoleon's brothers and his brother-in-law proceeded upon a principle which such a well-educated and scientific man as Bignon treats as ridiculous—viz., that the well-being of the countries respectively under their rule, ought to be their first care; he was, therefore, compelled to make them by force fully aware that they existed only by and for France. King Joachim had surrounded himself altogether with Neapolitans, and appeared as if he purposed to establish a Neapolitan government completely independent of that of France; his court and his administration, as well as his ridiculous dress, and the military ostentation of the Gascon, appeared absurd to the Emperor and to other serious Frenchmen. Of the existence of these feelings King Joachim had received many hints; and when he still appeared to treat such admonitions with contempt, and continued to play the sovereign, the Emperor openly and directly informed him that he was nothing more than the other great officers of the Empire. In proof of this, the Emperor appealed to the statute by virtue of which his brother Joseph had ruled in Naples, and which referred expressly to the dependence of that country upon France. He alleged that Joseph could not, by the treaty of Bayonne, have transferred to Joachim rights which he himself did not possess. The king, in 1811, when Napoleon sent an ambassador, who was to

\* In a passage of his memoirs, which has no reference to his own complaints against his brother, Lucien briefly sums up the political faults which the latter had committed from 1807 till 1812. "*Mémoires de Lucien Bonaparte, Prince de Canino, écrits par lui-même.*" Paris et Londres, 1836, vol. i., p. 281. "*Napoleon sans doute n'était pas infaillible. L'Espagne et la Russie attaquées en même tems, la Pologne, et l'Italie attendant en vain leur rétablissement, le chef de la religion persécuté après avoir sacré l'élu du peuple, n'ont pas attiré des reproches sans quelque apparence de vérité.*"

say the harshest things to him, and whom he referred to his minister for foreign affairs, appealed to the statute issued by Napoleon in 1806; the ambassador, however, was obliged to maintain, that by virtue of this very statute, Naples was a sort of French province, and the king nothing else than a French vassal, who was bound to receive, support, clothe, and pay French troops, at the expense of his Neapolitan subjects.

The ambassador commissioned to make these unpleasant communications met the King of Naples in Rome (March, 1811) on his way to Paris, in order personally to congratulate the Emperor on the birth of an heir to his dominions, who was called *King of Rome*; Joachim, therefore, arrived in a very discordant mood. All that his minister for foreign affairs, to whom he had referred the ambassador, afterwards wrote to him in Paris, disturbed him still more; and instead of waiting, as was expected, to grace the baptism of the King of Rome by his presence, he returned to his dominions before the event.

Napoleon's ambassador had informed the Neapolitan minister of foreign affairs that his master was completely dissatisfied with the whole state of the government in Naples; that he considered it quite ridiculous in the king to play the part of a sovereign ruler, and disapproved of his having, on his own responsibility, undertaken to create a new Neapolitan nobility of dukes, princes, counts, and barons. He disapproved of his acting as if he was a king by the grace of God, whilst he was in reality merely one by Napoleon's favour, and ought never to forget that he was not to govern as a king, but merely as a French general, and occupy the throne for the general well-being of the Empire. Among other subjects of dissatisfaction, he blamed him especially for not observing the system of exclusive trading, and finally threatened, that if he did not alter his whole plans, the Emperor would feel himself constrained to govern Naples as he did Lombardy—by a viceroy.

The king had some warm conversations with the Emperor in Paris, and, after his return, the queen, who, like the Sicilian queen, Caroline, possessed a great eagerness and capacity for dominion, did everything possible to reconcile her husband with her brother. He, however, gave great offence, not only to Napoleon, but to the whole of the French nation, by the adoption of a very hasty step. He issued a decree that all the Frenchmen then in his service should be compelled to relinquish their rights and position as French citizens, and to become legalised Neapolitans, if they wished to remain. Not one of the persons so circumstanced obeyed the order. They were all ready to leave Naples, when the Emperor issued a decree of a precisely contrary import, which announced Joachim's want of power to the whole world, and gave him great offence. In the imperial decree it was declared that no Frenchman should be required to become a Neapolitan citizen, because every French citizen was also a Neapolitan one. His measures did not stop there, for he placed a



French garrison in the fortress of Gaëta, and sent one of his officers as commandant to Naples, who was to exercise command in the very capital without asking the king. The Duke of Bassano was, moreover, made to send the king a document, in which were minutely prescribed the conditions which he was strictly to observe if he desired to continue to occupy the throne.\* Joachim submitted to his fate, but the King of Holland refused to become a mere instrument of French oppression.

King Louis of Holland has often been accused of peculiarities, obstinacy, and eccentricity, amounting even to insanity. With vanity, luxury, and extravagance, he has never been reproached; and, at the very first, he had the greatest repugnance to be forced upon the Dutch by mere power. For this reason he absolutely forbade the presence of French troops on his entry into the Hague; and as soon as the French, who did not feel comfortable in his capital, took their departure, he divided all the offices about his court among the Dutch nobility, whom he thereby sought to gain to his cause.† The whole ministry consisted of Dutchmen, who partly belonged to the old patriotic anti-Orange families. Among them was the jurist Van Maaren, who, in 1825, rendered their king, the former Prince of Orange, intolerable to the Belgians. In Holland, as in Prussia, abundance of promises to pay were made, which were never performed; and at last King Louis declared to his brother, in 1806, that if France did not pay what she owed to the Dutch, if the French troops were not withdrawn from the country, and the imperial forces also paid out of the imperial treasury, he had no longer any desire to remain King of Holland. The Emperor did, indeed, withdraw his soldiers, but very unwillingly, and only because at that time he had need of all his troops against the Prussians and Russians, and because he called upon his brother to organise a Dutch army.

\* C'est comme grand feudataire que le roi est engagé à maintenir la constitution de ce royaume, approuvée et garantie par l'Empereur; à fournir un contingent de troupes et de vaisseaux, et observer dans ses états le système continental. Le traité de Bayonne n'est pas un traité proprement dit. Un traité est une convention où se balancent des intérêts. Celui de Bayonne n'est qu'un acte de munificence impériale, par lequel S. M., disposant d'un trône, a dicté les conditions de son bienfait. De la qualité de grand feudataire découlent les devoirs suivants:

Déferer à ce qui est exigé de lui pour maintien de ses rapports avec son suzerain. Construire une place forte qui domine le détroit.

Tenir en bon état les batteries des rades de Tarente; concourir avec la France et le royaume d'Italie à l'entretien de Corfou.

Ne pas souffrir que dans ses états, comme dans la Confédération du Rhin, aucun ministre étranger usurpe les préséances qui appartiennent au ministre de l'Empereur.

Couvrir d'une protection spéciale les principales familles qui, lors de la conquête, ont contribué le plus à établir la dynastie dans l'esprit du peuple Napolitain.

Enfin, d'inspirer à l'armée Napolitaine un esprit Français.

Le jour où les rois de Naples oublieront ces devoirs, ils auront déchiré leur titre à la couronne.

† Baron Zeulen von Nyveld was appointed first chamberlain to the queen, instead of Count d'Arjuzon; Baron Boest de Alkemade, grand marshal of the palace, instead of Major de Broc. General Bruno replaced General August de Caulaincourt; Herr van Hekerer replaced General Nogués, who was Governor of the Hague and Master of the Hunt, &c., &c.

In the autumn of 1806 the king appeared at the head of his new army in Germany, and was about to march to Cassel, when his brother took away the command of the army from him, and forbade his mixing himself up in business, because he was nothing more than a French general in Germany. The king, thus deeply offended, returned to Holland, and his army was sent to Hanover. Immediately afterwards, by virtue of the Berlin decrees, the trade of Holland with England was more limited than ever, and English property was seized wherever it was found in Holland, while the king did everything in his power to avert the fall of the nation, which must be the obvious result of the suppression of its trade, and the cessation of all intercourse and connexion with its colonies. When Napoleon was at the castle of Finkenstein, in Prussia, a deputation was sent to him from Holland, to which he, indeed, gave a very friendly reception, but openly said to its members, at the audience which he granted them: "He knew very well that his brother was favourable to a continuation of the trade of Holland with England, and that it was necessary for him, after the peace, to make the Dutch sensible that they had constantly striven to counteract his well-known views." By the peace of Tilsit, Holland had, indeed, received East Friesland, Jever, and the sovereignty of Varel and Kniephausen. It was obliged, however, in return, to cede not only the town and harbour of Flushing, with its territory, but a change of territory was also spoken of, which appeared to be of the same importance to Holland as the change of Catalonia into a French province was afterwards to Spain. Immediately afterwards Holland began to be treated as a province of France.

The king, at great cost, had removed his residence from the Hague to Amsterdam. A new French ambassador was sent to Holland, who was nominally commissioned to negotiate concerning the exchange of Dutch Brabant and Zeeland for the Hans Towns. It was well known, however, that his real commission was to make preparations for the incorporation of Holland with France. This ambassador was Alexander Larochefoucauld, the son of the celebrated Duke de Larochefoucauld, so well known for his virtue and magnanimity, and shamefully put to death after the 10th of August. Napoleon at that time incessantly repeated that it was ridiculous for his brother to play the part of a patriotic king, as he was, properly speaking, merely a prince of the Empire, and, by his appointment, constable of France, but in himself nothing. He intimated the threatened dissolution of the kingdom of Holland also, by conferring on the king's eldest son the grand duchy of Berg when Joachim Murat became King of Naples. The new ambassador was obliged to commence his duties by severe reproaches to the king, in the name of the Emperor, for having appointed Dutch marshals and established a new and privileged nobility in Holland. The ambassador was obliged imperatively to call upon the king forthwith to repeal both these institutions. Still the question of favouring the



trade with England was the main ground of reproach, and caused the Emperor to send a number of his troops to take up a threatening position on the frontiers of Holland. The behaviour of the king and of the Dutch authorities on the landing of the English at Walcheren filled up the measure of his indignation. The English on this occasion had sent over immense quantities of goods; the Dutch had conveyed them into the country, and divided them among the merchants, who had laid them up in their stores. It was about this time, and under these circumstances, in the end of 1809, that the great and splendid assembly of all the vassal princes was holden in Paris, and King Louis was invited among the rest.

Although the King of Saxony was in Paris, the King of Holland was at first in great doubt as to the propriety of going thither, inasmuch as he was afraid that advantage would be taken of his absence to order the French troops, long since ready, to advance into his kingdom; and whoever has read the letter written to him by the Emperor from Schönbrunn, as early as the 17th of July, 1809, will be convinced that his anxiety was well grounded. He was at first very foolishly disposed to resist force by force, and even when he at last resolved to set out, he left orders to make preparations for defending his states against the French. At the end of November he arrived in Paris, and received a most cordial reception from the Emperor, who was warmly attached to him as a brother, but could not endure him as a ruler, and had already come to a decisive conclusion respecting Holland. This resolution was no less than the annihilation of the kingdom, and was first announced in an assembly of the legislative body at which King Louis was not present.

To this solemn assembly of the legislative body all the numerous kings and princes then in Paris were invited, with the exception of Louis alone. He was first made acquainted with the harsh language of the Emperor by the columns of the *Moniteur*, and immediately demanded from his brother a clearer explanation of his views than he had given in his address to the assembly.\* This was done by a letter, which the Emperor wrote to his brother from the Trianon on the 20th of December.† In the first burst of his resentment the king

\* "La Hollande," it is said, in the Emperor's address, "placée entre l'Angleterre et la France, en est également froissée. Cependant, elle est le débouché des principales artères de mon empire. Des changemens deviendront nécessaires; la sûreté de mes frontières et l'intérêt bien entendu des deux pays l'exigent impérieusement."

† The whole of the documents connected with the government of King Louis which affect him personally are appended to the "Mémoires sur la Cour de Louis Napoleon, et sur la Hollande, Paris, 1828." This long letter, among others, will be found there, p. 353. It concludes as follows:—"Voici mes intentions. Je demande—1. L'Interdiction de tout commerce et toute communication avec l'Angleterre. 2. Une flotte de quatorze vaisseaux de ligne, de sept frégates, et de sept bricks, ou corvettes, armés et équipés. 3. Une armée de terre de vingt-cinq mille hommes. 4. Suppression des maréchaux. 5. Destruction de tous les privilèges de la noblesse contraires à la constitution que j'ai donnée, et que j'ai garantie. Votre majesté peut faire négocier sur ces bases avec le Duc de Cadore, par l'entremise de son ministre, mais elle peut être certaine qu'au premier paquebot qui sera introduit en Hollande je rétablirai la défense des douanes; qu'à la première insulte qui sera



resolved secretly to withdraw from Paris and place himself at the head of the Dutch troops; he, however, afterwards gave up this bold idea, and the more readily when he discovered that his brother, who was aware of his indignation, had long placed him under the strict surveillance of his police. The king learned from a disguised gendarme, who had formerly served in his regiment, that he was actually surrounded by spies in his own dwelling in Paris, and that they never suffered him out of their sight.\* Among all the Dutch ministers, the minister of war alone joined the king in the wish to offer active resistance to the entrance of the French. This minister he was compelled even from Paris to dismiss, and immediately again to abolish the dignity of marshal, which he had founded. The occupation of Holland was by no means pressed forward with haste, because Napoleon still hoped that the English would make peace, in order to prevent the incorporation of Holland with France. He therefore showed himself serious in his object, but proceeded very leisurely in his plan, in order to leave sufficient time for the English. Oudinot, who was at the head of the army destined to take possession of Holland, entered and occupied Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom, in spite of all the complaints and protests of the king; he then advanced slowly, and by degrees seized upon all the country lying between the Meuse, the Scheldt, and the sea for the benefit of France. From the banks of the Meuse and the Scheldt the French troops afterwards advanced first to Utrecht, and then, by slow degrees, drew nearer and nearer to Amsterdam, whilst Napoleon, by the instrumentality of his brother, used all his endeavours to urge the leading men in the Dutch government, who were well known in England, to prevail upon the English government to resolve to deliver Holland by means of a peace. Hope and Baring, who were closely connected as English and Dutch bankers, and of whom the Barings had been extremely serviceable to various English ministries, were to convey these proposals to the English government; and, in order that Napoleon might not appear in the matter, Labouchere, one of Hope's partners, was to proceed to England as if on business, and to be a mediator in the affair. This great state affair was, therefore, carried on as an intrigue. Fouché, who was quite a master in intrigues, and a very dilettante in cabals, took

*faite à mon pavillon je ferai saisir, à main armée, et pendre au grand mât l'officier Hollandais qui se permettra insulter mon aigle. Votre majesté trouvera en moi un frère, si je trouve en elle un Français; mais si elle oublie les sentimens qui l'attache à la commune patrie, elle ne pourra trouver mauvais que j'oublie ceux que la nature a placé entre nous. En résumé, la réunion de la Hollande à la France est ce qu'il y a de plus utile à la France, à la Hollande, au continent, car c'est ce qu'il y a de plus nuisible à l'Angleterre. Cette réunion peut s'opérer de gré ou de force; j'ai assez de griefs contre la Hollande pour lui déclarer la guerre."*

\* "Le roi sut qu'il était gardé à vue par des gendarmes déguisés. Parmi ses gendarmes se trouvait un ancien soldat du cinquième régiment de dragons, qui crut pouvoir trahir son incognito en faveur de son ancien colonel."—*Mémoires, &c.*, p. 64.

offence that such an affair should be carried on without him. He therefore intermeddled, and destroyed everything. Wellesley, the English minister, appeared at first ready to entertain the proposal submitted by Labouchere, both for the sake of Holland and for the benefit of trade; but Fouché no sooner took upon himself, without a commission from the Emperor, to send over Ouvrard, notorious as a scheming speculator and contractor, and who was accustomed to speak of millions as other men do of dollars, than he withdrew. Little confidence can be placed in the memoirs of such a man as Ouvrard. If, however, they contain any truth, it is very probably true that Talleyrand, who had been at this time long removed from the ministry, took a part in this cabal of Fouché, at which Napoleon was greatly offended. Ouvrard, who had undertaken the mission, was arrested, by the Emperor's orders on his return to Paris; and Fouché, as has been already stated, was first removed from his office, and afterwards also sent out of France.

From this time forward there was no longer anything said about peace with England; but as hopes were still entertained in Paris that England might be induced to enter into negotiations, as long as Holland was not actually incorporated with France, a treaty was concluded between Louis and his brother, after which the king was less under surveillance, and was privately allowed to return home to Holland. In this treaty concluded with the Emperor, Louis was obliged to submit to the most burdensome conditions respecting navigation and trade, and to cede the whole of Dutch Brabant, Zeeland, and so much of the province of Gueldres as lies upon the left bank of the Waal, to France. He was also obliged to consent to the occupation of Leyden and the Hague by Oudinot's army, and to suffer the general himself to establish his head-quarters in Utrecht, and make preparations for taking possession of Friesland also. When King Louis returned to Amsterdam, he found not only his capital and the whole country inundated with French soldiers, but Oudinot sailed from Utrecht without the slightest regard to the king, his ministers, or authorities. The king made repeated and warm complaints to the general, whose answer was an appeal to the commands of the Emperor. To judge from appearances, Larochefoucauld in Amsterdam, and the Duke of Reggio (Oudinot) in Utrecht, had received express commands to bring about a rupture, because Napoleon, since Louis's return, had quite quarrelled with his brother. Had this not been the case, the ambassador would scarcely have made an insult to his coachman an affair of state.

The ambassador's coachman had been insulted, and the ambassador demanded the giving up of the offenders, which the king absolutely refused: this was used as a pretence to proceed to extremities. Even previous to this, Napoleon had written from Ostend a very offensive letter, on the 20th of May, 1810; on the 23rd, he sent a sort of declaration of war, and expressed himself in his letter in the very



harshest terms.\* The Dutch ambassador was immediately sent away from Paris, the French ambassador recalled from Amsterdam, and the Duke of Reggio received orders to march from Utrecht to Amsterdam. The king appeared, for a moment, resolved to defend himself in his capital against his brother's army, but afterwards thought better of it. He resigned the throne in favour of his eldest son; went first to Haarlem, hastened from thence at midnight on the 1st of July across the borders, and proceeded to Töplitz in Bohemia. The Emperor by no means expected this extraordinary step, which caused a great sensation throughout the whole of Europe. It was a matter of general surprise, that he who was at enmity with all the old dynasties, should come to issue with his own family also, as soon as he had made them princes and kings, and they refused to become the mere slaves of his will.

In the mean time the French had entered Amsterdam, and taken possession of all the provinces of the kingdom; and on the 9th of July, 1810, Holland was declared to be united with France. From that time the whole administration of the country was committed to the hands of Belgians and Frenchmen. In order to show some respect to the old republicans, Napoleon appointed the aged Lebrun, in the main a good man, and at heart a Girondist, his former colleague in the Consulate, governor-general of Holland, just as he had formerly employed him to give a French character to the ancient, aristocratic trading republic of Genoa. Lebrun, who was in himself a very simple man, was created a prince by Napoleon, Duke of Piacenza, and high treasurer of his Empire, but still remained a man of no pretensions. He was now, by the splendour with which he was to be surrounded, to make some compensation to the Dutch for the loss of a court; power, properly speaking, he had none. Oudinot continued commander-in-chief of the French troops in Holland till the commencement of the war with Russia, in which he was obliged

\* Of the documents already referred to, appended to the "*Mémoires sur la cour de Louis Bonaparte*," &c., from No. VIII. to XIV., refer wholly to the resignation of the king; No. VIII. is the letter from Ostend; No. IX. The letter from Lille; No. X. The message from King Louis to the Dutch legislative bodies respecting the reasons of his resignation; No. XI. The document of resignation itself; No. XII. The king's proclamation to the Dutch people; No. XIII. The king's protest against the union of Holland with France; No. XIV. Otto's letter, then ambassador in Vienna, in which, in the name of the Emperor, he requires the king, who had betaken himself to Töplitz, and then to Carinthia, to return to France. Of the tone of these letters we shall quote a single example: "*Je vous declare donc, que je ne veux plus d'ambassadeur de Hollande à Paris. L'amiral Verhuell a ordre d'en partir en vingt-quatre heures. Ce ne sont plus des phrases et des protestations qu'il me faut; il est tems que je sache si vous voulez faire le malheur de la Hollande, et par vos folies causer la ruine de ce pays. Je ne veux non plus que vous envoyiez un ministre en Autriche; je ne veux pas non plus que vous renvoyiez les Français qui sont à votre service. J'ai rappelé mon ambassadeur; je n'aurai plus en Hollande qu'un chargé d'affaires. Le Sieur Serrurier, qui y reste en cette qualité, vous communiquer mes intentions. Je ne veux plus exposer un ambassadeur à vos insultes. Ne m'écrivez plus de vos phrases ordinaires; voilà trois ans que vous me les répétez, et chaque instant en prouve la fausseté. C'est la dernière lettre de ma vie que je vous écris.*"



to take a part. His government of the Dutch, who were not inclined to conspiracies, was like that of the Prince of Eckmühl among the Germans, who at that time were under the greatest excitement. We shall confine ourselves to a few examples of the manner in which the celebrated hero of the French people suffered and caused other nations to be treated.

One of the first measures of the new French administration was to have the whole of the colonial products in the public and private warehouses, the property of merchants and traders, as well as all goods of English manufacture, registered, and to require the payment of a duty of 50 per cent. on their value. The prefects in the departments, and the heads of the police in the principal towns, exercised a despotic and arbitrary government. Among these were two who reminded the people of the Low Countries of the Spanish authorities in the time of Philip II. These were Duvilliers Duterrage in Amsterdam, and Marivaux in Rotterdam, who were emulated by some Belgians, placed in public offices, and who, like them, made themselves the terror of the whole country. In 1811 Napoleon indeed undertook an ostentatious journey to Holland, and from the accounts of his eulogists we might enumerate a considerable number of wise and beneficial regulations, as the results of this journey; the single fact, however, that the coarse and harsh Intendant-General Daru, who had already shown his capacities for oppression and extortion in Austria and Prussia, was the man appointed to drain the substance of the Dutch also, and that he combined the most intolerable insolence with the most revolting severity, gives the lie to all the bombast and boasting of the French. Count Celles, as prefect of Amsterdam, and De Stassart, as prefect of the Hague, made themselves as much objects of hatred as Daru.

The course pursued by the Emperor of the French on the further side of the Rhine, and in the neighbourhood of the Julian Alps, also gave as clear indication of the consolidation of all the newly-erected states with France, as what took place in Spain, Naples, the States of the Church, Tuscany, and Holland. As long as there was any hope that England, in order to retain the hereditary dominions of its sovereigns in Germany, would relinquish some advantages, the fate of Hanover remained undecided, although the country was severely wasted. The French found willing instruments in such men as Patje, Von Scheele, Von Hammerstein, and Von Hardenberg, who received in Cassel decorations and places, the old advantages of their order.

It was therefore politic and wise in Jerome to create the order of the Westphalian crown, and to get up a court before the finances of the country were regulated; for the high nobility, who afterwards acted so patriotically, pressed forward to obtain every office connected with which there was more splendour than work. Baron Patje, Count Hardenberg, and Baron von Schulte were made councillors of state; Count von Oberg, and Barons Knigge, Kampen,

Bülow, and Ompteda, were appointed Westphalian chamberlains; the Countesses of Söwischeld, Von Bernstorff, Von Oberg, and the Baroness of Arnswald, ladies of the court. This reconciliation of the old with the new proved as little profitable to Napoleon's new state in Germany as it did in France. The privileged nobles willingly accepted as much of the old institutions as was given them; but they showed themselves the no less eager to avail themselves of every occasion to obtain back the whole of their former advantages, privileges, and honours.

Napoleon had at first quieted the various princes of the Confederation of the Rhine by giving them a solemn assurance, in 1806, that he had no desire to extend the boundaries of France across the Rhine; but he immediately appeared to aim at nullifying this declaration by making his brother and his brother-in-law princes, prescribing to them French laws and forms of administration, and converting Wesel, Castel opposite Mayence, and Kehl, into French fortresses. Magdeburg, too, was occupied by a French garrison: all this, however, was not enough, for the new institutions introduced by the Emperor himself were all completely changed by him again after a few years. The new alterations, too, were of such a kind, that every one saw they were merely preparations for the incorporation of these countries with France. The grand-duchy of Berg had been already completely organised after the French fashion by Murat; and when he was made King of Naples, and the duchy again fell to the Empire as a vacant fief, it was conferred on the second son of the King of Holland: as, however, the prince was a minor, its administration was entrusted to his uncle. The name of the grand-duchy remained; the country, however, was governed by Frenchmen, and after the French fashion; it was therefore merely a province of France. The whole system of administration was calculated upon the well-known endurance of the Germans, and upon the separate and distinct interests of German ranks and classes, because the people were made of no account whatever, and had been accustomed for centuries to this mode of treatment.

The Germans therefore also, in 1809-10, changed masters and administrations, just like negroes sold in the slave-market. The inhabitants of whole districts were attached to Westphalia, Bavaria, Baden, Wirtemberg, Hesse, Würzburg, or even to Reuss and Sigmaringen, as it happened to be the pleasure or interest of those whom the Emperor wished to enrich at the expense of the Germans. Scarcely was one change effected, and dearly paid for to the French ministers and agents by the German princes, when they were obliged to submit to another. The English, as usual, were made a pretence for all those changes connected with the dissolution of the kingdom of Holland and the extension of the boundaries of France, seeing that they seized, one after another, upon the colonies of all nations. As early as February, 1809, they had con-

quered Martinique; in July, St. Domingo and the French possessions in the Senegal; in February, 1810, they took Guadeloupe; in July, the Isle of Bourbon; and in December, the Isle of France; and their allies, the Portuguese from Brazil, took possession of Guiana and Cayenne.

Napoleon had previously made the constant growth and increase of the British power a pretence for requiring in the peace of Schönbrunn considerable sacrifices from Austria, and uniting the provinces so separated, partly immediately with France, and partly subjecting them to its dominion by incorporating them with the kingdom of Italy. The portions of ceded territory which he left to his vassals were burdened with the most oppressive conditions in the form of payments and dotations. Tuscany and the States of the Church were incorporated with France, and the King of Naples was obliged to confine himself within the limits of a French governor-general. The republic of the Valais, which Napoleon, as consul in 1802, had separated from the confederation and made a distinct state, was united with France, just as Cracow in our days has been united with Austria. In both cases the manifest injustice of the act was excused by what Milton calls "the tyrant's plea." Napoleon took advantage of the party quarrels and disputes in the Valais to put an end to the strife by annihilating the little state, and heaping contempt upon the unfortunate people, whom he robbed by compelling them to ask for his protection. He complained of the state of Valais, and accused it of not having shown itself sufficiently grateful for the road over the Simplon, which he had constructed, and at the same time stirred up their party enmities. Then, for the purpose of quelling the strife, he caused seven notables, selected from the different parties, to come to him to Paris, with the view, as was pretended, of pointing out and agreeing on means of providing for the care of the Simplon, and putting an end to the state of anarchy in the republic; the final result, however, of all these pretended reformatations and consultations was the decree of the 12th of November, 1810, by which the republic of the Valais was annihilated. As early as the month of December it was united to France, under the name of the department of the Simplon, divided into districts and communes, and subjected to the system of French taxation, police, and administration. In this way, it is true, the country was freed from the intolerance and party spirit by which it had been continually oppressed, but the freedom was rather too dearly purchased at the expense of its existence. The proclamation for the annihilation of a state founded by Napoleon himself, compared with the clamour which the whole French nation have raised with respect to the annexation of Cracow (of which we by no means approve), may serve to prove how vacillating the French ideas of right and wrong are, for all French writers warmly approved of the conduct of Napoleon on this occasion. "The road over the Simplon," it is therein said, "has cost eighteen millions of francs; the inhabitants of



the Valais have not, however, fulfilled their obligations respecting it. In addition to this, the country is in a state of anarchy, because one party among the people are bent on the oppression of the other; nothing therefore remains but to unite the country to France."

The whole of Germany, like Poland, was deeply burdened with dotations and payments to the Emperor's ordinary and extraordinary treasury of domains; and by means of exchange and barter, every ancient, local, and family bond was violently torn asunder. Bavaria, indeed, received a population of three millions and a half, but the best portion of it was continually in the field for the French, and those who remained at home were constantly harassed with furnishing supplies and quarters for the armies. Ratisbon, Salzburg, Berchtesgaden, portions of the district of the Inn and Hausruck, and finally the Tyrol, fell, indeed, to the share of Bavaria; but the price at which they were purchased was so much greater than their value, in proportion as the condition of all the princes enriched by the Emperor became more uncertain, because he was continually engaged in making new plans and territorial distributions. First of all, as has been already stated, the Tyrol was to be conquered by enormous sacrifices of blood; then the whole circle of the Adige, a great part of that of the Eisach, and the district of Clausen; therefore, all that part of the country distinguished for the cultivation of the vine and of silk was to be ceded to Italy. The bond by which the Tyrolese were held together was rent in pieces; Bavarians they neither could nor would become. The same also is true of those provinces which formed part of the Austrian spoils; for the families who were their landowners—the Auerspergs, Bathianys, Khevenhüllers, Weissenbachs, Tettenbachs, Taufkirchens, and Frankings, were, by historical recollections, and other distant properties, too completely identified with Austria as members of its oligarchical nobility to be able to become Bavarian subjects. Ratisbon was dearly purchased by the king, who was already deeply in debt, and very careless in questions of money. In addition to the diplomatic presents and military requisitions, its cession was to be purchased by a yearly payment of 400,000 francs; of which, again, a Frenchman received his share. The one half was given to the prince primate, and the other divided between the Prince von der Leyen and Count Tascher, who was married to one of the Leyens. Portions were sundered from Bavaria as compensation for Würzburg; whilst, on the other hand, the whole of the circle of the Maine, lying on the further side of Rottach, as far as the confluence of the Regnitz with the Maine, was ceded to Bavaria.

Everywhere the Emperor's word was decisive; and his determination alone put an end to the long strife between Bavaria and Wirtemberg, respecting the rounding off of their respective territories; and Bavaria was obliged to give up Ravensberg, Buchhorn, Tett nang, Geislingen, and those portions of Illerdissen which lay beyond the Iller, Albeck, Söflingen, Schweinfurt and Ulm, to

Wirtemberg. In April and May, 1810, Baden agreed to the treaties entered into by the mediation of the Frenchmen who were commissioned for the purpose, by virtue of which it received, in return for due compensation, the Landgraviate of Nellenburg, and parts of Hornberg, Rittweil, Tuttlingen, Ehingen, Maulbronn, Brackenheim, and Mergentheim. The inhabitants gained by this exchange, inasmuch as they were no longer compelled to submit to those acts of violence which were perpetrated in Wirtemberg everywhere, and against every person.

The prince primate had been made Grand Duke of Frankfort, and when ceding Ratisbon to Bavaria had been richly compensated by Hanau and Fulda; but at the same time completely lost all the reputation for patriotism and earnestness in the cause of German nationality and progress, which he had previously enjoyed. He twice betrayed his German subjects to foreigners. As Archbishop of Ratisbon, he accepted as his coadjutor Cardinal Fesch, who was at least half a German, as the son of a Basle apostate; as Grand Duke of Frankfort he even consented that, under certain circumstances, his territory should be united with France. He first of all accepted Eugene Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, alone as his successor; but with the appended clause, that, should he die without male issue, then the territory was to be united to France. The nomination of the young Dutch prince as Grand-Duke of Berg was a mere empty form, which deceived no one. The prince was a child, and Röderer was sent into the grand duchy to administer it according to the French laws and usages; and the same Röderer afterwards governed it as a French province. In like manner the grand duchy of Frankfort, under Dalberg's government, was completely administered on the French system, and the Frankfort troops, along with those of Lippe-Detmold, Bückeburg, Anhalt, Westphalia, and those of the Saxon dukes, were obliged to serve Joseph Bonaparte in Spain against their own countrymen, who were fighting bravely in the English ranks.

We have already several times referred to the history of the kingdom of Westphalia without entering upon that of the court and the scandal of the society in Cassel, which was composed of German nobility and French adventurers. We have observed that the King of Westphalia, by a proclamation of the 1st of March, 1810, was allowed to declare Hanover and its possessions a part of his dominions, although even Bonaparte was convinced that this country must be restored in case of a peace with England, with reference to which even the words of the French pettifoggers who drew up the act of union were calculated. This act, of the 14th of January, 1810, was so drawn up as to enable the Emperor at any moment to resume his present without violating his word. The Duc de Cadore, who concluded the treaty with the king in the Emperor's name, had declared in the document that the Emperor relinquished to his brother *the full sovereignty of Hanover*; this phrase he was



obliged, by Napoleon's express command, to alter, and to say instead, that the Emperor *conferred upon his brother all the rights to Hanover which he himself possessed*.<sup>\*</sup> Hanover, with the exception of Lauenburg, was then, as before said, united to Westphalia, but the union was equally unfortunate for both. In order to prove this, we need only quote a single passage from the manuscript observations of Count Malchus on the French libel against the kingdom, which is the more worthy of credit as Malchus was among the commissioners employed to take possession. Whilst disputing other accusations, he admits that Hanover was a miserable present for the kingdom of Westphalia, and the burdens thrown upon the treasury on and through the cession of Hanover, in the year in which it was fully incorporated with the kingdom, exceeded its revenues by about three millions.

Saxony was less oppressed and troubled in its German provinces than the other states of the Confederation of the Rhine. It was, however, used as the tool of the French, and threatened with immediate incorporation with France. On the other hand, it did not enjoy those advantages which fell to the lot of the other states (Wirtemberg excepted) from French dominion. These advantages, which were again taken away from many of the states after 1814, consisted of equality in the eye of the law, the abolition of all feudal burdens and of patrimonial jurisdiction, and the annihilation of the Roman and Canon law, intelligible only to the learned;—in short, the enjoyment of all those wise institutions which had been introduced into France since the revolution, and which Napoleon had not found it necessary to abolish in order to establish his autocracy. In Saxony everything remained as before, for which reason the Saxon mode of legal proceedings continues to this hour undisturbed, and the manner in which public business is still transacted in the Saxon chambers and courts reminds us of the days of Augustus, of Fleming, and Brühl.

Napoleon respected the aged and virtuous, though pedantic, king, as he deserved to be respected, because he was honourable, faithful, and true. Neither his superstition nor his adhesion to what was old injured the Emperor; and he availed himself of his fidelity to load the poor Saxons with the duchy of Warsaw, and therefore both the defence of the Elbe and the Vistula, in addition to those feudal burdens which they even yet continue to bear. Seven millions were to be expended upon the fortress of Torgau, the army to be newly organised and increased, and all this in order that Warsaw might be made a camp, and Saxony a bulwark against Russia and Prussia. The burden of the administration and defence of Warsaw fell upon the Saxons, the advantages of the possessions to France. It is, therefore, no wonder that the whole of the French writers are

<sup>\*</sup> The Emperor wrote to the Duc de Cadore, in reference to this expression, "*Je ne puis pas céder une souveraineté que je n'ai pas. Je cède mes droits sur cette province; c'est tout ce que je puis faire.*"



unable to find language strong enough to justify and commend the deeds of violence which were committed, in order to make Warsaw a domain for those Frenchmen, who, by their expenditure, were to increase the splendour of the imperial court. It has often already been remarked how burdensome these dotations and imperial reserves were from the very first; and the union of Western Gallicia with the duchy, after the peace of Schönbrunn, increased rather than diminished them. By this union the duchy of Warsaw was, indeed, enlarged by two-thirds of its whole extent, and its population doubled; but, on the other hand, it was called upon to pay 10,000,000 francs to the French domains, and the army was raised to 60,000 men; the loss was therefore greater than the gain.

Matters had gone to such a length, as early as 1810, that Napoleon and his servile sophists in the senate no longer considered it necessary to justify or even to excuse the annihilation of states with which they were at peace or living in friendship, or the spoliation of those that were weak. One and the same decree of the senate united the whole north coast of Germany and the kingdom of Holland to France; and on the very same day, the 13th of December, 1810, as this decree was passed, another for the union of the Valais with the Empire was also brought forward. The decree given below\* not only affects Oldenburg and the Hanse Towns, not only the possessions of the Duke of Arenberg and other small territories, but also portions of the recently enlarged kingdom of Westphalia, and even Prussian territories lying within what had been agreed upon as the line of demarcation. These measures would have been regarded as less surprising had they been considered as mere acts of force; but the Duke of Oldenburg was the nearest relation of the Emperor of Russia, who was, or appeared to be, on the most friendly terms with Napoleon; the Grand-Duke of Berg was the emperor's own nephew and ward; and the King of Westphalia his brother. By virtue of this decree, the grand duchy of Berg lost 200,000, and the kingdom of Westphalia 500,000, inhabitants. The Emperor of Russia's brother-in-law was altogether driven out of his territories, and no notice whatever was even given to the King of Prussia that hands had been laid upon, or that there was any intention of violating, his possessions. The Emperor's message,

\* "Les arrêts du conseil Britannique en 1806 et 1807 ont déchiré le droit public de l'Europe, un nouvel ordre de choses régit l'univers. De nouvelles garanties m'étant devenue nécessaires, la réunion des embouchures de l'Escaut, de la Meuse, du Rhin, du Weser et de l'Elbe à l'Empire, l'établissement d'une navigation intérieure avec la Baltique m'ont paru être les premières et les plus importantes. J'ai fait dresser le plan d'un canal qui sera exécuté avant cinq ans et qui joindra la Baltique à la Seine. Des indemnités seront données aux princes qui pourront se trouver froissés par cette grande mesure, que commande la nécessité et qui appuie sur la Baltique la droite des frontières de mon empire." In reference to this and similar questions, the whole tone of Bignon's book undergoes a change from the ninth part forward; for he himself directs attention to the indifference with which such scandalous spoliation is passed over. He merely observes: "La réunion du Lauenbourg, des villes anséatiques et de toutes les côtes depuis l'Elbe jusqu'à l'Éms est commandée par les circonstances."

by which the imperial decree of the 12th and that of the 13th were changed into resolutions of the senate, Champagny's insolent speech on the subject, and Semonville's favourable report, are completely in unison with the manifestoes and diplomatic notes of the three powers which divided Poland among themselves. Of the same character, too, is the answer which the Emperor on the 17th returned to a deputation, which had been sent to him respecting the completion of the decree. The senate did not think it worth while to waste a single word respecting the union of the Valais with France.

In the first four months of the year 1811 three French departments were formed out of the frontier of North Germany, containing 646 square miles, and above 300,000 inhabitants, which was thus incorporated with France. The terrible Prince of Eckmühl (Davoust), who sported with men's lives as if Napoleon were a god, was placed at the head of the secret police throughout Germany and Poland—a body which was found lurking in every corner, and exercising the most cruel tyranny. This idea of the power of his master may well have been entertained by Davoust, when even aged, distinguished, and well-educated Germans in authority so far forgot their duty to their nation and their own dignity as, in order to obtain a favourable look for themselves or the places over which they ruled, to offer up meaner incense to a conqueror who oppressed them than that of his Parisian creatures. This was done, for example, by Doorman, the aged syndic of Hamburg, and by Count Grote, in the speeches delivered by them at public and official audiences in Paris, given to the one on the 17th of March, and to the other on the 30th of June. We shall subjoin, for the sake of illustration, a few expressions of these representatives of the great trading community and of the high nobility of Germany.\*

#### 4.—SWEDEN.

Charles XIII., having obtained the crown of Sweden from the aristocracy, who were combined together against his nephew, and secretly protected by Russia, in the same manner as Louis Philippe, in our days, the throne of France, by means of the democrats, who

\* The aged Doorman, as if eager to lay his grey hairs with shame in the grave, says—"The Hanse Towns have been at all times Frenchmen in heart and in their predilections, and they would now be united, not merely as a spot of the earth's surface, not as a nameless gain, to the immeasurable magnitude of the astonished provinces which yield obedience to one master." Count Grote even goes beyond this. He reminds the Emperor of Charlemagne and Wittekind, whom he represents as inferior to his genius. He alleges that Divine Providence, according to its unfathomable decrees (so the devil uses the Bible), had undoubtedly from the beginning destined Napoleon, after the expiration of ten centuries, again to incorporate the cradle of the Franks and the paternal soil of the brave Saxons with his empire. Similar phrases abound, which we pass over. That these speeches were written, put into their mouths, and printed in the *Moniteur*, by Frenchmen, is no excuse for them whatever.



were grossly betrayed by him, immediately afterwards bought the friendship of Russia, as Louis Philippe did the alliance with England. King Charles XIII. was obliged to pay much more dearly for the friendship of Russia than Louis Philippe for the English alliance; but Sweden was also at war with Russia on this account, a great portion of the country was conquered, and the whole kingdom might easily have been reduced. Peace with Russia was therefore purchased by the cession of the whole of Finland, a part of West Bothnia, and the half of the Aland Islands; and peace with Denmark by an agreement respecting the succession to the throne.

Charles XIII. had no heirs, nor the prospect of having a son; the Swedes therefore chose the nearest relation of the King of Denmark as their crown prince. The choice of Prince Christian Augustus, of Schleswig-Holstein-Augustenburg, as crown prince of Sweden, was solemnly proclaimed in Stockholm before the estates on the 28th of August, 1809; and on his arrival from Norway, on the 6th of January, 1810, he was received as an idol, especially by the citizens and peasants. Among the great families, however, he had many enemies. Among the most discontented were the dreaded aristocrats of the proud families of Piper and Fersen, who were afterwards accused, probably without any reason, of causing the prince to be poisoned. The peace with Russia and with Denmark was at that time already concluded, and in such terms that, by virtue of its conditions, agreed to in September, and ratified in October, the Inlet of Aland and the Gulf of Bothnia on the east, and the small rivers of Torneo and Muonio on the north, were to form the boundaries between Sweden and Russia. The peace concluded with Denmark on the 10th of December involved no conditions which were burdensome to Sweden. Napoleon, too, showed himself disposed to conclude a peace with the new Swedish government, and even to restore Swedish Pomerania, which he had conquered. He demanded, however, on the part of Sweden an unconditional acceptance of his continental system.

The acceptance of the continental system would necessarily lead to reprisals against Sweden on the part of England, and, on account of the peculiar relations of this kingdom, which, since the peace with Russia, had no more than two millions and a half of inhabitants, would subject them to poverty and misery. The French Emperor, it is true, when consenting that a large part of Sweden should be ceded to Russia, had required from the Emperor Alexander that he should enforce upon that country what he himself had promised to do respecting England; but, on concluding the treaty, Sweden and Russia came to an understanding as to the means of evading this stipulation. It was conceded to Sweden that she should import as much salt and colonial goods as were sufficient for her own consumption. Napoleon saw too well what this concession would lead to, to submit to it without interference. In order to bring the negotiations, commenced in Paris immediately after the conclusion of the peace with Russia, to an end, the Swedish government had forbidden all



English ships, whether for merchandise or ships of war, to enter any of the Swedish harbours, and yet the Swedish deputies were several months in being able to bring the negotiations to an issue. Napoleon was not only unwilling to agree to the concessions made by the Emperor Alexander, but actually prohibited all Swedish ships from access to any of the harbours on the north coast of Germany.

In order to obtain peace with France, Sweden, urged on by Denmark and Russia, was at length obliged to consent to a complete renunciation of all trade with England,—a promise which, as it soon appeared, could not possibly be kept. The Emperor, too, secured to the Swedes some advantages, as the French had the audacity to say, from *magnanimity*, in the peace which was at length signed on the 21st of January, 1810. He restored Swedish Pomerania, and the island of Rügen, as well as the Swedish ships which had been seized since Charles XIII.'s accession to the throne, together with their cargoes, as far as these did not consist of English goods. As, however, our object is not to give a full view of Swedish, but of European history, we must leave the internal history of the kingdom to its own historians, and in this and what follows leave Sweden altogether untouched. The contemptible character of Charles, who was in a state of physical and moral degradation, gave full room to the miserable schemes of the leading noble families, who for 150 years had been accustomed to cabals; and the situation of a noble-minded prince like Christian Augustus, who was adored by the two other estates, was no very enviable one, and Napoleon's views respecting Sweden were by no means clear. The Swedish government, for example, besought the Emperor of the French to promote a marriage between the crown prince of Sweden and a princess of his house—a proposal which, however, on the French side, was formally declined on the 10th of February.

Notwithstanding the peace concluded in the preceding month, the Emperor was, about this time, highly dissatisfied with the Swedes. He complained in no very measured terms of the continuation of the friendship between England and Sweden; he expressed his indignation at the Swedish *chargé d'affaires* still remaining in London, and the English one in Stockholm, and at the non-observance of the condition respecting a complete renunciation of trade with the great enemy of France. Napoleon, supported by the information derived from his numerous spies, *chargés d'affaires*, and their creatures, alleged that the English trade in Sweden was pushed more zealously than ever; that Gothenburg was nothing else than a great *dépôt* for the German coasts, and that even Pomerania was full of English goods. By disputes on these points the mission of Alquier, who had been long since nominated for the post of ambassador in Stockholm, was continually delayed, and the duties of his office performed by Desaugiers, secretary to the embassy. Some allege that the latter had, of his own accord, intermeddled in this business, when the sudden death of the crown prince led to the choice of a successor;

others say that he had received express orders from Paris, but was given up by his court. The cause of the sudden death of Christian Augustus is still veiled in obscurity.

In May, 1810, the crown prince took a journey to Schonen, in order to be present at a review, and became unwell on the way, after eating of a cold pasty, of which he alone partook. He, however, continued his journey, and attended the review on the 23rd of May, where he suddenly fell dead from his horse. The king had sent Dr. Rossi, his physician, who was then involved in the imputation of poisoning, which found credit among the Swedish people, as the fable of Caspar Hauser did among the Germans. The poisoning is said to have been a device of Count Fersen and his sister, the Countess Piper. The name of Fersen is well known in connexion with the flight of Louis XVI. The queen, too, is alleged to have been privy to the plan. Whatever amount of blame may be attached to Count Fersen—as is likely to happen to such *roués*—respecting the poisoning of the prince, if he were really poisoned,\* he was certainly not immediately a party. The government punished the king's physician, and the people let loose their wrath on the count. On the occasion of the interment of the crown prince, on the 20th of June, Count Fersen was ill-treated, tortured, and put to death in a horrible manner, and the palace of his sister, Countess Piper, was stormed.

As the king was old, weak, and unequal to the state of business and parties, it was necessary to take measures forthwith for the choice of a successor; and a wide field was thus opened for cabals. We cannot, however, go into minute details, but must confine ourselves to the general results. It would almost appear as if Russia kept herself very quiet on this occasion. King Ferdinand VI., of Denmark, appeared openly as a suitor for the crown, and the Emperor of the French played a very equivocal part. The question on the *tapis* was now the election of Bernadotte, and the Emperor was in the greatest perplexity, whether he should hinder the choice of a hated rival for military glory, or, because the general was brother-in-law to his brother, and had been created by himself Prince of Ponto-Corvo, suffer that to take place which he could not very properly publicly interfere to prevent. Bernadotte was not only very advantageously known in Sweden since the time in which he had been entrusted with the administration of Hanover and the Hanse Towns, but he had rendered special services to the Swedes in 1806,

\* The illness caused by the pasty appeared to be past; the prince had an interview with his brother, the duke, in Schonen, and thence went to be present at some manœuvres of the Mörner Hussars. As the regiment was making a charge the prince took his place on the left wing, dashed off at a gallop, lost his hat, immediately fell backwards from his horse, and in a few minutes was dead. Physicians were brought from Lund to assist Rossi. Rossi was afterwards removed from his office, and later sent out of the kingdom. Professor Lodin's report clearly intimates poison. The other medical reports either leave the matter in obscurity, or contradict the suspicion. So much for the *collegium medicum*. The contents of the prince's stomach were not, however, carefully examined.

whom he overtook in Travemunde, under the command of Count Mörner. Mörner and the other officers, whom he at that time treated with great kindness, exercised a strong influence among the nobility qualified to elect. Bernadotte had also gained the favour of other men of influence at the time in which he commanded the French troops in the north of Germany, and afterwards in Jutland; and in addition to all these, his name had been mentioned on the former occasion. On the present there was, consequently, a greater chance of success. Mörner, in the name of the party which he had got together in favour of the Prince of Ponto-Corvo, sent his nephew to Paris on a deputation, to whom the prince declared that he was disposed to accept the offer, but that the Emperor's permission must first be obtained.

There was the greater reason not to take a step in the affair without the Emperor's permission, as the Swedish deputies declared the preliminary condition of the choice to be that Bernadotte should wholly relinquish his rights as a French citizen, and make a profession of the Lutheran faith. The Estates were summoned to meet for the election at Orebro, and named an election committee of twelve; besides Bernadotte, there was no other candidate but the King of Denmark, because the brother of the late crown prince, the Duke of Augustenburg, withdrew when the king, whose successor he must be, was proposed. Napoleon had at that time every reason to do what was agreeable to the King of Denmark; and though, therefore, the feeling was in favour of the Prince of Ponto-Corvo, Desaugiers, the French *chargé d'affaires*, at first exerted himself in favour of the king; when, however, the real state of the case was known in Paris, it was said that Desaugiers had meddled in the matter without orders, and he was recalled. The Duc de Cadore afterwards said to the Swedish ambassador that Desaugiers had been sacrificed; Bignon affirms the reverse. Who can unravel the complicity of diplomatic falsehood and deception? To us it does not appear worth while even to make the attempt; we, therefore, have merely to report that Bernadotte, proposed by the king, was unanimously elected crown prince by the Estates of Sweden on the 25th of August, 1810; that he accepted the offer, and that the choice was approved of by the Emperor. Napoleon may, perhaps, have looked with no very favourable eye on the elevation of Bernadotte, but we doubt the truth of his having proposed to him to promise never to carry on war against France; and when he refused to comply, having had a violent and angry scene with him on the subject. On the contrary, he released him fully from his oath of allegiance, handed him over two millions in cash, gave him a splendid suite, paid the amount of his dotations, and suffered him to retain possession of his estates purchased in France.

After his election the crown prince arrived in Sweden in October, was adopted by the king, appointed generalissimo, and immediately initiated into the management of affairs. The Emperor of the French



at length allowed Alquier, the ambassador, to take his departure; but he was too anxious to promote his master's interest, and too vehement to be able to do much towards smoothing down the difficulties which had again arisen between Sweden and France. The Emperor had commissioned him imperiously to demand that the continental system should be not only strictly followed out in Sweden, but that war should be declared against England. Alquier not only minutely followed the commands of the Emperor, but Napoleon himself held a personal conversation with the Swedish ambassador in Paris, on account of the delay in Sweden; and this conversation was carried on in a tone wholly inadmissible even in respectable private society.

The ambassador has left a record of the subject-matter and style for the benefit of posterity; and it is obvious that the Emperor became more vehement at the end than became either himself or his office. As a proof or illustration, we shall quote below a few passages from this bluster.\* The Emperor then commanded his minister of foreign affairs, who was present at the interview, immediately to prepare a courier to proceed to Sweden, and proposed to the Swedish ambassador to do the same. Their duty was to be, to convey the Emperor's wishes to the Swedish government, and to state that if within five days from the time in which Alquier should have handed in his last demand they did not unconditionally accept of the terms proposed, Alquier was to take his leave, and the war to begin. The Swedish ambassador denied, indeed, every accusation brought against Sweden—declared, however, that his court would declare war against England, and confiscate all English goods.

The English did not avenge this on Sweden, but took into account the circumstances of the country, and spared Sweden as much as possible. By this conduct the Emperor was strengthened in his opinion that there was some secret understanding between Sweden and England. He therefore increased his demands. He called for not only a much stricter observance of the continental system, which he himself was constantly violating by his licenses, but required that, in order effectually to prevent Gothenburg from

\* "La Suède, me prend-elle pour dupe? point d'état mixte, point de sentiments, des faits. Vous gardez un agent Anglais; vous avez des bâtimens dans tous les ports d'Angleterre; des bâtimens Anglais assiègent Gothenbourg; vos isles servent de magasins à leurs marchandises; vous transportez leurs denrées coloniales en Allemagne, j'en ai fait saisir à Rostoch; vos affaires m'empêchent de reposer en paix. Eh bien! restez avec les Anglais. Vous m'assurez, que la Suède aime mieux rester avec moi; mais des preuves, vous dis-je, des preuves! Le commerce d'exportation, c'est le cheval de bataille. Où est-il donc le pavillon neutre? Il n'y a plus des neutres, l'Angleterre n'en reconnaît point, je ne veux plus en reconnaître. La Suède est la cause de la crise que j'éprouve, elle m'a fait plus de mal que cinq coalitions ensemble. Choisissez—des coups des canons aux Anglais qui approchent de vos côtes et la confiscation de leurs marchandises, ou la GUERRE AVEC FRANCE. Je puis vous attaquer par les Russes et les Danois, je puis faire confisquer tous vos bâtimens sur le continent, et je le ferai si dans quinze jours vous n'êtes pas en guerre avec l'Angleterre." Such is the report of Baron von Lagerbielke. The Emperor added that he had caused troops to march against the Swiss, and thus very recently compelled them to confiscate all English goods.

being made a *dépôt* for English manufactures, French custom-house officers should be admitted there, and 2000 sailors, soldiers, and officers be furnished for the equipment of the Brest fleet. At first, 12,000 were required. It was even a subject of consideration to take Swedish troops into French pay; and Sweden was to raise 50 per cent. on all English goods found in the country. As the crown prince had now taken upon himself the management of public affairs, he wrote a letter to the Emperor direct, without, however, obtaining an answer, whilst Alquier and the minister of foreign affairs in Stockholm were engaged in exchanging official correspondence. In letters of the date of the 14th and 19th of November, the crown prince vainly urged that the Emperor was requiring impossibilities; that the most of the demands could not be complied with by the king, because the constitution conferred upon him no right to deal with the lives and property of the people according to his pleasure.

The interchange of notes, however, continued, and the correspondence was rendered bitterer than before by the interference of the crown prince, when just at this time the disputes between Russia and France began which led to the war of 1812. We shall subsequently refer to the causes of this war, which had become unavoidable as early as the end of 1810. Here we shall merely observe that the Emperor Alexander, in December, 1810—the month in which he issued the ukase concerning trade which gave such deadly offence to Napoleon—entered into an alliance with Bernadotte. Tschernitcheff made the first of his renowned journeys from Petersburg to Paris and back in September, 1810. In his second, in the month of December of the same year, he took Stockholm on his way, and held several interviews with the crown prince, of which he afterwards made a masterly use, as the prince stood in close connexion with those persons in Paris who, without being precisely conspirators, were thoroughly dissatisfied with the whole course of affairs. Tschernitcheff took with him a letter from the crown prince to Paris, from the contents of which it is obvious that he must have been commissioned to come to an understanding with him, and to act as a partisan for Sweden in Paris. From the letter quoted below\* will be seen the reasons alleged by the crown prince as an excuse for not declaring war against England, or complying with the other

\* On the 19th of December the crown prince writes as follows:—"Tschernitcheff will inform your majesty that Sweden is just on the eve of being in the most melancholy situation; that it is wholly destitute of means for carrying on the war which it is called upon to declare; that the government has redoubled its efforts in this pressing crisis, but that the king's power is not sufficient to carry out the system of confiscation here to its full extent, as may be done elsewhere. The rights and property of every individual here are protected by the fundamental laws of the kingdom; and were the king himself disposed to act in contravention of these laws, there is not a single councillor of state who would venture to agree with him."—*Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de Charles XIV.*, Jean, Roi de Suède et de Norwège. Par le Chef d'Escadron, Coupé de St. Donat, et B. de Roquefort, &c. Paris, 1820. (Appendix.)

requirements of the Emperor. Napoleon did not answer immediately even now; he, however, lowered his demands. Instead of 12,000 soldiers and sailors, which he had at first required, he now limited his demand to 2000, and was obliged to be satisfied when he could not obtain even these. He even proposed to Sweden to make an exchange with him, and to give him iron in return for the colonial produce which was heaped up in his storehouses, from confiscations and licenses for trade. In the following year (1811), however, the contests became more violent than before.



## CHAPTER III.

TILL THE YEAR 1815.

## § I.

PRUSSIA—TURKEY—THE POPE—FRANCE TILL 1812.

## A.—PRUSSIA IN 1809—1811.

WE have already stated that the minister Von Stein was obstructed in the midst of his reforming career, by being obliged to lay down his office at the close of 1808, and, in the beginning of 1809, to take refuge in Bohemia, where he remained till 1812, when he went to Russia, and proved of great use in all the great things which were undertaken by the Emperor Alexander. We think it right once more briefly to advert to the principles on which Von Stein's reforms were founded in 1808, in reference to his patriotic endeavours in 1813. We feel it to be the more incumbent upon us here to notice the reforming views of Baron von Stein, as we shall subsequently see that, in 1813, Metternich, Stadion, and their associates, who made common cause with him, were in reality more afraid of him, and of all those by whom he was surrounded, than of Napoleon himself. He had, however, succeeded in reforming the Prussian states; but the French and General Scharnhorst, for very different reasons, however, opposed a general arming of the people. Scharnhorst, with good reason, was first anxious for the restoration of the regular troops; but the first real benefit which Von Stein rendered to Prussia was the means taken for arming the people *en masse*, occasioned by Dohna, and demanded by Rühle von Lilienstern. As to Von Stein's activity before his flight to Bohemia, and the whole tendency of his proceedings, we think we shall be able to convey the clearest idea by employing his own language. His views may be seen at length, in a circular addressed to the leading administrative authorities in Prussia, on the 24th of November, 1808, when he was obliged to have recourse to a hasty flight to Bohemia.\*

\* This circular is a sort of political will, or confession of faith. Having remarked that much had already been done, he proceeds as follows:—"Hereditary subjection has ceased. The support of every throne, the *will of freemen*, has been founded; the *unlimited right to the possession of landed property* has been proclaimed. The duty of making provision for its first necessities has been again restored to the people; the towns have now been declared no longer minors." He next lays down eight propositions, on the acceptance of which, in his opinion, it would mainly depend whether the machine of the Prussian states could be changed into one organic whole, with life and motion in and for itself. These propositions are—1. Government can only proceed from the highest power. 2. Those who administer the law must be dependent

Stein's removal prevented all quick progress in Prussia; Scharnhorst alone successfully applied his knowledge, gained in the practical military school of the singular Count von Lippe, to the new organisation of the Prussian army. The king and his family still remained in Prussia Proper: there was a total want of order in Berlin, and of some strong guiding mind. Altenstein, Dohna, and Beyme, of whom the ministry consisted, proved quite unequal to meet the financial difficulties, especially as Napoleon, with implacable severity, insisted upon the immediate payment of eighty-five millions of contributions that were in arrear. He even at length consented, in order to obtain payment, that Hardenberg, who was a more supple and diplomatic but less moral man than Stein, should take his place as prime minister. At this time there appeared on the 6th of November, before the king returned to Berlin on the 23rd of December, 1809, that most important decree, by virtue of which the inalienability of the royal domains was removed. The effect of this decree was, that Prussia, as in the eighteenth century, no longer remained the king's private estate, but might become the property of free men. This will be obvious from certain determinations then adopted, to which we shall advert, in order to indicate the importance of the decree. The sale of peasants' estates, mills, and other royalties belonging to the crown, was now declared to be entirely free. The alienation of lands, forests, and privileges, was to be sanctioned and allowed, as far as this was necessary to meet the wants of the state.

At the very time when everything loudly demanded that the Germans should at length get completely rid of all the obstructing formalities of etiquette and Byzantine forms, and be united as one people, the court announced its return to Berlin, not very advantageously, by issuing a number of ordinances relating to the most contemptible things, court forms and etiquette; the combined efforts of Von Humboldt, Altenstein, Niebuhr, Schleiermacher, and other distinguished and vain literati, were directed to carving out the plan of a new university in Berlin. This plan was really brought to a successful issue in the autumn of 1810, and these distinguished men at first even succeeded in bringing their own pretentious tone and depreciation of others into fashion, and, along with this, in

on the highest power alone, and, therefore, all patrimonial jurisdictions must be abolished. 3. Hereditary subjection is, it is true, abolished; but many laws for domestics, especially Silesian, still limit freedom. 4. The representation of the people, while such exists, is very imperfect. A general system of representation must be organised, and on this depends the weal or woe of the Prussian people. 5. There is no proper connexion between the nobles and the citizens. The nobility must be reformed, and brought into connexion with the other estates. Hence it follows—6. That *general* measures for the defence of the country must be established by law. The class of peasants must be elevated: 7. By legal means for collecting dues: 8. By stirring up some religious sense in the minds of the people: 9. Mainly by due care for the instruction and education of youth. He adds that, if these principles be duly observed and carried out, any other small deficiencies, especially in questions of finance, will be easily overcome.

giving currency to a pretended new philosophy, and a new system of history and archæology discovered by them. In this way they thought themselves justified, thenceforward, in calling Berlin the metropolis of German literature and science, and the rest of us really believed for a long time that we were all dwarfs, and that there were no giants except in Berlin. When it afterwards appeared that the most of these men were tall merely because they walked upon stilts, we smiled and remained silent. The object, however, at which these distinguished gentlemen aimed was accomplished; and the English and French, who have a great admiration for what is *distingué*, and mistake names for things, honoured Germany for Berlin's sake.

Baron von Hardenberg, who now, by Napoleon's consent, managed the Prussian affairs as chancellor of state, had the merit of making these and other reforms possible in the midst of the most melancholy condition of the state. He understood what Von Stein did not: how to beat the French with their own weapons, to play an equivocal part in a masterly manner, and thus not only to deceive the French, but also his own timid king. Whatever may be said of Hardenberg's private life, of his associates and his favourites, the rage exhibited by all French writers as to his faithlessness and falsehood abundantly proves that he was just the right man, when necessary, to fight them with their own arms. That he was a man well qualified to organise a new system of administration, he had formerly shown in Franconia, where he used the services of Ritter von Lang, who, although he has heaped the most scurrilous abuse upon others, has made him alone a hero of virtue. In order to regain Napoleon's favour, he even had recourse to the services of two of his diplomatists, when the Emperor peremptorily demanded his removal from office and public affairs. Bignon informs us, that as early as 1808 he had caused a paper to be given into the hands of the Emperor and recommended to his attention by Duroc, in which Hardenberg sought to justify himself.\* When the king was afterwards anxious to make him chancellor of state, but did not dare to do so without Napoleon's consent, the Count de Marsan, then French ambassador in Berlin, undertook the mediation. The Emperor assented; but, from his letter to St. Marsan, it appears that he only did so on the condition that anti-German traitors, spies, and rascals, should be held in honour in Berlin, and true German men always discouraged.†

\* Bignon, vol. ix., p. 174, No. 1, says: "En 1808, durant mes fonctions d'administrateur-général de Prusse, le Baron de Hardenberg avait écrit à Napoleon pour expliquer et justifier sa conduite. Cette lettre m'ayant été remise par un de ses amis, un Monsieur Jordan, je l'adressai au Général Duroc, avec qui M. de Hardenberg avait eu de fréquents rapports dans les trois mois qui précédaient la guerre."

† "Ecrivez," he writes to St. Marsan, "que les ennemis du Prince de Hatzfeld" (that is, the genuine German patriots and enemies of French rascality) "sont les miens, que ceux qui l'attaquent m'attaquent, et que je reconnais là l'influence de la cabale qui a causé tous les maux de ce pays."



For a view of Hardenberg's course of action from this time forward, when he became chancellor of state, and of the manner in which he organised all the subordinate offices, we must refer our readers to the third part of Manso's "History of Prussia" or to Pölitz's "Manual;" we must ourselves be very brief, and confine ourselves to intimations of his general policy and tendencies. One thing is certain, that with Hardenberg's reappearance in Berlin a completely new period of Prussian policy began, and that Hardenberg well understood how, on the one hand, to *appear* wholly French, and, on the other, to *be* completely German. He was, and remained, the support of the patriotic association of true Germans, who in July had lost a protectrix in the noble-minded and amiable queen. The chancellor found able assistants in the men whom Stein had supported, in carrying out his plans, and bringing king, nobles, and people into such a relation, that ever after, as regards foreign countries, they were as one.

Although Hardenberg apparently removed Scharnhorst from the ministry of the war department, yet the latter still remained quietly in action, and everything stated by Bignon to the contrary is the very best proof that Von Stein's vehemence, haste, and obstinacy had been given up, while his tendencies and objects were retained, and the diplomatists and their spies deceived. The absolute power of a king, and his right to make laws without consulting the people, never worked more beneficially than in 1808, when Von Stein, and, since 1810, Hardenberg, used the royal name and authority quickly to carry out changes, which in any mixed assembly of the states would have been attended with the greatest difficulties.

Permission was granted to citizens and peasants to acquire and possess real estates, and to the nobles to pursue commerce and trade, without any relinquishment of their dignity; the burdens which hitherto lay exclusively upon the humbler classes were removed, notwithstanding the loud and urgent murmurs of all those whose advantage lay in the former state of things. The obligation of the country people to find additional horses for a small remuneration to those who were travelling on the king's business, altogether ceased; the rights of socage to mills, distilleries, and breweries, which still exist in Saxony, were either abolished or greatly limited. The right of granting debtors respite from payment was confined to narrower bounds, and better defined than before. The relation of the landowners to the peasant was regulated, and exemption from many of the grievous burdens and services imposed upon the peasants rendered possible. Guilds and corporations were abolished; the election of parish and other authorities better arranged, and many ecclesiastical estates, provostries, and chapters, the incomes of which were not necessary for churches or schools, were secularised. Taxes were now equally distributed, and a representation of the people regulated to convey their wishes to the king, for in the then state of affairs no *new estates* could be thought of. Every change adopted in this time of need was intended either as a means of relieving the financial embarrassments of

the state, which at that time tried in vain 'to raise a loan in Holland on the hardest terms, or to apportion and distribute the taxes in a way more suitable to the times, and better calculated to make the oppressive and humiliating social relations of the olden times less sensibly felt.

In despite, however, of all the efforts of the government, the state of things in Prussia became daily more oppressive, and the financial embarrassments more urgent. In 1810 and 1811 it appeared as if the Emperor was determined to find reasons for a breach, and to drive matters in Prussia to extremities. The king stood in much the same relation to the French as Louis XVI. to the Girondists after his flight; it was well known, however, that the noble officers by whom Prussia was afterwards saved had succeeded in forming a small but vigorous army, and that Eckmühl and his associates would not willingly urge this army to a desperate struggle. In the mean time, Napoleon ventured, without shame, to exercise a continuous tyranny against the Prussians, and to compel the government to be his tool. By letters from Paris, he gave orders for burning or selling all English goods in Prussia; he resolved on the division of all the confiscated estates, and took to himself the lion's share; he issued an ordinance for the regulation of all ships entering in or sailing from the Prussian ports, and of everything connected with them. The Emperor carried on a correspondence on all these subjects with his ambassador, who carried out to the letter everything which his master required.

Every district in Prussia and all the towns were full of adventurers and spies, who carried things true and false to the French generals, ambassadors, and commissioners. All the ports, officers, and merchants, were strictly watched, and accusations were sent to Paris against almost every ship. When it was given as an excuse that such ships were North American, the reply was also short, that **ALL COLONIAL GOODS WERE ENGLISH**. The scandalous proposition was made to the Prussians to make their ports apparently open, and when ships had run in, to seize the cargoes and divide the spoil with the French. In all those places where the French lay, or through which they merely occasionally marched, such goods were seized and carried off by them without excuse or compensation. Some idea may be formed, from what Bignon says of the system of espionage which he, independently of other systems under other persons, organised, in 1811, in Poland against Russia and Austria, of what took place in Prussia, which was inundated with French. Bignon states that he paid 150,000 francs yearly to persons of consideration, who travelled, apparently for their own pleasure, through all the provinces of both empires. Each of these travellers had his own cipher, and their letters were forwarded to Paris not by the post, but through the instrumentality of ambassadors. Napoleon meddled even directly in the internal administration of Prussia, and publicly took under his protection people of rank, who served him and were unfaithful to their country. We shall quote an example of each.

As regards his immediate intermeddling in the internal adminis-

tration, he compelled the ministry of themselves to diminish the exports, by imposing a heavy duty on the export of wood and corn. Prince Hatzfeld is an example of the protection granted by the Emperor to persons who were objects of suspicion to the king. Napoleon, on his journey to Holland, happened to stop at Bergen-op-Zoom, where he was informed that government was hard on the track of the treachery practised by the prince and those of his associates who were working against Hardenberg, and that they were threatened with danger. He immediately wrote a letter in the most insolent tone to his ambassador, the Count de Marsan. In this letter the ambassador was commissioned to declare, that persons like the Prince of Hatzfeld were to be regarded as under French protection, and that the Prussian government must be careful in calling any of them to account for their conduct. It is difficult to say, whether on this occasion we should express a greater degree of astonishment at the tone of the letter to the ambassador, or at the manner in which Bignon, in his history, tries to excuse the matter. St. Marsan did not at least belong to that class of persons who, under Napoleon, made his severe commissions still harsher by the mode of announcing and executing them. This was done by the Prince of Eckmühl as well as by Daru. The Duke of Bassano, too, however courtly his conduct in other respects, was the blind tool of the Emperor's caprices, merely in order to execute them to the letter. He did not suffer himself to make an objection, and often, therefore, made great mistakes in the persons whom he recommended. The Germans smiled at his sagacity when he caused Johannes von Müller to be appointed secretary of state to the King of Westphalia, for the historian admitted, immediately after his arrival in Cassel, that he was incapable of managing the business entrusted to him; the Lithuanians, too, bitterly complained, when he was in Wilna, in 1812, that, out of mere servility, he tried to conceal the true situation of the Emperor. The vain De Pradt, in his abusive account of the embassy accuses him, and not without reason, of a great number of faults, which he is said to have committed from his excessive zeal for his master's service. This minister was, however, an honourable, just and humane man, who did not urge on the Emperor to this or that harsh measure by calumnies or exaggerated reports, like the Prince of Eckmühl, who played the tyrant in Germany from 1810 to 1812, and especially in Prussia.

The Prince of Eckmühl and other Frenchmen dreamed of nothing but conspiracies and dangerous schemes; the word *Tugendbund* was a word of real terror, as those of *radical* and *communist* have been in our days. The *Tugendbund* was at that time made a scarecrow for the Emperor, and whenever any man was in the least free spoken, or at all unfavourable to the new system, he was denounced as a member of this association. Proofs of such real or pretended conspiracies against the French were not easily obtained, and recourse was therefore obliged to be had to the most detestable and degrading



systems of espionage. For this reason the Prince of Eckmühl organised a whole corps of German traitors and French scoundrels, who by means of newspapers, magazines, and books, were to hunt out all traces of conspiracies or plots against the French. Conversations were overheard, confidential letters seized, and even broken open in the post-office; and whenever a man was suspected, he was treated as if he were actually guilty. All the fortresses, but especially Magdeberg and Wesel, were filled with state prisoners, who were detained without being either examined or brought to trial. In the year 1810, when in December the relations between France and Russia, which had long been unsatisfactory, received their deathblow, the condition of Prussia had become altogether desperate; but it was precisely in the year 1811, when the storm was at its height, that Hardenberg showed his skill in steering the vessel of the state with safety through breakers and rocks.

The three Prussian fortresses which had been left in the hands of the French as a security for the payment of their contributions, still remained in their power, because the debt was not yet discharged, although, according to the terms of the agreement, Glogau should have been delivered up as soon as the one-half of the debt was paid. So little idea was there of fulfilling this condition, that, in opposition to the terms of the treaty, the garrison of all the three fortresses was increased. The opinion, that the annihilation of Prussia was to precede the impending and threatened war with Russia, was general. Such men as Gneisenau, Blücher, Scharnhorst, and the friends of Stein, who were closely bound together, did not, indeed, despair of deliverance by a desperate struggle. Hardenberg, too, was well informed of all that was going on, but was obliged to conceal it from his own commonplace and timid king as carefully as from Napoleon's spies. All the boldest plans, therefore, of the Prussian cabinet were obliged to be concealed under diplomatic proposals; but that the measures to be adopted in case of need were already quietly prepared, is indisputable, from the documents connected with the negotiations for an alliance with France. The king, however, was wholly unacquainted with the object.

When the approaching breach between Russia and France became daily more unavoidable, it was obvious that the neutrality of Prussia in the impending contest would prove more ruinous than a share in the conflict, and that an alliance with Russia was impossible. Hardenberg, therefore, prevailed upon the king, in April, 1811, to consent to an alliance with France. The proposal for this alliance which Hardenberg caused to be brought before Napoleon was so couched that, in case of necessity, other objects might be accomplished by means of the preparations for the war as well as those which were at first made known to the king. General von Krusemark, the Prussian ambassador in Paris, was commissioned to offer to the Emperor the assistance of Prussia in case of a war with Russia, and to promise that Prussia would get on foot a considerable army, if the

Emperor would agree that this army should be under the command of a Prussian general, and not be separated; and if he, according to the treaty, would evacuate the fortress of Glogau. It was also taken for granted that in such case the remainder of the contribution due from Prussia should be remitted.

By means of the proposal made in April, Prussia would, first of all, have been able to raise the number of its army—limited to 50,000 by the peace of Tilsit—to twice that number, already well disciplined in the background; to bring a number of able and patriotic commanders again into active service; and to be relieved from the oppressive burden of the contributions to France. Napoleon knew much better than the king what was going on throughout the whole of Germany; he knew, also, that there was nothing to fear from the fermenting masses as long as they had no regular army to lean upon. He was, therefore, little disposed to sharpen a sword against himself. He remained silent for months; and it appeared, therefore, as if the fall of Prussia was determined upon in his council. Another, and, in the circumstances of the case, very bold step, was taken by Hardenberg. The chancellor, in a very able, modest, and dignified manner, gave Napoleon to understand, without boasting or threatening, that all the necessary measures were taken for defence, and that now Prussia—no longer the army alone which had fought in Champagne and at Jena, and consisted of mercenaries—would only yield after a desperate struggle. With this view General von Krusemark was desired to renew the proposal for an alliance at the end of August.

The letter in which the chancellor, on the 30th of August, 1811, developed and communicated his views of the then state of things to General von Krusemark, was to be by him presented to the French minister of foreign affairs, not in a threatening tone, but incidentally brought under his notice. This communication is to be found among the documents in Hardenberg's papers, and serves to give some value to the "*Denkwürdigkeiten Eines Staatsmannes*" (the Memoirs of a Statesman), which are, in other respects, not very trustworthy. We shall, therefore, give the substance of its contents. We shall do this, too, with the greater satisfaction, because we cannot better describe than in the official words of Hardenberg's letter the condition of Prussia at the end of 1811, the time at which we must now break off further details for the present:

"The finances are, indeed, in a very bad condition. This, however, is nothing more than a consequence of the political condition of the moment. The whole of the peoples around are in arms. On the one hand, the Russian armies are in array on the Prussian frontiers; and, on the other, Saxo-Polish troops are cantoned so near as to be able to reach Berlin in three days' march. A whole French army, moreover, is lying in Danzig. It has been further decided by treaties that only 10,000 men were to be stationed in the fortresses on the Oder, whereas the Emperor has at this moment 23,000

divided among them, the support of which costs the Prussian state 250,000 dollars a month. In Stettin there are at this time 17,564 men." To this complaint the minister subjoins the following declaration, which does the greatest honour to him, and to those in whom he placed his confidence:—"All the generals, all the officers and soldiers, all Frenchmen without distinction, and even the allies, speak openly and distinctly of the annihilation of Prussia. The Emperor of the French has not contradicted those reports; he has not accepted the proposal of an intimate alliance with Prussia; and the chancellor therefore admits that Prussia, too, has made warlike preparations. It has been already stated to the Count de St. Marsan that Prussia must fall with arms in her hands." It was then, indeed, added, as policy demanded, that Prussia was nevertheless armed *for* France, if she was disposed to consent to an alliance. "Count St. Marsan will already have announced that our fortresses are in good condition, and that **WE, AS SOON AS AN INTIMATION SHALL HAVE BEEN GIVEN, CAN SET ON FOOT A HUNDRED THOUSAND MEN.**" This was a threat most delicately conveyed.

#### B.—HISTORY OF TURKEY, FROM 1808—1812.

It has been already observed, in speaking of that relation among the Russians, French, and Turks which was established by the peace of Tilsit, and the subsequent agreement entered into between the two emperors in Erfurt, that Austria, after the truce of Slobosia, used every means in her power to dissuade and prevent the Turks from ceding Moldavia and Wallachia to the Russians. The negotiations for a definitive peace, which were first carried on at Bucharest, and afterwards at Jassy, continued, throughout the whole year 1808, without leading to any result; and the Russian army, under the command of Prince Posorowski, still held possession of the provinces on the Danube. The very impracticable plan of a partition of Turkey between France and Russia, projected at Tilsit, was renewed at Erfurt, and Austria was again thrown into a state of anxiety and fear. She therefore used her mediation to reconcile England with the Turks, as the only power which could effectually prevent its completion. Having, therefore, communicated to the Turks the project agreed upon by the two emperors at Erfurt, Austria was able to prevail upon the Turks to accept of the proposals made by the English, especially as Sir Robert Adair, who promoted the arrangement, distributed considerable sums of money amongst the venal members of the Turkish ministry. The peace, therefore, which, by the mediation of Austria, was concluded between the English and Turks in January, 1809, was considered as an act of hostility against France, and incensed the Emperor against the Austrian cabinet to the highest degree. This was, in fact, the main cause of the war with Austria, which was terminated by the peace of Schönbrunn. Peace was no sooner concluded between Turkey and England than



the Turks, urged on by Sir Robert Adair, the British ambassador in Constantinople, made new preparations for war, and Prince Posorowski, by the command of his court, was compelled to send threatening messages to the Sultan. The insolence of the last demands of Russia, supported by France,\* could not fail to annoy and irritate the Turks. If, it was said, Sir Robert Adair is not sent out of the city in four-and-twenty hours, the war will be again begun.

The war was, in fact, renewed in the provinces on the Danube in February, 1809. The details of this war it is no part of our object to relate. We, therefore, merely observe that Posorowski, then Bagration, and then Kamenskoi II., commanded the Russians, and that the grand vizier, with the main body of the Turks, lay near Schiumla, in a fortified camp. As early as 1809 Ismail was taken; but, upon the right bank of the Danube, New-Orsova, Widdin, and Nikopolis, and, upon the left, Silistria and Ghiurgevo, remained in the power of the Turks. In the following year, 1810, the Russians conquered Silistria in June, but suffered considerable losses in various places during the summer. Their attack upon the grand vizier's camp at Schiumla failed; and, in their attempt to take Rustchuk by storm, on the 3rd of August, they were driven back, and lost great numbers of people in the assault. Fortune first became more favourable to them in autumn.

Encouraged by the advantages obtained in July and August, the Turks resolved, on the 7th of September, to attempt the relief of the town of Rustchuk, which continued to be closely blockaded by the Russians, and, therefore, to try the fate of a pitched battle near Batyen, at the confluence of the Danube and the Jantra. The Russian commander marched against them with his main army, and left only Langeron and Sass behind, with a division of his forces, in order to prosecute the siege of Rustchuk, and immediately to commence that of Ghiurgevo. The engagement was bloody, and lasted for nine hours. The Turks were not only beaten, but Achmet Pasha, who had maintained his ground on the evening of the 7th with the third of the Turkish army, found himself closely surrounded on the 8th, and surrendered on the morning of that day. The whole Turkish camp, with all their artillery, 178 standards, and 5000 prisoners, fell into the hands of the Russians. From this time forward the Russians continued to be conquerors. The town of Sistova and the Turkish flotilla on the Danube were taken; immediately afterwards Cladova was occupied, and, even before the end of September, Rustchuk and Ghiurgevo were reduced. The grand vizier still occupied his fortified camp near Schiumla, but the Russians,

\* "Si la Porte," writes the Duc de Cadore, as printed in Lefebvre, vol. iii., p. 166, "continue de se confier dans l'amitié de la France, l'Empereur la soutiendra encore; il lui assurera la possession de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, et cette puissance aura encore quelque moments de végétation. Mais si la Porte a fait la paix avec l'Angleterre, si elle s'est séparée de la France, regardez-la comme perdue. L'EMPEREUR NE SE REFUSERA PAS DU PROJET PRÉSENTÉ DEPUIS TILSIT (this is openly a falsehood) DE PARTAGER SES PROVINCES, ET SON EXISTENCE AURA PRIS FIN AVEC L'ANNÉE."

nevertheless, before the end of October, took Widdin and Nikopolis.

In Servia, also, the Turks were unfortunate. The Russians there supported their friends by religion and race, who even received a garrison of their troops in Belgrade. The Turks continued in their fortified camp, whilst the Russians conquered various small fortresses. The negotiations at Bucharest, however, came to a stand, because the Russians demanded not only the cession of Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, but also insisted upon the complete independence of Servia. In the year 1811 circumstances were favourable to the Turks, because, in the middle of this year, Russia was threatened with a war by France, and because the Grand Sultan at length removed the grand vizier, now eighty years old, from his office, which he had not before ventured to do. Achmet Aga, a man in the vigour of life, was appointed grand vizier, led a new and numerous army into the fortified camp, entirely broke off the negotiations, and appeared at length in the open field.

Kamenskoi II. had also been recalled from the command of the army of the Danube; and Golenitcheff Kutusoff, who had been appointed his successor, appeared at first desirous of confining himself to merely defensive operations. He gave up all the places on the right bank of the Danube which had been previously occupied, caused the walls of the cities on that bank to be rased, and retained Rustchuk and Silistria alone as strong places on the right bank. Achmet closely followed the Russians; took possession of Sistova and Nikopolis without trouble, because the fortifications of these cities had been rased; and, on the 4th of July, made such a vigorous attack on the army encamped before Rustchuk, that, although the Turks were compelled to evacuate the field of battle, their opponents suffered great loss. The loss of the Russians in the battle itself, and in the skirmishes of the following day, was the more sensibly felt, as they were already greatly weakened by the sending off of numerous bodies of troops, in consequence of Napoleon's preparations for war. They therefore withdrew with their whole army across the Danube two days after the battle. Rustchuk was blown up by them, the siege of Widdin was raised, and a division of their army only remained before Ghiurgevo. The Turks gained some advantages in Servia also. In the autumn, however, they lost again, from want of order, discipline and tactics, all that they had gained before. In September they made an attempt to search out the Russians on the left bank of the Danube, and for that purpose despatched a portion of their army across the river, whilst the main body, with the baggage, remained behind in the camp before Rustchuk. In October, Kutusoff took advantage of their security and indifference to make a sudden attack. He captured the camp, and thereby became master of immense booty, scattered the whole army, and afterwards completely defeated it on the left bank of the river.

The army, which had been sent by the grand vizier across the river under another commander, was scarcely 25,000 strong. Immediately after the victory at Rustchuk, the Russians again took possession of the cities of Widdin, Silistria, and others. The Turks saw no possibility of being able to pass from the left to the right bank of the river, and their leaders therefore concluded a capitulation with Kutusoff in November. The whole army was obliged to surrender as prisoners of war; and thirty-five cannon, with the whole of their field apparatus, fell into the hands of their enemies.

Even before this capitulation, the grand vizier had been endeavouring to obtain a suspension of arms; and Italinsky, the former ambassador in Constantinople, had gone to Ghiurgevo to agree with him upon preliminaries, which were afterwards to form the basis of the peace to be agreed upon at Bucharest. This peace would scarcely, however, have been concluded in May, 1812, as very unexpectedly happened, had not the English at this very time entered into a new alliance with Russia. The Emperor Alexander recalled Kutusoff, and sent Admiral Tchitchakoff. The English bribed the grand vizier and other Turkish grandees, in order to secure the conclusion of the peace before General Androssy, sent by Napoleon, could possibly arrive in Constantinople: this proved afterwards decisive for Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. We shall subsequently return to the peace thus concluded between the Turks and Russians, under English and Swedish mediation, when we come to speak of Napoleon's march to Russia in 1812.

#### C.—NAPOLEON'S DISPUTES WITH THE POPE SINCE 1809.

We have already incidentally referred to the manner in which the Emperor of the French carried away the Pope from Rome, and caused him to be brought to Savona, where he detained him as a prisoner, and where he, as a mere monk, became more an object of fear than he had been in Rome. In Savona he appeared as the defender of ecclesiastical against secular rights. Napoleon himself was conscious that although he might prescribe ecclesiastical laws to the Italian, French, and even to a part of the German hierarchy (for religion was altogether out of the question), he could not do so to the whole hierarchy of the Catholic Church. He therefore returned to the idea of the claims of the Gallican Church, which Louis XIV. had set up in his disputes with Innocent X. The whole year 1809, however, passed away without any decisive step being taken. Negotiations were indeed carried on during the whole time, but they led to no result. The sees remained vacant; the dispensations reserved by the Concordat to the Pope were not granted; excommunications were spread about quickly, and occasionally attached even to the church doors; the kind of religion which Napoleon regarded as the best for a state religion, and brought into repute, proved therefore ruinous to himself. In 1810 he at length caused the ecclesiastical arrangements to be changed in conformity with



the rights of the Gallican Church; these had been laid down by Louis XIV. in March, 1682. This new arrangement was, according to the Emperor's will, to be regarded as a law of the Empire. Napoleon not being able, as was the case with Louis XIV., to oppose the decrees of the Pope by the decisions of the Sorbonne respecting spiritual authority, secured the co-operation of some bishops and canonists, who, either in order to do him a pleasure, or because they were really more favourable to episcopal than to papal government, appeared disposed to take part in a synod in favour of the Gallican system.

Before a council could even be thought of, the Emperor had sent a certain number of cardinals from Rome to Paris, and appropriated to them a yearly income. At the end of the year 1810 he established a so-called ecclesiastical commission, which, however, proved altogether incapable of meeting his views, without wholly losing their credit with the faithful; the Emperor, therefore, soon perceived that he had meddled in a matter which he could neither carry through by force nor promote by friendly counsel. This became such a source of vexation, that, by his conduct towards the Pope and the Popish clergy, he obstructed his own aim. He caused the Pope's papers to be seized, the coarsest things to be written to him, and the most rigid conditions to be imposed upon his freedom; as we shall hereafter see, he however suddenly altered his whole conduct; and all this was totally unworthy of a great ruler. The Abbé Dastros, vicar-general of the diocese of Paris, and the same man who in 1807 had delivered the celebrated address on the *restoration of religion in Notre Dame*, caused the bull of excommunication against the Emperor to be stuck on the doors of that church, and had the boldness to deliver a papal brief to Cardinal Maury, a man generally despised, and whom the Emperor had made Archbishop of Paris, in which he was commanded to betake himself to his own see of Montefiascone. This conduct, indeed, deserved punishment; the Emperor, however, by giving publicity to his private revenge on the vicar-general, committed almost the same fault which Louis XIV. committed against Cardinal Rohan in the affair of the necklace, by causing him to be arrested *in pontificalibus*. He ordered the vicar-general to be taken into custody on the 1st of January, 1810, just as he had placed himself at the head of the clergy and was entering the Tuileries to offer the congratulations of the season to the Emperor. He pushed his precipitation still further; for he treated Portalis, one of the members of his council, with great severity at the council-board itself, ordered him to withdraw, removed him from his office, and persecuted him merely because he knew what Dastros had done without making the Emperor acquainted with the fact. The cardinals were also persecuted. In the whole of the ecclesiastical commission appointed by the Emperor, there was, properly speaking, only *one* estimable man, who was free from servility, and to whom no ambitious or indirect motives could not be imputed; this was Emery, the Superior of St. Sulpice. The

other members were, Cardinal Fesch, who was at enmity with the Pope; Cardinal Maury, who was an object of general dislike; the Bishops of Evreux and Nantes; the Archbishop of Tours; to whom were afterwards joined, Cardinal Caselli, Bishop of Parma; and finally, De Pradt, Archbishop of Malines, who in his miserable books has given such a view of himself, and in such a manner, that no one who has ever read his works would ascribe to him a particle of impartiality.

A variety of questions were submitted to this commission by the Emperor, and answered by them quite according to his wishes. At length he himself made his appearance at its sitting on the 6th of January, 1812, uttered the greatest abuse of the Pope, and entered into disputes with Emery respecting Bossuet and other things which it was quite impossible for him to have thoroughly understood, though his eulogists fail in finding words enough to commend all that he said on the occasion. At last he laid before the commission two main questions; the first was with reference to what was to be done respecting dispensations, should the Pope insist on altogether breaking off Church communion with the Emperor. The commission intimated a negotiation with the Pope, and referred the question of the dispensations to the bishops of the respective dioceses. The Emperor spoke of a council; and when Emery proved to him that this could not be held without the Pope, the Emperor was not indignant, because he looked upon the contradiction of Emery quite in a different point of view from that from which he looked on the duplicity of a Portalis. Carl von Dalberg, at that time Grand-Duke of Frankfort, had seasonably come to the rescue with a work on the nature of Church discipline and ecclesiastical rights. In April, 1811, he had published a work under the title, "*Ueber den Frieden der Kirche in den Staaten des Rheinbunds*" (*On the Peace of the Church in the States of the Confederation of the Rhine*). Napoleon caused this book to be lauded in all his journals, because it proposed a concordat with Rome for the whole states of the Confederation, and a council for instituting a Church for Italy, Germany, and France. In order to arrange the necessary materials for the future council, the commission was first to beg the Pope to add a few supplementary articles to the French concordat. Among the articles which the commission were to endeavour to prevail upon the Pope to accept was the recognition of the edict of 1682, especially of the rights to which the Gallican Church had always laid claim till the time of the Revolution. On their part, the commission sent the Bishops of Trèves and Nantes and the Archbishop of Tours to the Pope at Savona, and Napoleon added to the deputation the Patriarch of Venice and the Bishop of Faenza. The whole deputation was not to negotiate in the name of Napoleon or of the ecclesiastical commission appointed by him, but in the name of the bishops assembled in Paris before the departure of the deputation, for Napoleon had, on the 25th of April, issued a summons to a council in



Paris, to be held on the 9th of June, and addressed to archbishops and bishops of Italy, Germany, and France. The deputies arrived in Savona on the 9th of May.

The Pope refused at first to listen to negotiation, because he was a prisoner, and also to give anything in writing; but he suffered himself to be prevailed on to see and converse with the deputies, because the question was not to bring about a reconciliation with the Emperor, but only to effect a removal of those hindrances which were injurious to the hierarchy and disturbed the order and peace of the Church. He verbally gave his consent to five points, the concession of which would have placed the Emperor in a condition to endure the enmity of the Pope.\* Napoleon, however, did not accept of the concessions, because he hoped to obtain more. Led astray by Von Dalberg and others, he hoped to reach his object by means of a council, that is, to obtain dominion over the Church. He thought he would be more secure against all the schemes of Rome, by availing himself of the services of a council rather than of that of the Pope; in this, however, he was deceived. His council, moreover, consisted of a very small number of bishops.

On the 10th of June there assembled in Paris only some hundred and twenty bishops and archbishops from Italy, Germany, and France; and on the very opening of the council and the first vote, the Emperor must have seen, that, if such a course was pursued, the council would serve the Pope more than it would be useful to him. At the opening on the 16th of June, the confession of the Council of Trent was first read; this, as is well known, conferred upon the Pope a degree of power in the Church which he had never had before: and immediately after this, an oath of true obedience and submission to the Pope was taken by all present. We may admit that these in reality were in some degree matters of form, but it was at least a very clear indication of the tendencies of the assembled clergy. In vain the Emperor had appointed his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, president of the meeting; in vain he obtruded the ministers of worship for Italy and France upon the assembly, as superintendents of order; violent opposition soon manifested itself, and the

\* The articles are as follows: (1.) "Les archévêchés et évêchés ne pourront rester vacants plus d'une année, dans lequel espace de tems la nomination, l'institution et la consécration devront avoir leur plaine et entière execution. (2.) Le concile suppliera l'Empereur de continuer, en vertu du concordat, de nommer aux sièges vacants, et les évêques nommés par l'Empereur auront recours dans la forme accoutumée au souverain pontife, pour obtenir l'institution canonique. (3.) Dans les six mois qui suivront la notification faite selon l'usage au souverain pontife, Sa Sainteté donnera l'institution, conformément au concordat. (4.) Si au bout de six mois Sa Sainteté n'aura donné l'institution, le métropolitain sera chargé d'y procéder, et à son défaut le plus ancien évêque de la province ecclésiastique. Ce dernier, s'il agit de l'institution d'un métropolitain, la donnera également. (5.) Le present décret sera soumis à l'approbation de Sa Sainteté, et en conséquence S. M. l'Empereur et roi sera humblement supplié d'accorder à six évêques qui seront députés la permission de se rendre auprès de Saint Père pour lui demander respectueusement la confirmation d'un décret qui offre le seul moyen de remédier aux maux des églises de France et de l'Italie."



opening address was by no means favourable to the views of the government.

As early as the 28th, almost immediately after the opening of the council, it was announced to its members by a message from the Emperor, that in his opinion the Pope had violated the concordat, and that therefore the council, instead of papal institution, might make arrangements for episcopal. This message caused an outburst of ultra-montanism in the assembly. The Bishop of Brescia first rose and protested against the edict of 1682 in favour of the Gallican Church; the Bishop of Chambéry called upon the assembly to go in a body to the Emperor and urge upon him the duty of releasing the Pope; and the Baron von Droste, afterwards Archbishop of Cologne, and well known on account of his war with the King of Prussia, and who was then Bishop of Münster, concurred in opinion with the Bishop of Brescia. The Bishop of Namur delivered a fanatically violent speech in favour of the universal power of the Pope, and it appeared at first as if the whole assembly would carry his views by acclamation. Napoleon soon learnt that it was much easier for him to deal with Russian and Spanish warriors than with theologians, and especially with men of systematic learning; and he was weak enough to take offence at a degree of contradiction and resistance, which none of us who stand on the same level with such men would have regarded as either offensive or surprising, and which ought to have given no offence at all to the Emperor and hero who stood so much above them.

The Emperor was at first disposed immediately to dissolve the council, but he afterwards satisfied himself with giving it to be openly understood, that in ecclesiastical as well as in secular affairs, he required even from those who were versed in them, not counsel, but military obedience. He not only refused to receive the address voted by the council, but did not admit the deputation, who were to place it in his hands, into his presence, and required, on the contrary, that his message should be immediately taken into consideration. This was necessarily done, and led to long and violent debates; at length it was agreed that the five points to which the Pope had given his verbal consent, under reserve of the council, should be reduced into the shape of a formal decree. The point held in reserve was, that the decree of the council must be first again laid before the Pope for confirmation, to which the ecclesiastical commission was previously unwilling to assent. This reserve was not the only thing calculated to excite the Emperor's indignation against the council, for in the course of their discussions the question of the Emperor's excommunication by the Pope had been raised, and the *right of the Pope to take this step* was maintained, because the Emperor himself had acknowledged a Catholic hierarchy, and the Vicar of Christ as its divinely appointed head. This threw the Emperor into a furious rage; and, instead of despising this folly, he avenged himself, and gave the priests an opportunity of representing themselves as martyrs

for true liberty, and their cause as that of religion in opposition to revolutionary despotism.

The Emperor, namely, not only dissolved the council, but caused the Bishops of Tournay, Troyes, and Ghent to be arrested, and an inquiry into their conduct to be made by the police; they only escaped severe measures by resigning their offices. The three priests were, no doubt, most miserable intriguers; but had not Napoleon been seized with the love of despotism since the days of Austerlitz, he would only have punished them by contempt. The difficulty concerning the filling up of the sees was rather increased than diminished by the dismissal of the council, because all its members would not consent to go into a separate negotiation on the subject with the minister of public instruction. When, however, the Emperor at length consented to have the five propositions which had been drawn up in the form of a decree laid before the Pope for approval, eighty of the council consented to recognise the decree as the resolution of the council, and these therefore united to form a meeting on the 6th of August which represented the whole.

The affair now appeared at an end, and nine of the eighty who constituted the congregation—viz., the Archbishops of Tours, Malines, and Pavia, and the Bishops of Faenza, Piacenza, Feltre, Evreux, Trèves, and Nantes, were commissioned to wait upon the Pope, and to persuade him to accept of the decree. The Pope having complained that in Savona he had none of his cardinals and councillors around him, the Emperor allowed Cardinals Bayenne, Ruffo, Roverella, Doria, and Dugnani, together with the papal almoner, to join him. The negotiations between the deputies of the council and the Pope's plenipotentiaries were continued from the 1st till the 20th of September, when the Pope at length agreed to have these five points drawn up in the form of a brief, and also to grant canonical institution to the four bishops to whom he had formerly refused it. To the joy of all those, however, who were dissatisfied with the pliancy of the Pope, because they were opposed to the slightest concession or change, a new obstacle was raised on the part of the Emperor. He would neither accept of the brief respecting the five points, nor of the bull for the institution of the four bishops.

The Emperor had communicated these documents to the jurists of his council of state, and they, as appears from the declaration of the ministry of ecclesiastical affairs, had advised him not to accept the brief, because in the document the Church of Rome was called **THE MOTHER AND RULER OF ALL OTHER CHURCHES**. The non-acceptance of the Pope's concessions was also advised, because, after the declaration that if in the course of six months the Pope did not institute to the see the person recommended to the Emperor, certain bishops and archbishops named by the Pope should grant the necessary authority, was subjoined the clause that such institution could only be performed by them **IN THE NAME OF, AND COMMISSIONED BY, THE POPE**. Thus the ecclesiastical affairs which had occupied



the attention of the whole of France, Germany, and Italy, throughout the year 1811, remained precisely at the same point at the end of it at which they had stood in 1810, and so they continued till January, 1813, when the Emperor, immediately after his return from Russia, entered into new negotiations with the Pope, who had been brought to Fontainebleau as early as May, 1812.

#### D.—FRANCE AND RUSSIA TILL JANUARY, 1812.

Notwithstanding all the demonstrations to the contrary made since the peace of Tilsit, England, Russia, Prussia, and also Austria partially, always continued to keep up a certain understanding, which was, however, kept very secret, and somewhat resembled a conspiracy. The most distinguished statesmen both in Russia and Prussia felt how unnatural an alliance between Napoleon, Alexander, and Frederick William III. was, and directed attention to the subject; this was also done on the part of England, and it is certain that the Emperor Alexander, as early as the meeting in Erfurt in 1808, expressed his doubts respecting the duration of his alliance with France. We do not think it necessary to go into the minute details of the reasons of this misunderstanding, but shall merely incidentally mention the equivocal nature of the French diplomacy in Turkey, and Strogonoff's behaviour in Madrid. In the year 1809 the two emperors made mutual complaints, and matters came to serious explanations between them. The first cause of want of confidence was given by the Emperor of Russia to the Emperor of the French, by his sending the auxiliary force agreed upon by the treaty so late into the field, and by its proving at first of so little use when it made its appearance. Prince Galitzin, who was at the head of the Russian army, appeared by his movements and the positions he took rather disposed to promote the success of the Austrians than that of the French. The more immediate circumstances, and the violent outbreak of Napoleon's indignation at the diplomatic equivocations of the Russian auxiliaries, have been previously adverted to in the history of the war from 1809, where it has been also stated that neither party thought it advisable to give any prominence to their disunion, and that Napoleon, even when he had entered, through Thugut, upon the subject of an Austrian marriage, still continued to carry on negotiations for an alliance with a Russian princess.

The enlargement of the territory of the duchy of Warsaw, extorted by Napoleon at the peace of Schönbrunn, at length led to an exchange of diplomatic notes, which from all appearance must lead to a war. The Poles naturally expected from Napoleon and his advisers that he would in some way give new life and currency to the name of Poland; against this the Emperor of Russia earnestly protested. The whole of the diplomatic correspondence between Russia and France in the years 1810 and 1811 turns upon the use of the words *Poles* and *Polish*, although Russia had again obtained by the peace



of Schönbrunn a portion of Austrian Poland, as it had previously obtained a part of Prussian Poland by the peace of Tilsit. Because the whole of Western Galicia, Zamoisk, and Cracow had been united to the duchy of Warsaw by the peace of Schönbrunn, Russia called upon the Emperor of the French to bind himself expressly by treaty not to revive the names of Pole and kingdom of Poland. As early as the end of 1809 many notes were exchanged concerning this point, apparently so insignificant, but in reality so important for the peace and safety of the Russian Empire.

Bignon, in the ninth volume of his history, has given a very full report of the course of the negotiations, and of the anxiety which was felt that Napoleon might revive any recollections of the ancient kingdom of Poland even by the use of the name. He defends, as usual, the French policy by sophistical reasons, but at the same time has not misrepresented the facts. As early as November, 1809, the Emperor of the French agreed to give the assurance respecting Poland so earnestly desired by Alexander, and Caulaincourt, the French ambassador in Petersburg, signed a regular concession of the Russian demand in January, 1810. By the first two articles of this agreement it was laid down that the words *Poland*, or *Polish*, was not to be used when any reference was made to the enlargement of the duchy of Warsaw. By the third article the two emperors bound themselves not to revive or renew any of the old Polish orders. In the fifth article the Emperor of the French agreed not further to enlarge the duchy of Warsaw by the addition of provinces or cities belonging to the former state of Poland. This treaty, signed by Caulaincourt, still required the confirmation of the Emperor of the French; and Napoleon had given instructions to his ambassador only to agree to such an arrangement on condition that the agreement was to be drawn up in the usual diplomatic manner. This manner consists in employing words and phrases so chosen as to be capable of any subsequent interpretation which may best suit the parties. This was not done.

The articles were very briefly drawn up, the words and sentences so clear and definite as to be incapable of mistake or misrepresentation; the Emperor did not therefore refuse to give his sanction to the treaty, but required that it should be couched in different language, and caused it to be presented in another form. The Russians saw through his views too clearly to relinquish, for his pleasure, the use of clear and definite expressions for those that were obscure and indefinite. The Chancellor Romanzoff was a man of a complete French mode of thinking; the emperor, therefore, was accustomed to dissemble in his presence, but when he brought him the news of Napoleon's refusal to employ clear and definite expressions, the emperor gave loose to his indignation in language which surprised the chancellor himself. The chancellor made the French ambassador secretly acquainted with them, who concluded that the emperor believed Napoleon was

really meditating some hostile measures against him, and was only seeking to gain time by the treaty.\*

This occurred in February, 1810; in the following months both Romanzoff and Caulaincourt took the greatest possible pains to bring the question to a favourable issue, and negotiations continued to be carried on respecting this subject till September. They could not agree; and after September there was no more talk of the treaty, much less of its alteration. The relation between the two emperors had undergone a complete change in the course of the year 1810. The French, indeed, allege, that the Emperor Alexander regarded Napoleon's marriage to an Austrian princess as a sign that he had no wish for a union with Russia; but he had sued long enough for the hand of a Russian princess. A lady, who must have known all this better than Bignon and others, assures us, that even in spite of the negotiations, which, as we allege, but she denies, had been opened in the camp before Vienna, and in spite of the secret articles of the treaty of peace of Schönbrunn, the Austrian marriage had not been finally settled in January, 1810, and that when in February at length the consent of the Emperor Alexander, of his mother, and the princess (who hesitated longest) arrived in Paris, the Emperor, with visible manifestations of vexation, cried out "IT IS NOW TOO LATE." On this point, therefore, the Emperor Alexander had no grounds for complaint. Napoleon, however, in the course of the year 1810, gave various and indubitable proofs of an unfriendly feeling towards Russia.

Of these proofs we allege as the first, that in January he assigned Hanover to the kingdom of Westphalia, and thus indirectly to France; and the States of the Church he incorporated with the Empire. At the same time Holland and the whole of Lower Germany were joined to his dominions, and the system of *Licenses* invented, by which all the disadvantages of the continental system were pushed off upon the allies, and the advantages reserved for the Emperor's private treasury. The system of selling licenses to trade with England and its colonial goods was in reality nothing less than establishing a monopoly in favour of the Emperor himself to trade in goods which, though generally forbidden, had become necessities to all the nations of Europe. On the 2nd of July, 1810, the Emperor issued a decree from Antwerp, "THAT NO SHIP SHOULD PUT TO SEA FROM A FRENCH HARBOUR, BOUND FOR ANY FOREIGN PORT, WITHOUT A LICENSE SIGNED BY THE EMPEROR'S OWN HAND." From this time Russia and Sweden must have seen, that if they were not prepared to sacrifice their subjects to an alliance with France,

\* Bignon, vol. ix., publishes the letter of the Duc de Vicenza of the 11th of March, 1811. In this he states that the Russian ambassador had informed him that the language employed by the Emperor Alexander, in giving loose to his indignation respecting the Paris version of the treaty, was: "Si les choses changent ce ne sera pas notre faute. Ce n'est pas moi qui troublerait la paix de l'Europe, qui attaquerai personne. Si on vient me chercher je me defendrai."



they must either publicly or privately withdraw from adhesion to the severe regulations of the continental system. The Emperor acted precisely with the licenses as he had done with the lordships, estates, and monies of the princes who were banished or robbed by him. He suffered the licenses to be employed in trade for his own profit; or he made presents of such permissions to the members of his own family, or to favourites about his court for whom he wished to realise a princely fortune to enable them to meet a princely expenditure: many of these licenses were paid for by some hundred thousand francs. Trade was also carried on with the goods which had either been bought on the Emperor's account, or had been confiscated; and he went so far on one occasion, when a great quantity of spices had accumulated in his stores, as to require the traders named in his ordinance to take them off his hands at a certain price.

We in the trading towns of Germany saw the use which was made of these licenses in Germany and France, although the Emperor and his ministers publicly declared that no licenses were given for colonial goods, except for the prime necessities named in the imperial decree. The United States of America perceived clearly that he would in this way increase his own private property and that of his creatures at the cost of other states, and they therefore declared that they would forbid their fellow-citizens to purchase these licenses—that is, permission to carry on trade to enrich the Emperor of the French. Denmark, Russia, and Sweden also complained bitterly of the Antwerp decree. The manner in which the Emperor replied to the Danish and Russian complaints sufficiently proves that he was quite aware of the injustice he was imposing upon those states on which he enforced the continental system. Russia and Sweden tried to help themselves, and the Emperor, a year afterwards, came to issue with both states on the subject; Denmark submitted, because she hoped for protection from France, and was at strife with England. Trade by sea was carried on in Sweden without let or hindrance; in Russia, colonial goods were brought in under passes, prepared in Teneriffe and not in England. The anger of the Emperor of Russia was excited to the highest degree when Napoleon united the whole of North Germany as far as the Stecknitz with France. On this occasion the duchy of Oldenburg also, the territory of the emperor's nearest relation, and which Napoleon had only two years before admitted into the Confederation of the Rhine to please the Emperor of Russia, was incorporated with France without any previous notice or reasons assigned. Apparently, indeed, all sorts of compensation were offered to the duke, who betook himself to the Emperor of Russia; but these were of such a description as to make it matter of doubt whether they were sincerely offered. From this moment Russia and France assumed hostile attitudes towards each other, although the appearance of peace was preserved for a year and a half longer. As early as 1810 new fortresses were erected at different places, as at Reval, Riga,



Dwinamunde, and up the line of the Dwina; and the Russian army was strengthened.

At length, in the end of December, 1810, the Emperor of Russia published a ukase, which contained to some extent an announcement of the conditions of the intimate alliance between Russia and France, and in which resolutions were put forth obviously hostile to French trade. In the ukase of the 19th of December, 1810, it was announced that it was no longer forbidden to import English goods in neutral ships; and on the 29th a new tariff was published, in which certain French goods were altogether prohibited, and heavy duties imposed upon others. All goods not enumerated in the tariff were to be regarded as wholly prohibited. Among the articles thus excluded were cloth, silks, ribbons, gauze, batiste, linen, lace, porcelain, and bronze—in fact, the chief articles of French manufacture. Brandy was expressly prohibited; and an unreasonable duty was laid upon wines. We entirely agree with Bignon, when he alleges that the hostile correspondence which commenced in 1810 was merely a prelude to the war, which both emperors then clearly foresaw must presently break out; the seizure of the duchy of Oldenburg on the one part, and the new tariff on the other, were merely pretexts for a quarrel, the proper reason of which was that both parties had become weary of longer dissimulation.

As early as February, 1811, the Emperor of Russia declared that he felt himself constrained to send a protest to all the powers in Europe against the manner in which his rights had been violated in the case of the duchy of Oldenburg; and from that moment Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, gave up all hope of being able to maintain peace by his friendly mediation, and begged to be recalled. When Napoleon afterwards sent General Lauriston to Petersburg, there was very little hope of the continued maintenance of peace. The tone of this Napoleonite guardsman was very different from that adopted by Caulaincourt, and yet Lauriston was one of the most enduring of the military diplomatists whom Napoleon so frequently employed on diplomatic missions, to the great detriment of his business.

The Emperor of Russia at decisive moments chose his ambassadors better. He, indeed, allowed Prince Kurakin, with whom Napoleon was very much dissatisfied, because he was a mere actor, to remain quietly in Paris, but employed Colonel Czernitcheff, a man thoroughly versed in such things, *in procuring intelligence and intriguing*; he made twelve journeys from Petersburg to Paris and back between the end of the year 1808 and February, 1811. Czernitcheff conveyed in 1809 Napoleon's letter, in which Caulaincourt's recall and Lauriston's mission were announced. From this letter it clearly appears that no other means but arms were left to decide the dispute. Bignon has with great propriety incorporated the letter in his text, although, as in the case of the Emperor's will, he, as the paid advo-

cate of the imperial policy, must seek to find something different in its contents from what appears to us. As we read and understand, it is written that it should be proposed to Russia to compel the Duke of Oldenburg to accept of a compensation for his hereditary states, without even knowing wherein such compensation was to consist. It is further required that the ukase respecting the duties shall be recalled. This is deducible from the very first passage in the letter, which we shall quote below.\*

The further course of negotiations proves that Russia insisted as obstinately on its demands respecting Oldenburg, as France on the recal of the ukase concerning the tariff; that both emperors, foreseeing the greatness of the approaching struggle, made preparations of all kinds, and sought to draw Sweden into an alliance, Napoleon by urgency and threats, and Alexander by promises and representations. The Emperor of Russia, relying confidently on a secret understanding with Sweden, withdrew a part of his standing army from Finland as early as 1811 and sent it to Poland; and trusting to the mediation of England for a peace with the Turks, ordered some divisions of his army in Moldavia to the frontiers of the duchy of Warsaw. A public and official address of Napoleon, published in all the journals, and a protest of the Emperor Alexander respecting Oldenburg as public and as official, left little hope, as early as April, 1811, that peace could be maintained.

Napoleon, on the birth of a son, to whom he gave the title of **KING OF ROME**, received a congratulatory deputation from the trading community of his empire on the 24th of March, 1811; and on this occasion delivered one of those noisy, boasting, and abusive addresses, which sometimes escaped him against his will when he was angry, and violated all the usages of propriety. Such addresses he, as is well known, made, to the great offence of diplomatists accustomed to smooth and polite speeches, to Lord Whitworth, Markof, Metternich, and others, of which his address to the ambassador of the King of Naples at the coronation in Milan was an example. This system he practised also, as we shall see below,

\* "Je charge le Colonel de Czernitcheff de parler à S. M. I. de mes sentiments pour elle, ces sentiments ne changeront pas, quoique je ne puisse me dissimuler que votre majesté n'a plus d'amitié pour moi. Elle me fait faire des protestations et toute espèce de difficultés pour Oldenbourg, lorsque je ne me refuse pas à donner une indemnité équivalente, et que la situation de ce pays, qui a été toujours le centre de la contrebande avec l'Angleterre, me fait un devoir indispensable pour l'intérêt de mon empire et pour le succès de la lutte où je suis engagé de la réunion d'Oldenbourg à mes états. Le dernier ukase de V. M. dans le fond et surtout dans la forme est spécialement dirigé contre la France. Dans d'autres temps V. M., avant de prendre une telle mesure contre mon commerce, me l'aurait fait connaître, et j'aurais peut-être pu lui suggérer des moyens qui, en remplissant son principal but, auraient cependant empêché que cela ne parût aux yeux de la France un changement de système. Toute l'Europe l'a envisagé ainsi, et déjà notre alliance n'existe plus dans l'opinion de l'Angleterre et de l'Europe. Fût elle aussi entière dans le cœur de V. M. qu'elle est dans le mien, cette opinion générale n'en serait pas moins un grand mal."

towards Prince Kurakin, and in June, 1813, towards Metternich in Dresden. The address delivered to the deputation a whole year before there was any talk of a war, was so greatly contrary to all usage, all propriety, and even to the decencies of well-bred society, that the Emperor himself tried to gloss over the affair in a letter to his ambassador, and caused it to be excused in another way afterwards by an article published in the *Altona Mercury*. The real point of this ill-bred outburst against a power with whom he was at peace can neither be softened nor excused, and we shall therefore convey its substance without using precisely the Emperor's words.

In reference to the limitations in the conscription of French goods in consequence of the ukase, he threatened and talked of a march to Petersburg and Moscow, as if he had been speaking of an excursion to Fontainebleau. He said to the deputation, whom it did not at all concern, that he had two hundred millions in his cellars, which were his own private property, and that he was ready to apply this to the service of the state: that he had nine hundred millions in cash of yearly income (and he might have added with truth, that he had purchased six millions' worth of diamonds): that he could, if he pleased, produce a fleet of 200 ships, although the English had better admirals, &c., &c. This surely was astonishing language for a man so intelligent as Napoleon. Ever since the peace of Schönbrunn his head had become giddy from success and pride, as was formerly the case with Nebuchadnezzar and Tamerlane. He thought himself able to despise fortune, and at length neither could nor would endure any one who was not ready to yield unconditional obedience.

Champagny, too, was removed from the ministry of foreign affairs, because the Emperor needed a man who would never make objections, but submit to clothe the will and thoughts of the Emperor in suitable diction. In this respect Maret (Duc de Bassano) was well chosen. He was a man of excellent education, great industry and honour. He wrote in the cabinet what the Emperor suggested, as Lauriston, the new ambassador in Petersburg, adopted the language of Napoleon's military courtiers at the Russian court. Napoleon forgot all self-respect and propriety in the language which he employed towards Prince Kurakin, who was, generally speaking, a man of a patient character. Even Bignon, the paid advocate of the Emperor, does not venture either to excuse or defend his conduct towards Kurakin, though he excuses almost everything, and will have his readers believe, that even in February Napoleon was sincerely anxious for the maintenance of peace.\* During the time

\* "Outre qu'un homme du caractère de l'Empereur ne pouvoit guère en de telles discussions s'empêcher de laisser échapper des paroles trop vives ou du moins peu mesurées, il étoit à peu près impossible, que même innocentes et irréprochables ces paroles ne fussent dénaturées et ne donnassent lieu à de malveillantes interprétations. Aussi presque toujours fallait il que sa diplomatie à l'aide d'un texte fourni par le ministère cherchât, ou à restreindre la signification des paroles prêtées à l'Empereur, ou même en corriger le travestissement."



of the interchange of correspondence respecting Oldenburg and the new tariff, Napoleon held a personal conversation at a splendid levee on the 15th of August, 1811, with Prince Kurakin, and, warming in the conversation, became louder and more vehement, till at length, after many other unbecoming expressions to the ambassador, he exclaimed, "No, your emperor wishes for war. My generals inform me that the Russian armies are now on the march to the Niemen. The emperor is deceiving me; he seduces the people whom I send to him," &c., &c. These last words refer to Caulaincourt. In reference to Caulaincourt, we are disposed to give credit to Gourgaud, in other respects but little worthy of confidence, when he alleges, and indeed proves, that what has been stated concerning Napoleon on this subject in so many French books, is nothing more than a silly fable. The Emperor is said on this occasion to have turned to Caulaincourt, who was present, and to have exclaimed, "AH! YOU, TOO, HAVE BECOME RUSSIAN—YOU, TOO, HAVE BEEN WON BY THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER;" while the ambassador replied, "YES, SIRE, BECAUSE I BELIEVE HIM TO BE FRENCH."

Other extraordinary things which he is said to have uttered on this occasion appear characteristic and probable—viz., "Whether it may be ascribed to good fortune, or to the bravery of my soldiers, or to my understanding a little of the science, I have been always successful in war. I will not say that I shall beat the Russians, but we will outdo ourselves. They know that I have money, 800,000 men, 250,000 conscripts at my command every year, and that therefore I can add to my army in three years 750,000 men, and that is enough to prosecute the war in Spain, and at the same time to carry on war in Russia. If, perhaps, they reckon upon Austria," he continued, without paying any attention to the fact that Prince Schwarzenberg, the Austrian ambassador, was standing near him, "I am persuaded they miscalculate; for if Austria again take the field, it can be only to wrest from them what was taken from her in the last war."

The war with Russia was now become unavoidable, in consequence of Lauriston's mission, and the gross and insulting language held by Napoleon to Prince Kurakin. The preparations which were made for carrying it on were immense, and as burdensome to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine as to the French. The latter consoled themselves for the loss of their subjects by the glory of serving a great man. Not merely soldiers were pressed into this service in the Polish and Russian forests and marshes, but artisans also of every description; gardeners and labourers were to be seen incessantly marching through Frankfort with all the implements of their respective trades. Twenty thousand men, with all the necessary materials, were sent to Danzig, in order there to make preparation of things which could not be expected to be found in Russia or Poland, just as things were sent all ready from France to Spain. In

Russia, orders were issued for a new levy, and this was notified to the French ambassador; on the 31st of December Napoleon decreed the levying of 120,000 conscripts. This new demand for the bloom of their youth to carry on war at a distance, caused so much the greater degree of secret discontent among the whole population of France, as the want of good servants and labourers had already been universally felt, as so many endeavoured by every means to escape the military service, and the severest punishments were inflicted upon the families or friends of such refractory persons as gave them either aid or an asylum. From this moment it became obvious that the Emperor's new triumphs would infallibly lead to the complete destruction of all the civil liberties of the French people, because even the chief article of the constitution, that the legislative body should be called together every year, was no longer observed; and even for the decisive year 1812 no such meeting was called.

In consequence of the servile manner in which the commands of the French were carried out by the princes and their servants, the way in which every Frenchman who showed himself was flattered, and the whole system of espionage and police maintained, the people of Germany were wholly alienated from their governments, and even the officers and soldiers, with perhaps the partial exceptions of the Bavarians and Wirtembergers, longed with impatience for an opportunity of freeing themselves from the disgrace to which they had so long been obliged to submit. In Russia, Hardenberg was obliged to play a very painful character; on the one hand, he was compelled to keep on good terms with such patriots as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Blücher, and other noble-minded men, who were disposed to risk everything, and to gain the mind of the army and people for a desperate struggle, because he foresaw that the threatening attitude and feeling of the people alone could prevent the French from proceeding to extremities; and on the other, in order to ward off this calamity, he offered an alliance to France against Russia. We see, therefore, that whilst the Prussian ambassador in Paris was taking all possible trouble to bring about this alliance, General Blücher, who then commanded in Pomerania, was busy in strengthening the fortifications of Colberg, and making such serious preparations for war, that the Emperor of the French repeatedly urged his punishment and recal.

The Emperor was idolised like a god, and on this occasion was extolled after the manner in which the later Roman emperors were ridiculously and bombastically extolled; and no one therefore dared to announce and explain to him the true feelings of the people. When, in 1811, his brother Jerome ventured to do so, his well-meant communication was very ungraciously received. The letter of the King of Westphalia, written as a warning at the very time when he was at the pinnacle of his greatness, is too important in regard to the manifestation of the character of a man accustomed to unconditional

obedience, not to demand insertion in the text. The letter was written on the 5th of December, 1814, and is as follows:—"I know not, Sire, in what way your generals and commissioners represent to you the state of men's minds in Germany. Should they represent them as disposed to bow to the decisions of your will, or speak of their weakness, they deceive you. The fermentation has reached the highest point, the wildest hopes are conceived and cherished, the course of affairs in Spain is held out as an example to follow, so that, should war break out, the whole of the countries between the Rhine and the Oder will present the spectacle of an immense and powerful popular rising. The cause and impulse to such rising do not lie in the hatred borne to the French, and the dislike felt towards all foreign dominion alone, but in the misfortunes of the times and the misery of all classes. The oppression of their burdens is become insupportable; and the cost of military duties, of the maintenance of soldiers on their march, and all sorts of torments, are daily renewed. The people will rise in fearful numbers, not only in the kingdom of Westphalia, and in the districts subject to France, but in all the countries belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine. The princes of those countries will themselves fall the first sacrifice to the wild indignation of their subjects, should they attempt to oppose their desires. I repeat to your Majesty how earnestly I desire that you should open your eyes to the true state of affairs; you will then, in proportion to the superiority of your judgment, form a true opinion of that condition, and be able to adopt such measures as seem calculated to guard against the impending evil. . . . The people are not equal to or prepared for deep political combinations, but excited by the present oppressive evils."

The Emperor was so dazzled by his past good fortune, so misled as to his universal genius by his flatterers, and so filled with contempt for the people, who for the most part were objects of derision to his successful generals as well as to his civilians, that he immediately sent the letter to which we have just referred to his minister for foreign affairs, with the following scornful message, in which he referred only to the person of the writer, and not to the truths which it contained:—"IF THE KING IS UNABLE TO HAVE ANY CONFIDENCE IN HIS TROOPS, WHO IS TO BLAME? THE KING HAS TOO MANY SOLDIERS, AND SQUANDERS TOO MUCH MONEY." On the outbreak of the new war, the Emperor of Russia pursued a very different course from that taken by Napoleon. Instead of assembling around him and listening to his creatures and flatterers alone, he drew around him independent men who had escaped from Russia, and listened to the counsels of such Germans as Von Stein, Schleden, Pfuel, Clausewitz, and others, whose widespread associations and connexions offered him various resources, even when the great men of his own empire were of a different opinion. He listened to the opinion of Armfelt as to the manner in which he should conduct



the campaign, and allure the French into the heart of his empire, even at the risk of exposing the whole Russian nation to the imputation of cowardice. Armfelt unfortunately, together with the dreadful Araktchejev, was always his secret adviser; in this point at least, however, he was useful, although in other respects his violent and despotic counsels in internal affairs often brought Alexander into contradiction with himself. Pfuël drew up a plan of a tedious campaign much better calculated for Napoleon's character than Napoleon's warm and violent attack for Alexander's, and Barclay de Tolly carried out the Emperor's wishes with great skill, till the latter found himself compelled to appoint a Russian as commander-in-chief.

Alexander was much better informed of the state of public feeling in Germany than Napoleon, who always regarded the outward signs of hatred as the mere work of conspirators, clubs, and intriguers; the Emperor of Russia, therefore, calculated with certainty, that if the slightest inroad could be once made on Napoleon's power, and the prestige of his success broken, all would be hostile to him. The little that Alexander said to the Swedish ambassador in Petersburg in the year 1811, respecting the general feeling and the suppressed indignation of Germany, appeared so important to Alquier, the French ambassador in Stockholm, that he immediately sent an account of the occurrence to Paris. The Russian emperor spoke in the very highest terms of Napoleon's capacity as a military commander, but added, "In case of a war with him, however, I should have an advantage on which he cannot reckon, and it is this, that I have nothing to fear from the whole country in my rear. Should the Emperor of the French, on the other hand, suffer any check or misfortune, the whole of Germany would rise in arms, oppose his retreat, and prevent him from obtaining reinforcements." Many of the conditions in the treaty of alliance afterwards concluded with Russia were intended to guard against this contingency, but as it will appear they increased rather than diminished the difficulty.

As early as September, Charles Frederick, Grand-Duke of Baden, had informed the Emperor of the state of public feeling in Germany, and Napoleon ought to have placed the more confidence in his opinion, as he was a noble-minded prince, of whom his subjects had as little reason to complain as the Saxons had to complain of the personal qualities of their king. The grand-duke's letter was written at the time when a fresh war with Austria was imminent, and reinforcements of Baden troops were demanded for Spain. We give the original\* in a note with so much the greater confidence,

\* "Un tiers des revenus du pays est absorbé par les pensions et les dettes publiques qu'en vertu des traités avec V. M. je dois payer; les suspendre, porterait la misère et le desespoir dans toutes les familles. Les impôts ont été augmentés, le mécontentment en est l'effet. Le credit publique est nul, L'INSTABILITÉ DES

as what was true in 1809 had double and triple force two years afterwards; for the situation of the vassals and their subjects had become in that time very much changed for the worse.

Although the Emperor could not dispense with the services of King Joachim, who was a distinguished cavalry officer, notwithstanding his Gascon vanity, and his love of feathers, ribbons, finery, and stars, they had, in fact, become so unfriendly in their relations that the King of Naples refused to wear the broad ribbon of the legion of honour. Notwithstanding this, he was ordered, like the other vassals, to take part in the Russian campaign. His dissatisfaction reached the highest point when Napoleon's army was ready for the expedition to Russia, and he was peremptorily ordered to join the force at the head of 12,000 Neapolitan troops. He protested for the same reasons as the other petty vassal princes who ventured to beg for some remission of the demands made by the Emperor. He said that he could not make up his mind to lead his subjects to their certain destruction. Napoleon, however, answered as our autocratic princes and their ministers are accustomed to answer—"The system is more important than the individual; Joachim has been made a king by the system, and for its promotion the people of Naples have been put into his power, that they may be used and abused for the advancement of France."\* The king was obliged to yield. He was appointed commander of that incomparable and numerous body of cavalry which fell in 1812, and took his Neapolitans with him to Russia, where they were frozen to death.

## § II.

### HISTORY OF THE YEAR 1812.

#### A.—SWEDEN, PRUSSIA, AUSTRIA, POLAND.

##### 1.—SWEDEN.

WE have already given an account of the manner in which Bernadotte, Prince of Ponto-Corvo, went to Sweden, where he had been chosen crown prince by the Estates of the kingdom. He was suffered to depart by the Emperor half in dissatisfaction and half in

**EVENEMENTS LE DETRUIT.** Les impôts sont arriérés parce que le commerce et la circulation sont empêchés; nul emprunt ne peut se faire. Les nouvelles repandues par nos ennemis ont produit une telle impression, que je dois supplier V. M. de ne pas vouloir employer le contingent contre l'insurrection en Espagne; le soldat y marchant avec répugnance, il ne peut inspirer de la confiance."—*Correspondance Inédite*, part vii., p. 360.

\* On the 30th of August, 1811, Napoleon wrote to the king—"Rappelez-vous que je ne vous ai fait roi *que pour* l'intérêt de mon système. Ne vous y trompez pas. Si vous cessiez d'être Français, vous ne seriez rien pour moi." He therefore took for granted that a man *could only then be a Frenchman* when he was ready to sacrifice all other nations for the French.

friendship. He arrived there in November, 1810, and was received as heir to the throne with great rejoicing. On his arrival, however, he found that the government had been, since August, engaged in a new strife with Napoleon, on account of the continental system, and the tariff imposed on colonial goods by the imperial decree of the 5th of August. The consequence of this decree was, as it were, a general impost on all countries in alliance with France which traded in colonial products. This new act of violence was the necessary consequence of the imperial ordinance respecting licenses, whereby the Emperor secured to himself a monopoly of the trade with England. By the use and abuse of these licenses the continent was inundated with prohibited goods, as the Emperor might have foreseen, and this abuse led to the issue of two new ordinances of the 6th and 7th of August. These ordinances, as the Emperor alleged, were directed against English trade, but, in reality, against all those who had been unfortunate enough to purchase goods sold by virtue of the Emperor's licenses. By the first of these ordinances it was required that 50 per cent. should be forthwith paid as a tax on all goods, wheresoever found; and, by the second, published on the following day, it was added, that in future all prohibited goods should no longer be imported, but either burnt or destroyed in some other way. Prussia, Sweden, and even Denmark, were not only heavily mulcted by these arbitrary decrees, but their government was placed in a state of strife with the people, because the decrees compelled them to rob the people, and to divide the spoil with the French minister. Sweden, moreover, from the nature and situation of the country, had never been able seriously to contemplate the relinquishment of all intercourse with England; and, even before Bernadotte's arrival, its government had been overwhelmed with diplomatic notes on this subject. As early as May, 1810, the Emperor of the French had made it known, that as soon as Sweden ceased fully and faithfully to fulfil all the conditions of the treaty concluded with France, he would, on his part, consider the treaty itself as at an end. As every place was full of French spies, and the ambassadors and consuls in every state and country brought up traitors who, in order to gratify their employers, reported what was agreeable to the Emperor to hear, he asserted, as a matter of fact, that Gothenberg was visited annually by between fifteen and sixteen hundred ships under the American flag, and that stores were erected there for the purposes of English trade. From thence, as he alleged, a continual contraband trade was carried on with the whole of the north coast of Germany, and Swedish Pomerania was little else than a storehouse for English wares. As the King of Sweden was weak and sickly, the crown prince immediately took upon himself the duties of government, investigated the subjects of complaint made by the Emperor, found many of them well grounded, and promised their removal. For this, however, the Emperor would not wait. Just a month after the



arrival of the crown prince in Sweden, he sent for Lagerbielke, the Swedish *chargé d'affaires*, to come to him at Fontainebleau, and, as Odeleben informs us, addressed him as he was sometimes accustomed to do his generals. Such interviews with diplomatists seriously injured the reputation of the Emperor, and were of no use, for he violated all the rules of politeness, and even the tone of well-bred society, and altogether forgot the respect due to foreign monarchs. We should be disposed to hesitate in ascribing such a course of conduct towards a foreign power to so great a man as Napoleon, had not the Swedish *chargé d'affaires* actually written down the very words; and, besides, their form and substance present as clearly the characteristics of the Napoleon mode of expression and thought as many passages of the Memoirs from St. Helena, which so strongly indicate the Emperor's manner, but for that very reason cannot be regarded as any sure evidence of the facts. On such occasions he poured out his thoughts in a torrent of words, became more and more violent as he proceeded, and used sometimes the most eloquent and able expressions, sometimes the most trivial and burlesque, as De Pradt, in his "Polish Embassy," has comically described. His first allegation against Sweden was, that it did him greater injury than all the five coalitions had done.\* Having commenced with this sentence, he concludes by saying that things have come to such a condition that either Sweden must declare war against England, or he must declare war against Sweden.

Alquier, the French ambassador in Stockholm, was a man both fitted and disposed to use a peremptory tone when addressing those princes to whom he might be sent. He did this the more heartily in Stockholm, because he and the crown prince entertained feelings of mutual unkindness. Napoleon had commissioned his ambassador to intimate to the Swedish government that he would leave Sweden if war was not declared against England within the space of five days. He made this declaration on the 13th of December, 1810; and, on the 18th, he was informed that the king had declared war against England. This was also announced to the Emperor himself by the crown prince, who, since November, had been engaged in immediate correspondence with him. The crown prince's letter, whether written by himself, or only copied and approved, bears evidence of great prudence, and is couched in a modest and almost subservient tone. He describes the impossibility of Sweden continuing to exist without trade, or being able to carry on a war without subsidies. Bignon alleges that the latter sentence was designedly inserted by the crown prince, in order that France might offer such

\* His first words to the ambassador were, "La Suède souffre, dites-vous; mais croyez-vous que je ne souffre pas, moi?—que la France, que Bordeaux, que la Hollande, l'Allemagne ne souffrent pas? Voilà pourquoi il faut en finir; il faut à tout prix la paix maritime. La Suède est la seule cause de la crise que j'éprouve; la Suède me fait plus de mal que les cinq coalitions ensemble."

aid, and that the Emperor was wrong in not understanding the hint, and in being too saving at an unseasonable time. The decision of this point is, however, a question of policy. Certain it is that the Emperor, who was unable to give any really satisfactory answer to the crown prince's letter, refused to enter into a personal correspondence, and excused himself by coldly alleging that he did not correspond with other crown princes, and was indisposed to make any exception.

The Emperor caused a letter to be written to the crown prince by his minister, in which he alleges that war has indeed been now declared against England, but that the declaration is more directed against him than against England; and that the mere words are not enough. The government was called upon immediately to collect the imposition laid in the month of August upon all English and colonial goods; to receive French custom-house officers in Gothenburg; and to send a number of Swedish soldiers into the French service, and give a very considerable number of Swedish sailors to man the Brest fleet.\* This demand met with a decided refusal, and the crown prince began to lend an ear to Russian proposals, because the Emperor's orders and threats became continually more violent. The Emperor Alexander was well acquainted with Bernadotte's relation to the anti-Bonapartist party in France, and for that reason showed great readiness in acknowledging his election as crown prince; he sent to congratulate him on his elevation, and Czernitcheff, who was closely connected with all the malcontents in Paris, travelled by way of Sweden on his journey to France. He was commissioned by the crown prince to deliver the letter to which we have just referred to the Emperor of the French, and gave, as it appears to us, the first hints of a possible union of Russia and Sweden with England against France, and of a compensation to be gained in this way for the loss of Friesland. This appears to be deducible from the answer which Alquier received from the crown prince, when in his fulfilment of the Emperor's commission, he said: "If he should separate from the Emperor, the Emperor would give him up." The answer to this threat was first given when Czernitcheff had set out for Paris, precisely at the time, therefore, the end of the year 1810, when the Emperor Alexander had granted the importation of English goods into his dominions, and laid a heavy duty upon the products of France. We shall lay before our readers Alquier's words, employed in his letter to the French minister of foreign affairs, from which it will be obvious, that as early as January, 1811, the English and Russians were preparing for what

\* The documents complete will be found appended to SKANDINAVIEN UND CARL JOHANN XIV. Nordische Denkwürdigkeiten alter und neuer Zeit. Herausgegeben von Carl Venturini, 1821. They consist of thirteen pieces. These must, however, be compared with what Bignon has given, drawn from the archives of the department of foreign affairs, not forgetting only that this consists of a number of detached passages, put together in the form of a defence.

was carried out a year afterwards, and were anxious to induce Sweden to join their alliance.\* Bignon says that General Suchtelen, the Russian ambassador in Stockholm, in speaking of the vast preparations which were being made by Russia in December, 1810, made no secret of the co-operation of Sweden, and of her being won over to the alliance. It was not Napoleon's plan in 1811 to bring about an open breach with Russia, or to commence open hostilities against Sweden; he therefore resolved at the time in which the king, on account of his health, had given over the management of public affairs to the crown prince, at last to send the latter a personal answer to his previous communications.

On the 17th of March, 1811, the King of Sweden gave up the direction of affairs, which he resumed in January, 1812, to the crown prince; as early as the 8th of March, 1811, Napoleon at length sent a reply to the crown prince's three letters. To the allegation that the Swedish government could not altogether forbid trade with England, because that country was the great market for the staple product of Sweden, and that its *iron* could not elsewhere be so well disposed of, and that, besides, the country could not do without a proper supply of colonial goods, Napoleon made the singular proposal of exchanging twenty millions' worth of colonial produce which he had in Hamburg for its value in iron, alleging that by this exchange Sweden, which was poor in money, would not be called upon to send any of its cash out of the country, that the colonial goods could be given to those merchants who would pay the import duties, and Sweden be relieved of its surplus iron. Into such a transaction the Swedes refused to enter, even if it were, which we can scarcely believe, seriously intended; the tedious correspondence therefore with the Emperor continued. Sweden knew well with what view a great part of the Russian standing army in Finland was marched in January, 1811, to Poland; it was also fully aware of the close alliance between England and Russia; for the numerous couriers, in passing from the one country to the other back and forward, travelled by way of Sweden. The crown prince was anxious to obtain Norway as a compensation for Finland; this he might look to obtain either through England and Russia, or through France; Norway must, however, first be wrested from the Danes. The Danes being at that time the most faithful allies of France, Sweden could not hope to receive any support from the French in an attack upon Norway, whereas England and Russia, being both at enmity with Denmark, might be supposed to support his views. Bignon, in

\* The crown prince addressed Alquier in December, 1810, according to the ambassador's report, as follows:—"Ah! vous croyez que j'ai quelque chose à craindre de la Russie, vous êtes dans une grande erreur. Sachez, qu'IL NE TIENT QU'À MOI DE ME JETER DANS LES BRAS DE LA RUSSIE ET DE L'ANGLETERRE. Je ne veux pas me séparer de la France, mais aussi long temps que la France me laisse tranquille, qu'elle ne m'opprime pas; que l'on craigne alors une nouvelle guerre de trente ans, et que l'on sache que je puis jeter cinquante mille hommes en Allemagne."



in the tenth part of his "History of France," has given a very full account of the long and difficult negotiations respecting Norway, which were carried on in the course of the year 1811, and from this account we learn that both the rulers of Sweden and Denmark pushed their respective causes with all the pettiness of German princes. They made complaints of one another on account of the trade of their subjects, they placed spies on each other's ships, they enviously accused each other of violating the imperial decrees against importing colonial produce, and alternately provoked the Emperor's indignation by their irregular trading, and his want of power to prevent it. As early as June, Sweden had come to a full understanding with Russia, and thus indirectly with England, with respect to the resistance to be offered to French pretensions; still both parties tried to make it be believed that there was a serious desire to maintain the presumed existing friendship. The crown prince, however, who directed his own war-office, made considerable additions to his army, and organised it anew. At that time Alquier acted with much greater precipitation than Napoleon desired. As early as 1811 he did all in his power to bring about a breach, which the Emperor wished to avoid, because he knew that the relinquishment of Norway to Sweden would be attended with difficulties as long as England did not consent to aid in wresting it from Denmark. Napoleon emphatically disapproved of the tone which Alquier had assumed, and which led the minister of foreign affairs in Stockholm to repel insolence by insolence, without applying to Paris to have the obnoxious ambassador removed, and refusing to receive any further communications from him.\* The French ambassador's conduct towards Engestrom, his vain and boasting letters, in which he represented the crown prince as ridiculous and absurd, at length induced the Emperor to recal him. This, however, was not done till the 14th of October, and in a manner most insulting to the Swedish government. The Emperor gave secret instructions to his ambassador warmly and bitterly to accuse the Swedish minister of foreign affairs of having begun a strife at a most unseasonable time;† he could not, however,

\* "J'étais loin de m'attendre," wrote Engestrom to Alquier on the 24th of August, "que les dispositions empressées de notre part pussent jamais vous autoriser à m'adresser une mission, qui en attaquant l'honneur national offre l'exemple de la violation la plus inouïe du droit des gens."

† The minister of foreign affairs writes to Alquier: "L'Empereur n'a point approuvé votre conduite dans ces derniers tems. Il juge, que vous n'avez point gardé la mesure convenable dans vos rapports avec le Baron d'Engestrom; que vous avez agi avec precipitation, et que vous n'avez point répondu à ce qu'il attendait de votre experience et de votre longue habitude des affaires. Cela seul était une grande faute, de vous avancer au point de rendre votre rappel nécessaire et de forcer ainsi la main à votre gouvernement." The Duke of Bassano adds that the Emperor had only taken his part because he attributed Engestrom's answer not to him but to the crown prince. The words are as follows: "Le ton qui règne dans cette réponse (Baron Engestrom's) semble indiquer, qu'elle part de plus haut que du cabinet de M. d'Engestrom. Jamais en effet un ministre doué de quelque sens ne se serait permis de s'exprimer avec une indécence aussi revoltante en s'adressant à l'envoyé de S. M. l'Empereur. C'est par cette considération que S. M. I. n'a pas voulu vous désavouer."

fail to see that Engestrom's insulting answer was, properly speaking, to be attributed to the crown prince, and his personal enmity towards himself, and he took his revenge accordingly. He caused orders to be given through the Duke of Bassano to Alquier to take his departure from Sweden, without, on the one hand, breaking off all intercourse, or, upon the other, observing the customary courtesies. He was directed neither to take leave of the king, the crown prince, nor the minister of foreign affairs, but merely to send his letter of recal to the minister in a note. The Marquis de Cabre, who afterwards managed the business of France, was regarded rather as an official spy than an ambassador.

Alquier was then sent to Copenhagen, and the Prince of Eckmühl was in command of the troops in Germany. Both were personal enemies of the crown prince, who at this time had entered into negotiations with England. As there could be no reasonable hope of procuring any aid from France in getting possession of Norway, he hoped to be able to obtain his end by the aid of Russia and England. Alquier and De Cabre did all in their power to increase Napoleon's feeling of dislike to Bernadotte; they despatched almost daily accounts to Paris of the continued intercourse between the English and Sweden. Alquier and the Prince of Eckmühl were urgent to have orders issued for seizing upon Swedish Pomerania, which they represented as a great English storehouse. The Emperor, who had threatened for sixteen months to take this step, at length gave orders for his troops to take possession of Pomerania. Bignon is of opinion that it was not the Emperor's desire to have these orders quickly carried into execution; but the Prince of Eckmühl, from private enmity, was only too well pleased to fulfil them.\*

We must leave the point undetermined how much or how little the personal enmity between the Prince of Eckmühl and the crown prince had to do with the advance of the French troops into Pomerania. Certain it is, however, that General Friand, without any declaration of war or friendly relations being broken off, marched, at the head of his division, into Pomerania, on the night between the 26th and the 27th of January, 1812. He took possession of the whole of Pomerania, together with the island of Rügen. The intercourse, however, between Pomerania and Sweden was so obstructed, that the news of the occupation did not reach Stockholm till the 11th of February. Sweden was now in a position without any hesitation to enter into the negotiations which had been long since opened with Russia.† The Swedish ambassador, Löwenhielm, had

\* Bignon, vol. x., p. 406: "Une vieille et profonde haine, qui existait entre Davoust et Bernadotte, n'a peut être médiocrement contribué à la mésintelligence de la France et de la Suède." This is proved by documents, but Bignon takes good care in his account not to bring these documents forward.

† It was known in Sweden that the Prince of Eckmühl had given orders to occupy Pomerania, and the Swedish commander (Von Peyron) in the province was instructed to resist. He, however, suffered himself to be deceived, for which he was afterwards called before a court-martial. All the Swedish civil officers who refused



been in Petersburg since February. Everything was therefore ready, and he received orders to conclude.

On the 24th of March a treaty of alliance was concluded between Sweden and Russia, which was based upon the certain expectation of a war between France and Russia. Russia agreed either to induce Denmark voluntarily to relinquish Norway to Sweden, or to assist the crown prince with an army of 30,000 men, to take it by force. In return, the crown prince, in case of a war between Russia and France, was to land in the north of Germany with an army of the same amount; not, however, till he had first been put in possession of Norway. This treaty was kept absolutely secret; because Russia as well as Sweden still kept up friendly relations with France. Another treaty was, therefore, on this occasion concluded for appearance sake, which contained nothing of which France could have any reason to complain; and this treaty alone was made public. The secret treaty, moreover, required the fulfilment of a number of preliminaries,—the assent of England, a Russian army of 30,000 men, and especially the consent of the Estates of Sweden. This consent was afterwards given in an assembly of the Estates at Orebro, and during their consultation both the English and Russian ambassadors remained in the neighbourhood of the town; the alliance with England was not concluded till July, and Napoleon was not informed of the adhesion of Sweden to this hostile alliance till August, in Witepsk. Notwithstanding the occupation of Pomerania by the French, Monsieur de Cabre was still in Stockholm, and hostilities were not actually commenced till the beginning of the year 1813, after some essential alterations had been made in the treaty with Russia, agreed upon in August, 1812. We shall, therefore, have occasion to return to the expulsion of De Cabre from Sweden, and the part taken by the crown prince in the war in Germany, when we come to enter into the details of the year 1813. We shall here refer to one point only, which was decisive of the fate of the French army in Russia. This point is, that the crown prince himself, on the 27th of August, went into Finland, and there, in presence of the English ambassador, General Lord Cathcart, relinquished his claim to the antecedent fulfilment of that article of the treaty which related to the possession of Norway.

It was agreed in Abo that the Russian standing army in Finland must be first used in Poland, and the expedition against Norway allowed to stand over for a time, but that, at a later period, Russia would furnish an army of double the strength of that agreed upon in the treaty of Petersburg. Sweden, however, still delayed, and

to do homage were afterwards carried off to Hamburg as criminals. As the nation was strongly opposed to an alliance with Russia, the Swedish government caused the whole of the documents to be printed under the title: "*Rapport à S. M. le Roi de Suède par son ministre d'état et des affaires étrangères, en date de Stockholm le 7 Janvier, 1813. Publié par ordre de sa majesté. Stockholm, de l'imprimerie royale, 1813,*" p. 42. See also "*Archcuholz Minerva, 1813,*" vol. ii., p. 111.



England declared herself to be not quite decided; and we shall therefore subsequently see that the relations between Sweden and France were not wholly broken off at the end of the year 1812. Negotiations were still being carried on with the Danes in April, 1813; and, since the meeting at Abo, the most friendly relations subsisted between Russia and the crown prince. He was loaded with all sorts of honours and decorations, promised to take the command of a Russo-Swedish army, and, at a later period, helped to induce Moreau to leave North America and join the Russian army. He received the three most distinguished Russian orders—those of St. Andrew, Alexander Newski, and St. Anne—all in one day; and the Russian emperor resumed the Swedish order which he had before sent back to Gustavus IV.

## 2.—PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA.

We have, in the previous sections, given an account of the manner in which the Emperor of the French long hesitated whether he should accept the offensive alliance against Russia offered to him by Prussia in 1811, or whether he should blot out her name from the list of nations. Hardenberg was honest enough under the circumstances not to pretend any particular friendship, but merely to show that he was placed between two great evils—a war with France, in alliance with Russia, and a war with Russia, in conjunction with France—and that he merely chose the less of the two when he resolved on adhering to France, in spite of the friendship of the king for the Emperor Alexander. He proved, by a long letter delivered to Count de St. Marsan in Berlin, that Prussia could find safety and deliverance by no other means than an alliance with France, and in this paper it was expressly presupposed that France must still retain the upper hand. It is therefore ridiculous to see that the French, in 1813, and even now, are inexhaustible in the abusive epithets heaped upon Prussia for the breach of a treaty which she was compelled to conclude, as soon as such renunciation was for her own advantage. The manner in which the minister of foreign affairs in Paris announced to Count Krusemark the inclination of the French government to enter into the treaty with Prussia—or, in other words, to suffer her existence for some little time longer—could not possibly form a ground for any obligation on the part of Prussia to adhere to the treaty a moment longer than necessity required. In January, 1812, the Duc de Bassano, when he resumed the consideration of the proposal made in the previous year, addressed Count Krusemark in the following insolent language:—"My dear baron, the moment for deciding the fate of Prussia is at length come. I must not conceal from you that it is a question for her of life or death. You know that the Emperor entertained very strong views as long since as the meeting at Tilsit. These views *continue in all respects the same*, and their accomplishment can only be prevented by Prussia becoming and continuing to be our faithful ally. Moments are precious, and

the circumstances very serious." Whilst the negotiations concerning the alliance were being carried on, the King of Prussia, in agreement with the Emperor of the French, who wished to keep up the appearance of maintaining peace, attempted a mediation in Petersburg, in which he rested on his personal friendship for the emperor, who had always remained faithful to him. In the middle of the year 1811 he had commissioned Major von Schöler to proceed on a special mission to Petersburg, because Von Schladen appeared to be too favourable to Russian views. The emperor was convinced that the fall of Prussia was unavoidable, unless by an alliance with France. As early as May the king had informed the emperor, by an autograph letter, that he was compelled by his situation to enter into an alliance with France. This letter, together with the emperor's reply, is to be found among the contents of the *Correspondance Inédite* of the Emperor Napoleon. The answer sent in June, 1811, clearly proves that the Emperor of Russia had then fully resolved upon a war, and that he considered the king's letter as written at the suggestion of the Emperor of the French. He wrote a sharp and bitter answer, not to the king, with whom he always kept up a good understanding, through Von Schladen and others, but to the Emperor, whose hypocritical language he treats with contempt.\*

In February, 1812, Colonel Knesebeck was sent to Petersburg to entreat the emperor, in the name of friendship, not to compel the king to take part in a new war against him. This was the king's private affair, and for this reason Knesebeck was especially employed, for Von Schladen was one of the chief members of the *Tugendbund*, and his feelings were completely in accordance with those of Hardenberg. The origin of the mission was a report of Krusemark's, respecting a conversation which he had held with the Emperor Napoleon, and which the good King of Prussia took for sterling coin. Krusemark had also given it as his opinion that Napoleon was really serious in his desire for peace. In Petersburg, however, the Russians were not so easily deceived; all the enemies of France were there assembled, and Knesebeck therefore returned without having accomplished the object of his mission. In March, 1812, he delivered in a very full report of his mission, which may be seen in the *Correspondance Inédite*, already referred to. From this report it appears that the Emperor Alexander knew well what he had to expect from Napoleon's offers of peace. Napoleon saw

\* *Correspondance Inédite*, vol. vii., p. 133: "J'ai reçu en son tems la lettre que V. M. a jugé à propos de m'écrire à la date du 12 Mai. J'avais cru que ma manière de voir et mes principes politiques lui étaient connus; ainsi son contenu n'a pu que me surprendre. Je n'ai jamais cherché ni provoqué la guerre. Ne convoitant rien à mes voisins, n'ayant nul besoin d'agrandissement, il n'est pas raisonnable de me supposer l'envie de troubler la paix. Je crois, au contraire, avoir assez prouvé combien j'étais soigneux à la conserver. Mes mesures n'ont été que des mesures de pure précaution, commandés par ce qui se passait à côté de moi. La guerre ne se fera que quand je serai attaqué, et alors le parti que les autres pourront prendre ne pourra m'empêcher de me défendre avec vigueur." The letter is also contained in the *Supplément*, by Fain. MS. de 1812.



that every agreement entered into by Russia, on the eve of an impending war, would have the same advantages for him which he was always accustomed to draw from treaties concluded immediately after his victories. This was openly alleged to the colonel by the Emperor of Russia, when speaking of Nesselrode's mission to Paris, which Alexander had at first promised, afterwards put off under all kinds of excuses, and finally altogether refused. He stated to Knesebeck, "that to send a plenipotentiary to Paris under the existing circumstances was unbecoming his dignity; as since the Emperor Napoleon had assumed a threatening attitude, it would appear as if he were anxious for a peace from a fear of war." He acknowledged that he was far from being so good a general as Napoleon, and must therefore submit to his fate. Notwithstanding this, Knesebeck saw that the emperor did not thus resign himself, because he hoped for a speedy victory, or because he sought for peace, but because he reckoned upon a long war. Nothing, therefore, remained for Prussia to do than to accept of the proffered alliance with France, however burdensome its conditions might be. This alliance was concluded whilst Knesebeck was in Petersburg.

When French writers, such as Fain and others, allege that the Prussians then believed themselves to have been for ever bound to France, and cherished hopes of gaining Livonia and Courland, and that therefore the withdrawal of Prussia, in 1813, ought to be represented as a scandalous betrayal of the common cause, this is nothing more or less than miserable sophistry. How little obligation there was in an oath forced to be taken with a knife at the throat, is abundantly proved by the Emperor's hostile commands issued to his generals, in despite of the alliance. As to the wish for the continuance of the alliance, we know not what was thought on that subject by Count Golz, as minister for foreign affairs, but we can readily believe that men like Prince Hatzfeld and Councillor Biquelin, who were sent to Paris to assist Krusemark in concluding the treaty, were zealous enough for an alliance with France. (They best knew for what.) The chancellor of state and all the true patriots and statesmen in Prussia, however, properly regarded the alliance as a mere temporary necessity. Even the French sophists themselves, such as Bignon, Fain, Norvins, and others, furnish us with the orders of their hero, in which he commands his generals and civil officers to treat Prussia, after as well as before the treaty, as a hostile country. On the 18th of April the Emperor commanded the Prince of Eckmühl to use the Prussians to watch the district between him and the Russians; and on the 24th ordered him "to keep a watchful eye on the inhabitants of Prussia, lest in case of any mischance in war they should be excited to rise against the French." In the instructions to Oudinot, of the 21st and 22nd of April, he was directed to keep guard over the country between the Vistula and the Elbe, to keep a tight rein upon the Prussians, and to secure the rear of the army. He was told that he must take care to know where



the Prussian troops were that did not belong to the contingent, and where their guns, artillery, and ammunition were to be found. The French were to take possession of the arsenal in Berlin, to retain everything which was the property of the king, and not to take away anything without a careful record. French officers were to hold command in Berlin, and the Bürger guard to be under their orders; and yet they were not on any account to interfere with the civil administration. The commander-in-chief, moreover, was not to accept of any table money, for the Emperor alleged that what he allowed him was sufficient to maintain a princely table. Whilst not a farthing of the arrears due by the King of Prussia was remitted by the hardhearted Daru, and Glogau was not restored according to promise, the Emperor wrote to the Prince of Eckmühl, who was to hold the chief command till his arrival in April, when his hundred thousand troops inundated the country, "The troops are to be maintained by such supplies as can be drawn from the neighbourhoods in which they are; the magazines are not to be touched, but to be carefully preserved for the time when the troops shall have passed the Niemen. Berlin, Glogau, and Posen are to be places for concentration and head-quarters." All this refers to March, April, and May;—the treaty with Prussia had, however, been concluded on the 24th of February, and its main articles remained a secret. Two agreements were entered into on the same day, one public and one secret. The former was a mere defensive alliance, and consisted of four articles. By the first, it was agreed that France and Prussia stood mutually bound to defend each other against any European power which should attack either the one or the other. By the second, an advantage was secured to the King of Prussia, which Hardenberg had been in vain endeavouring for a year to obtain, that Prussia should not be annihilated. The two powers pledged themselves to maintain their respective states in the then existing condition. By the third article it was settled that everything which was to be done in case of a necessity for the treaty to come into operation was to be determined by a future agreement. From the fourth article it will be seen that the negotiators never even gave themselves the trouble to open the acts of the peace of Utrecht; inasmuch as they take things for granted as decided in the treaty of Utrecht of which there is no mention whatever. The article runs as follows: "The ships of those nations are to be excluded from the coasts and harbours of both powers, who contrary to the maritime rights settled by the treaty of Utrecht have suffered the independence of their flags to be violated."

The secret treaty in its first article alleges that contracts have been determined on in consequence of the approaching war with Russia. By the second, it is agreed that Prussia shall furnish an auxiliary force of 20,000 men, 14,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry, and 2000 artillerymen. Articles three, four, five, six, seven, and eight, refer to the garrisons in Prussian fortresses; nothing came, however, of the garrisoning of Colberg, although in the case of Spandau the Prussians

were obliged to give way. In these articles, too, those Prussian provinces are enumerated through which troops were not to be allowed to march, and in which they could not remain; and other military points are decided. The length of time for occupying the fortresses of Glogau, Cüstrin, and Stettin is cunningly reserved in article fourteen for future decision. In the ninth article, it is decided that in respect of the requisitions which the French commanders would have to make in the country, what was required is either to be paid for in cash, or at the end of the campaign to be deducted from the arrears of contributions which might be then due. By article thirteen an increase of territory is promised to the King of Prussia, as a compensation for the burdens which he may be called upon to bear in the war, and the sacrifices he may be required to make.

The real object of the fourth article of the first and public treaty was made known by the publication of a royal edict on the 25th of April, by virtue of which all the colonial wares which might be imported from Russia were strictly prohibited in Prussia. On the 9th of May General Durutte was appointed governor of Berlin; Königsberg, Pillau, and Spandau were garrisoned with French troops, and the country was overrun with half a million of men of all kinds, and its inhabitants drained as in a time of war. None of the contributions were remitted, and the article respecting the payment of supplies was not fulfilled.

The King of Prussia hoped at least to derive the advantage from this treaty of being able to increase his army to the extent of the auxiliary force which he had engaged to supply; but even this was not allowed. He showed, by an account of the number of forces which he had in garrison, for police and coast guards, that in addition to the 24,000 men to which he was limited by the peace of Tilsit, he had absolute need of 24,000 more; but all to no purpose. The exact fulfilment of the conditions of the peace of Tilsit was not only insisted upon, but in the eleventh article of the secret treaty every species of warlike preparation was expressly forbidden. The eleventh article is as follows: "Prussia binds herself not to raise any troops, not to collect an army, and not to make any military movement, as long as the French remain in Prussia or on the enemy's territory; this can only be done when it may be for the advantage of the allies, and by the express agreement of both parties." Even Bignon, diplomatist and sophist as he was, and the defender of every measure adopted by Napoleon, does not venture to justify the harshness of this article; and describes it as not only in the highest degree impolitic, but also completely useless.

One consequence of this oppressive alliance was the removal of all noble-minded patriots, all the friends of Stein, who were without distinction called *Clubbists*, from every public office or employment, and from all kinds of influence. This was not done, indeed, by express written stipulations, but was the result of a secret understanding. Even in the previous year, when Blücher, who then held

command in Pomerania, caused the fortifications of Colberg to be strengthened and his corps to be reinforced, the authorities in Berlin were required to call him to account; both he and his friends were superseded. The most distinguished amongst those who were removed, were the men who afterwards, together with Baron von Stein, laboured to make Prussia the chief power in Germany, such as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Von Sack, Justus Gruner, and others. The treaty of the 24th of February was afterwards ratified without alteration on the 14th of March.

Austria had long given indications of a closer alliance with France, and in this case Napoleon had not to settle in his own mind, as in the case of Prussia, whether it would not be better at once to incorporate the whole kingdom in his Empire, or to enter into an alliance; the treaty therefore was soon concluded. For the same reasons for which Russia had previously taken part in the war against Austria, Austria was now obliged to take part in the war against Russia. There was, besides, a special reason for taking the field in favour of Napoleon, because it was allowed to do what Prussia was absolutely prohibited from doing—to increase its army, to replenish its arsenals, and refit its fortresses, under the pretence of arming against Russia. A public and a private treaty was also concluded, and from these we shall only select a few of the leading articles, because they are to be found complete in works generally known. In the public treaty, which consists of nine articles, the fourth and the seventh are the most important. The two powers first guarantee to each other the possession of all the countries under their respective rule, and promise mutual aid in case of attack. In the fourth article the amount of this aid is fixed at 30,000 men, viz., 24,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, together with 60 pieces of artillery; and it is agreed that this auxiliary force shall be kept at all times ready equipped. The integrity of the Turkish Empire is also guaranteed. In the seventh article, the maritime rights of neutrals, as pretendedly settled by the treaty of Utrecht, is recognised by Austria as was done in the treaty with Prussia; and in the eighth, the Emperor of Austria agrees to enter into the prohibitive measures against England (but only *autant que besoin est*). And finally, in this article it is also agreed that the treaty is not to be communicated to any cabinet without the consent of both parties.

The secret treaty consists of eleven articles, of which the first contains the application of the other treaty to the war with Russia, and determines that the auxiliary army, with all the necessary *materiel*, shall be ready to be concentrated in Lemberg in fourteen days after the 1st of May. The force is always to be provided with double allowance of provisions and ammunition. In order to guard Austria from all danger, the Emperor of the French agrees, in the third article, to have his whole army at the same time in the field. In the fourth article, it is settled that the auxiliary corps is always



to remain united and under an Austrian commander-in-chief, selected by the Emperor of Austria, who is to receive his orders immediately from the Emperor of the French. It was also expressly (and specially) agreed that the army was not to be called a *contingent*, but an AUXILIARY ARMY. The most important of these secret articles are the fifth and sixth, which intimate a probable restoration of the kingdom of Poland; these, however, are so jesuitically drawn up, that we shall give the original, word for word, in a note.\* In the seventh article, compensation is not only offered to the Emperor of Austria, as to the King of Prussia, for the sacrifices which he might be called upon to make in the war, but such a compensation for loss and increase of territory as might remain as a monument of the close and enduring friendship between the two sovereigns.

### 3.—NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND FRANCE FROM 1811 TILL MAY, 1812, AND THE CONDITION OF POLAND.

We do not deem it necessary to give a detailed account of the preparations for war made by either the Emperor of Russia or the Emperor of the French in the year 1811, or the diplomatic transactions which took place between them. As to the negotiations, we are firmly persuaded, that as early as the end of the year 1810 both parties knew well that it was impossible for peace to be maintained by notes or embassies, or even by the mediation of Prussia. Each was mainly anxious to throw the blame of a war of extermination upon the other. Ever since the peace of Schönbrunn the relation between the two powers had been such as always indicated a breach, and the chief object of sending Czernitcheff so many times to Paris from the year 1808 was to make use of his *liaisons* to worm out secrets, to bribe persons in high official situations, and to catch the whole of Napoleon's police in their own nets. Throughout the whole of this time Prince Kurakin was ambassador in Paris; Napoleon was well pleased with him, because his wits were not particularly sharp. Czernitcheff, on the other hand, availed himself of every one of his missions to Paris to use his connexion with persons in high life in such a way as gave offence to Napoleon, who twice reproached him severely for his conduct. Bignon, Schöll, and others have given very detailed accounts of the perplexed negotiations of the year 1811; and we must direct the attention of our readers the more especially to these works, as our account, without the necessary documents which they give, would prove altogether insufficient. It has been already stated that the Emperor Alexander's

\* "Dans le cas où per suite de la guerre entre France et la Russie, le royaume de Pologne viendrait à être rétabli, S. M. l'Empereur des Français garantira spécialement, comme elle la garantit dès a présent, la possession de la Gallicie. 6. Si le cas arrivait, il entre dans les convenances de S. M. l'Empereur d'Autriche de céder, pour être réunie au royaume de Pologne, une partie de la Gallicie en échange des provinces Illyriennes, S. M. l'Empereur des Français s'engage, dès à présent, à consentir à cet échange."

promise of sending Nesselrode to Paris was merely a means of delaying the war till the fullest preparations were made. Nesselrode was promoted to a higher station merely, as was pretended, that he might be able suitably to enter upon his mission to Paris, which, however, was put off from time to time, and eventually not carried out. In the same way as the Emperor Alexander sought to deceive the world respecting his true designs by the mission of Nesselrode to Paris, Napoleon, by making new proposals of peace to the English government, sought to give currency to the opinion that it was the English alone who made a general peace impossible.

It was in truth very singular that Napoleon should, through his minister of foreign affairs, cause such proposals to be made to Lord Castlereagh, at the very time in which he himself was making the most immense preparations for war with Russia, which had been made for any war since the days of Xerxes, at the very time in which England was straining every nerve in order to support Russia, and to prevail upon Sweden to co-operate with her against France. The whole was a mere device to have the whole of the documents printed in the *Moniteur*, and there they really appeared; impartial men were not deceived, but many of the French believed that the Emperor was serious, and their writers even now represent the matter as if they believed it. On the 17th of April the Duc de Bassano wrote to the English minister of foreign affairs, and made proposals for peace, but at the same time declared that an understanding must first be come to respecting Spain, Naples, and Portugal, before entering into any further negotiations. He offered apparently reasonable conditions, but which would necessarily be declined, because he wished by a cunning equivocation to secure the crown of Spain for King Joseph. France, it was stated, required no increase of territory at the cost of Spain; the PRESENT DYNASTY was to be declared completely independent, and the country to receive a constitution agreed upon by the Cortes. Portugal was also to be independent, and to remain under the rule of the house of Braganza; Naples to be governed by King Joachim, and Sicily by King Ferdinand. Lord Castlereagh, in his reply, begged to be informed of the definite meaning attached to the phrase the "PRESENT DYNASTY" in reference to Spain. If it was intended to convey the continuance of King Joseph's government, he declared that he must at once decline all further correspondence on the subject. As neither of the two powers could or would make any concession on this point, and Napoleon knew that well when he made his proposal, the whole affair was a mere delusion.

In 1811 the autocratic Armfelt, Pozzo di Borgo, Von Schladen, and many Prussian officers who (as Pfuël, Clausewitz, and Eugene of Wirtemberg) had entered into the Russian service from various reasons, urged and stimulated the Emperor of Russia to adopt the firm resolution of engaging in a war of desperation. When the Baron von Stein, the implacable enemy of Napoleon, came to Russia



in 1812, he guided and led the proceedings of the Emperor Alexander without entering into his service. The Duke of Serra Capriola, too, the ambassador of Ferdinand of Sicily, used all his influence over the emperor's mother to spur him on to the war. One of the agents of Hardenberg, in a paper contained in the Memoirs of a Statesman, and which is one of the few documents that give the book any value, so correctly represents the state of things at the court of Alexander shortly before the breaking out of the war, that, little importance as we attach to these Memoirs, we are so well persuaded of the genuineness of the paper as to feel ourselves entitled to quote it as an authority. We therefore give in a note the remarks of the correspondent on the different Austrian ambassadors who appeared in Petersburg, and on the men who exercised an influence on the mind of the emperor.\*

As to Poland, its inhabitants, who are so easy to be deceived, so impulsive, and so little restrained by the influence of any high feelings of morality, had been constantly excited against Russia, from the time of the erection of the duchy of Warsaw; and although the secret article of the treaty relating to Poland between Austria and France, agreed upon in 1812, was not immediately made known to the Emperor Alexander, Bignon's course of action in Warsaw could not escape his notice. Bignon, indeed, has not himself left us any express account of what the object of his mission was, and of the reason why Napoleon placed such large sums of money at his disposal; we can guess, however, what this object really was, from the accounts which he gives us of his successor, De Pradt, and his rhodomontade, whom Napoleon with great precipitancy and shortsightedness sent to Warsaw. The report of Archbishop de Pradt's embassy is a lampoon upon the Emperor Napoleon, and casts all kinds of blame upon Bignon, who unquestionably possessed ten times as much diplomatic talent as his successor. For these reasons, Bignon in his work felt himself bound to give a clear account of the influences exercised upon the Poles in the years 1811 and 1812.

Bignon came to Poland in the commencement of the year 1811, immediately after the breach between Russia and France had become unavoidable, in consequence of the extinction and absorption of the

\* "*Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat*," vol. xi., p. 299: "Quant à la légation Autrichienne, je l'ai vu passer de l'honorable et véritablement grand Seigneur Prince de Schwarzenberg à l'honnête et ridicule Comte de St. Julien, ayant pour surveillant le spirituel Sturmer, puis tomber jusqu'à Lebzeltern, ministre actuel, mais aussi fin et zélé, espèce d'aventurier politique." As regards the emperor's confidants he writes as follows:—"Deux hommes dans des positions personnelles et morales bien différentes semblent avoir maintenant le plus de crédit: ce sont le Général Arahatcheff, général abhorré, mais sur qui repose la sûreté de l'empereur; puis le Baron d'Armfelt, ardent ennemi de la France révolutionnaire et poussant à la guerre contre elle de tout son pouvoir. Bien vu de l'impératrice mère et de l'adorable impératrice régnante, Armfelt est lié avec le Duc de Serra-Capriola et ceux qu'il dirige; il est enthousiaste de Stein; il choisit Löwenhielm et même Kacheloff, repoussé jadis par Catherine II., comme illuminé et recherché aujourd'hui par la faction anti-Française, comme lié à quelques chefs du *Tugendbund*." He then adds, "No one knows fully what the emperor either wishes or thinks."



duchy of Oldenburg and the issuing of the imperial ukase of 1810. From Warsaw, as Napoleon's representative, he carried on a correspondence of which he has given us an account, and from which we see that an organised system of *espionage* was established from Petersburg to Constantinople, and that a great number of agents and spies were employed in every important place. This equally affected the Russians, the Turks, and the Austrians; Bignon, however, was besides obliged to inspire the Poles with hope, that they by their efforts in the approaching war might be able again to restore their native kingdom. This was, no doubt, a difficult task, because he was compelled on the one hand to urge them to make the greatest sacrifices and efforts, in order to get on foot a powerful army, without on the other giving them any specific promise of the restoration of their ancient kingdom. Bignon was then placed in a position of great difficulty, being obliged to cherish and keep alive the hopes of the Poles; and at the same time to continue the negotiations with the Russians for the whole year 1811, they expressly requiring on their part that Napoleon should expressly declare that he would neither revive the name nor the kingdom of Poland. De Pradt therefore accuses him of being one of the main instigators of the war with Russia. True, indeed, the Poles were rendered shy by the continuance of the negotiations with Russia; Bignon, however, altogether denies that he was more forward than others in promoting war; but he cannot deny that he wrote hundreds of letters to Paris full of the most captivating descriptions of the enthusiasm of the Poles. It is obvious from his work that he was himself deceived, and took the expressions of the distinguished circle of an egotistical nobility yearning after the recovery of their former privileges for the popular feeling. The ladies and gentlemen whose flickering enthusiasm he rhetorically describes, regarded everything which Napoleon thought and projected as possible, simply because he willed it; this, too, was the idea of Bignon and those like-minded. We shall therefore subjoin a passage in a note, in which he describes the situation of things at the time of his presence in Warsaw, and gives an account of his own activity at the same time.\*

Bignon admits that he succeeded in inspiring the Poles with the idea, that if they succeeded in raising a considerable army among their countrymen, it might be used, not for the French, but for their own new-born country. In a letter written shortly before the

\* Vol. x., p. 360: "Le soin que l'empereur mettait à faire accélérer les fortifications de Modlin, de Zamosc et de Thorn, tandis que la Russie établissait de pareilles lignes de fortifications sur son territoire, les mouvemens perpetuels de troupes sur les deux frontières, tout enfin annonçant aux habitans du duché la possibilité d'un choc prochain entre la Russie et la France, cette population ardente, avide d'indépendance, accoutumée à croire que rien n'est impossible à Napoleon, dont elle a partagé la gloire sur tant des champs de bataille, ne voyait dans la guerre que des chances heureuses, un triomphe infaillible et la renaissance de la patrie Polonoise. Ces dissensions s'accordaient trop bien avec les intérêts eventuels de la France pour que son ministre à Varsovie cherchât à les combattre, vu seulement à les affaiblir, mais il en devait maîtriser l'essor et en prévenir les écarts."

outbreak of hostilities, in March, 1812, he says expressly that the Poles and their ladies seemed to have lost all consideration and prudence, whilst the Emperor commanded him to promise nothing definite, but to console them with general expressions and constant reference to his acknowledgment of their services.\* The Poles spoke and declaimed in the Diet, which was called as early as 1811, quite according to their former custom, and inasmuch as they, like the French, greatly preferred fighting to living after a steady, clean, and frugal fashion, a very considerable army was speedily got together; there was, however, a general want of money properly to equip the troops. Bignon reports that the old and honest, but pedantic King of Saxony, with all his predilections for the discipline, perukes, and pigtailed of the seven years' war, had himself said to him, that the Poles could indeed furnish fortresses and soldiers, but there was a universal want of money. This want the Emperor of the French was unwilling to supply; and Bignon, who very seldom blames him, accuses him therefore on this occasion of having greatly injured his cause by his unreasonable parsimony, because the Poles were the men by far best calculated for an expedition to Moscow, and they alone of all the army brought back their guns after the disasters there experienced. The evil influence which the want of money must have had on the organisation of a large Polish army, which the Emperor urgently required, could not have escaped his attention, because Bignon in a letter, dated the 7th of November, 1811, expressly informs him that a great review could not be held because the soldiers were without shoes.

De Pradt, whose authority we always follow with hesitation, and never rely upon except confirmed by other trustworthy evidence, alleges that the Poles brought 85,000 men into the field, but that no pay had been given them from the month of July, 1812, Napoleon having furnished half a million to meet the demands of the month of June. Poland had also seven millions to claim for contracts; the accounts were made up, and still the French paymasters obstructed in every way the payment of the money. This might have been advantageous to individual Frenchmen, but it was very injurious to the Emperor's cause. Bignon had been sent to Warsaw under the very modest title of resident; the Emperor, however, according to his erroneous supposition of the influence of pomp, extravagance, and pretension, had no sooner resolved to throw off the mask than he sent a representative to Warsaw, who was to exhibit great splendour in the character of an extraordinary ambassador; for this purpose Talleyrand would indisputably have been the proper man. The Emperor was, however, at first unwilling to take him with himself to Poland; he had become an object of

\* "La guerre," he writes, "n'a plus rien qui effraye; personne ne calcule les dangers. Dans les cercles, l'occupation de la soirée est de faire de la charpie. Les dames se partagent les régiments pour lesquels chacune d'elles doit fournir le linge et les bandages nécessaires aux blessés."



suspicion to his master since the year 1807, which was increased by his intimate connexion with the whole system of *espionage* and intrigues carried on by Czernitcheff, for no one believed that the agent whom he had given up as a sacrifice on account of the sale of public papers was the real criminal. Talleyrand, who, as was universally known, continually fluctuated between the extremes of vast riches and bankruptcy, was besides at that time in great pecuniary difficulties. The Emperor therefore selected De Pradt, Archbishop of Malines, whom he had already employed in Spanish affairs, and very recently in his disputes with the Pope. It is wholly unnecessary to dwell on the character of such a man, as he has sufficiently characterised himself in his History of the Spanish Revolution, and of his Embassy to Warsaw, or we would rather say, by the lampoons upon Napoleon which these books contain, he has effectually pilloried himself. De Pradt was the Emperor's grand almoner, and in September, 1811, had just returned from his mission to the Pope at Savona; at the end of April, 1812, he received orders to follow the Emperor to Dresden. Bignon was a thoroughly practical and intelligent man, and, because he was master of the German language, had been appointed to superintend the administration both of Austria and Prussia at the time in which these countries were occupied by the French; he was now recalled from Warsaw, first to follow the army, and then to reside in Wilna, as a centre from which the whole of Lithuania might be roused into action.

De Pradt had no sooner arrived in Dresden than he received a general commission from the Emperor to play the part of a great man in Warsaw. By this means he was to excite and captivate the good feelings of the distinguished Polish ladies and gentlemen, who have been always more attached to splendour, luxury, and magniloquence than to any more solid qualities. Among the Catholic Poles and their bishops, a prelate, who had little spiritual about him except the name, and was rich in gasconade, and well practised in courtly manners, was admirably calculated as a representative. For this reason he was dignified with the title of ambassador extraordinary, and very considerable sums were placed at his disposal to enable him to see society, and to keep a splendid table. When he appeared, the whole of the high Polish nobility belonging to the old oligarchy, who alone possessed power, indulged in sensuality, and sold the general good to whomsoever paid the most to them and their factions, now thought that the good old times were returned. They acted and declaimed as formerly, and the old, rigid Catholic King of Saxony rejoiced that a prelate of the Church was for a time at the head of affairs, and that although the royal power was nothing but a shadow, the true faith would have the support of the archbishop.

The King of Saxony had already previously given very extensive powers to his ministry residing in Warsaw; he consented to the calling of a Diet, which brought the country into no small difficulty,



in consequence of the excited imaginations of the people roused by a feeling of their greatness, and the misconceptions with respect to the real views of the Emperor. Napoleon soon perceived that the selection of an empty, though splendid and variously-accomplished talker and courtier like De Pradt, had been a very unfortunate one. It must moreover be admitted, that notwithstanding all that Bignon has said, his writings in refutation of the absurd speeches, calumnies, and boastings of the archbishop,\* the instructions which he had received from the Emperor were of such a description, that he must either have wholly neglected them, or necessarily have led the excited Poles into errors. We shall leave our readers to examine for themselves the justification furnished by Bignon of the measures adopted by Napoleon, and quote the instructions themselves from the abstract of them given by Fain, who without exception gives the best colouring to everything said and done under Napoleon. They run as follows:—

“If matters should lead to a breach with Russia, the Poles must not only become our allies in arms, but they must on this great occasion, the last perhaps that will ever be presented to them, resolve to act for themselves and on their own account. The war which we are about to carry on in the north must be considered by them merely as a means of assisting their own strength, and France be looked upon as a powerful auxiliary. From this moment they must prepare to make the most extraordinary efforts, and, as far as circumstances will permit, all Poland must be in the saddle.”

The King of Saxony was obliged to become the instrument of bringing the Poles into danger, want and war, for the benefit of France, and of filling their minds with patriotic enthusiasm, whilst Napoleon directed his representative to speak merely of the arming and equipment of the Poles, but not a word of the restoration of the kingdom. The Diet which the king's ministers called in the middle of June to meet in Warsaw offered the spectacle which Poles in all ages have exhibited when called upon to consult upon the interests of their country—much fiery enthusiasm, many high-sounding phrases, great clamour and ostentation; but also great vanity, jealousy, and many secret divisions. Prince Adam Czartorinski, then eighty years of age, and worn out with service, was appointed marshal; his son was first minister, and then councillor of state, and confidential friend of the Emperor of Russia. Potocky, who was appointed president of the assembly, opened the Diet with a very singular bombastic speech. The aged marshal was misused to hand in petitions, or as we now see also in Germany, *PRETENDED* petitions, from Poles who had long since become Russians, in which the Diet

\* Bignon's papers, the documents collected, and the letters written as recorded in the last three volumes of his work, furnish altogether a new source for the proper elucidation of the history of the years 1811—1815. This, however, is essentially the case with the first four chapters of the eleventh volume, which are wholly given in Bignon's own hand. The first of these gives a full and detailed account of De Pradt's doings and sayings in Warsaw.

was entreated to try to prevail upon Napoleon to restore to them as a nation their ancient privileges and independence.

At the first sitting of the Diet, held in the church of St. John, the vain archbishop took his seat between the senators and the throne, which was no very favourable indication of the independence of Poland so pompously announced. The clamour raised by the Poles was at first by no means disagreeable to the Emperor; he was desirous that Warsaw should be rendered fanatical, and that the enormously wealthy magnates should apply their money for the military equipment of their clients, that is, of the poor nobility. The Emperor therefore stated to a deputation, which waited upon him as he was on his way to the army without stopping at Warsaw, "That they were quite at liberty to write and speak in Warsaw as much as they pleased—that everything was agreeable to him which excited public attention;" but the vanity of his minister, De Pradt, appeared too empty and absurd; for as far as he was personally concerned, he wished to remain quite apart from the affair, and that the Poles alone should raise all the clamour. The archbishop, meanwhile, intermeddled with everything; he played the part which Repnin and Stackelberg had formerly played; he not only corrected the speeches, proclamations, and manifestoes of the Diet, but he even manufactured them. In his ridiculous book on the Embassy, he boasts of his powers of style. Count Matuschewitz having drawn up the opening address of the Diet in Polish style, in order that it might be sent to the Emperor, the archbishop thought it necessary to have it worked up after the Parisian fashion, which provoked the Emperor extremely. Napoleon, who saw further than his minister of foreign affairs, at first looked upon De Pradt's address as something very fine; he soon, however, perceived that it would be obvious from the style that the whole proceeded from the French, and therefore from him, and to that he decidedly objected. He sent a sharp reproof to the conceited ecclesiastic, by which, however, the latter did not suffer himself to be disturbed.\* De Pradt continued to manufacture speeches and proclamations for the Poles; but he availed himself of the Diet in a manner very different from what the Emperor wished. The object was to maintain the assistance of the Diet, together with a general confederation and numerous particular confederations, and in this way to bring the whole Polish nation into a state of insurrection. The plan, however, failed; and it is absurd to ascribe this failure to the archbishop alone, though he undoubtedly had his

\* It is amusing to read his own account of his indignation against the Duc de Bassano for having at first, from politeness, commended his address, and afterwards being the medium of its official condemnation. *Histoire de l'Ambassade, etc.*, p. 125: "Le Duc de Bassano en recevant le discours de l'ouverture de la Diète, m'avait prodigués les éloges le plus flatteurs—en ouvrant la dépêche du duc sous la date du 6 Juillet j'y lus ces mots:

"« Votre discours m'avait séduit; mais l'Empereur l'a trouvé mauvais, et je dois convenir qu'il a raison. S. M. croit, qu'une adresse faite à Posen, écrit en mauvais style, mais en style évidemment Polonais, aurait été meilleur. C'est par ordre de S. M., et presque sous sa dictée, que je vous écris. »"

share in the matter. He found it advisable to dismiss the Diet, which united both government and legislature, as an inconvenient assembly, because after its dissolution the executive remained in the hands of the king's ministers, or, more properly speaking, in his own. On the 15th of June, at the second sitting of the Diet, the general confederation had been formed, and the king had acceded to it in the beginning of July; but the intended object of the confederation proved a failure.

We do not venture with Bignon to throw the whole blame of the failure upon the archbishop; but he indisputably had a share in the bad success of those measures. The general confederation was to work continuously as a sort of national convention, for it was only in this way that the speeches delivered in it could keep the people in a state of perpetual excitement; the executive remained with the Diet, whose members were in a condition, by means of particular confederations in the different palatinates, to organise the armed masses. This was, indeed, a revolutionary means, but suited to the circumstances; a very different course was, however, followed. The general confederation had no sooner been formed on the 15th of June, than the Diet separated on the 16th; met again, it is true, on the 26th, but separated anew on the 29th. On the 16th a general council, consisting of twelve senators, was appointed; but this council possessed no such executive power as that which belonged to the Diet. The general council was empowered to draw up and issue manifestoes and proclamations, but the executive was in the hands of the ministers of the King of Saxony, who had great influence in Warsaw, but very little in the distant parts of Poland. Of this body, too, the unlucky De Pradt, according to the express command of the king, was president.

Napoleon was in the highest degree dissatisfied with all that was going on in Warsaw and in the whole of Poland, because he himself was continually compromised, when he was anxious to remain entirely neutral, in order not to excite the fears of Austria; the Poles, in his opinion, were alone to act. The courses pursued in Lithuania and Poland were in the mean time decidedly the opposite of each other. In Warsaw it was made to appear as if Poland was to be again restored. In Lithuania, on the contrary, Bignon formed a particular confederation and an interim government, without any regard to what was being done in Poland. The Emperor Alexander, moreover, had succeeded in making a part of the Lithuanian nobility very coolly disposed towards the French, whose allies, the Germans, behaved very badly in their country, partly by the instrumentality of his friend the younger Czartorinski, partly by the intimation that he was not indisposed to restore the kingdom of Poland, and partly by means of balls and all sorts of kindness and courtesy during his sojourn in Wilna.

In July, Napoleon himself was obliged to damp the enthusiasm of the Poles by an answer which would excite our surprise, were it



not that he did not wish at that moment to rouse the suspicion of Austria, inasmuch as he hoped to obtain another corps in addition to that of Schwarzenberg. He replied to the Polish deputation of the council-general, representing the Diet and general confederation, sent to him to Wilna, "That he saw with pleasure the Poles full of enthusiasm, clamour, and universal excitement, and taking arms *en masse*, in hope of the resurrection of Poland; but that it was not consistent with his policy publicly to declare himself favourable to the restoration." This cool answer brought the excited Poles, their ladies, and the Emperor's ambassador extraordinary, into no small difficulty. The archbishop had prepared a speech to be made by the deputation to the Emperor, who remained in Wilna till the 14th of July; as, however, this speech, as is usual on such occasions, was previously communicated, it was not allowed to be made. The celebrated Woiwode Wybieky, who was at the head of the deputation, was obliged to deliver another. Wybieky's address, if we may judge from Bignon's language, does not appear to have been drawn up without his aid.\*

The essence of the speech, which contains a great many phrases very flattering to the Emperor of the French, and denunciations against the Emperor of Russia, was, "that the Emperor would be good enough to confirm the act of the general confederation by his most gracious sanction, to take the resuscitated Poland under his protection, and for this purpose merely to pronounce the words, **THE KINGDOM OF POLAND EXISTS**. This decree in the eyes of the whole world would be equivalent to the fact. Four millions of Poles were already happy; but as soon as these words should be uttered by the Emperor, sixteen millions of Poles would be ready to sacrifice their lives and properties in his cause." The Emperor's answer begins and ends by assuring the Poles how much he is really affected by their enthusiasm, but at the same time he informs them that, in his situation, he is compelled to look at the affairs of Poland not with enthusiasm but with calmness. "Were I a Pole," he observes, "I would have acted as you have done, and voted as you have voted in the assembly in Warsaw, as patriotism is the first virtue of civilised men. In my situation, however, I have many opposing interests to reconcile, and many duties of very different kinds to fulfil." In the conclusion of his address he endeavours on the one hand to repress all hopes of the restoration of Poland, and on the other to excite the Russian Poles, by the assurance that the sacrifices which they should make for him would entitle them to his protection and regard. We shall quote his own words in a note.†

\* The two authors entertain very different opinions respecting this speech; Bignon regards it as not amiss, whilst De Pradt characterises it as "un discours de fabrique dure et grossière."

† "Je vous ai tenu," he says in conclusion, "le même langage lors de ma première apparition en Pologne. Je dois ajouter que j'ai garanti à l'Empereur Autrichien l'intégrité de ses états, et que je ne saurais autoriser aucun manœuvre ni aucun

Bignon, according to his fashion, alleges that this answer had not that damping influence ascribed to it by De Pradt and other writers; and it is indeed true, that the Poles who had been in the French service for years, and belonged to the faction of Poniatowski and other generals, even afterwards made great efforts and brought large forces into the field; but it is also true that the general enthusiasm was extinguished. We readily admit that this was not the effect of words to which much greater influence has been attributed than they really had upon the Poles, but of that general oppression exercised upon the country. Even before the beginning of the war, Berthier, as major-general, had reason to compare the general want with the luxury, revelry, and court ceremonies of the kings of Westphalia and Naples;\* and afterwards the Westphalians and their ruder leader Vandamme, who had been all but sent to the galleys, formerly conducted themselves in Poland as if they were in an enemy's country; and the Wirtembergers behaved so badly, that Napoleon publicly chid the crown prince who was their commander as if he had been a child; at length all their military chests were exhausted, want became universal, and French marauders fired, burned, and plundered in all directions.

A Diet was to be held in Lithuania as well as in Poland, and the meeting was fixed for the 15th of August; as early as September, however, some of the Lithuanians began to suspect what would be the issue of the war, because the Russian army of the Danube was inundating Poland. Although we do not attach great importance to the boasting and insulting language of the archbishop, the passage from his pasquinade given below appears to contain more truth than most writers respecting the deeds of Napoleon are disposed to allow.† Even Bignon cannot deny that one of the Polish ministers

*mouvement qui tendrait à le troubler dans la paisible possession de ce que lui restent des provinces Polonaises. Que la Lithuanie, la Samogitie, Witepsk, Polotzk, Mohilow, la Volhynie, l'Ukraine, la Podolie soient animées du même esprit qui j'ai vu dans la grande Pologne, et la Providence couronnera par le succès la sainteté de votre cause."* The Poles were thus referred to God, and next to the Emperor's grace, who however made them no definite promise. If they were disposed to sacrifice everything for him, then he says that they would establish "des droits à mon estime et à ma protection, sur la quelle vous devez compter dans toutes les circonstances."

\* On the 18th of May the Prince of Neuchâtel writes as follows to the Duc de Feltre, minister of war: "Ces rois ont des états-majors très exigeants, et il ne faut rien moins que la supériorité de l'Empereur et sa présence pour en bannir tout luxe inutile, et le maintenir sur le pied militaire. Je vous prie de vouloir bien me seconder, l'aide de votre excellence m'est nécessaire pour résister aux demandes des rois commandans des corps d'armée en ce qui est contraire à l'ordre général établi par l'Empereur."

† He remarks in his "Ambassade de Varsovie," p. 131:—"LA RÉPONSE ENTORTILLÉE ÉVASIVE DE NAPOLEON GATA TOUT; elle consterna les Polonais. Ces bonnes gens, aussi peu subtils que moi, ne se doutaient pas de la finesse de Napoléon, ni de l'imbroglio qu'il avait imaginé. Leur froid se communiqua à la Pologne, et depuis ce tems on n'a pu parvenir à la réchauffer. Le Duc de Bassano m'écrivait des mirabilia sur la profondeur de cette réponse. Le Roi de Westphalie, à son retour à Varsovie, s'exaltait sur la prodigieuse habileté de ce discours, et trouvait que l'Empereur s'était surpassé en descendant ainsi par prudence à des raffinemens qui contrastaient si fort avec l'ardeur naturelle de son génie."

of the King of Saxony, and other Polish magnates, with respect to whose enthusiasm and patriotism De Pradt cannot find language strong enough to express his admiration, were in correspondence with the Emperor Alexander. Bignon moreover admits that the Emperor destroyed the hopes which he might have placed upon the former members of the Polish republic, by the conduct of his despotic officials in Lithuania. He had appointed the Dutch general, Count Hogendorp, governor-general of the province. This officer, who had formerly played the Oriental despot in Java and the Dutch colonies, by his rudeness and insolence not only affronted the Poles, but gave great offence to the moderate and intelligent Frenchmen who were united with him. He soon disputed with Bignon, who as the imperial commissioner was endeavouring to keep the Poles in good humour with the provisional government of Lithuania. General Jomini too, who was military commandant of the province, was speedily at issue with Hogendorp. The Emperor decided in favour of the servile governor-general, blamed Bignon, and recalled Jomini. Jomini considered himself affronted and degraded; from that moment he appears to have renewed his equivocal negotiations with Czernitcheff, and in August, 1813, went over to the enemy.

The younger Czartorinski who, as a friend and servant of Alexander, although apparently yielding obedience to the ordinances issued under his father's presidency, and separating himself from Russia, nevertheless secretly inclined to the side of the Russians, united with Oginski and others in availing himself of the want of confidence in reference to Napoleon's views awakened in Poland and Lithuania, in order to lead his country to hope to obtain, through the instrumentality of the Emperor of Russia, what Napoleon proved unwilling to promise. We shall hereafter see the manner in which Alexander dealt with the hopes thus raised, that he would restore the ancient name and privileges to at least a part of Poland; for no such idea could be entertained with respect to Volhynia, Podolia, and the Ukraine; and the auxiliaries of Austria had then suppressed all kinds of public manifestation of opinion.

### § III.

#### RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN TILL THE END OF THE YEAR 1812.

##### A.—SITUATION OF THINGS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA.

BEFORE we direct attention to the immense preparations made by the Emperor of the French for a campaign in an inhospitable country, where he could entertain no hopes of finding the luxuries and the conveniences of life, or even a condition of general competence among its inhabitants, we must observe that he had good reason for distrusting some of his most distinguished civil servants, but



from prudence only branded some of the meaner officials as traitors; whilst the Emperor Alexander suffered himself to be misled so far as to persecute some of his ablest men of business as friends to the French.

Napoleon was obliged to endure Fouché and leave him in possession of Illyria, because his services were indispensable; he was obliged to endure Talleyrand, and out of prudence to refrain from dismissing all those who were closely connected by correspondence and feeling with Bernadotte, or who had been bribed by Czernitcheff. The malcontents were, indeed, universally cried down by the sophists, military men, and their innumerable creatures, who swarmed like locusts in all the places to which the armies came; we shall, however, subsequently see that the Emperor on his return to Paris, after the loss of his whole army, became conscious of how little importance was attached to the arrangements made by him for the government of France or the succession to the throne. Two very insignificant generals met with general credence, when they announced in Paris that the Emperor was dead and a provisional government established. No one thought for a moment about the King of Rome, and it was thought that the men who directed the whole could have reckoned on a great number of senators, had the mad scheme been attended with success. We shall see, also, that the Emperor Alexander, when his army returned to Russia, became convinced that secret societies had been formed, which he did not venture at first openly to prosecute, and whose republican dreams first came to light after his death.

Napoleon knew that Czernitcheff had been busy in Paris since 1810, in seducing parties connected with the departments of foreign affairs and of war, and that some of the officials were received into Russian pay, or induced by the influence of ladies of doubtful reputation to be guilty of treachery. He knew that Czernitcheff had bought secret papers and intelligence, and accused him of abusing the privileges conceded to him by the right of nations. Czernitcheff excused himself, but continued without interruption his secret machinations, of which even Kurakin knew nothing, and gained over Berthier's secretary and three of the clerks in his department. By their instrumentality, the last time he was in Paris he got possession of copies of all the papers and plans which had been drawn up respecting the expedition to Russia. At the end of February he carried with him to Petersburg all the orders issued to the several commanders, the marching directions, the army lists, and the whole plan of the campaign, and this, too, when it was too late to issue new ones. This was not known till after his departure; orders were given for his arrest; he was, however, already either beyond the Rhine, or, as Savary, then at the head of the whole system of police and *espionage*, informs us, it was thought undesirable to make much excitement on the question. Had this not been so, he might easily have been overtaken. Three clerks and Cüstinger, the steward

of the Russian embassy, were arrested, but every one was convinced that these men were sacrificed in order to conceal the fact of how little use all the costly system of high police really was. No attempt was made to punish the really guilty. It is proved by Thibaudeau\* himself, a count and councillor of state, and therefore a good witness, that Michel, a clerk in the war department, who was tried, condemned, and executed in May, for having, through the instrumentality of Cüstinger, steward of the Russian embassy, given army lists and other important papers into Czernitcheff's hands, was not the real culprit.

The Emperor of Russia's suspicion of two of the most meritorious and enlightened of his official servants, who did homage to his moderate mode of monarchical government, and his harsh conduct towards them at the moment when the French were advancing to the Vistula, were probably in the highest degree unjust, and the results of the calumnious insinuations of those who were enemies to every man in office supposed to entertain any liberal modes of thought. We have already, several times, stated that the nephew of that Baron Armfelt, who had been at the head of the conspiracy of Ajala, or the conspiracy of the nobles against Gustavus III., enjoyed the special confidence of the emperor at this critical moment, and guided the whole of his conduct in foreign affairs, without being really attached to that department, just as Aracktshejeff directed the internal administration. It was also the younger Armfelt who, in conjunction with the younger Czartorinski, endeavoured to induce the emperor to restore the old Polish nobility, and to support the cause of the wholly forgotten Bourbons. He was further the man who, in opposition to the wishes of the genuine Russians, prevailed upon the emperor to adopt the plan of the campaign which had been suggested and prepared by two officers of German origin. The one of these was General Pfuel, who had passed from the service of Prussia into that of Russia; and the other was the Livonian Barclay de Tolly, who combined the administration of the war department with the chief command of the army, till the emperor was compelled by the murmurs of the Russians to employ the aged Kutusoff, who, as may be seen in Danilewsky's work, was afterwards extolled by the Russians as their deliverer and an incomparable general, although, properly speaking, he merely lent his name.

The plan which Pfuel, Armfelt, and Barclay de Tolly laid before the emperor, and of which he approved, consisted, first of all, in sacrificing one part of his empire in order afterwards to be able to save the whole. Such a plan was only capable of being carried out in a country full of swamps, morasses, and forests, without military

\* Thibaudeau, vol. v., p. 528. "Comment un employé subalterne aurait-il pu réunir des états dressés pour quatre armées différentes, dans quatre bureaux différents, et former un tableau dont la rédaction appartenait au cabinet entier du ministre?"

roads and small towns, or even many villages. According to this plan, a decisive battle was to be avoided, the whole country far and wide was to be laid waste and destroyed, and the French allured onwards more and more into the interior. Armfelt accompanied the emperor on his journey to Wilna, to visit the army under the command of Barclay de Tolly, and prevailed upon him, before his departure, to adopt the harsh measures above referred to against these very distinguished individuals, against whom no other accusation could be made than that they corresponded with some very eminent jurists in France. One of the persons so ill-treated was Count Speranski, who had rendered most important national services by the collection of Russian laws, and stood remarkably high in the emperor's favour in consequence of the liberality of his modes of thought. The genuine Russians, however, and the autocratic Armfelt were indignant with him for having gained the emperor's approval to the introduction of a judicial system in accordance with that established in France. It was rumoured that he wished to introduce the *Code Napoléon*, and he was accused of attachment to France, because he maintained friendly relations with Locré and other jurists of that country. The emperor's conduct on this occasion does little honour to his piety and sentimentality; for Speranski was arrested on his departure from a consultation with Alexander, thrown into a carriage, deprived of all his offices, carried first to Nisney Novogorod, and afterwards to Perm. At the close of the war, the emperor repented of his arbitrary conduct towards the most distinguished man in his empire, recalled him from banishment, and tried to compensate him. The first director of a division of the ministry of justice, and Beck, a councillor of state, president of the department of foreign affairs, were at the same time treated precisely in the same manner as Speranski.

With respect to the preparations made, and measures adopted by the Emperor of the French, the multitude of waggons, the long trains of artisans and workmen of every description, masons, armourers, and even gardeners, tailors, and shoemakers, gave to those of us, who were lookers on in Frankfort-on-the-Main, the idea of the emigration of a whole people, or of the transplantation of the civilisation of France to northern regions. The systematic and methodical arrangement of the means of transport for the army, and the minute regulations even with respect to the oxen for the draught, appeared to be admirable, and the well-disciplined drivers excellently fitted for the management of those thousands of waggons under their care; it soon appeared, however, that the preservation of all this order and regularity was impossible. As thousands of horses were also used for the carriages and baggage of the officers, generals, and marshals, it was impossible to pay adequate attention to all this immense train, together with half a million of warriors, or even to find forage and stabling for the horses. The most of those measures had been adopted as early as 1811; at the end of March the troops



were on their route, and everything necessary for the war was collected and prepared in Danzig. In a bulletin dated the 20th of June, the Emperor alleges: "That he has sent to Danzig provisions of every description, cannon, muskets, powder, balls, and cartridges, together with pontoons, that the garrison of the place was raised to 20,000 men, and very considerable sums placed at the disposal of the engineer corps to strengthen and increase the fortifications."

De Chambray, the best writer on the Russian campaign, has observed and proved that, in a military point of view, a great deal too many heavy guns were carried with the army, and that these were badly horsed. This became obvious when it was felt that this could not be remedied by requiring the use of thousands of horses in the country, as was now done in Germany. This writer asks, what all of us who were ignorant of military movements also asked, as we looked on the immense trains marching through our city: "If the bakers and masons are useful, what does the Emperor propose to do with many of the other tradesmen?" He observes further, that materials for the construction of six bridges; whole trains of waggons full of furniture, axes, saws, and tools of the engineer corps; immense transports of ammunition, and the vast battering train which was sent to Danzig, were all conveyed along with the army. The huge mass of stores of all sorts, and of people who did not belong to but accompanied the army, rendered an immense number of *employés* necessary; and De Chambray, in reference to the commissaries, storekeepers, and overseers, justly observes that their only use was to procure provisions from place to place, and to collect stores in the fortresses,—but experience proved that on the march the commissaries were useless if the soldiers were allowed to carry on marauding practices, and injurious if this was not the case; because the soldiers could obtain all that was necessary much better from the authorities of the country, who were obliged to furnish supplies.

The military regulation of the waggon-trains on this expedition has often been praised as a masterly discovery; De Chambray, however, in the fourth note to the first book of his history, has indisputably proved that the whole of this gigantic arrangement was a failure. We have only to think of twenty-six squadrons of heavy waggons divided into companies, in such a country as Poland. Each company was commanded by a lieutenant, and every squadron by a captain, the waggons sometimes drawn by horses and sometimes by oxen; how was it possible even to bring such a train to the Niemen? The same was the case with the waggons divided into battalions, of which each battalion, drawn by oxen, was laden with 4800 cwt. The six hundred light waggons, called *à la comtoise*, each battalion of which was laden with 1000 cwt., were better fitted for the purpose; we shall, however, subjoin, in a note, the manuscript remark made by a *chef de bataillon* belonging to the engineers upon our copy of De Chambray's book, and it will be seen that this scheme also failed to answer

its purpose.\* Besides, the march was so quick, and the number so great, that the waggons fell whole days' journeys into the rear; and that no distribution could be made, the stores were of no use to the troops, and foraging parties were obliged to be sent out far and near.

Even Bignon, the defender chosen by Napoleon himself in St. Helena, and who therefore suffers not the slightest blame to be attached when the Emperor can possibly be justified, is compelled to admit, that in the Russian expedition there was displayed a want of that judicious foresight which the Emperor had exhibited on almost every other occasion.† Colonel Knesebeck's report to the King of Prussia, to which we have previously alluded, and which the king communicated to the Emperor, ought alone to have deterred them from making such colossal preparations for a march into the interior of Russia.‡ Savary, in his Memoirs, has, it is true, admirably justified the measures adopted by the Emperor; but if we even do him the justice to grant that everything was excellently well arranged if the expedition was to be undertaken, it by no means follows that it ought to have been undertaken at all. Knesebeck's report, founded upon his own observation, and communicated to the Emperor on the 23rd of March, 1812, is fully confirmed by Poniatowski's opinion, who was in command of the Polish part of the forces, and, as a native of the country, must have been best acquainted with its nature and resources. He was very urgently opposed to an expedition into the interior of Russia. Persons who were very nearly connected with Napoleon, and honoured him greatly, but understood nothing of military measures, have assured

\* "On avait fait faire quantité de voitures à la comtoise fort commodes, en ce qu'elles étaient légères, et pouvaient aller à reculons au moyen d'un petit changement qui de l'avant train faisait un arrière train, et réciproquement. On y attelait des bœufs destinés à la consommation, et les troupes en marche étaient chargées de conduire ces petits convois de vivres avec elles jusqu'en quelque magasin prochain, ou bien on leur permettait d'en disposer en route. Mais souvent ces bœufs mal attelés et mal conduits ne voulaient pas avancer, ce qui occasionnait du retard et du desordre, et faisait manquer l'approvisionnement."

† Vol. xi., p. 69. "Nous ne voulons pas le dissimuler, la prévoyance qui dans les époques antérieures mettait tant de soins à préparer le succès des diverses guerres entreprises par Napoléon, avoit sous plus d'un rapport été en défaut au commencement de la guerre de Russie."

‡ Knesebeck first makes a report on his mission, and on the tremendous resistance which the Russians would make, and then passes on to what in reality brought the fate of Xerxes upon Napoleon. *Correspondance Inédite de Nap. Bonaparte*, vii., p. 427: "Les localités donneront encore de grands obstacles à surmonter. Des marais, de grandes forêts, peu d'habitations par de grandes routes soignées, aucune grande rivière, qui favorise les opérations; en général un pays stérile; tout cela gêne les mouvemens et sera cause que les grandes masses ne pourront pas rester rassemblées long tems sur un point; il faudra les disperser par corps pour pouvoir les nourrir, et la défensive donne sous de tels rapports de grands avantages au défenseur, comme elle fait maître à celui qui attaque des obstacles, propre à mettre aux entreprises des plus grand génies des bornes insurmontables, si celui qui se défend adopte un système de dévastation en se retirant sur des points bien choisis d'avance, et en perdront du terrain avec sagesse, ou le défendent pied à pied." He adds, that he learned in Petersburg that such was the system intended to be followed in the war.

us that, on other occasions when he set out, they had never anticipated anything but success, but on this they were filled with gloomy anxieties, and had no cheering hope of anything calculated to add to his renown.

Napoleon's delusion on this occasion would be incomprehensible were it known with what servility all the princes, without exception, and all the corrupt and faded higher classes, paid him homage even in his journey to Poland. The year 1848 has brought upon those princes and nobles the first dreadful penalty for their misconduct, after they had, in 1814-15, defrauded all other classes of their share in the advantages arising from the overthrow of the French dominions by force. Bignon knew and felt this truly, and having, as those who have been in good society are accustomed to do, given a carefully wrought description of the meanness, the flatteries, receptions and festivities, of their princely pomp and princely humiliations, he has shown that God only raises such men as Napoleon and Louis Philippe so high, and holds them up so long, that mankind may see in their fall that what is good and true alone remains for ever.\*

Since the French still continue to blame the Prussians and other Germans for employing every means in 1813 to recover their freedom, we shall here show by example the manner in which the Prince of Eckmühl managed the police in Germany shortly before, and how matters were conducted in Russia. The Prince of Eckmühl perpetrated acts of violence in the kingdom of Westphalia as well as in the north of Germany; he kept a watchful eye on all the *employés* in Westphalia, caused persons to be arrested, gave the necessary instructions to the police in Cassel, and on one occasion gave them notice, that if they did not pay greater attention, he himself would undertake the management of the police. Wherever a French commander was to be found, no right or law was to be had for a German.

About that time, Venturini had undertaken to edit Bredow's "*Chronik des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*," and every one who reads the magazine will perceive with what anxious caution Venturini wrote, because he himself was living in Brunswick under the eye of the Westphalian police, and his publisher in Altona was no less under the superintendence of the Danish authorities, then closely allied with Napoleon. The Emperor had probably never heard of the magazine, but some of the Prince of Eckmühl's bloodhounds called his attention to the fact, that the very innocent historical papers which appeared in the work were often anti-French in their tendency; a notice was therefore sent to the Danish government that the publication must be stopped. It contained, moreover, some remarks in the course of the year 1808 not very favourable

\* Bignon, vol. x., p. 481: "Jamais dans nos tems modernes, jamais dans aucun siècle de l'antiquité, la puissance n'alla plus loin. Napoléon en a touché le faite; monter plus haut est impossible; force lui sera bientôt de descendre, et descendre, d'un sommet si élevé, c'est couler dans un abyme."



to the universal dominion of France, which led to the demand of the French government. The Danish government was obliged to comply, although it was sensible of the injustice, and even gave the publisher to understand that it would meet the case if he would only alter the title of the work. It therefore continued to appear till 1813, under the title of "*Geschichte unserer Zeit*" (the History of our Times), and was published also in another name. Notwithstanding this, it was prohibited under this title also throughout the whole of Germany. It could only be conveyed through the department of the Elbe into Danish territory by smuggling, and the publisher very narrowly escaped the fate which befel Becker, the harmless author of the *National-zeitung*, the "*Noth-und-Hülfsbüchlein*," and other popular books, in Gotha, viz., being carried off to France. Venturini would have been arrested in Brunswick had not the prefect given him a hint at the right time.

With respect to states and princes, the latter were compelled to exercise the most cruel oppression over their country and subjects, in order not to be suddenly driven out of their provinces. This severity was the most oppressive upon the people of Darmstadt, who were distinguished above all others by the Emperor of the French. Lieutenant C. Röder, whose journal has been recently published, observes that the Emperor peculiarly favoured the best of the Darmstadt troops, and that the despotic military prince who was at their head was acknowledged to be as thoroughly hearty in his contempt for the rabble as Napoleon himself. As to Prussia, the alliance with France was so burdensome, that the French, who complain so bitterly of the sudden desertion of Prussia, must have the most extraordinary ideas of the duties of the stronger power towards the weaker, not to admit that all obligations on the part of Prussia ceased as soon as she felt herself in a situation effectually to resist. The King of Prussia, in a letter of the 12th of May, written to Napoleon shortly before their meeting in Dresden, shows most clearly that at that moment the alliance with France was more injurious to the country than a state of open war. An extract from the king's letter, written in the deepest despair, may show the reader\* that such a constrained friend must necessarily prove an enemy in ambush. Napoleon proved that he too was of this opinion, by the manner in which he treated Prussia and used the Prussian troops.

The Austrians, too, were very suspicious allies, for reasons, however, different from those respecting Prussia; they rather promoted the

\* *Correspondance Inédite*, vol. vii., p. 448. "J'ai ratifié les conventions du 24 Février, parceque je croyois leur exécution possible; elle ne le sera pas, si on persiste à s'écarter de la base de ces traités. V. M. daignera se convaincre par la lecture de ce mémoire que les sacrifices qu'on demande à la Prusse surpassent de beaucoup ses moyens et ses ressources. V. M. ne saurait approuver ces prétentions, parcequ'elles réduiraient mes sujets à la famine et au désespoir. Je me décide à faire les derniers efforts pour remplir mes engagements, et j'en appelle uniquement pour le reste à la justice et à l'amitié de V. M."

cause of the Emperor's enemies than his, as soon as his army was beaten in Russia. The Austrians had the advantage of not being under the command of a Frenchman, although their commander-in-chief was obliged to act on Napoleon's orders, communicated to him by Berthier. As, however, there was an immense distance between the Emperor and his allies, and as circumstances constantly interfered with a free communication, the Austrians delayed and obstructed the operations of the Saxons under Regnier, who was joined with them. The Emperor of Austria had appointed as commander-in-chief of the Austrians a man not very distinguished for his military qualities, but who, in consequence of his pliancy and diplomatic ability, was selected on the following year for the very difficult post of commander-in-chief of the combined Russian, Prussian, and Austrian forces. This was Prince Schwarzenberg, at that time Austrian ambassador in Paris, who still continued to hold his diplomatic office, and left the business to be managed by a *chargé d'affaires*. The grand object of the Austrians was to prevent any commotion among the Poles, whilst the French were desirous of the very reverse; Napoleon was therefore more distrusted than aided by his Austrian allies as soon as they reached those districts which had formerly belonged to Poland. This proved really the case, and Schwarzenberg adopted his measures in such a way as always to follow the commands of Napoleon without ever losing sight of the equivocal policy of his court in reference to Russia and Poland.

We do not venture to determine whether Schwarzenberg acted according to express secret instructions, when he failed to give the Emperor of the French that active support which the latter expected, although that is boldly alleged by Segur, whom we cannot regard as any authority; certain it is, however, that his main object was to cover Austrian Galicia, to prevent the union of the Poles for any patriotic objects, and to do as little injury to the Russians as possible. We shall hereafter prove, from a letter written by Napoleon to the Emperor Francis in 1812, that the great man incomprehensibly deceived himself with respect to the nature of his alliance with Austria, and the value of his personal relationships in political affairs. Gourgaud therefore, in his remarks upon Segur, appears to us to be perfectly right, when he alleges that Schwarzenberg's Austrians, afterwards reinforced by the French and Saxons under Regnier, should have been sent into the interior of Austria and distributed among the French troops. He thinks that Poniatowski ought to have been left in Poland and been employed in Volhynia and the Ukraine, in order to raise and arm the Poles in those provinces, and to oppose the Russian army of the Danube.

The accounts even of those writers who have seen and compared the lists, are very different respecting the amount of those, who might probably be called soldiers of all nations, who marched against Russia in the commencement of the campaign in the month of May. As persons almost innumerable and partially under military order

and discipline were employed in the management of the waggon-trains, and bakers, smiths, and boat-builders, in the stores, and in other business, who were not soldiers, it is impossible to state with any precision the number of men who crossed the Oder. We shall merely enumerate some of the statements which have been given, without troubling ourselves with any minute examination of their correctness. As far as we know, the largest number has been given by Labaume.\* Thibaudeau alleges that 509,000 men were together when Napoleon passed the Niemen; he adds that this force was accompanied by 1200 cannon, with 3000 artillery-waggon, and 4000 waggon for the commissariat and other uses; and that in addition to the cavalry 200,000 horses were employed. When we bear in mind that the preceding year in those countries had been a year of want and drought, and that green fodder must necessarily be used, we can easily believe the truth of Thibaudeau's assertion, that one-third of their strength was gone by the time the vast multitude had reached the Dwina. The army-lists of which Czernitcheff succeeded in getting possession in Paris, contained only 417,000. Gourgaud, who, after the fashion of his military countrymen in everything relating to glory or the idolatry of Napoleon, makes no scruple of boldly and insolently disregarding the truth, and appeals to lists which were in his possession as an officer on the staff, and which Napoleon had seen and corrected with his own hand, when he states that the fighting men amounted only to 325,000, of whom 155,000 were French, and 170,000 allies. He explains the difference between his accounts and the numbers given by others by saying, that in them the whole of the regiments, battalions, and squadrons enumerated are reckoned as full, when they were not so. Venturini, without assigning his authority, reckons 600,000. De Chambray, and General von Hofmann, in his account of the battle of the Borodino, give the number as high as 678,000.

The strength of mind and memory exhibited by the Emperor in the documents appended to the first part of De Chambray's history, are such as excite our wonder and admiration. He is there represented as dictating the manner in which every particular is to be regulated, how many persons are to be sent to Spandau and Pillau, what officers as excisemen are to be ordered to Colberg and Graudenz, how single battalions and even companies are to be distributed; and in Berlin everything to be kept carefully under French oversight. He knew all the numbers, every minute circumstance, such as where

\* *Relation complète de la Campagne de Russie*, 1812. The last document in the appendix is an "Etat sommaire des corps faisant partie de la grande armée Française dirigée contre la Russie depuis le premier Mars jusqu'au premier Septembre, 1812. This enumeration concludes with a recapitulation, which contains, first, the strength of the staff, next the eleven different corps—then the corps auxiliaire Autrichien, the garde imperiale, grand Parc, the garrisons of Magdeburg, Danzig, Königsberg, and Hamburg, then the division Roncière (of the viceroy, and therefore Italians), division Napolitaine, troupes Danoises, troupes en marche, dépôt général de cavallerie, corps de cavallerie, 1—4:—in all, 680,500 men, and 176,850 horses.



a bridge was to be thrown over, or a fortification erected; he knew where the guns and ammunition of the Prussians were lodged, and the numbers of their troops, and gave strict orders that they should not be increased. His comprehensive mind, which never anticipated such a destruction as befel his terrible army, made provision for having a new army in readiness, even before he began his march; and this new army was actually called into service in the spring of 1813. This army, though almost equal in number, was, indeed, wholly different from his first one, in training, vigour, and hardiness, if not in courage. In order to arm a nation warlike in its very nature, he had again recourse to the republican idea of a national force, instead of placing reliance, as he had previously done, and as Scharnhorst and Wellington did, upon a standing army. He desired to make every Frenchman a soldier, and even his council of state was struck with terror, when he informed them of his resolution in 1812, because the members of the council perceived that by the renewal of this patriotic military system, he would change this republican system into an imperial one, with the same cunning and energy as he had changed the legal ordinances of the convention into the *Code Napoléon*. The armies of citizens, whom he set in motion, were neither allowed to organise themselves nor to choose their own officers; the government gave them a military form, military law, and military rights; the Emperor prescribed to them military discipline, and placed some of his veterans at their head, who were accustomed to military despotism. The council of state laid before him statements and remonstrances, but these were of no avail, inasmuch as the senate readily decreed whatever the Emperor chose to demand. Lacépède, who was remarkable for his servility above all his compeers, had the shamelessness to extol as a blessing to the citizens of his country the same measures which opened to them the prospect of being in a short time sent to Poland or Spain for the benefit and glory of the Emperor, his marshals, relations, and creatures. The military exercises, as he alleged, were a pleasant amusement for the citizens, and furnished them with agreeable means of recreation in their houses, stores, and workshops.

We know not who may have given the Emperor the idea of resorting to an *arriere-ban* as a cover for his immense recruiting-system; the means was well devised, of concealing under an old Frankish term a device which was still worse than the hated conscription. The whole of the male population of France was divided into the *ban* and *arriere-ban*, according to their age. All persons from twenty-six to sixty were to form two classes, of which the second, or the *arriere-ban*, was only to be called into service in case of extreme necessity. The third, or the first as we may call it, comprehended all persons from twenty to twenty-six. This division was alone contemplated, it alone was organised, and in the course of 1812 some cohorts belonging to it crossed the Rhine. The terror infused into the minds of the whole population of France by this

demand upon the whole youth of the country may be imagined, when we know that shortly before, on the 20th December, 1811, 120,000 conscripts had been called out simply by a decree of the senate passed at the requisition of the government, without any previous commission, or assigning any reasons whatsoever. In order that the matter might not excite too much dread, it was pretended that this levy, divided into cohorts of 160 men each, was destined exclusively for the protection and guard of the frontiers, and should not be ordered beyond the limits of the kingdom. It was intended, as was said, to assist in keeping the police of the interior, to guard the naval stores, harbours, arsenals, and fortresses. No long time elapsed, however, before a portion of the levy was ordered to be used as an army of reserve; and a hundred cohorts of the *ban* were placed after this purpose at the disposal of the government.

#### B.—CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA TILL SEPTEMBER, 1812.

We have already stated that the two emperors, from the commencement of 1811, looked upon war as unavoidable, and laid small stress upon their diplomatic correspondence; we do not therefore think it necessary to delay upon the missions and interchange of notes which took place in the year 1812. They strove to deceive one another; and the very letter which Czernitcheff brought from Paris to Alexander in the end of February, still appeared to contain honest proposals for a reconciliation. This letter was delivered on the 10th of March, at the very same moment in which the ambassador laid before his master the unexampled preparations which were being made for the war against Russia, together with a plan of the campaign; it therefore remained for a long time unanswered. When at length Baron Serdobin arrived in Paris on the 24th of April, and two hours afterwards Prince Kurakin demanded an audience for the purpose of verbally explaining what the Emperor of Russia required from the Emperor of the French, previous to entering upon any negotiations, the latter put off the audience till the 27th. Even then he did not grant the demand, in order, if possible, to put off a breach, but referred the ambassador to the Duke of Bassano. Kurakin stated to the duke, that "before the emperor could suffer himself to enter upon any negotiations, the French must evacuate Prussia and the whole of Germany as far as the Rhine." To this Maret gave no categorical answer, and avoided any further personal intercourse. The ambassador, in consequence, wrote a letter to the minister on the 30th, the main contents of which we quote, without entering into any detailed examination of the diplomatic notes and correspondence which took place between France and Russia.\* The Emperor Alexander declares himself dis-

\* All the documents are printed at the end of the First Book of Part I. of the *Fain MSS.* of 1812, pp. 129-160, under the title: "§ V. Pièces relatives à la rupture entre la Russie et la France. No. 1. Rapport de M. de Knessebeck au roi de Russe, 23 Mars, 1812. No. 2. Echange de notes entre l'ambassadeur M. de Kurakin et le Duc de Bassano. No. 3. Dernières missions données à M. de Lauriston."



posed to negotiate respecting the continuance of the peace. The basis of such negotiations, however, shall be, the immediate evacuation of the territory and fortresses of Prussia by the French. The Emperor Napoleon, also, must agree to a considerable diminution of the garrison of Danzig, evacuate Swedish Pomerania, and come to an agreement with the King of Sweden, which shall be satisfactory to him and the Emperor Alexander. When this has been done, the emperor, without departing from the principles which he has adopted in reference to trade in his states, and the admission of neutrals, and which he cannot renounce, yet, in compliance with the terms of the peace of Tilsit, will not look for any alteration in the existing system of prohibition against English goods. As to direct trade with England, the emperor is ready to unite with the Emperor of the French in a system of licenses for Russia as well as for France; and also to come to an understanding respecting some changes in the tariff of 1810." The Emperor Alexander, in addition to this, professed his readiness to enter into some arrangement for compensation to the Duke of Oldenburg; and the whole was wound up with the declaration, that these conditions must either be accepted or rejected without modification, as Prince Kurakin was not empowered to alter a single syllable.

Although this was a declaration of war, so to speak, yet the Emperor of the French held it advisable to act as if a reconciliation were possible. There can be no doubt that Narbonne's mission, as well as the commission at a subsequent period entrusted to Lauriston, to make certain proposals, were intended partly to open up negotiations, and partly so to influence the mind of the Emperor Alexander as to induce him, like the Emperor Francis, to sue for a treaty after the loss of a battle. Napoleon did not, it is true, go into the subject any further with Kurakin; he, however, gave directions on the 25th of April to the supple, ready, and clever Count Narbonne to proceed from Berlin, where he then was, to Petersburg—the same Narbonne, who in 1792, on the recommendation of Madame de Staël, had been minister of war in Paris, and in 1813 ambassador in Vienna. He was commissioned to make proposals of all kinds, but especially to communicate to the emperor the result of Napoleon's last correspondence with the English government. Narbonne on his arrival found that the emperor had gone to Wilna, whither he followed him; he was very badly received, and was informed that no alteration whatever could be made in the conditions which had been proposed through Kurakin. This journey to Petersburg, and afterwards to Wilna, took up so much time, that he did not meet Napoleon till the 28th of May, till he was taking his departure from Dresden. The Emperor of the French then learned from Narbonne that the whole population of Russia was against him, and that the emperor was prepared to make every sacrifice. In spite of the bad success of all his previous schemes, and in order to deceive the Russians by offers, and to prevent them from adopting



any desperate resolutions, Lauriston was commissioned to proceed to Wilna, and to make further proposals. He, however, was no longer suffered to proceed to Wilna, but required to forward his communications in writing.

All due preparations having been made, the different corps distributed, and the whole army placed in quarters in Prussia and Poland, Napoleon took his departure from Paris on the 9th of May, remained from the 11th till the 12th in Mayence, arrived in Aschaffenburg on the 13th, was met by the King and Queen of Saxony in Freiberg on the 16th, and thence conducted by them to Dresden. As Napoleon was accompanied by his wife, and as the Emperor Francis and his wife, the King and Crown Prince of Prussia, the reigning Dukes of Weimar, Coburg, and Dessau, the Grand-Duke of Würzburg and the King of Westphalia met him in the capital of Saxony, accompanied as they all were by whole swarms of persons, the whole business and pleasure of whose life consists in parade, ostentation, and festivities, we may be able to form some idea of the encomiums which were heaped upon Napoleon, and of the humiliation and servility of all the other high personages who bowed before him. The French writers are inexhaustible in depicting the exhibition of festivities, in which Napoleon, as the representative of the French nation, was honoured like a god; into any further notice of such follies we cannot enter, and satisfy ourselves with referring those who take an interest in them to the report of the vain Archbishop of Malines, who was quite at home on such occasions and in such topics.

Russia had at length succeeded completely in drawing over Sweden to its interests, and in coming to such an understanding with the Turks, as to be able to employ its army on the Danube against the French, at the very moment when their armies had penetrated deeply into Russia. A treaty had been concluded on the 24th of March with Sweden, in which Russia promised its aid in the conquest of Norway, and England had assented to the arrangement; nay, subsidies had even been promised to Sweden in case she sent her armies into Germany. By the mediation of Sweden and England, a reconciliation between the Russians and Turks was at length effected. This fact was indeed not known to Napoleon when he took his departure from Dresden on the 29th of May, in order to begin the war.

Notwithstanding the defeats suffered by his armies, as has been already stated, the Sultan Mahomet could not bring himself to resolve on ceding to Russia those districts which the latter demanded; the congress of Bucharest therefore continued its sittings till Kutusoff laid before them Napoleon's letter, in which he proposed a partition of Turkey with the Russians, and till the people who conducted the negotiations were bribed by Russia and England. At that time the three brothers Morusi had the chief influence in the Turkish cabinet; Demetrius Morusi was the first dragoman of the Porte, and

arranged the business, which should have been conducted by the minister of foreign affairs (Reis Effendi); in the mean time his brother Paganotti discharged his duties in Constantinople, and both were aiming at the office and dignity of a hospodar. Demetrius so contrived, that Kutusoff was enabled to conclude a peace on the 28th of May, shortly before his departure from Bucharest. Had Napoleon's ambassador arrived in Constantinople at the proper time, the Sultan would not have confirmed the peace; the departure of the ambassador was delayed, however, at first by the Emperor, and then by Turkish cabals. General Andréossy, who was commissioned to urge the Sultan to renew the war, and to afford him assistance in officers, soldiers, and money, reached Laybach as early as the 7th of June, 1812; he was however obliged to wait there for instructions, and these warlike instructions could not be prepared till the war was actually begun. His arrival in Constantinople was afterwards delayed by the combination of the bribers and the bribed in obstructing the preparation of a firman till it proved too late. The Emperor of the French was first made acquainted in Witepsk with the conclusion of a peace between Russia and Turkey, when he also received certain information of the Swedish and Russian alliance. In the rest of Europe the peace of Bucharest was not published till October.

By the terms of this peace, the whole of that portion of Moldavia lying eastward from the Pruth to the confluence of the Kilia and the Danube was ceded to the Russians; whilst the latter had again restored to the Turks the province of Servia, which they had previously taken under their protection and recognised. The Sultan regarded the peace as disgraceful, and he hesitated even in July, when it had already been confirmed by the Emperor Alexander in June, whether he would give his sanction. He went so far as to cause the brothers Morusi, who had concluded it, to be bowstrunged; at last, however, he confirmed it in autumn. As soon as the Sultan had given his consent, Admiral Chitchakoff with the army of the Danube was enabled to march to the Beresina.

In the mean time the Emperor of Russia had arrived at Wilna on the 28th of April. Then he collected not merely all his generals round him, but he also invited to join him Benningsen, Suboff, and Korsakoff, whom he had hitherto kept at a distance as the murderers of his father, and gave public manifestations of his reconciliation. The heads of the Lithuanian nobility, Princes Sulkowski and Lubbecki, Counts Oginski, Karwicki and Wawreski were honoured with broad ribbons, and flatteries were heaped upon the distinguished gentlemen of Poland. One grand festivity followed another, and no one was in fact, not merely in appearance, more amiable and knightly than Alexander. The Lithuanians, therefore, were deeply offended at Napoleon for having placed over them such a coarse man as Hogendorp, with whom no one, not even Bignon and General Wrede, could agree; to say nothing of Jomini. The Crown



Prince of Sweden was, moreover, no very faithful ally, for he attempted, even after he had come to a full understanding with Russia and England, once more to obtain from Napoleon what he had secured from the Russians. Signeul, the French consul in Stockholm, for this purpose set out for Dresden, and arrived there on the 30th of May. Napoleon had taken his departure on the 29th; he, however, declined Signeul's proposals, as soon as he heard that the alliance of Sweden was offered to him on conditions of his sanctioning and assisting in wresting Norway from the Danes and paying subsidies to Sweden. The Emperor travelled from Thorn on the Vistula to Kowno, where the French army crossed the Niemen, in seventeen days; he had, however, already announced the commencement of the war to his soldiers by a proclamation issued from Gumbinen, and composed in his usual boasting and pompous style. Whilst the French were advancing, a warm and tedious discussion was carried on so long in the imperial Russian council of war at Wilna, whether to defend that city, or adopt the plan of Barclay de Tolly the minister of war and commander-in-chief, that they were at length obliged to march precipitately to the Dwina with the sacrifice of considerable stores, and to take possession of a fortified camp which had been established at Drissa. As late as the 27th the Emperor Alexander and the whole of his splendid staff and court were assembled at a ball, at the castle of Zacreſt, near Wilna, belonging to General Benningsen, so that the French found everything on the 28th just as it had been prepared for the reception of the Emperor of Russia. They plundered the castle, and carried off the furniture as booty; the Russians were even obliged to leave behind them considerable quantities of ammunition and provisions. In this way, the line of the Russian defences was broken through; and even a portion of their army under Platoff and Bagration would have been cut off, had not the King of Westphalia neglected to obey the commands of his brother with the necessary rapidity. The difficulties of carrying on war in such an inhospitable country as Lithuania and Russia became apparent even at Wilna; the carriages and waggons fell behind, the cannon were obliged to be left, discipline became relaxed, above 10,000 horses had already fallen, and their carcases poisoned the air. General Balachof could scarcely be considered serious in the proposals which he then made for peace in the name of the Emperor of Russia, because the Russians required as a preliminary to all negotiation that the French army should first retire behind the Niemen. The mission of a general, who had been minister of police, and had therefore had great experience in obtaining information, had no doubt a very different object in view from that of making peace at such a moment.

In Wilna, Napoleon established an administrative body which contained many Frenchmen, and where everything was conducted after the French mode. Although the provisional government consisted of Poles, Bignon and Maret, who had followed his master to



Wilna, went with him to reviews, and was employed, contrary to all precedent, in military affairs; Jomini, and afterwards Hogendorp, were really at the head of affairs. When the country was afterwards divided into four intendances, viz., those of Grodno, Wilna, Minsk, and Bialystock, the intendants were universally Frenchmen, young auditors of the council of state, with the rank of generals of division, sons of the new nobility. The sub-prefects alone were natives. The Emperor remained longer in Wilna than was advisable, considering the shortness of a Russian summer, if he wished to push forward to Moscow; his object, however, was to restore the order of the march and the arrangements for the commissariat, which had already fallen into great confusion. He did not set out till the expiration of seventeen days, when he proceeded through Swenziani to Witepsk. Then he heard to his great vexation, that, in consequence of his brother's neglect, the plan of shutting up Bagration between the Prince of Eckmühl's corps and those under Schwarzenberg, Regnier, and the Westphalians, had altogether failed. The Prince of Eckmühl had already got before Bagration, and the King of Westphalia was following close upon his footsteps; on the 29th he ought to have been in Grodno, in order to overtake the Russians on the road from Nicolajeff to Nieswich; he did not arrive, however, till the 30th. This delay might possibly have been ascribed to the incessant torrents of rain which fell, and to the depth of the roads; he, however, afterwards delayed three days in Grodno, as it appears to us for reasons of convenience. In consequence of this, Bagration, against whom the road to Mohilef had been stopped by the Prince of Eckmühl, obtained time to march towards Bobruisk, through waste land and bye-paths, and to reach the Dnieper, where he again formed a junction with the main army. The King of Westphalia, who had previously sent away Vandamme, a man of rude manners but a skilful general, and thereby offended his brother, on this occasion set a very bad example—an example which excited so much the greater attention, as it led to open differences between him and the Emperor, such as those which existed between Napoleon and his other brothers. Whether the Emperor was right or wrong in his accusations against his brother, the conduct of Jerome in leaving his army cannot possibly be justified. When Napoleon found that Bagration had succeeded in escaping from the dangerous position in which he was placed, he took away the command from his brother, and gave him orders to submit himself in future to the directions of the Prince of Eckmühl; and the prince made no delay in informing the king of this resolution. Jerome no sooner received this intimation on the 16th of July, than he relinquished the command of his division, afterwards commanded by Junot, Duke of Abrantes, to General Tharreau, and immediately took his departure from the army, in order to hasten back to Cassel. He did not at first even take his guards with him; a portion of them, however, afterwards followed him.

In the mean time the Emperor of the French had completely gained his object as a general, and broken through the centre of the Russian army, whose line was too widely extended, reaching from the Baltic to Volhynia. Barclay de Tolly being separated from Bagration was obliged to give up the fortified camp of Drissa, in order to be able again to form a junction with him at the other side of the Dnieper. Napoleon, therefore, on leaving Wilna, directed his march to Witepsk, sent Macdonald and the Prussians under York, Grawert, and Kleist to the Lower Dwina, O'Donnell to the Upper Dwina, and left St. Cyr with the Bavarians in Wilna, in order to support the two marshals in case of necessity. The Emperor of Russia had, on this occasion, bitter experience of the consequences of the well-known and almost incredible covetousness and dishonesty of the Russian civil and military officers of all ranks and classes. His army-list contained 1,200,000 soldiers ready for service, of whom not more than 500,000 were in reality in a condition to take the field; and when he arrived at the army, only 300,000 were to be found. He had also caused three lines of stores and provisions to be placed one behind the other; he however found, when he came to the places where those stores were to have been established, that the sums allotted for this purpose had been surreptitiously made away with by persons whom he neither could nor would make responsible. He hastened back to Petersburg, and issued a proclamation, which was announced and put into circulation by the clergy, the civil officers, and generals; it roused the people, and urged the nation in its enthusiasm to make the greatest sacrifices, to lay the towns and cities in ruins, and to change the whole land into a desert, in order to prevent the enemy from finding either shelter or provisions. Wittgenstein with an army was to cover the capital. The emperor himself afterwards went to Moscow.

The French at this time, by the admission of the Emperor himself, suffered excessively from the rain, which fell like waterspouts, and made the roads impassable, and then from intolerable heat. Even in Wilna the whole of their means of transport had been found to be in a miserable condition, and the complaints respecting the deficiency of all the measures and preparations taken and made for the care of the army became so loud, that the Emperor wrote almost in despair. He threw the blame upon Jomini, who, like himself, was to have been everywhere present, and to have personally seen after the adoption of all the necessary measures. Five hundred cwts. of flour were to be distributed daily, and yet he was obliged to listen to complaints from all quarters, that there was no confidence either in the transport of provisions to Wilna, or in the administration which had been appointed for Lithuania. In the mean time he continued his march to Smolensko, although the duchy of Warsaw was so urgently threatened, even before the Russian army of the Danube left Moldavia, that it was necessary to place the Saxons

under Regnier under the command of Schwarzenberg, and to order him to return from Volhynia to Poland. Markoff and Tormasoff had got together an army formed of their united divisions, with which Tormasoff surprised Kobrin and took Klingel's brigade prisoners. Regnier, who had remained behind in the duchy, could not of himself offer sufficient resistance, and was obliged to look for help from Schwarzenberg. There still, however, remained 160,000 men, who in case of a battle could be brought into the field by the Emperor.

Napoleon reached Witepsk on the 28th of July, and continued there till the 13th of August; and it was supposed for many reasons that he would not push further into the interior of Russia. The season was so far advanced that two months was the longest time in which troops could keep the field. In Witepsk the Emperor received positive intelligence that Sweden would take part in the war against him, and that a peace had been concluded between the Russians and the Turks; he must therefore have expected to be threatened by the Russian army of the Danube in the rear. The treaty concluded between Russia and England at Orebro opened the Russian harbours to English ships; Russia received 700,000*l.* for subsidies, and agreed on her part to give her fleet in pledge to the English, and to send it to English harbours. Sweden also concluded a treaty with England, and was to receive subsidies as soon as the crown prince should enter Germany with a combined army of Russians and Swedes. The Emperor of the French, notwithstanding all this intelligence, continued his march, and set out for Smolensko on the 13th of August, because he had learned that Barclay de Tolly had succeeded in forming a junction with Bagration to dispute his passage across the Dnieper, and to defend Smolensko. This would necessarily lead to a decisive action; Napoleon entertained not the slightest doubt of the success of his arms, and after the victory he hoped to be able to persuade Alexander to conclude a peace.

The main body of the Russians occupied the suburbs of Smolensko upon the right bank of the Dnieper; twenty thousand, however, afterwards by degrees passed over to the left bank, in order to defend the town itself, which was surrounded by a high wall. Ney and Murat had hastened forward before the rest of the army, and the former made an unsuccessful attempt to take the town by storm as early as the 16th. On the 17th the whole body of the troops appeared not far from the city, and as Barclay de Tolly, the main body of whose army was on the right bank, continually allowed more troops to cross to the left, Napoleon hoped he would offer battle before the town; he, however, kept his army within the walls. A desperate struggle was continued during the whole of the 17th, whilst the town itself was on fire in all directions. Thousands fell on both sides, and the Russians, who were bad marksmen, lost many more men than the French; the latter, however, proved unable to



force their way into the town. In the evening the French artillery were got into position on the glacis and swept the streets; the walls were at length undermined, the wooden buildings were easily set on fire by discharges from the howitzers and mortars, and the Russians at length found it advisable completely to evacuate the town in the night between the 17th and 18th. They withdrew into the suburbs lying on the opposite side of the town, and burnt down the bridges behind them. The whole city was now in flames, and General Korf, who covered the retreat and maintained his position the longest, did all in his power, as he retired, to increase the destruction, in compliance with the policy of the Russians, to destroy everything which they were unable, or did not wish, to defend, just as the French annihilated whole towns and villages from carelessness or malignity. The town presented a dreadful spectacle. Dead bodies lay scattered in all directions, and wherever the eye was turned nothing was to be seen but desolation. Six hundred men, to whom two hundred Russian prisoners were added, were employed till the 21st in the removal of the dead. Danilewsky maintains that the number of the fallen on both sides amounted to more than 20,000.

The main body of the Russians remained till the 19th upon the heights on the further side of the Dnieper. From thence they first withdrew along the road to Petersburg, but afterwards, by following a cross road, reached the highway to Moscow. The state of the victorious army was already such, that it was obvious to all, that if it followed the Russians to Moscow, it could not survive the severities of a Russian winter. This is alleged in all the Memoirs written by officers who were present with the expedition, and De Chambray has given such demonstrative proofs of the truth of the opinion, that we may unhesitatingly refer our readers to his remarks. He also gives an account of the miserable condition of the hospitals, with the exception of those attached to the Wirtemberg troops, of which he speaks in the highest terms.\*

In order to reach the road to Moscow from that to Petersburg, Barclay was obliged to cross a morass, the exit from which might have been easily barred by the French; Ney made the attempt to do so with his division. A regular battle was the consequence at Valutina Gora, and each party brought into action on this occasion about 30,000. In the early part of the engagement the advantage was on the side of the French, but as the Russians were continually receiving reinforcements, and the French were not, the fortune of the day was turned, and the former succeeded in getting before the latter on the road to Moscow. Most writers throw the blame upon Junot. Fain even alleges that Junot was a little wrong in the head as early as the 17th (which afterwards he in reality did become); De

\* De Chambray, "Expedition de Russie," vol. i., p. 103-113. With respect to the hospitals he observes, p. 108: "Les hôpitaux y (in Wilna) étaient très mal tenus. Les hôpitaux Wurtembergeois établis dans la même ville, mais pour le compte de leur souverain, ne manquaient de rien."

Chambray alone is impartial enough to admit, that Napoleon himself, because he was not sufficiently well acquainted with the circumstances of the case, had first given orders to General Morand to halt, and had then not sent the order to advance to Junot, who was unwilling to advance without orders; it might have been sent in half an hour. The Emperor, moreover, was very unwilling that Junot, either from his own desire, or at the strong appeal of the King of Naples, should be put in motion; for he wished to remove him from his command, and to transfer it to General Rapp. This was prevented by Rapp himself, and Junot's weakness of mind afterwards proved very frequently injurious.

All writers are agreed that the plan followed by Barclay de Tolly on this occasion was admirable; the Russians, on the other hand, and amongst them even Bagration, blamed the Germans, from whom the plan proceeded, for having made Russia a desert; and, therefore, they were clamorous for the appointment of a Russian commander-in-chief and a battle. The emperor was constantly importuned by his brother, Constantine; and although he knew that Barclay de Tolly was pursuing a judicious plan, he was obliged to yield to the general clamour. Napoleon had already sent a part of his army forward on the road to Moscow; he remained, however, for some time undetermined whether he ought to proceed. It is clear, from his having sent home such a man as Dessoles, that all his generals did not agree with him; but because he was not well informed of the general feeling among the Russians, he imagined that Barclay would find himself compelled to venture a decisive battle. Having, therefore, remained in Smolensko from the 20th till the 24th of August, he commenced his march to Moscow. He proceeded with so much the more confidence, as Oudinot and St. Cyr had driven back Wittgenstein on the one wing at Polotzk, and Schwarzenberg and Tormasoff on the other; and he had already sent forward several divisions of his army. On his march, he himself was accustomed to say that he expected a battle, a victory, and after that a peace. "In eight days," he observed, "we shall have an engagement and then a peace." In this expectation he was deceived, from want of a proper knowledge of the Emperor Alexander's character.

Barclay de Tolly had been already obliged to resolve on risking a battle, and had chosen a position for the purpose of the engagement; before, however, the time arrived, Kutusoff received the chief command, and he chose another position, five marches on this side of Moscow. Wiasma, a town of 15,000 inhabitants, was burnt down by the Russians in order to prevent the French from finding either shelter or provisions; whilst Ghiat and Dorogobrigi were similarly treated by the French without any reason whatever. Kutusoff, who arrived at the army on the 29th, had gained some splendid victories over the Turks, whilst he was in command of the army of the Danube; he was accused, however, of doing all in his power to pre-

vent a peace, instead of promoting it, and, in consequence, he fell into disgrace. He was therefore recalled, and Chitchakoff appointed to succeed him; the peace, however, had already been concluded, before the admiral undertook the command. Kutusoff was the ideal of all the Russian nobles, of the ladies, and the court, whilst the emperor, on his part, was not well affected towards him. He thought it prudent, however, to conceal his feelings. The nobles, who kept importuning the emperor, made great sacrifices, at that time, for their country, and they looked upon Kutusoff as the national hero. Some of them afterwards complained, at the close of the year, that advanced age had made him slow and cautious in his operations. Amongst the distinguished persons who were anxious to have the destinies and honour of the nation committed to Kutusoff, were the Grand-Duchess Catherine, Memonoff, Soltikoff, Demidoff, the Countess Orloff, and others, who formed whole regiments of their own vassals, and equipped them at their own cost. The Germans, whose plans were thrown aside and treated with contempt, did, however, on this occasion, great service to Russia. Baron von Stein continued to excite and stimulate the minds of his fellow-countrymen, and kept up constant communications with the Prussians before Riga. The most distinguished of the Prussian officers, such as Clausewitz, Hofmann, Pfuel, and others would much rather have entered into the Russian service than have aided the French; and at that time Von Tettenborn formed his parti-coloured corps from German, French, Italian, and Spanish deserters and prisoners. A formal treaty was concluded with the insurgents of Spain, and their deputy Zea Bermudez, whilst Madame de Staël and Louis XVIII., or more properly speaking, the familiar friend of that egotistical gourmand, stirred up all their friends amongst the French against Napoleon. Madame de Staël had come to Petersburg in person, and afterwards travelled to Stockholm, when a sort of anti-Bonapartist club assembled at her house; the Countess Polignac was actively engaged in the interests of Louis XVIII. and the Comte d'Artois. It is moreover alleged, that the Emperor Alexander was so little disposed to appoint the aged Kutusoff commander-in-chief, that the two empresses were obliged, most earnestly, to beseech him to concede his restoration; others allege that he merely consented to name the veteran, then 75 years old, to the post, in order to prevent the consequences of a misunderstanding between Barclay de Tolly and Bagration.

As the French pushed forward against Wiasma, Miloradowitch, at the head of 16,000 men, formed a junction with Barclay de Tolly, who indeed burnt down Wiasma on the 27th, and retreated, but had resolved to risk an engagement on the 29th or 30th, in a valley full of ravines and narrow paths. At this moment, however, Kutusoff arrived, accompanied by Benningsen, and De Tolly was patriotic enough to remain and continue in service under the new commander-in-chief; especially as both he and Armfelt relied upon the emperor, who still shared their views. Both sides had lost a great many men



at and in Smolensko, and at Valutina Gora; and when Kutusoff assumed the command, he did not think it advisable to offer battle in the place selected by his predecessor. He, therefore, left Ghiat and Dorogobrigi to the fate which the French had, either designedly or through carelessness, brought on almost every place—on almost every village and single house since they had entered old Russia. The inhabitants either took refuge in the woods or fled further into the interior. Kutusoff at length selected Mojaïsk, within five marches of Moscow, as his battle-field, close to the village of Borodino, situated on the two small rivers Kolocza and Moskwa. The battle which was then fought has been therefore called by the Russians the battle of Borodino, whilst the French have given it the name of the battle of the Moskwa. Shortly before the engagement, Napoleon caused a letter to be written by Berthier to the Russian commander-in-chief, that he, in his own name, might send a copy to the Emperor Alexander. This letter was intended to induce the emperor, provided the French were victorious, to agree to a peace.\*

The French Emperor was engaged from the 1st till the 4th of September in collecting and arranging his army, which was to advance from Ghiat against the Russians, who had erected redoubts, and taken up a fortified position on the Moskwa or Kolocza. Some of the Russian redoubts were taken by storm as early as the 5th, and on the 6th and 7th the most bloody battle was fought which has taken place since the invention of gunpowder. It is no part of the object of this work either to describe the battle or to pass any judgment on the generals and their measures. General von Hoffmann, however, and a great many French writers, have given full and scientific accounts of the dreadful scene. They have also instituted inquiries concerning the number of troops engaged on each side, from which it appears that the Russians were greater in number, though inferior in discipline, and led by inferior commanders. De Chambray alone has come to a different conclusion, and alleges that the French had 100,000, whilst the Russians were only 92,000. Napoleon, after having made, as usual with him, all the necessary arrangements, and seen his orders carried out, retired to a distance of a few miles from the field of battle, where he walked up and down in company with Berthier, and occasionally rode nearer to the scene of action. Of all the Russian generals engaged on this occasion Bagration gained the highest honour. He had been known as a distinguished officer from 1805. In this battle, however, he was mor-

\* The postscript to this letter, dictated by Napoleon to Berthier, was as follows: "L'Empereur, à qui j'ai communiqué cette lettre, me charge de vous prier de faire ses complimens à l'Empereur Alexandre, s'il est à l'armée, ou au premier rapport que vous lui ferez. Dites-lui que ni les vicissitudes de la guerre, ni aucune circonstance, ne peuvent altérer l'estime et l'amitié qu'il lui porte." This appears to push matters too far even for a cunning Corsican. The opportunity for writing the letter was furnished by the return of Count Orloff, who had been sent to Smolensko to make inquiries concerning a Russian general who had been taken prisoner, and detained till the French entered Ghiat.

tally wounded, and died very soon after. Among the French, Ney was distinguished by Napoleon above all the others. As Ney had been previously created Duke of Elchingen, in honour of the victory gained at that place, Davoust, first Duke of Auerstadt, and afterwards Prince of Eckmühl, on account of the victories gained at those places respectively, Ney was now raised to the dignity of Prince of the Moskwa, on account of his services in this battle.

After the murderous engagements of the 6th, the Russians still maintained a part of the battle-field, and were able, with some appearance of truth, to boast of a victory in their reports to the emperor. They went so far as to order a *Te Deum* to be sung in the churches, and the emperor created Kutusoff a field-marshal, as if he had been conqueror at Borodino. The immediate results, however, proved clearly enough that the Russians were beaten, although in such a way that doubts were at first entertained whether they would not risk another battle. Each party brought about 400 pieces of artillery into the field (De Chambray assigns the French 587, and the Russians more than 600). Of the 104 pieces belonging to the French guard, only 36 were brought into action; but these, as the French allege, were so admirably managed by Sorbier, the commander of the artillery of the guard, that the greatest part of the Russians who made the last desperate attack was annihilated by them. The loss of the Russians in this battle was much greater than that of the French, because Napoleon employed the heaviest artillery, and the Russians exposed themselves to the fire in very dense masses. The best French, Russian, and German authorities are very nearly agreed respecting the number of killed and wounded in this horrible battle. Thibaudeau, on a comparison of all the reports, reckons the loss of the Russians at 50,000, and that of the French at 30,000. General Hofmann, who was present in person, and also minutely examined all the proper sources of information, estimates the loss of the former from 40 to 45,000, and that of the latter at the same amount as Thibaudeau. He alleges, at the same time, that the Russians lost one-half of their infantry, and the French only one-third, whilst the loss of the latter in cavalry was greater than that of the former. The ridiculous manner in which the ordinary French writers, such as Norvins, Gourgaud, Fain, and others, have exaggerated the loss of their enemies and understated their own, and supported their statements by lying bulletins, is at once obvious, from their attempt to make the world believe that not more than 10,000 French had been killed and wounded on this occasion, although it is proved beyond doubt that 49 generals, 37 colonels, and 6547 inferior officers, were killed or wounded. The Emperor of the French is unjustly accused of having had it in his power to change this doubtful victory into a decisive one, had he not been too sparing of his guards, but sent them freely into the battle. He knew very well what he was doing, and the history of the retreat from Moscow proves how truly he foresaw what might possibly happen. The

Russians retired in the night, with the loss of a few guns only, and no prisoners. The battle-field, however, strewn with balls, was covered with thousands of wounded Russians and French. The Russian army not only marched for five days in perfect order on the road to Moscow, but they once even made a halt at Fili, as if disposed to offer the French an opportunity for another engagement. The Emperor of the French was desirous of removing his headquarters, on the day after the battle, to Mojaïsk, about an hour's distance from Borodino; but Platoff and his Cossacks so obstructed and harassed the imperial equipages, that the King of Naples was only able on the following day to advance so far on the road towards Moscow as to render it in any degree safe to have the headquarters removed to Mojaïsk. The Russian army, moreover, on its arrival in Moscow, marched quietly through the city, and at first took up its position on the road to Vladimir. Murat hastened so far before the rest of the army, that Platoff's Cossacks were still in the town as he entered. There was, however, a silent understanding not to attack them, in order to avoid fights in the streets.

#### C. CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA TILL THE END OF DECEMBER, 1812.

The Russians contrived for some days to conceal the direction of their march and their positions from the observation of the French, who suddenly saw themselves deceived in all the expectations which they had formed from the possession of a city of 400,000 inhabitants. They naturally expected a quiet existence, such as they had enjoyed in Berlin and Vienna, and a central point for their administration, in which they purposed to employ the most distinguished and richest of the Russians who had remained behind, as their deputies and tools. The Emperor had already appointed Mortier as governor of the city, Durosnel as commandant, and Lesseps was destined for intendant, having been previously for a long time consul-general in Russia, and having travelled across the whole empire, when La Perouse sent him from Kamschatka to Paris. Murat expected a deputation to wait upon him, as had taken place in Germany; no one, however, appeared; the most distinguished persons had left the city, and the others remained concealed. The treasures of the Kremlin, the archives, and dépôts for the troops, which were very numerous in Moscow, had been all removed from the city. The university, the institute for young ladies of noble family, and the orphan asylum had all been transferred to Kasan, when the Emperor entered on the 14th of September. Napoleon at first took up his abode in the suburbs, but afterwards betook himself to the Kremlin, the ancient palace of the Muscovite czars. There he soon found himself surrounded by flames.

As early as the 14th single houses were on fire; on the 15th whole streets were in flames; and on the following days the progress of the



destructive element still continued; and as the Russians had carried away all the fire-engines, the fire became so dreadful as early as the 16th, and the heat in the Krenlin so great, that the Emperor was obliged to retire to the country palace of Petrowski, lying about two miles from the city. The rage of the burning continued till the 20th, when of the whole number of 6500 wooden houses only 2000 were standing, and of the 2600 stone ones not more than 526. The number of houses destroyed has been exaggerated to 13,800, and the loss estimated at 331,000,000 of roubles. In the Memoirs of a Statesman there is contained a minute investigation of the cause of the fire; De Chambray, however, proves that the destruction of the capital had been secretly resolved upon in the Russian cabinet, and the execution of it left to Rostopchin, the governor, who with a polished exterior combined a genuine Russian character, and by means of popular and scurrilous writings excited the people against the French, just as Hébert and Marat in Paris were accustomed to influence the democrats against their opponents.

As the sacrifice of a capital is a solitary case in history, and the burning of Moscow made a fearful impression upon the conquerors and their leader—as the Emperor Alexander has never acknowledged that he was a willing party to the destruction, and Rostopchin has publicly denied, in a printed declaration, that he was privy to its execution—we must dwell for a few moments on the consideration of the facts and evidence. We shall not repeat what has been so well and critically observed by De Chambray. We shall remark, first of all, that it appears clear to us, from the very language of the proclamation issued by the Emperor Alexander during the sojourn of the French in Moscow, and wherein he predicts all the evil consequences of a prolonged stay in the interior of Russia, that the destruction of the capital had been long contemplated in the cabinet.\* The measure of destroying the capital to save the empire is not, indeed, morally justifiable, but it exhibited as dreadful an energy as was displayed by Danton in the massacres of September. It was also as effectual for its object; and Rostopchin and Danton only aimed at being politicians, and not moralists. We feel called upon to add something further in a note, in order to justify ourselves when we allege without hesitation, supported by the word of Baron

\* "All the evils," it is said in the proclamation, "which the enemy has thought to inflict upon us will fall at last upon his own head. However painful it is to see the ancient capital of the empire in his power, HE HAS NOTHING OF IT EXCEPT THE EMPTY WALLS. In his pride, he thinks himself able to prescribe a peace. HE WILL, HOWEVER, FIND HIMSELF DECEIVED IN HIS EXPECTATIONS. Surrounded as he is on all sides, he will find himself compelled, from want of provisions, to cut a way for retreat. The one-half of his army, from its various struggles with us, is already fallen, or has been destroyed by weariness, want, sickness, and desertion. The remainder of his army is in the midst of the empire, plunged, as it were, into the midst of a true and faithful people, and completely surrounded by our armies, one of which is against him in the field, and three others in movement, in order to cut off his retreat," &c.

von Meyendorf, that the burning of Moscow had been long agreed to by the emperor before the city was set on fire.\* The consequences of the burning were, first of all, a general plunder of the city, the demoralisation of the troops, and an accumulation of booty of all kinds in the hands of the French generals, officers, and soldiers, which they were afterwards obliged either to relinquish or leave behind them, and which, in fact, they were wholly unable, from the loss of horses, to carry with them. There was still shelter enough to be found in the houses which remained, nor had the whole of the inhabitants deserted the city. Unhappily, the Emperor remained there too long before he was able to resolve upon giving the humiliating command to retreat.

It would be very unjust not to acknowledge that the great superiority of the *élite* of the French army above those of all other countries—the English partially excepted—was never more splendidly exhibited than at this moment, when their number was being daily diminished, and at a time when demoralisation began to loosen all the bonds of discipline. There can be no doubt, that until the time of the hard frost came, the Russians were uniformly obliged to yield to the retreating army whenever matters came to a collision; it is, however, a thing equally certain, that the army, even before the frost had become severe, was incredibly weakened—dissolved as it were—and left without any means of help or deliverance. The Emperor was indefatigable in his labours, and dictated orders which have been loudly extolled by all writers; we, however, only see the effect of his care in questions of strategy and tactics, when the object was to prevent his army from being annihilated, or to force a way for retreat through the enemy; he was, indeed, born to be a great military hero. The condition of the army may be best illustrated by one or two examples. The fourth army corps had lost so many of its men from forced marches and the habit of marauding, that between the time of its marching out of Glogau and that of its reaching Moscow it had diminished from 50,000 to 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. The thirteenth division had fallen from 13,000 to 4000; and the same degree of loss appears from General Lassberg's letters to have taken place in the Westphalian divisions, and from Colonel Röder's printed journal to have befallen the Darmstadt troops. The

\* We might confidently refer to Butturlin as an evidence, who, without directly affirming that his government caused this fearful tragedy to be executed, gave such intimations as must lead us to conclude that such is the fact. Rostopchin, when he was in Paris in 1822, published a pamphlet, entitled, "*La Vérité sur l'Incendie à Moscou*," in which he boldly denies the whole affair. But even then every one laughed at this brutal buffoon, on account of his attempt to throw dust in the eyes of the public. When the winter palace in Petersburg was burnt down, in December, 1838, Herr von Meyendorf, at that time a councillor of state, chamberlain to the Emperor Nicholas, and a member of the embassy in Paris, published a pamphlet respecting the fire, and the previous events which had taken place in the palace. "*C'est là*," he observes, "*que fut résolu le sacrifice de Moscou*." As Bignon, who received the pamphlet from Meyendorf, appeals to it in his "*Histoire de France sous Napoleon*," vol. xi, pp. 118-120, we feel justified in adopting the same course.



squadrons and battalions of waggons that were so celebrated, and even the *comtoises*, were lost before they reached Wilna, or were left behind in that city, and many of them had not even crossed the Niemen. The 5000 baggage-waggons which the army possessed on leaving Moscow, as well as the 500 guns and 2500 artillery waggons, lost a considerable number of horses every day. The cavalry horses died like flies, and those that survived lost all their strength. This proved the more ruinous, as General Hofmann assures us that the Russian horses were so thoroughly accustomed to a climate and fodder which was destructive of the French, that he never saw an instance of one which had fallen from weariness or want. As to the cold, De Chambray affirms that the horses would have borne it perfectly well had they been properly fed.

Should it be asked, why a great general, whose mind embraced within its grasp many things which escaped those of others, spent five weeks of precious time in and around Moscow, it might be replied that he still entertained hopes of being able to conclude a peace, and that everything possible was done on the part of the Russians to confirm him in this expectation. As to the latter point, immediately after the entrance of the French into Moscow Jacoffleff, councillor of state, well knowing that there was no idea of concluding a peace, undertook the commission which Napoleon gave him. He had remained in Moscow, and became the bearer of a letter from Napoleon to the Emperor Alexander at Petersburg, and promised to return with an answer. He set out on the 14th of September, but on the 4th of October Napoleon had had no news whatever either of his letter or of Jacoffleff. He then tried another way, and sent Lauriston, his adjutant-general, who had been shortly before ambassador in Petersburg, to Field-Marshal Kutusoff, in the Russian camp. Lauriston was admitted to Kutusoff's presence only with great difficulty; he had, however, a conversation with him on the 6th of October, when he requested leave to travel to Petersburg, and to convey Napoleon's letter to the emperor. That leave he was unable to obtain; but the French were detained in Moscow by the promise of forwarding the communication through Prince Wolkowsky. The Emperor Alexander not only did not send an answer, but he even sent a reproof to Kutusoff for having so much as admitted Lauriston into his camp; and even this communication did not arrive till the French had already made all the necessary preparations for departure.

The preparations for the retreat from Moscow had been made since the beginning of October, which was at least two days too late;\* and these circumstances lead us to make two observations. On this subject we have a striking example of the nature of the Bona-

\* Gourgaud, vol. ii., liv. ix., ch. xix., enumerates the orders of the 5th, 6th, 10th, 13th, and 15th of October, which contain admirable arrangements for the retreat. Every one knows how easy it is to give orders—the execution, however, is a very different thing.



partist historiography. The whole of Bonaparte's historians and eulogists inform us that the army had six lines of magazines from Moscow to Stettin; while the eye-witnesses and those who took part in the affair state, on the other hand, that from Moscow to Kowno many more men and horses perished from want than either through cold or arms. Secondly, it appears to us in no small degree ridiculous, that at a moment when the whole of the heavy artillery should have been left behind, and the pontoons really were so—when it was evidently impossible to bring the guns, baggage, and men back into Germany—orders should be given to pack up heavy trophies of victory to forward to Paris. As early as the 9th of October, various objects of rarity found in the Kremlin were packed up, such as the standards which the Russians for the last hundred years had taken from the Turks; an image of the virgin, richly adorned with false stones, which were taken for diamonds; the small golden cross, which had stood upon the large wooden one covered with sheet-iron, on the top of the tower of Ivan Weliki.\* On the 15th this baggage was sent forward; on the two following days the hospitals were removed to Smolensko, and the Emperor purposed to follow on the 19th. He gave all possible commands, and admirably, as might be expected; but he did not trouble himself to inquire whether their execution was possible. Thus, on the 10th, he wrote to Murat that there was 1000 cwt. of flour and a great deal of brandy in Moscow, which he was to take with him. Murat, however, had no means of transport, and his people lived on horseflesh.

When Kutusoff was first driven out of Moscow, he pitched his camp on the Vladimir road, and afterwards took up a position at Kolomna, on the Moskwa; and at length, from the 17th till the 25th of September, took a circuit round Moscow, and fixed his quarters on the Oka, on the road to Kaluga. The advanced-guard of the Russians was under the command of Miloradowitch, who, from the 11th till the 17th of October, when Lauriston was in his camp, suffered the French to remain unmolested, and Murat on his part observed a formal suspension of arms. Kutusoff was entrenched behind the Nara and the Istia, whilst Murat had placed a division of the troops under his command at Winkowo, where he was suddenly surprised on the 18th, and driven back. He lost thirty-six cannon and the greater part of his baggage. His cavalry

\* Gourgaud, *Examen Critique*, vol. i., liv. ix., ch. i., corrects the stories relating to the immense iron cross of the Ivan Tower, which Napoleon, according to report, was said to have carried away with him: "Cette croix, qui, placée au haut de la tour d'Ivan Weliki, avait trente pieds de hauteur, était en bois recouvert de lames très minces d'argent doré. Lorsqu'on voulait l'enlever, les sappeurs chargés de cette opération la laissèrent tomber, elle fut brisée en mille pièces, les lames d'argent mises à part, et le bois abandonné. Une petite croix en or pur, d'environ dix pouces de haut, était fixée au milieu de la grande place. Elle fut conservée et emportée avec le trésor de l'armée. Voilà la gigantesque croix de M. Ségur réduite à dix pouces." Even the small cross was not gold, but thickly gilt.

were either killed, or the horses, worn out with want or fatigue, were destroyed; the chief object, however, that of completely cutting off Murat and his 25,000 men, proved a failure. The French do not fail on this occasion, as usual, to complain of treachery and a breach of truce, which never had in fact been concluded. On the other hand, they boast with good reason of the strategical skill of Bonaparte, who, as he took his departure from Moscow, proceeded as if he meant to march to Kaluga and Tula, and who successfully passed round the Russian position at Torontino, where Kutusoff had encamped, believing that from thence he commanded both the roads to Smolensko—the one by Kaluga, the other through Juchnoff.

Before following the French from Moscow to Smolensko, we must relate the manner in which, at the time when the main army was on its retreat to the Dnieper and the Beresina, the armies on the wings were pressed upon, and finally compelled to relinquish their positions. With regard to the left wing under Schwarzenberg and Regnier, or the Austrians and Saxons, who, after the attack of the latter at Kobrin, marched under Schwarzenberg against Tormasoff, in order to save Warsaw, Schwarzenberg gained a victory on the 10th of August at Gorodezno, which compelled the Russians completely to retire; he, however, took very good care not to attack them with any design of inflicting serious injury. He remained a quiet spectator whilst Tormasoff took up a position behind the Styr, till the Turks at length resolved to confirm the peace of Bucharest, and Admiral Chitchakoff had completed his march through Moldavia. The admiral had received orders as early as the 6th of August to march with his army of the Danube to the Vistula; it, however, required a long time to draw in all the scattered divisions of the corps to the main body. He afterwards marched through Moldavia, and crossed the Dnieper at Chotzin on the 6th of September. From thence, on the earnest entreaties of Tormasoff, he hastened his march, and his advanced guard reached Lutsk as early as the 15th of September. On the 18th, both the armies, consisting of four divisions, were completely united. Three days afterwards, Schwarzenberg, whose rear-guard was under the command of Regnier, found it advisable to retire behind the Bug. Whilst Schwarzenberg, pressed by the Russians, was proceeding towards Brezsk Litoweski, Czernicheff arrived in the Russian camp with a letter which summoned Tormasoff to the main army. Tormasoff was appointed to the command there which Bagration had held. Chitchakoff received the command of the combined armies, and at the same time instructions to take measures to obstruct or prevent the retreat of Napoleon's army. Chitchakoff followed Schwarzenberg's army, crossed the Muchawetz at Bulkowa on the 8th of October, on the 9th took up a position against the Austrians, and was about to attack them, when they quickly retired. The



French writers, with the exception of De Chambray, throw blame upon both the generals; upon the Austrian, for not marching to Minsk instead of proceeding to the neighbourhood of Warsaw; and upon the Russian, for not pushing rapidly forward instead of remaining still for some time, and allowing his Cossacks to wander about in the duchy of Warsaw, instead of quickly forming a junction with Wittgenstein's army, then in Lithuania.

As we have already stated, Wittgenstein was acting against the left of the French, when Napoleon marched to Smolensko. This left wing consisted of the corps under Macdonald, viz., of the Prussians under York, Grawert, and Kleist, and of Oudinot's corps. The two corps kept possession of the whole country, from the mouth of the Dwina to Polotzk. Macdonald's troops lay in parties from Riga as far as Reval; Oudinot was stationed on the Upper Dwina; and Wittgenstein pushed forward between the two. Oudinot was not equal to the Russians in number; and, St. Cyr, with the Bavarians under Derooy and Siebein, was ordered to reinforce him; he, however, did not wait for their arrival, but crossed the Polotzk, and proceeded against the enemy. On the 2nd of August he was attacked at Swolna, and driven back to Polotzk; but was no sooner joined by St. Cyr and the Bavarians, than he advanced again against the Russians. On the 17th a very bloody, though indecisive, battle was fought, in which Oudinot was severely wounded. St. Cyr renewed the engagement at noon on the 18th, and drove the Russians back, for which he was made a marshal. Derooy and Siebein were both mortally, and General Verdier severely, wounded. The siege of Riga could not be undertaken for want of heavy artillery, and it was only closely blockaded. The Prussians lay before Riga from the 22nd of August till the 17th of September, because they were deficient in siege artillery; on the 18th, 130 pieces were at length got together at Runthal. The season was by much too far advanced for earth works; and the Emperor did not then think it advisable to commence a formal siege. The Prussians, scattered about over Courland and towards Esthonia, were, moreover, by no means numerous enough completely to blockade such a considerable town. The besieging army had enough to do to defend itself from the garrison of the town and General Essen; when, therefore, a second Russian army was landed at Riga, in conjunction with General Essen, to seize upon the siege artillery, and, if not successful in that, to reinforce Wittgenstein, the Prussians were not in a condition both to defend their park of artillery and to protect the city of Mitau.

On the 27th of August, the Crown Prince of Sweden had a personal interview with the Emperor Alexander at Abo, in Finland. Lord Cathcart, as the English plenipotentiary, was present at that meeting, and it was agreed on this occasion that Russia should have on the Dwina the use of a portion of the army formerly promised to the



Swedes. This army was at that time in Finland to assist the Swedes in the conquest of Norway; but it was agreed that the attack upon Norway should be put off, and the Russians on a future occasion were to send double the number formerly promised—50,000 instead of 25,000. The *élite* of the Russian army in Finland was therefore landed at Riga under General Steinheil, almost at the same time as the immense park of artillery was got together at Runthal. This park had been sent by ship from Danzig to Königsberg as early as the 20th of May, and from thence, on the 12th of July, it was forwarded also by water to Tilsit. From Tilsit it was brought by land to Runthal, and had scarcely reached its destination, when the Russians made an attack along the whole line upon the Prussians, under York, Grawert, Kleist, and Hunerbein, who showed on this occasion as great bravery as skill. They were, indeed, for a moment obliged to surrender Mitau, from whence the Russians carried off considerable stores and a few pieces of cannon; they fortunately, however, succeeded in protecting the park of artillery at Runthal against their opponents. Mitau also was immediately afterwards again taken possession of, and Steinheil formed a junction with Wittgenstein, whose force was progressively raised to 40,000 men, and then far superior to the French under St. Cyr. St. Cyr had therefore in some degree fortified his position at Polotzk, but immediately took measures to give it up as soon as he was attacked by Wittgenstein, on the 18th of October.

A part of St. Cyr's force consisted of the Bavarians who, after Dero's death, were commanded by General Wrede. Their number had been greatly diminished through want and fatigue; they however greatly assisted St. Cyr to maintain his position in the bloody battle of the 28th, which was renewed with double vehemence on the 29th. In this engagement St. Cyr lost between five and six thousand men; the Russians almost double that number. The new marshal was himself so severely wounded, that he was obliged to give up the command to General Merle. Merle remained in his position on the 20th, but on the 21st he gave it up, in order to draw near to Victor. Victor had already advanced to Smolensko, when, without having received the smallest intelligence of the main army, he received orders to approach Minsk and Polotzk, in order to unite the 9th, 2nd, and 6th corps under his command. He then proceeded with 36,000 men to the Lukomila, where General Merle formed a junction with him on the 29th of October. Victor had still at that time 4000 cavalry in his army, the Bavarians however had all disappeared to about 2000 men. The French for a moment appeared as if they were about to attack Wittgenstein, but afterwards drew back. Their retirement was as favourable to the Russians as a victory would have been, for Wittgenstein was then enabled to send divisions of his army to Minsk, to Wilna, Dwina-burg, or Witepsk, just as circumstances required. He might, had he so desired, have

effected a much earlier junction with Chitchakoff than he did, because this general appeared as early as the beginning of September in the southern parts of Lithuania.

When Napoleon left Moscow on the 19th of October, he left General Mortier behind him, who did not take his departure till the 23rd, and before so doing perpetrated a great deal of reckless destruction. No one can complain that the general caused the whole of the heavy pontoons and apparatus for the construction of temporary bridges to be destroyed, because they could not be removed; nor of the destruction of the ammunition and materials of war found in the city; but the mining and blowing up the walls of the Kremlin was an act of reckless and most unnecessary destruction. At the moment of Mortier's leaving the city, about two o'clock on the 23rd, the old palace of the czar, a portion of the surrounding walls, the church of St. Nicholas, an arsenal, and some adjoining buildings, were seriously injured by fire or mines. A few of the sick and wounded were taken away, but 1200 were left behind in Moscow. It has been already stated, that Napoleon at first commenced his march on the road to Kaluga, either to give the Russians the impression that his object was to take possession of Kaluga and Tula, or because he preferred the road through Kaluga to Smolensko to that through Mojaïsk and Wiasma, where everything was destroyed and consumed. He, as has been above observed, went round the Russian position at Torontino. Eugene, viceroy of Italy, who commanded the van, marched on securely at the head of his troops, when, with his 17,000 men, he most unexpectedly fell in with Kutusoff's main army on the 22nd, at Malojaroslowez. Napoleon conceived Kutusoff to be still at Torontino; he had, however, pitched his camp in a position from which he could watch and command both the roads to Smolensko—that through Kaluga, and the other by Juchnoff.

Napoleon's army was stronger on his departure from Moscow than on his arrival there, having been considerably reinforced by the coming in of those men who either could not or would not follow the march. The army, however, was very deficient in light cavalry, and was often very ill-informed of the various movements of the Russians. The artillery horses fell down daily by hundreds; of the cavalry, only about 4000 men of the guards were fit for service; and the march of the troops was constantly obstructed, and the narrow passes rendered dangerous by long trains of carriages and waggons of all kinds, by baggage and plunder, and by people who had attached themselves to the army in Moscow. The French were still superior to the Russians in the open field, as was proved in the fearful struggle of the 24th, in which the viceroy alone was engaged with the Russians before the arrival of other troops. He compelled Kutusoff to retreat. During the battle, the small town of Malojaroslowez was completely burnt down and destroyed, and Kutusoff lost about 8000 men. He, however, appeared as if he would renew the battle on the 25th; the affair had cost the French 6000 men, and they were



besides obliged to carry away their wounded along with them. During the night, Platoff fell upon the French with his Cossacks; Rapp was thrown from his horse, and received a severe contusion; Napoleon himself was very nearly being carried off; and eleven guns were seized. Withal, however, Kutusoff afterwards retired behind the Oka, so that the road to Kaluga and Tula was left open. Napoleon, notwithstanding, found it advisable neither to take the road by Kaluga to Smolensko, nor that by Juchnoff; he preferred turning aside from the highway across the country, in order again to reach the completely desert way through Wiasma, by which he had advanced to Moscow. In this way seven precious days were lost, viz., the time of the march to Malojaroslowez, the day of the battle, and the following one. We do not, however, relying on the authority of Butturlin, Wilson and others, venture to blame the great general for not having fought a second battle, and then proceeded through Kaluga and Tula into the Ukraine. If we suffered ourselves to enter upon military questions, we would here introduce what De Chambray has written concerning the measures which the Emperor ought immediately to have adopted, as these appear to us to have been the right ones.

When the French took the road to Wereja, Kutusoff chose a circuitous direction over Modyn, which led him somewhat backwards away from his opponents; in consequence of this, the march of the French, which was like the migration of a whole people, was relieved for a time from the attack of their enemies, and they had merely to deal with the Cossacks. Leaving Mojaisk to the right, the old road was again reached near Borodino. On the 27th, when the cold began first to set in severely, Napoleon was in Wereja, and on the 29th had passed beyond Mojaisk. He himself, with his guards, led the van, and was followed by three other corps, each at half a day's march from the other. The first of these corps was under the command of Ney, the second of the viceroy, and the third of the Prince of Eckmühl, who covered the retreat of the baggage and camp-followers, and drove them all before him. The last of these appeared afterwards not to push on with sufficient speed, and the Emperor therefore left the rear-guard to the Prince of the Moskwa. At Wereja, Mortier joined the main army, having come from Moscow by the same road as the young guard. Immediately afterwards the cold reached eight degrees of Reaumur, and the roads, which had hitherto been almost impassable, became slippery and smooth, and the horses, which had not been duly prepared for the frost, fell by thousands on the high plain lying between Wiasma and Smolensko. The wounded, who had been crowded into the hospitals and conventual buildings of Kolotzskoi, were by the Emperor's command placed in the officers' carriages, and even upon the market carts. De Chambray, however, justly remarks that he knows not whether this was done from humanity, a false sense of honour, or a desire to save the lives of veteran soldiers. The result was very



melancholy for the army, and wholly destructive to the unfortunate victims themselves. These unfortunate men had no means of existence whatever, and they were not in a condition to endure the fatigue, privations, and remaining by night in the open air, and were therefore left behind by those who had brought them away, and should have provided means for their support. They died from want of shelter, of winter clothing and shoes, and destitute of the commonest necessities of life, for which, were we to write history after Gourgaud, or with faith in the orders, or according to the assertions of Montholon, Fain, and others, we should say abundant provision had been made. The want of draught cattle and horses, after their loss by thousands, altogether ruined the army before Smolensko, although it continually maintained a bold front to the enemy.

In order to give anything like a just account of the sufferings and heroism of the French on the road from Moscow to the Beresina, it would be necessary to give a regular journal of their labours, and to enter into particulars wholly inconsistent with our object; all this, however, may be found detailed in De Chambray, Ségur, and Labaume. Whenever their accounts are defective, especially as regards the German troops, the deficiency is fully supplied in the printed journal of Colonel Röder, of the Darmstadt troops, and in the Letters of General von Lassberg of Cassel. Our purpose is merely to give a hasty sketch of the whole march, and occasionally to furnish a few particulars by way of example.

As Kutusoff took the longest road through Modyn to Wiasma, the two hostile armies marched for some time almost in opposite directions, and the Emperor reached Wiasma sooner than the Russians. He remained there from the 31st of October till the 2nd of November. From the moment in which he left Wiasma the Russians were close upon him. On his right marched Field-marshal Kutusoff himself, and in the rear the corps of the Prince of Eckmühl was hard pressed by Miloradowitch, whom the French called the Russian Murat. As early as the 3rd of November the three corps were obliged to turn round and to offer battle at Wiasma, otherwise the whole of the rear would have been cut off. True the French drove their enemies back, but lost on their part from four to five thousand men and some thousands of prisoners. Before this time, the Prince of Eckmühl had been in command of the rear, and as Napoleon thought that his delays had led to the necessity of the battle, he transferred the command to Ney. All discipline, however, gradually ceased, and the number of stragglers increased to an incredible amount. In order to procure fodder it was necessary to form foraging parties to maraud in the plains at an hour's distance from the high road. Provisions were not to be had, with the exception of the flour and brandy distributed to the guards in Ghiat, Wiasma, and Dorogobni. When at length handmills were distributed to the troops on the 5th they were useless, because no grain was to be

obtained. The only food was the flesh of the dead horses. As early as the 4th, the booty carried away from Moscow, the baggage, artillery, and waggons were thrown into the lake of Semolovo, and from Mojaisk onward the reports of the blowing up of the ammunition waggons, which could no longer be drawn forward, were incessant.

Up to the 6th and 7th of November, when the army had reached within about twenty miles of Smolensko, the cold was endurable. On the 16th, however, it rose to seventeen degrees of Reaumur, and afterwards became again a little milder. The ice and snow rendered many places wholly impracticable for the horses to draw either the cannon or waggons; and on the 9th, when the viceroy reached the river Wop, which was crowded with floating ice, the division of the army under his command appeared as if it must necessarily fall into the hands of the enemy. On the 8th, Prince Eugene had caused a bridge to be thrown across the river; but for want of solid materials the swollen stream carried away the bridge, and he was left suddenly on the banks of the rapid stream completely exposed to the assault of the advancing enemy. At length one of the most distinguished among the officers ventured to set an example to the soldiers by showing them the possibility of wading across the river, and they immediately followed, although the water reached their shoulders. The whole of the camp-followers, all the weary and irresolute, remained behind; and when Broussier, who had been left behind for their protection, crossed the river with the whole of his division on the 10th, they, together with the whole of the baggage and more than eighty pieces of artillery, fell into the hands of the Cossacks. Many soldiers were drowned in the Wop, while others perished on the further bank. Of the whole of the sixth corps, 6000 at most remained under arms.

The Emperor himself reached Smolensko as early as the 9th, but the whole army was not collected there till the 18th. Their expectations of finding shelter, protection, rest, and provisions there were however miserably deceived. The Emperor, it is true, appears from the account of the Prince of Neuchatel, to have issued admirable orders; but those to whom their execution was entrusted acted in the most shameless, dishonest, and negligent manner. One of them brought an account for 1000 oxen, which he alleged had been sent forward to the army, while it turned out on inquiry that he had not sent a single one, but had sold them all to Jews. No proper provision was made for distributing flour, brandy, and peas from the stores which were in existence. The soldiers, driven by hunger to despair, seized the magazines by force; and even the officers sent and encouraged their men to lay hold of, and carry off by force, whatever they could find. When the Emperor is accused of the care bestowed upon his guard, it should be remembered that upon the guard alone rested any hope which remained of safety or deliverance, and that Napoleon saw in it the only kernel of a new army. The guard,



therefore, kept well together as far as Smolensko, and also rendered most important services afterwards.

Claparede, with the van, left Smolensko as early as the 13th. Napoleon followed on the 14th; then Eugene, and the other corps, at similar intervals; so that Ney did not leave the city till the 17th, when the cold had become very intense. From 6000 to 7000 wounded men were left behind in Smolensko without any provision whatever being made for their care and support. The walls and towers of the place were blown up; guns, ammunition, and cannon were either destroyed or buried; and even the rest of the city would have been knocked to ruins had not Platoff, with his Cossacks, ventured to enter even before the French took their departure. The French army collected together in Smolensko, which was still in some measure in a condition to keep the field, together with the garrison which had been left there, is said to have been about 40,000 strong; but, on the other hand, not more than about 2000 heavy and 1000 light cavalry remained of the 37,000 which the Emperor had led across the Niemen; not more than 250 out of 600 guns. The number of stragglers who followed the army without order or discipline was at that time estimated at 50,000 souls.

From Smolensko the army was, first of all, obliged to march to Krasnoë, and from thence to Orsha; Kutusoff's object was to anticipate the arrival of the French at the latter place, which he really accomplished by marching to Jelnia, where he pursued his way along a parallel road. On this march he was opposed by Baraguay d'Hilliers, who had been sent by Victor in order to protect and facilitate the progress of the retreating army. The corps of the French guard was, however, far too much divided: Augereau, brother to the marshal, had been surprised in Liacknowa, and, after a desperate struggle, the whole of his force—2000 strong—had been obliged to lay down their arms. Baraguay d'Hilliers, with the rest of his division, went to Smolensko. The Emperor believed that Baraguay was to blame for Augereau's unlucky defeat, and sent him home under arrest, where he was to be tried by court-martial. The general, however, died on the journey. Not only the 2000 men of Augereau's corps fell into the hands of General Orlof Denisof, who had fallen upon them by surprise, but also the magazines in Liacknowa, which proved of the greatest advantage to the Russian army.

Kutusoff now became so superior to the French army that it would have been difficult for the latter to have withstood a general attack; he, however, probably hesitated to run the risk of the issue of a general engagement, and was sure that the hostile army, without any risk on his part, must fall a prey to the severity of the climate and the difficulties of the march. Perhaps he also thought that Chitchakoff and Wittgenstein would form a junction at the Bere-sina, whilst he would cut off the French in the rear. He quietly suffered the Emperor with his divisions to enter Krasnoë; the following divisions, however, under Davoust and Ney, were in great



danger of being cut off. Napoleon resolved to hasten to their relief. On the 17th he returned and attacked the Russians, who had pressed in between him and the corps by which he was followed. Davoust was saved. The Emperor, however, did not wait for Ney's arrival, but left him behind surrounded by the enemy, and for some time gave him up for lost. Ney appeared to be lost, several thousand soldiers following the army without order were made prisoners; but Ney created general astonishment, saving himself and his troops in a wonderful manner, by crossing the Dnieper on the ice a little higher up, though it was scarcely frozen over, whereas the rest of the army had crossed lower down by the bridge at Orsha. At this place the French army again assembled, and attempts were made to restore order to the miserable remnant. It was necessary, however, to use great expedition, for at this very moment Wittgenstein and Chitchakoff's armies threatened to occupy the bridge at Borisoff, the only one across the Beresina, and thus completely to cut off the road to Wilna. According to the testimony of Butturlin, Kutusoff had lost about 30,000 men from the battle of Malojaroslowez to that of Krasnoë, and he therefore now wished to leave a part of the struggle to the two auxiliary armies.

Chitchakoff, after having retired on the 20th of October before Schwarzenberg and Regnier to Brezse, manifestly remained too long there, but he at length left Sacken and was on the way to Minsk as Napoleon entered Liady. On the 18th of November the admiral took possession of Minsk, of which Napoleon was informed on the morning of the 18th at Dubrowna, a day's march from Orsha. He then immediately despatched Dombrowsky's division, in order to defend the *tête du pont* on the right bank of the Beresina; Oudinot with the whole of his corps was to support Dombrowsky, and to drive the Russians back again out of Minsk. In the mean time Marshal Victor was to prevent Wittgenstein from forming a junction with Chitchakoff. The admiral, however, had left Minsk on the 21st, and not only taken possession of the *tête du pont* on the Beresina, but had also sent a division across the river, which pressed into Borisoff at the same time with the French, and was to be on the look out for Wittgenstein. Fortunately Kutusoff had made a halt on the Dnieper, having previously left the road to Orsha open to the French, by recalling Tormasoff, who was between Liady and Krasnoë; Wittgenstein therefore was in no haste to form a junction with Chitchakoff, so that the latter was now not equal to the French, who since their arrival in Orsha were greatly refreshed and revived. True, the French had again lost a great quantity of baggage and many guns, together with about 3000 men able to bear arms, and as many more, incapable of service, between Orsha and Krasnoë; but they found supplies in Orsha, and were also able to calculate on Oudinot, St. Cyr, and Victor. In Orsha they not only met with provisions, but also twenty-five field pieces, and horses to draw them. The artillery which had been brought as far

as Smolensko and Krasnoë had been lost within the last few days, and ten thousand more besides. At Orsha there had been found two bridges of sixty pontoons, with all the necessary implements and materials for construction, but they were burnt, because reliance was placed on the use of the bridge at Borisoff. Another misfortune supervened in the coming on of a thaw, at the very time in which it was necessary to march through the marshy districts to the Beresina. The cold, however, again returned with such severity in December and January as to prove destructive even to the Russians. On the march the roads were unfathomable, and the Beresina, although not frozen over, was covered with floating ice.

Marshal Victor stood opposed to Wittgenstein; Oudinot marched to Bobr, in order to retake Minsk, because it contained magazines and stores, and because, also, it might be used as the road to Wilna; when, however, he found Borisoff occupied by the Russians, he called in Dombrowsky's troops under his own command, in order to retake the town. He drove the Russians back across the river, but was unable to prevent them from burning down the bridge. It appeared afterwards impossible hastily to restore this bridge, although all the materials necessary for the construction of a temporary structure had been rescued from the burning of the materials in Orsha. From the commands issued by the Emperor we see, also, that he was not guided, as has been often stated, by the fact of Corbineau's having discovered a place where the river might be forded, in selecting a place for crossing the river, but that he had previously pointed out the two points at the village of Studianka and the hamlet of Weselowo, as laid down upon the large map of Russia, which the Emperor had had copied, translated, and distributed to his generals, as the proper places for effecting the passage. In an order of as early a date as the 23rd, the Emperor had designated Studianka, five hours above Borisoff, as the most favourable point for the construction of two or three bridges. One of the bridges was completed under his own eyes on the 26th, by the great activity of Generals Eblé and Chasseloup, and by the sacrifice of the *pontonniërs*, who worked standing up to their middle in water full of floating ice. A captain of the *pontonniërs*, who has added some manuscript notes to our copy of De Chambray's book, observes that it had been an unpardonable oversight not to spare and bring with them at least four waggon-loads of the materials which were consumed. Dombrowsky and Oudinot first crossed by this bridge, in order to drive Chitchakoff's troops from the higher and lower bank of the Beresina. The swamp on the further side was frozen over. On the following day Napoleon himself passed, leaving only Victor behind to protect the countless multitudes who were crowding forward without order. On the 27th Oudinot succeeded, after a bloody struggle, in driving Chitchakoff's troops so far back that the passage of the river was rendered possible; he himself, however, was wounded in the battle. Victor fought the whole of the 26th against Wittgen-



stein's army heroically; the result was, however, horrible—one of the bridges broke—a junction was formed by the three Russian armies, all order and discipline among the French left behind under Victor's command wholly disappeared, the cold became intolerable, the Russians made a violent assault on the night between the 27th and 28th, and Partonneaux with his division was cut off at Borisoff.

On the 28th, and still more on the 29th, the distress and suffering on the bank became indescribable; the bridge for carriages had completely given way—the others were frequently blocked up by the multitudes passing over; the waiting mass, during the night between the 28th and the 29th, became too fearful, indolent, and irresolute to cross, and when the Russians came on in the morning, all was thrown into irremediable confusion. Hundreds were squeezed or trodden to death on the bridge; and others fell into the water and were drowned among the floating ice; many were frozen to death, and innumerable masses perished from hunger and complete exhaustion. The artillery of the Russians and the pikes of the Cossacks annihilated thousands. We cannot, therefore, be surprised at the *sufferings of the Beresina* having become an expression for the highest degree of calamity which can befall men in war. The simplicity of the Duke of Bassano was unexampled, who instead of informing Macdonald in right time of the misfortune of the army, in order that he might take his measures accordingly, wrote him a letter, which was received on the 4th of December, wherein it was stated that Napoleon had beaten Wittgenstein and Chitchakoff, who tried to dispute the passage of the Beresina, and had inflicted such a loss upon the latter as to leave him only 7000 infantry and 6000 cavalry. According to the report in the Königsberg Journal, which was sent to Macdonald, Napoleon had made 9000 prisoners, and taken nine stand of colours and twelve cannon.

Ségur indeed says, that Napoleon, after the crossing of the Beresina, had still 60,000 men, including the corps of Oudinot and Victor, of whom one-third were capable of service; De Chambray however, a much more trustworthy authority, informs us that three days after the passage, he had only 8400 men, and proves this statement by a detailed account of each division of the army. Luckily for this weak army, Chitchakoff had neglected to burn the boards which were laid across the marsh at the other side of the Beresina, and which formed a species of road and enabled the army to get over; by this means the French not only were enabled quickly to cross the morass in which they would otherwise have sunk, but the Russians in pursuing them were obliged to take a circuitous road, in consequence of the boards being taken up and burnt by the French. The Neapolitans and Bavarians at length marched to Wilna, and were sent to meet the scattered army; but the cold, which had again become dreadful in the months of December and January, partly destroyed them, and the want of order and discipline, which



had previously invaded Oudinot and Victor's corps, infected the new advancing troops like the plague. Before the army reached Wilna the misery and confusion had reached an incredible extent, notwithstanding which Napoleon's bulletins till the last moment announced nothing but victory, and the Duke of Bassano communicated nothing but the most advantageous reports to the ambassadors by whom he was surrounded in Wilna; the sudden revelation of the truth therefore made so much the more dreadful impression. Napoleon first perceived at Malodeczno, long after the passage of the Beresina, that the whole of his army was either dissolved or annihilated; he therefore resolved to make the truth known and to hasten back to France, in order to organise a new army.

In Malodeczno, on the 3rd of December, the Emperor dictated the celebrated 29th bulletin, in which he gives a fearfully true account of the condition of the army since its departure from Moscow, which, at the same time clothes the whole in the dress of boasting untruth. It contains not a word of the misfortunes and failures of the army, of the want of care for the due support of the troops, and of the total relaxation of discipline before their arrival in Smolensko; the whole calamity is ascribed to the effect of the cold, although that in fact did not become excessive till the 3rd of December. At the same time Napoleon left behind him in Malodeczno a whole series of orders, which like everything he did and ordered, prove the superiority of his genius, but show (as did all his conduct in Spain, Poland, and Russia) that he never troubled himself to consider whether his orders under given circumstances were possible to be carried into execution. In order to justify this opinion, which appears very bold to the readers of the Bonapartist authorities, we shall refer to the facts that, according to his command, an army of 80,000 men was to have been got together in Poland at the end of the year, and yet at that very time no single army was there to be found, because he had reckoned without his host. He commanded Loison with a division of 10,000 men, which had gone from Königsberg to Wilna, to go to Ozmiana, three marches from Wilna, to meet and reinforce the army. This division was either frozen to death or dissolved itself. De Chambray alleges that in three days 7000 of the 10,000 men perished from cold. Heudelet, with an equal force, was to wait for the army at the Niemen; there was, however, no force of the kind. Macdonald with the Prussians, Schwarzenberg with the Austrians, and Regnier with the Saxons, were to form a junction with the reinforced army in Ozmiana and on the Niemen; all this was rendered impossible by circumstances.

In Smorgoni, a march nearer Wilna than Malodeczno, the Emperor at length resolved to hasten before the miserable remnant of his army to Wilna, and to travel also to Paris by Warsaw and Dresden, accompanied only by Caulaincourt, Duroc, and Mouton. He left Wilna on the 5th of December, and reached Paris on the 19th, after having two days before caused the dreadful 29th bulletin

to be published in the *Moniteur*, and thrown the whole country into mourning. Before leaving Lithuania he had communicated to the Duke of Bassano his views of all that was to be done after his departure. The whole of the diplomatic corps, on a hint from Murat, had taken themselves away, and Murat alone went out to meet the Emperor. Napoleon did not wish to delay in Wilna; he therefore took Murat into his carriage and communicated to him verbally the necessary directions. We pass altogether over the fact that Napoleon before leaving the army called together his marshals in Smorgoni, and addressed them after his manner, in a tone one while haughty and at another humble, and entered into particulars connected with his departure which are not necessary to indicate the general course of things; we cannot, however, avoid showing, that it was a grand mistake to have chosen his representative on this occasion according to relationship, and rank, and seniority. He gave the chief command of the army, not to Marshal Ney, who had previously rendered almost incredible services in the command of the rear guard, but to his brother-in-law Murat, King of Naples. In Smorgoni, Ney did not, like Napoleon himself, conceal the real state of the army; he expressed himself very strongly on the subject to Bignon, whom he still found in Wilna, and who has given us an account of what then took place. He alleges that Ney plainly stated in Wilna, that with the cold at 26 degrees below freezing, all the Emperor's measures and orders were wholly useless, and that the hope of saving the sick and the wounded must be altogether given up.\* On the 7th of December the diplomatic corps had fled from Wilna, and on the 8th Murat entered with the remnant of the army; but as the superintendents of the stores, and those appointed to distribute to the thousands of soldiers and stragglers who were perishing from hunger and cold, did not by any means quickly enough distribute supplies, which must have been left to the Russians, the magazines were broken up and plundered.†

Napoleon remained only a very short time in Wilna, and reached

\* Bignon, vol. xi., p. 180, notes: "Lorsque le maréchal arrivait à Wilna je lui marquais, qu'il venait d'arriver sept à huit cents voitures, que j'avais requises depuis quelque jours pour l'évacuation de nos malades et de nos blessés. Le maréchal, qui connaissait mieux que moi la situation des choses, me répondit qu'il étoit trop tard, QU'IL FALLAIT FAIRE LA PART DU FEU (ce sont ses termes); que d'ailleurs vu l'apreté de la saison, beaucoup de malades et de blessés périraient probablement en route, qu'il ne seraient pas longtemps plus en sûreté à Kowno qu'à Wilna; qu'ainsi il y avait plus d'humanité à les laisser dans les hôpitaux et dans les maisons particulières où ils étoient."

† Gourgaud, *Examen Critique*, &c., alleges that the stores of provisions were very abundant; we conclude, therefore, from this and from what is reported by Bignon in the previous note, that the wounded and the stores might have been saved had Napoleon given Murat and Bignon earlier information of the real state of affairs. Gourgaud, vol. ii., liv. xii., ch. 3, writes as follows:—"Il y avait à Wilna quatre millions de rations en farine, trois millions six cent mille rations de viande, neuf millions de rations de vin et d'eau-de-vie, quarante-deux mille paires de souliers, des magasins considérable de legumes et de fourrages, d'habillement, de harnachement et d'équipement, trente quatre mille fusils et un arsenal bien fourni en munition de toute espèce."



Kowno as early as the 7th, when he crossed the Niemen, and proceeded by sledge to Warsaw. Concerning the time of his halt in Kowno, a captain of the engineers and pontoniers then in Kowno has added a MS. note to our copy of De Chambray's history, which in our opinion deserves to be mentioned for more reasons than one.

"In the morning," writes M. Hasselat, "he summoned the commandant of the place and the commanding officers of the artillery and engineers to attend upon him with a plan of the fortifications. The commander of the engineers had been formerly known to him in Italy. He immediately recognised him again, notwithstanding the change in his appearance from sickness. '*You are unwell Périola,*' he exclaimed; '*you looked much better in Italy. Matters are not so well here.* Return to France, where we had better all have remained; what think you?' 'Sire,' replied Périola, 'since your majesty allows me to give my opinion, I entirely agree with you.' The Emperor then cast a look upon the sketch of Kowno, without saying a word. He then purchased his fur cloak from the commandant of the place for twenty-five louis d'ors, with a view to roll round his feet. He next gave ten or twelve louis d'ors to the people in the house, and said, smiling, 'I think you would like to have such a guest every day.'" The captain adds, "Périola related this to me on the very same day on which it took place, and set off for France, but died when he got as far as Dantzic. He could scarcely restrain his astonishment at the cheerful tone which the Emperor assumed on this occasion, and which was by no means natural to him." This incident is worthy of mention, because De Chambray agrees with Ségur and Rogniat in stating that from the time of Napoleon's march from Smolensko to Moscow, his whole nature appeared to have undergone a change.

Murat fled quickly from Wilna, for on the 10th he could only reckon on 4300 men; the remnant under Victor had renounced obedience, and Ney had nothing but the ruins of Loison's division, commanded by General Gratien since Loison's illness, together with 2000 Bavarians under Wrede, with whom he formed the rear guard; but these by degrees disappeared, except about sixty men, so that when they arrived at Kowno, Wrede and himself were alone. On leaving Wilna and before reaching Ponary, a most unexpected loss was sustained. Instead of choosing the road from Wilna by Nowoi and Troki, which leads across the level country to Kowno, the steep and smooth road which leads along the heights of Ponary was selected. It soon became apparent that the exhausted horses were unable to draw further the artillery, baggage, or treasure; and in order to prevent the whole from falling into the hands of the Cossacks who were in pursuit, they were obliged to sacrifice everything and to save themselves in the woods. All that remained of artillery and baggage were left here; Napoleon's equipage, as well as many sick and wounded officers, who, up to this time had retained their carriages, were now obliged to be left to their



fate. The treasure which Bignon estimates at six, and De Chambray at ten millions, was partly given to the soldiers and partly strewed about to detain the Cossacks in their pursuit. On the 14th Murat's army consisted of 400 infantry of the old guard, 600 dismounted cavalry, and nine pieces of cannon, which had been taken with them from Kowno. Besides these, from 40,000 to 50,000 men, without order or command, crossed the Niemen to Prussia, but soon scattered in all directions.

The Poles bore the difficulties of the campaign best; and as they were also favoured by good fortune they alone brought back their artillery with them. The divisions of the Polish troops which were connected with Murat's army proceeded through Nowoi, Troki, and Olita to Warsaw, found proper camp shelter and provisions, and bore the cold well, being accustomed to it. On the 25th of December, Poniatowski also arrived in Warsaw; and if his corps was not 20,000 strong, as has been alleged, with thirty pieces of cannon, it was soon again increased and equipped. On the 18th of December, Chitchakoff reached the Niemen and halted; Wittgenstein left Wilna to the left and proceeded hastily to Tilsit, because he had long since come to an understanding with the Prussians in Macdonald's army; and on the 16th Kutusoff united his whole army in and around Wilna, and placed it in cantonments in order to have a little repose, for the Russian army had also suffered severely. Kutusoff was said (according to not very trustworthy accounts) to have only 35,000 remaining of his army of 120,000; Wittgenstein and Chitchakoff, 13,000 each; Sacken, Hertel, and others, 25,000. The garrison of Riga consisted of 12,000; and then the whole Russian army may have amounted to 100,000 men. The Emperor Alexander appeared as early as the 22nd of December in the midst of his army at Wilna.

Baron von Anstetten, who had played the same character for Russia before the war in Poland as Bignon then did for France, continued during the whole of this time in secret intercourse with Austria, and on the 20th of December concluded a very equivocal agreement with Schwarzenberg, to which we shall subsequently return. The Prussians almost at the same time completely deserted France.

#### D.—IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNFORTUNATE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUSSIA.

##### I.—MALET'S MAD ATTEMPT AGAINST THE EMPIRE.

The dreadful misery which the Russian campaign brought upon hundreds of thousands of the bravest men in France, and upon all those countries whose inhabitants were involved either as friends or enemies of Napoleon, made a much slighter impression upon the Emperor himself than a very insignificant event in Paris, while it was made evident that the empire which he had founded depended

for its continuance on his own personal qualities, and not at all on the principles on which it was established. Everything possible had been done since 1800 to establish a new monarchical order. Since 1804 the empire had been founded, primogeniture introduced, and a new nobility established; since 1811 an heir to the throne had been born and generally acknowledged as such. The new empire appeared to rest upon immovable foundations, when it was all at once made evident that in Paris people had faith in the Emperor and not in the empire. We premise these observations because the history of the ridiculous conspiracy in Paris, of which Napoleon was informed in Smolensko, would not have been noticed by us at all, had it not been a matter of surprise to the whole world that even the authorities in Paris regarded the Emperor's death and a provisional government as things naturally connected. The Emperor himself is said to have expressed his great astonishment that the King of Rome had never been even thought of.

On the 23rd of October an attempt was suddenly made in Paris to take advantage of the Emperor's absence, in order to institute a provisional government, which, with the assistance of certain senators, would have been declared, had not the mad attempt been stifled in the birth. When the attempt failed, no one declared himself, and there was not the slightest evidence that any one except Malet, in whose mind republicanism had become a fixed idea, had in the least participated in the affair, or that what was called Malet's conspiracy was in fact a conspiracy at all. We learn, indeed, even from the person who was long at the head of Napoleon's police, that Malet was rather pitied as a man deranged, than regarded as a dangerous agitator.\* We willingly avail ourselves of the account of Malet's conspiracy from the history just referred to, which seems to be on many accounts entitled to confidence.

Malet had been an officer in service previous to the revolution; he was consequently one of the few persons of the olden time who did homage to the revolution from conviction, and remained true to its principles to the end; he was a fanatical republican. He had never given any proofs of distinguished talents; he had, however, become a brigadier-general, but remained so faithful to the system of 1793, that even under the Consulate he was constantly in strife with his creatures wherever Napoleon ordered him to go. When, for example, he was in Angoulême, he worked continually in opposition to Bonnaire, the Bonapartist prefect, and lived in unceasing disputes with him; when he was at a later period ordered to Rome, he was from the first constantly at issue with General Miollis; he was then removed from active service, and took up his abode in Paris. He availed himself of the moment, when Napoleon was in Prussia in 1807, to persuade a certain number of civil and military

\* *Temoignages Historiques, ou Quinze Ans de Haute Police sous Napoleon, par M. Desmarests, Chef de cette Partie pendant tout le Consulat et l'Empire. Paris, 1833. See pp. 291 and 310.*

officials that he was in a condition, in connexion with certain senators and a number of people of all classes, to put an end to military rule. He, however, neither submitted a definite plan of action, nor did he require agreement to any specific articles from those to whom he communicated his design. The affair was discovered; Malet and some other imprudent persons were arrested; suspicion was entertained against some senators, but no proofs were produced; Malet remained a state prisoner. It was the custom of that time for the police to pay spies in the state prisons, to listen to the revelations of their fellow-prisoners. Among these was a young Roman, who gave evidence that after the battle of Aspern in 1809, Malet had conceived a wild plan, very like that which was carried into execution in 1812. His design was to spread the belief that Napoleon had perished, then to show himself to the soldiers in his general's uniform, with their aid to free Generals Dupont and Marescot from the Abbaye (the military prison), and then to proclaim the republic. He was, it is true, prosecuted on account of this conspiracy; the whole plan, however, was absurd—the chief witnesses very much suspected persons—and nothing really attempted; on these grounds the government satisfied itself with giving Malet a severe reproof, and his friends even succeeded in ameliorating his lot. He was removed from the state prison to a lunatic asylum, in which a strict discipline was exercised—the institution under the care of Dr. Dubuisson, situated near the *Barrière du Trône*. In this institution he had freedom enough to enter into plans with some other political visionaries to cause uniforms to be prepared, which he needed for carrying out his new design of effecting a change of government during Napoleon's campaign in Russia.

Malet's plan was the same as that which had not been carried into execution in 1809. He was suddenly to make his appearance, announce that Napoleon had fallen in Russia, and that a provisional government had been appointed. For effecting this purpose he employed the Abbé Lafon of Bordeaux, an agent of the Bourbons, who was under easy restraint in the same house with himself, in order to have all the needful documents and official papers manufactured. The preparations and necessary orders were looked after by a young corporal of the municipal guard, named Rateau, who was employed in the house. In the execution of his plan, Malet designed to use Generals Lahorie and Guidal, who were under arrest in Paris, but knew nothing of the plan; they were, in fact, like others, deceived by forged documents and pretended uniforms. The pretended official documents of which Malet availed himself were: a proclamation of the senate, in which Napoleon's death was announced, his family excluded from the succession, and a provisional government of five persons named. Besides this he prepared a decree, by virtue of which he was appointed commandant of the first military division, commandant of the city of Paris, and a general of division; and still further, some new appointments and removals of civil authorities.



General Lahorie was nominated minister of police, and Guidal prefect of police. Malet, Lafon, and Rateau were full three months occupied in secret with the preparation of these false papers, and afterwards waited quietly for the arrival of the favourable moment. This appeared to have at length come, when, for fourteen days, no news of any kind had reached Paris from the army in Russia.

The documents, arms, and a general's uniform for Malet, an adjutant's dress for Rateau, and the scarf of a police magistrate, were all ready at the house of a Spanish priest named Caamagno, in the Rue Royale; two horses also, with the necessary equipments, were procured and held in readiness, when Malet and Lafon, in the night between the 22nd and 23rd of October, left the house of the physician. They were at first without arms and uniform, and had nothing but a portfolio, which contained the documents and papers they proposed to employ. Lafon had, moreover, no character in the play; he therefore retired to watch the progress of events, and then to fish in troubled waters to promote the cause of the Bourbons. The police magistrate's scarf was destined for a schoolmaster named Boutreux. Caamagno also escaped without loss or punishment, and was living quietly in Paris in 1834.

The commencement of this most singular attempt of the half-mad general was favoured by fortune. Soulier, colonel of the 10th cohort of the national guard, was deceived by Malet's allegations, allowed his men to be drawn up before him in the barracks of Popincourt, the false documents to be read in their presence, and gave orders to his major, Piquetel, to follow Malet. The precaution was not, however, taken to give the soldiers who followed him ball cartridges, or even to have flints in their guns. About five o'clock in the morning Malet presented himself at the prison of La Force at the head of the cohort, and liberated General Guidal, who had been imprisoned in consequence of some traitorous intercourse with English ships, and General Lahorie, who was also in confinement on account of the use of some imprudent language. They were astonished on being set at liberty, and hearing the decree read which nominated them to important offices. Lahorie had, besides, previously served with great reputation under Moreau, and been the chief of his staff. He was so thoroughly unacquainted with the whole affair, as to find it necessary to examine the papers as he went away. A few other officers, who had been liberated, returned to prison of their own accord; but Boccheciampe was afterwards condemned to death in consequence of Malet's having on the spot appointed him prefect of the department of the Seine.

From the door of the prison of La Force, Malet sent one of the soldiers who accompanied him to the barrack called *La Babylone*, to require the presence of the subaltern officers of the second regiment of the Paris guard, which was there stationed. Among these, apparently, official orders were immediately distributed, commanding them

to send out detachments in order to take possession of the palace of the senate, the treasury, and the bank, and to close and guard the outer gates of the city. These orders were received as genuine, without further examination, by Rabbe, the colonel of the regiment, who forthwith sent out detachments of his regiment to carry them into execution. It appeared on this occasion, that every one was so much accustomed to mere mechanical obedience, to leave everything to the police and wait for the result, that no one ever ventured to act for himself.

As soon as the three generals left the prison, Lahorie, accompanied by the whole cohort, proceeded to the minister of police in order to arrest him and the prefect of police in their official residence, and to place himself and Guidal in their places. The whole city was in amazement, when it became known at daybreak what had taken place ; but none of the citizens were roused to action. Savary, Duke of Rovigo, was arrested by Lahorie, who, with Guidal, took possession of his place, and Pasquier, Louis Philippe's arch-chancellor, as well as Savary, was carried off to prison, and the governor of the prison received them both without any hesitation. Pasquier, who was prefect of police, wrote a note to Savary, which, however, the latter did not receive. Frochot, prefect of the Seine, behaved the most weakly of them all, for he actually obeyed Soulier's command, who had drawn up his men on the Place de la Grève and gone to the Hôtel de Ville, in order to prepare rooms for the sittings of the pretended provisional government. Frochot suffered himself to be used for this purpose.

As to the provisional government, the names of the members were not indeed publicly known; still the selection excited suspicion, because the names seemed to point to a further plan, which never came to light. The persons named as members were Matthieu de Montmorency, Alexis de Noailles, General Moreau, and Frochot, the prefect of the Seine ; the name of the fifth was kept secret. Malet himself proceeded to the Place Vendôme in order, personally, to arrest Hullin, the commandant of the city, at his official residence. In this he not only failed, but the whole of this elaborate scheme, which had been in preparation for three months, was frustrated by an accident. Malet, general of the senate and of the provisional government, announced his arrest to the commandant ; the latter requested to see the decree, whereupon Malet drew his pistol and shot him dead. The next object of the originator of the plan was to seize upon the public offices, the seals, and to get the control of the officers employed. With this design he proceeded to General Doucot, the chief of the general staff, when he himself was suddenly recognised. On his first appearance he had assumed a false name, but Paques, the inspector-general of police, as well as Laborde, chief of a battalion, and who had charge of the military police, who happened to be present, recognised him as their former prisoner. Laborde and Doucot immediately seized and disarmed him, and sent



him back to prison. The whole affair, therefore, was thus ended about nine o'clock in the morning, like a farce; for Generals Lahorie and Guidal, when arrested, were excessively surprised that a mad-man could have so misled them and brought them into such risk of destruction.

The matter, however, even independent of this event, would have been brought to an issue at the commandature, because Lahorie had allowed a whole hour to the Duke of Rovigo before he led him off. Savary availed himself of this time to send to his secretary, Réal, councillor of state, who thereupon betook himself with the other heads of the administration to the house of the arch-chancellor, when a conference was held; the minister of war was also immediately in motion, and had despatched his chosen and confidential *gendarmes* to carry out his orders.

The documents, which were printed on the 25th of December, 1812, led to a very different result from that which, by artificial representation, Desmarests has given in his work already quoted, and Savary has indicated in his Memoirs. According to these documents Soulier was to blame, and the whole affair had been set on foot by the Jacobins, as Napoleon himself directly alleged in the violent speech which he stammered out to the council of state on his return. He alleged that ideology and those who proclaimed the sovereignty of the people, and inspired the masses with the idea that they ought to resist the government and take part in the administration of public affairs, were the causes of all the misfortunes which had fallen upon France. Reference was first made to the Jacobins somewhat later; and Napoleon was at first led to think of Moreau from the name of General Lahorie. In the council of state he afterwards pronounced a judgment respecting the civil servants of the empire, such as all of us in Germany since 1848 have pronounced upon our statesmen educated in all the juridical and diplomatic wisdom of their times, in the routine business of their offices, and the absurd and contemptible grimaces of courts. He said: "*He had found all the persons whom he had appointed to offices, and must necessarily regard as friends, to be a miserable set, and now saw that he had founded his empire on very rotten supports.\**"

\* The whole of the documents printed in col. 1423, &c., of the *Moniteur* of the 25th of December, 1812, may be found appended to chap. i. of the first part of Fain's MS. of 1813. There everything will be seen at a glance which refers to the miserable conduct of Frochot. Napoleon's language addressed to the council, to which reference has been made above, was as follows:—"Triste reste de nos révolutions! Au premier mot de ma mort, sur l'ordre d'un inconnu des officiers minent leur régimens forcer les prisons, se saisir des premières autorités! Un concierge enferme les ministres sous ses guichets! Un préfet de la capitale, à la voix de quelques soldats, se prête à faire arranger sa grande salle pour je ne sais quelle assemblée de factieux! Tandis que l'Impératrice est là, le Roi de Rome, les princes, mes ministres et tous les grands pouvoirs de l'état! Un homme est-il donc tout ici? Les institutions, les sermens rien? . . . . Frochot est un honnête homme dévoué. Mais son devoir était de se faire tuer sur les marches de l'Hôtel de Ville. . . . Il faut un grand exemple à tous les fonctionnaires."



The guilty, moreover, had been condemned and executed long before Napoleon's arrival in Paris;\* yet, as Thibaudeau observes, he was far from being satisfied with the severity of the judgment of the court-martial which sat under the presidency of General Dejean. Thibaudeau pronounces the same sort of opinion respecting the conduct of the authorities, as we should be disposed to do concerning the great majority of the German authorities during the disturbances from February till May, 1848. "The miserable conduct," he observes, "of the highest authorities, the mechanical obedience of the military, the indifference of the citizens, and acquiescence in their fate, which were exhibited by all, should have led the Emperor clearly to see whither his system was tending. THIS, HOWEVER, WAS NOT THE CASE." We quote this last sentence from Thibaudeau, because Napoleon at the same time despised the warning given him by Providence, by means of the issue of the expedition to Russia, in reference to France, and that which was given respecting himself by Malet's conspiracy.

## 2.—EQUIVOCAL CONDUCT OF AUSTRIA, AND DESERTION OF PRUSSIA.

Austria had not been strictly compelled to enter into the alliance with France as Prussia had been. In the case of Prussia, the only choice left was either to be wholly destroyed or to sacrifice herself for the French. Austria could not, therefore, defend her desertion from Napoleon on the same grounds as Prussia—viz., that no person or nation can remain bound to observe a compulsory oath. This, and the repeated violation of the alliance on the part of France, must in the mind of every impartial judge entirely justify Prussia for her open desertion of France, unaccompanied as it was by any act of treachery. Metternich, in order to justify his course, thought it necessary to have recourse to diplomatic arts. The mask of a faithful alliance was retained till February, 1813, although ever since October, 1812, negotiations had been carried on in Vienna, the result of which was a suspension of hostilities concluded between Prince Schwarzenberg and Baron von Anstetten, the Russian plenipotentiary, an emigrated Alsatian noble. We have a full account in the correspondence of Otto and Narbonne, the French ministers in Vienna, of the various devices adopted by Metternich from the middle of December, 1812, to preserve the appearance of a faithful

\* "Témoignages Historiques," &c., p. 317: "La destitution du préfet Frochot solennellement prononcée fut la dernière rigueur qui suivit cette malheureuse équipée. Dès le 28 Octobre les trois généraux, le colonel et le major de la cohorte avaient subi l'exécution militaire avec quatre officiers de leur corps et deux de régiment de Paris. Boccheciampe, qui s'était laissé nommer préfet de la Seine, périt avec eux; le jeune Bouteux, installé préfet de police, fut arrêté après et jugé seul. Le Colonel Rabbe obtint un sursis, que l'Empereur convertit en grace, en considération de ses anciens services. Le faux aide-de-camp, caporal Rateau, eut la même chance, par égard, je crois, pour son oncle, procureur-général à Bordeaux. Ainsi sur vingt-cinq accusés dix furent absous et quinze condamnés, dont deux graciés."

ally in the eyes of the Emperor of the French, till he was in a condition safely to alter his tone, without subjecting himself to the accusation of treachery. Otto's correspondence, with which we have most immediately to do, extends from the 16th of December, 1812, to the 20th of March in the following year, and Baron Fain has appended it as a genuine addition to the tenth chapter of his so-called Manuscripts of 1813. These are the same letters which were also printed in the *Moniteur*.

Schwarzenberg is said to have received express instructions to carry on the war with the Russians on the side of the French, just as the Russians did in 1809 against Austria. It is not our business to investigate this; his behaviour, however, as early as December, 1812, was as equivocal as Metternich's speeches to Otto. Schwarzenberg was in command of the united body of Saxons under Regnier, Poles under Poniatowski, and the Austrians whom he had led to Poland. He constantly manœuvred in such a way as to protect the Saxons and Poles and to cover Warsaw, without undertaking any considerable hostile movements. Afterwards, when the Russians still continued to push further forward, Baron von Anstetten himself came to Warsaw, and verbally arranged a suspension of hostilities, to be acted on without any formal treaty. This took place on the 21st of December, and Warsaw having remained in the power of the French, the King of Naples, to whom his brother-in-law had given the command of the army, consented to the suspension. When the Russian army was afterwards again put in motion, Metternich's policy had completely changed, and he had so explained himself respecting his future views, that it became very doubtful whether he would continue to remain in the alliance.

On the 16th of December Otto alleged that England, Prussia (although still in alliance with France), and Russia were taking all possible pains to win over Austria. They had promised her Italy, the Illyrian provinces, her former supremacy in Germany, and the restoration of the ancient splendour of the imperial crown. He added, that Metternich had forgotten himself, and had said to him, that **SHOULD AUSTRIA ADOPT A DIFFERENT MODE OF ACTION, SHE WOULD SOON HAVE 50,000,000 OF MEN ON HER SIDE. THE WHOLE OF GERMANY AND ALL ITALY WOULD DECLARE FOR AUSTRIA.** In a letter dated the 28th of December, the upright and honourable Otto represents Metternich quite as a martyr on account of his fidelity to France. All, he reports, have resolved to break with France; he alone still resists; great efforts are being made to have Stadion put into his place. On the 3rd of January he writes to say that Metternich had assured him that the troops in Gallicia and Transylvania were being armed for France, and that Count Bubna was proceeding to Paris with an imperial letter, solely in order to make the necessary preparations for the prosecution of the campaign. On the 11th of January Otto again states that Metternich had not been the least shaken by the desertion of Prussia, but

was about to send a messenger to the Emperor Alexander at Wilna, to make preparations, if possible, for a peace. On the 21st the question of sending Wessenberg to England is spoken of, and Metternich gives his assent to the preliminaries of the conditions of a peace with Russia and England communicated to him by Napoleon. Whilst the Emperor of the French was thus deceived, and Lebzelttern in Wilna, and Wessenberg in London, were engaged in very different things from those to which, according to Metternich, they were commissioned to attend, the Saxons in Poland under Regnier were left to their fate, and the Poles under Poniatowski were marched to Galicia, where they remained inactive till Napoleon's arrival in Dresden.

From December, 1812, till the middle of January, 1813, Schwarzenberg, in virtue of the suspension of arms, verbally agreed to and confirmed by Murat, covered Warsaw, which the Emperor of Russia, in consequence of his views upon Poland, also wished to guard against ill-usage. On the 21st of January Schwarzenberg received orders to draw nearer to Galicia. Before he took his departure, he made a capitulation for Warsaw, on the 25th; thus fulfilling all the duties of an ally. As Poniatowski's corps was to remain with Schwarzenberg, while the Saxons under Regnier were to return home through Kalisch, the Austrian general apparently did something for them also after the capitulation. He had promised to evacuate Warsaw on the 5th of February, but did not, in fact, leave that city till the 8th, in order that Regnier might gain time on his march; Wittgenstein, however, overtook him at Kalisch on the 10th of February—took a number of prisoners, and compelled the cavalry to seek for safety in Czenstochau. The remainder of the Saxons reached their own country and arrived at Glogau; the cavalry followed Poniatowski, who proceeded with the Austrians to Cracow, and was afterwards, after a long struggle, suffered to join the French by marching through Austrian Silesia.

It was afterwards alleged that all the Russian movements had been concerted with the Austrians, and this allegation receives full confirmation from the treaty subsequently concluded. The Austrian army, with which Poniatowski and the Saxon cavalry were also subsequently joined, even after the surrender of Warsaw still continued to retain their positions on the left bank of the Vistula, till Schwarzenberg in March handed over the command to Frimont, in order to undertake a mission to Paris. Frimont, in order to exclude Poniatowski from Warsaw, then concluded an agreement with the Austrians on the 23rd of March, concerning the cessation of the truce and the threatening movements which were to be made by the Russians, in order, under some feasible pretence, to be able to march to Cracow and to take Poniatowski thither.\*

\* This agreement, regarded as a profound secret, made between Count Nesselrode and Baron von Lebzelttern, and which was to be merely a note and not a convention, is as follows:—"L'armée de sa M. l'Empereur de Russie poussera des



Bignon informs us that Metternich, during the period of Austrian hesitation, had often enough given the Emperor of the French to understand that he was waiting for conditions in favour of Austria; and he adds, that in that case he would have broken off with Russia and Prussia. Bignon blames Napoleon for not having made those offers, notwithstanding the almost universal commendation which he bestows upon every part of the Emperor's conduct, and that, too, in such strong language, that the editor of the last part of his work endeavours to excuse him, by stating as an apology that when he wrote this passage he did not know he had been appointed by Napoleon in his will as his apologist.\* Metternich perceived, as he openly acknowledged to the French ambassador, that the system of policy, government, and diplomatic negotiations which he approved and followed, and which is still adopted in the aristocratic circles of Germany, was much better suited to Napoleon's principles than to those then proclaimed by the Emperor Alexander; or to the system favourable to the rights of the people which Baron von Stein and his friends followed in Germany in the name of the Emperor of Russia; or to those again announced by Arndt, Fichte, Jahn, Görres, and innumerable other free-thinking men; or finally to those promised to the Germans in the name of the King of Prussia. On the 19th of February, 1813, Otto alleges in a letter that Metternich had said

corps vers les flancs droits et gauches du corps Autrichien qui occupe aujourd'hui, sur la rive gauche de la Vistule, la ligne que lui a assignée la dernière armistice. Le général Russe, commandant les corps ci-dessus exprimés, dénoncera l'armistice au général Autrichien et motivera explicitement cette dénonciation par l'impossibilité dans laquelle se trouvent les alliés de laisser sur leurs flancs et à leur dos un foyer de mouvement et d'insurrection tel que l'offre l'armée Polonoise sous M. le Prince Poniatowski. Cette dénonciation aura lieu vers les premiers jours d'Avril. Les deux corps Russes s'avanceront avec une force si non majeure, du moins égale au corps Autrichien, forte de trente mille hommes: M. le Lieutenant-Général de Frimont recevra l'ordre de préparer et d'effectuer sa retraite sur la rive droite de la Vistule; il conservera des postes à Cracovie, à Opatowice et à Sendomir. La retraite à peu près consommée les généraux Autrichiens et Russes conviendront de nouveau d'une suspension d'armes sans terme fixe, et à quinze jours de dénonciation qui portera que les Autrichiens conserveront les villes de Cracovie et de Sendomir et le poste d'Opatowice avec un rayon convenable, comme tel du pont sur la rive gauche du fleuve devant ces trois points."—It was then added: "*La présente convention RESTERA à JAMAIS SECRETE ENTRE LES DEUX COURS impériales et ne pourra de part et d'autre être communiqués qu'à sa majesté le Roi de Prusse uniquement.*"

\* Bignon (xi., p. 321) writes as follows:—"D'après la dépêche de M. Otto du 26 Janvier M. de Metternich lui avait dit: 'Jusqu'ici la guerre n'est pas Autrichienne, si elle le devient dans la suite, ce n'est pas avec trente mille hommes, mais avec toutes les forces de la monarchie que nous attaquerons les Russes.' Il fallait donc la rendre Autrichienne. Cette guerre de l'Autriche n'avait jusque la figure que dans un rang inférieur qui ne peut plus lui convenir. Il fallait la rendre Autrichienne par une VERITABLE FRATERNITÉ D'ARMES, PAR UNE ASSOCIATION FRANCHE DE VUES ET D'INTERETS; c'étoit là le point décisif qui pouvoit rendre les deux cours maîtresses par leur union du destin de l'Europe. C'est ce que ne voulait pas Napoléon. Il tenait à rester seul maître, dominateur unique de la paix et de la guerre, il n'acceptait le cabinet Autrichien que comme un esclave, non comme un égal, c'EST CE QUE LE PERDIT." His editor (Ernouf) excuses this passage by the following words:—"Tout ceci avait été écrit avant que M. Bignon eût subit l'influence du mandat de l'Empereur Napoléon. Il aurait peut-être modifié quelques expressions de ce passage dans la rédaction définitive."

to him that he was very anxious about the continually increasing national agitation of Germany on the approach of the Russians. The religious fanaticism of the Slavonian population, attached to the rites of the Greek Church, was, in his opinion, as disadvantageous to his system as the political fanaticism of the German aristocracy and of the army. That Metternich and everything favoured by him was wholly opposed to the spirit of the times and to that enthusiasm in favour of the rights of the nation and people, is proved by Bignon, who alleges that several patriotic officers were arrested on pretence of their being likely to make an attempt upon Metternich's life, and that he was in the habit of calling the prevailing enthusiasm in favour of German freedom in the highest degree revolutionary and dangerous.\*

Bubna, who was known to the Emperor Napoleon, and regarded by him as one of those favourable to this maintenance of the union of Austria with France, was sent to Paris at the same time as Wessenberg was ordered to proceed to London and Lebzelttern to the Russian head-quarters. His object was to ascertain whether Napoleon would not offer a higher price for the Austrian alliance than the others; Bubna was not to make any offer himself, but to hear what might be proposed. Napoleon continued obstinate; Bubna was very well received, but no offers whatever were made; what was promised was so indefinite and confused that it might at any moment be recalled. When Schwarzenberg at length, after two months' delay, returned to his official post of ambassador in Paris, Silesia was offered; but it was then partly too late, and Metternich partly reckoned on provinces which Napoleon might have ceded without throwing any difficulties in the way of negotiations for peace.

At this time Napoleon's great preference for ambassadors of noble families was as injurious to his diplomatic affairs as, at other times, his dangerous practice of employing the mere soldiers of his army on diplomatic business. He sent Count Mercy d'Argenteau, a Belgian, who was on the most intimate terms with the Austrian aristocracy, and whose family had been previously in the Austrian service, to Munich as his minister, recalled the able but by no means aristocratic Otto from Vienna, and replaced him by Narbonne, who was an intimate friend of Madame de Staël, a man of fine, superficial, supple manners, like the men of his time and rank professedly equal to everything, but in reality fit for nothing. Prince Schwarzenberg had so little idea that Mercy d'Argenteau could be thoroughly favourable to the new system, that on his journey to Paris he ex-

\* Bignon (vol. xi., p. 341): “‘L’Autriche,’ disait M. de Metternich à M. Otto, ‘en se concertant avec la France PEUT METTRE UN TERME à cette invasion révolutionnaire et arriver à la paix.’ On faisait prêter serment aux employés Autrichiens de n’entrer dans aucune société secrète. Plusieurs personnages manquans, compromis par leur exaltation, furent arrêtés, notamment M. Hormayer, conseiller de la chancellerie d’état, connu pas ses rapports avec les Tyroliens. L’Empereur François se plaignit de sa position entre une faction qui voulut le forcer à changer le système et un allié QUI NE LUI DONNAIT AUCUNE IDÉE DE SES PROJETS.”



pressed his opinion to him in a manner wholly inexplicable. This we conclude from the account given by the French ambassador of his conversation with Schwarzenberg; we presume, however, that he gave this report in order not to break with any one, or to be able to send in writing through Schwarzenberg what he could not say verbally.

Schwarzenberg, on his way to Paris, visited the courts of Carlsruhe, Stuttgart, and Munich, and found the King of Wirtemberg alone thoroughly favourable to the military despotism of Napoleon; the other courts, it is true, were grateful to him, but still longed and waited for their deliverance. In Munich he is reported to have used the following language to the French ambassador, of which the latter immediately sent an account to Paris: "You see we must have peace, which your Emperor is not willing to conclude till he has attempted a final decision in the field. New misfortunes may utterly endanger his dominion; victories may lead him too far. You see what the general feeling is in Germany. Is not France *large and strong enough within the frontiers of the Rhine?* Does it require other means to maintain its power in Germany than its own power? The Hanse Towns must again become free; France must give up all claims to Illyria; the German princes must be again restored to their powers. The present condition of things cannot be allowed to continue; Austria will do nothing more than act as mediatrix in favour of France. In order to bring about a general peace, into which England also can enter, the Emperor Napoleon must make some sacrifices." The Emperor of the French had, however, at that time (1813) lost all confidence in Austria; for Stadion, who had been previously removed from all public duties in order to please him, had again been restored to an important post in the administration of the finances, in order that the government might avail themselves of his services.

At that moment the Emperor gave a most imprudent proof of his want of confidence in Austria. Baron von Wessenberg, who was on his journey through Hamburg and Gottenburg to England, with Napoleon's knowledge and apparently even with his commission, was detained in the former city, and his papers searched. This took place in February; in March, when Austria made bitter complaints of such conduct, the Emperor indeed alleged that it had been done without his knowledge, and against his will; no one, however, believed that such a step would have been ventured upon without his express command. His conduct towards Austria was manifestly an effect of the same delusion, which had led to the expedition to Moscow; he deliberately staked everything upon the cast, instead of following Talleyrand's advice, and purchasing the adhesion of Austria by making some sacrifices. Savary, in his Memoirs, informs us that at the time when Bubna and Schwarzenberg were in Paris, the Emperor had held a full meeting of his ministers, in order to consult whether any or what offers should be made to Austria. On



this occasion Talleyrand was decidedly in favour of concluding a peace, as long as the Emperor had good means of exchange in his hands. This advice was, however, so received that no one afterwards ventured to concur in opinion with Talleyrand, although the whole of the ministers were, in fact, of the same mind. According to the documents printed in the *Moniteur* on the occasion of the declaration of war, Prince Schwarzenberg therefore stated verbally to the Duke of Bassano, as early as the 21st of April, that Austria, in case her proposals were not accepted, would no longer continue in the alliance, but must be regarded as the third power in the prosecution of the war.

Prussia, since the end of the year 1812, had completely thrown herself into the hands of Russia, and that too, properly speaking, against the will of her anxious and timid king. Nay, ever since the peace of Tilsit, all the men of any distinction in the country had been either avowedly opposed to the alliance with France, or, having united in various and numerous associations, had done all in their power to counteract everything which was officially done in order to satisfy France. The mainstay of all these associations was Baron von Stein, who had been the constant companion of the Emperor Alexander since May, 1812. The great body of Prussian general officers who were in the service of Russia, and among them Herr von Clausewitz, well known as a military writer, kept up uninterrupted communications with their comrades and commanders before Riga, who nevertheless faithfully performed their military duties till Macdonald's withdrawal. When in December, 1812, the excitement in Germany became immense, and the members of the *Tugendbund* used the greatest exertions to rouse the people, Hardenberg played a very double-sided part. He was thoroughly acquainted with all that was going on, but acted as if he were greatly dissatisfied with all the demagogic operations; the king was so in reality; both, however, found themselves in a very disagreeable situation in Berlin when the Prussians, who had been in service under Macdonald, declared themselves neutral. Count de St. Marsan, the French ambassador, and Marshal Augereau, who had command of the troops, repeatedly assured the Emperor by letter that he might rely upon the King of Prussia. It so happened, however, that the king had in reality very little power, since not only all influence upon public opinion, but even the direction of all the public authorities, had passed from the hands of his majesty into those of the leaders of the patriotic societies. Blücher, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and others, were kept far from the king and the public service; but even York and the generals serving under him kept up constant communications with the Emperor of Russia through Stein and others; and Alexander, who knew well what the situation of affairs was with the king, gave directions to his generals accordingly. Whilst, therefore, Macdonald commended the courage of the Prussian troops in the field, he accused their commanding officers of never having shown

the slightest zeal to do anything more than duty strictly required. Metternich had long before warned Napoleon against the state of opinions in Prussia as very unfavourable to him. Justus Gruner, who had formerly been at the head of the Prussian police, had taken refuge in Prague, and thence, supported by Russian and English money, directed all the movements of the various patriotic societies of Germany, till the French at last insisted upon his arrest. Metternich appeared to yield, but he took very good care not to allow Gruner or his papers to fall into the hands of the French. He was seized in Prague, and carried, together with his treasure and papers, to Vienna, when the French ambassador received no further information than it was thought advisable for him to have. At the end of August, 1812, Metternich directly informed him that the feelings and opinions of the people in Prussia were wholly different from those of the king.\*

It was long before the king gave either to the French ambassador or to Marshal Augereau the slightest reason to doubt his sincerity; yet when he discovered in what situation the French army really was, he wrote to General York on the 20th of December, giving him to a certain extent full powers to act as he thought proper. He authorised him to do everything, and to enter into whatever arrangements might be necessary for the preservation of the Prussian troops under his command. York had probably long before come to a full understanding with General von Massenbach, that the time was come when it was necessary to venture a great risk, and to constrain the king to adopt a resolution to which he never could have been persuaded; an understanding was therefore come to with the Russians, and it was resolved to carry the matter out before reaching Prussia. Macdonald, on arriving at the Niemen, divided the Prussians; York, with the main body, formed the rear guard; Massenbach, with six battalions, six squadrons of cavalry, and two batteries, was placed in the van as the advanced guard; whilst Macdonald himself occupied the middle. In this order the army reached Tilsit. The Prussians were closely followed by the Russians under General Diebitsch, accompanied by Von Clausewitz, with whom everything had been arranged. As soon as they arrived in Tilsit, York sent for Macdonald, who was thrown into the greatest perplexity and surprise on having laid before him the convention agreed to on the 30th of December between York and the Russians in Tauroggen, and which, under the name of neutrality, concealed the complete desertion of the Prussians from the French. By the terms of the agreement a district of Prussia was assigned to York's corps, which the Russians were to leave unmolested. In this district the army was to get provisions and other necessaries, to be recruited and newly organised, and all stragglers were to be allowed to have free leave to join them.† A reserve was indeed made by the consent of the Emperor

\* "Il ne faut pas confondre les forces de la nation avec la volonté du roi."

† The agreement itself was published in all the newspapers of the time, and may



of Russia and the King of Prussia; but with the very cautious limitations, that in any case, if the King of Prussia refused his consent, the Prussians were to be left undisturbed for at least two months. Macdonald was about to issue his command to detain, or at least to disarm Massenbach's division; but on the same day on which York's communication had been made, he received a very dry note from Massenbach, in which he informed the French commander that he had recrossed the Niemen and formed a junction with York. In this way Macdonald, instead of reaching Königsberg and Danzig with 30,000 men, only brought with him from 6000 to 7000.

On this occasion the French raised a fearful outcry against treason and want of faith, and still continue to write their histories in a tone of the highest indignation and zeal for virtue and truth, without observing how much they thereby betray their vexation, at being for once fought with their own weapons. The King of Prussia was no less surprised at the step taken by York and Massenbach than St. Marsan and Augereau, and immediately handed the latter the official communication in which General York had informed him of the course pursued. He expressed himself in his hasty manner with great resentment against the conduct of his general, and promised to punish him with severity. Hardenberg, who was then, properly speaking, ruler, assumed the appearance of as great surprise as the king; and St. Marsan and Augereau were either really deceived, or afraid of giving occasion to a general rising and desertion of the Prussians, who were only held to them by the king. Had it not been so, they would probably have seized his majesty's person.\* Augereau and St. Marsan's letters to Napoleon prove that they entertained a full belief of the king's integrity; the latter, however, saw clearly that the two generals had obeyed the will of the people, and that the step taken by General York would constrain the king to follow the same course, whether he wished it or not. It is obvious that Hardenberg was in the secret, by the omission of the following passage in York's despatch, when sent to Count St. Marsan. "If," says the general, "the time is ever to come in which your majesty shall be able to withdraw yourself from the unbounded assumptions of an ally, whose views respecting Prussia are covered with a thick veil, and caused the deepest anxiety as long as fortune

be seen in Marten's "*Recueil de Traités*," vol. v., pp. 556-557. We do not, however, subjoin the document, because the convention, correspondence, and the whole of the most minute information on this point may be seen in Fain's MS. de 1813, § iv., pp. 198-219.

\* In the "*Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat*," which have improperly been called Hardenberg's Memoirs, as merely SINGLE documents have been drawn from his papers, it is very admirably observed: "Ce qui, malgré ses hésitations, eût lancé Frédéric Guillaume dans l'ancienne voie de l'alliance avec la France, était la crainte qu'un changement dans le système de la Prusse n'en amenât la ruine complète, car il comptait peu sur la Russie, se méfiait de l'Autriche, et redoutait la France. Il ne se dissimulait pas cependant la haine profonde de ses peuples contre cette dernière puissance, mais il comptait sur leur dévouement absolu vers sa personne, et se persuadait qu'ils finiraient par se calmer en voyant renaître un ordre de choses puissant et père."



favoured him, it is now. This consideration has influenced my conduct, which God grant may lead to the salvation of my country."

Every impartial reader will perceive how ridiculous the abuse was which the French poured out upon treachery and want of faith, who bears in mind that the aggression of the French upon Prussian Pomerania was announced by forcible possession without the slightest notice; and none of the sophistry of the Prussian councillor has ever convinced us that compulsory agreements are to be regarded as binding. Besides this, the French never fulfilled the promises of payment for supplies; and Beguelin's journey to Wilna in September, 1812, with a view to obtain payment, was followed by no result; and finally, the Emperor failed in complying with the agreement concluded through Beguelin in Paris on the 25th of February, 1813, by the terms of which at least one-half of the sum due was to have been immediately discharged. On his part, the King of Prussia openly showed his dissatisfaction with what had been done, by withdrawing the command of his troops from Lieutenant-General York, and transferring it to Von Kleist; and the immaculate Prince of Hatzfeld, Bonaparte's creature, was to take a journey to Paris with a letter from the king, excusing himself on account of the defection of his troops. York's removal from his command, and the decree ordering him to be tried by court-martial, were published in the newspapers; but the chancellor of state was actually engaged in his private room in listening to the secret Prusso-Russian reports at the very time when Prince Hatzfeld was waiting in his ante-chamber to receive instructions for his mission to Paris. In these circumstances York and Massenbach took no notice whatever of their removal. The Russians did not allow the king's adjutant, who was the bearer of despatches, to pass, and York declared in the Königsberg journal that he knew nothing whatever of his removal, except what appeared in the journals, and that no one was ever removed by such a channel. He not only retained the command of the army, but by the assistance of the Russians he reinforced it by recruiting in Prussia, and from among the numerous Prussian prisoners of war in the hands of the Russians. In the beginning of February he even went so far as to appeal publicly to the whole Prussian nation to take up arms.

It appears from Count St. Marsan's letters, that in full confidence in the king's integrity, irresolution, and timidity, he entertained the less fear of Hardenberg, especially as the latter, as late as January, 1813, entered into negotiations respecting an intimate alliance with Napoleon, concerning which no serious purpose could be entertained. This alliance was to be founded on a marriage between some member of the royal and one of the imperial family. When the Russians drew near the Oder, the king at last resolved to free himself from the power of the French, who might at any moment have carried him off from Berlin. On the 22nd of January, 1813, a royal proclamation was issued, which announced the king's journey to Breslau, but in which, at the same time, assurance was

given that Prussia would hold firmly to the French alliance; and moreover Count St. Marsan accompanied the king to Breslau, where he arrived on the 25th. From this moment every Prussian and German patriot prepared himself to take up arms on the first summons; and then also Blücher, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, and many others, who from fear of the French had been removed from the king, and must have been in momentary danger of being carried off, assembled around the king in Breslau. It now soon became evident that there could be no sincerity in all these repeated assurances of continued friendship with France. By a general order of the 3rd of February, all Prussians from the age of seventeen to twenty-four were called to arms, and by a second, issued on the 9th, all exemptions from military service were on this occasion abolished. About this time the French had been already driven back from the Vistula, and soon gave up their positions on the Oder also; but they left a whole army in the fortresses, whose numbers we give below, as they have been given.\*

Deliberations had been already long entered upon in the Prussian cabinet with respect to the bold step of a complete defection from France; hints had been long before given to Metternich, and encouraging though equivocal answers returned. These negotiations were, properly speaking, carried on for several months in Stockholm, where the parties were further removed from observation. Baron von Tarrach, who managed the Prussian affairs in Sweden, played a very different character in private and in public, according as he acted on his instructions from Count Golz, minister of foreign affairs, or in the spirit of the commissions given him by Lecocq, one of the first members of the Prussian ministry. According to his public instructions, he constantly assumed a hostile attitude towards the English and Russian ministers, whilst he secretly carried on with them the most friendly correspondence. All this, however, was changed about the middle of January. As early as the beginning of the month some friendly overtures were made by Thornton, the English minister, to Von Tarrach, to which he did not send an answer till the 16th, and on this occasion according to instructions from Count Golz. These instructions, it is true, were still drawn up in a very anxious spirit, and Tarrach was earnestly enjoined to be CAREFUL NOT TO COMPROMISE THE PRESENT SYSTEM. This redundant caution, or, as it may more properly be called, superfluous falsehood and deception, gave the French an apparently good excuse for making the bitterest complaints of the Prussian policy. It is, indeed, impossible to approve, under such circumstances, of the publication of a royal decree on the 19th of February in the Berlin Journal, in which York and Massenbach were removed from their commands and ordered to be tried by court-martial.

\* In Pillau, 1200; Danzig, 35,000; Thorn, 5500; Modlin, 5800; Zamosk, 4000; Czenstochau, 900; Summa, 52,100. Among these last 15,900 Poles, Saxons, and Bavarians, and 36,000 French.



The situation of affairs in February was singular enough. Whilst Count Golz, at the head of the regency in Berlin, and the king himself in Breslau, continued to act as friends and allies of the French, there was peace and friendship in Prussia Proper with the Russians, and a Prussian army organised for them against the French. York did everything in his power to reinforce his army; the Russians gave him guns which they had taken from the French; left him Pillau, as soon as the garrison was obliged to capitulate; sent for Von Stein and his friends to Königsberg, and the Emperor Alexander placed him at the head of an administration, which was to be conducted in the name of the king. The patriots who now managed Prussian affairs under Russian protection, and, in Breslau since the arrival of the king, under the direction of such men as Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, acted upon the bold and energetic principles of Von Stein. As early as the 19th and 20th of February, they summoned the whole mass of the people to arms, including even those who had been hitherto exempt; they abolished all the privileges of the nobility with respect to commissions in the army, and promised in all future appointments, either in the military or civil departments, especial advantages to those who should volunteer. Notwithstanding all this, Bignon, who knew the king well from long experience, is of opinion that, had Napoleon some weeks earlier made him the same proposals which he made on the 10th of February to General Krusemark, the Prussian ambassador in Paris, he never would have been induced to agree to a declaration of war; "for the king," adds Bignon, without meaning to say anything evil of him, "entertains very different opinions from those of his people."\*

The negotiations respecting a close alliance between Russia and Prussia were commenced as soon as the Emperor Alexander arrived at Kalisch; it appears to us, however, that at the very last moment Hardenberg had recourse to a piece of diplomatic artifice, which would have been wholly unnecessary for any other object. In order to determine the king to declare for war, and to gain time, he made a proposal for the maintenance of peace to Count St. Marsan as late as the 16th of February. Napoleon immediately perceived in this proposal for peace the preliminary to a declaration of war. It was easy to foresee that neither Russia nor France would acquiesce in any proposal which brought Austria as a third party upon the stage. Hardenberg proposed that Prussia should be declared neutral, and the territory of the king evacuated; that Russia and France should accept the mediation of Austria, the former withdraw her troops be-

\* Bignon, vol. xi., p. 286. After having adverted to Bonaparte's hypothetical offers he adds: "Du reste l'Empereur Napoléon persiste à demander que le roi n'entre point en négociation avec l'ennemi commun. S'IL A CONFIANCE DANS LA PERSONNE DU ROI, il se défie de la nation Prussienne, et surtout du parti qui là domine. Il ne peut aussi que s'alarmer du recrutement extraordinaire de la Russe, LORSQUE LE ROI N'A QUE DES OFFICIERS AUXQUELS IL NE PEUT PAS SE FIER LUI-MÊME."



hind the Vistula, and the latter retire beyond the Elbe.\* It appears to us that this new attempt to deceive the French merely furnished them with an additional unnecessary pretence for exclaiming against their insincerity; for at this very moment when it was made, Colonel Knesbeck was already in the Russian camp with a view to negotiate about the conditions of the alliance with Russia. On the 28th of February, Field-Marshal Kutusoff signed the agreement on the part of Russia at Kalisch, and Chancellor Hardenberg on the 27th at Breslau; and as early as the 1st of March, the king formally confirmed the agreement entered into by his chancellor. On the 11th of March, Nesselrode informed Prince Metternich of the treaty which had been made, and communicated to him those articles which bore upon the restoration of the old condition of things in Europe, with the express exception, however, of the imperial dignity, which was not to be renewed, inasmuch as each sovereign claimed the exercise of independent royal privileges. The treaty, as alleged, was to be made known only to England, Sweden and Austria, and to be kept secret from the other powers for at least two months. This concealment had especial reference to the articles on the new partition and settlement of territory; the remainder was published as soon as the Emperor Alexander reached Breslau on the 15th of March. On the same day a royal decree was issued in which York was declared free from all blame and his conduct approved of, and in the following day the conclusion of the treaty was announced to Count St. Marsan; Krusemark in Paris did not, however, ask for his passports till the 27th, and at the same time handed in a declaration of war, and a justification of it, to the minister of foreign affairs. The treaty of Kalisch, given by Martens, as far as it was intended to be made known, and which was afterwards printed by him though not with all the accessory articles, has never yet been fully published. This, however, may be regarded as indifferent by us, who at no time pay particular attention to the devices and schemes of diplomacy, but confine ourselves to facts. We shall, however, give in the text some, and add in the note others, of those points which were to be kept secret.†

\* The main point in Hardenberg's note, who alas! for the honour of his country always played a double part, is as follows:—"Il est venu au roi l'idée que rien n'avancerait plus le grand œuvre de la paix qu'une trêve d'après laquelle les armées Russes et Françaises se retireraient à une certaine distance et établiraient une ligne de démarcation en laissant un pays intermédiaire entre elles. L'Empereur Napoléon serait-il porté à entrer dans un pareil engagement? Consenterait-il à remettre les forteresses de l'Oder et celles de Danzig aux troupes Prussiennes conjointement avec les troupes Saxonnaises, et de retirer son armée jusqu'à l'Elbe moyennant que l'Empereur Alexandre retirerait toutes ses troupes derrière la Vistule?"

† The main points of the treaty of Kalisch are contained in the 2nd and 3rd articles: "The alliance between Russia and Prussia is for the present offensive. The immediate object of it is to restore Prussia in such a manner as that the repose of the two states shall be secured. As this cannot possibly be done as long as an armed French force maintains its position in the North of Germany, or even exercises any influence there, the first operations of war will be directed especially to this point. Russia shall therefore furnish 150,000, and Prussia 80,000 men, and they mutually bind each other neither to conclude peace nor accept of a suspension

It was first of all agreed, that inasmuch as the security and independence of Prussia could only be newly established by the restoration of the whole of the territory and power which it possessed previous to 1806, the Emperor of Russia, anticipating the wishes of the king, should bind himself by this special and secret article: "NOT TO LAY DOWN HIS ARMS TILL PRUSSIA HAD OBTAINED THE WHOLE OF HER FORMER STATISTICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL, AND FINANCIAL CONDITION, AND HAVE BECOME WHAT SHE WAS BEFORE THE WAR." For this purpose the emperor made the most solemn promises that he would use all the means in his power, both by arms and negotiation, to compensate Prussia for her losses, and to promote the extension of the kingdom; the only reserve was the old Hanoverian possessions. The more minute and definite settlement of what was to be done for Prussia was put off, whilst on the other hand a supplemental treaty was signed on the 19th of March, by Nesselrode on the part of Russia, and by Hardenberg and Scharnhorst on that of Prussia, on the plans to be followed on the advance of the army. It was agreed: (1) that not only the princes, as hitherto, the people having been little regarded, but the whole people should be invited and urged, by proclamation, to fly to arms and to shake off the French yoke, or, in other words, to renounce their own princes, provided these should continue to adhere to the French cause. (2) That a council of administration, consisting of three members, to be named by the allied powers, should be appointed as a central authority to organise and regulate all the provinces and districts occupied by the allied troops. The revenues of these provinces to be calculated and divided between Russia and Prussia, with the reservation of a part for Hanover proportioned to the amount of its contingent. (3) The whole of the countries from Saxony to the borders of Holland, with the exception of the former Prussian provinces and the parts belonging to Hanover, to be divided into five great divisions. The government of each division to be committed to a military and civil governor. The first members of this central authority, who had in fact very little to administer before the battle of Leipzig, were Baron von Stein, privy councillor Von Schön, and Rödiger, councillor of state, under the presidency of Kotschubey, a Russian count.

In drawing up this agreement Von Stein had succeeded in having it made a condition, that all those German princes who should refuse to do their part for the liberation of their country should be deprived of their states; and, by a proclamation signed by Field-Marshal Kutusoff, the Confederation of the Rhine was dissolved. Even before the declaration of war, Prussia had founded the order of the iron cross, as a reward for those who had suffered in her cause, and an encouragement for those who might distinguish themselves in the im-

of arms." In the 6th article, they bind themselves to endeavour to bring Austria into the alliance; and in the 7th and 8th, to negotiate with England to procure from thence subsidies for Prussia.



pending war. By another proclamation, dated on the 17th, it was publicly declared that the war just declared was to be one of no ordinary character ; that everything was at stake—life, liberties, and property. As a reward for unexampled exertions, privileges and freedom to all classes to share in the administration of public affairs were promised in the name of the king ; and the royal family itself promised to take its full share of all the impending dangers.

### 3.—VAIN ATTEMPT ON THE PART OF NAPOLEON TO BECOME RECONCILED TO THE POPE AND THE CHURCH.

The Emperor Napoleon set out on his campaign to Russia in a state of enmity with the Pope. By his command the Holy Father was kept under strict *surveillance* in Savona, which was, however, somewhat modified at the instant of his departure for Dresden. This was done either to try anew what could be done by mildness, or because he was afraid that he might be carried away from Savona by some of the English ships-of-war, which were very frequently on the coast. On the 20th of June 1812 the Pope was removed to Fontainebleau, where he was put in possession of the same apartments which he had occupied at the time of his presence in France at the Emperor's coronation, and was attended on by persons carefully selected from the Emperor's household. He was served and waited on after the same manner as crowned heads in their visits to France, and enjoyed the attendance of a number of clergy and of Porta, his own physician.\* Thus no physical restraint was imposed upon the aged man; the moral restraint, however, was proportionally the stronger, because all the persons were chosen precisely according as their modes of thinking suited the Emperor, who felt the need of a hierarchy and a Pope for the completion of his kind of state; and who, for this very reason, had sanctioned the restoration of the inventions of Jesuitical fetichism in Christianity in 1800. As friends, the Popish clergy were of very little use to the Emperor, but as enemies they were able to do him serious injury.

He became particularly sensible of this on his return from Russia, when the clergy began to whisper to one another, and to give the people to understand that the God of Zion was at length aroused. In their sermons and pastoral letters they hinted at the overthrow of the empire, and at the same time the liberation of the Pope and the triumph of Rome. The Emperor had previously tried to bring the question at issue to an end by severity, by an increasingly strict watch imposed upon the Pope and the incarceration of whole crowds of clergy, especially in the States of the Church. He perceived,

\* The Pope was surrounded by the cardinals of Bayonne, Fabricio, Ruffo, Rovellet, Dugnani, Doria, and the Archbishop of Edessa, his almoner. These formed his privy council. De Banal, Archbishop of Tours, Cardinal Maury, Archbishop of Paris, Duvoisin, Bishop of Nantes, Hirn, Bishop of Trèves, Bourlier, Bishop of Evreux, and finally, the bishops of Piacenza, Feltre, and Fuenza, were sent for as mediators to bring about a reconciliation.



however, when contemplating his expedition to Russia, that it would be impossible to carry on war against Russia and against fanaticism at the same time. The priests began even to assail the Pope, particularly because he had concluded a concordat; many of them conducted religious services in places not belonging to the state Church. The separation was so considerable that the council of state, by means of a circular addressed to the procurators, prefects, burgomasters and heads of the police, gave orders for such houses of prayer to be closed, and all religious exercises in them to be prevented. The superintendent of the press also fell into disputes with the bishops, because they suffered strong expressions to be used in their books of devotion and theological writings against the interference of the civil government in religious concerns, and were zealous in their defence of the Pope's supremacy. They were especially accused of having omitted St. Napoleon's day from the calendar, and Lemaitre, vicar-general of Dijon, of having made a most furious attack upon war and its consequences in a sermon preached on the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz. The discontent caused by the disputes with the Pope, and the experience of the danger of leaving no proper substitute in Paris during his absence in his campaigns, led him to entertain the idea of appointing a regency before he again left the capital, and of endeavouring to issue the dispute, concerning the changes which he was desirous of making, in his concordat with the Pope.

The measures adopted by the Emperor in reference to the regency which he designed to intrust to his wife, assisted by a council, do not fall within the scope of our plan, because they relate to France alone, and did not meet the main object, which was to prevent any defection in the capital; we cannot, however, pass over the negotiations respecting the concordat. The appointment of a regency in case of the absence of the Emperor and of the minority of the successor to the throne, under the presidency of the Empress, was probably influenced partly by a desire to flatter the Emperor of Austria, whose services were at that time greatly needed; the Emperor sought to take the Pope by surprise, and thus to bring him to the approval of what he desired. Even in reference to the concordat, however, we shall not dwell upon particulars, partly because this would constrain us to enter into the consideration of ecclesiastical affairs, which we designedly avoid; and partly because almost all the sources from whence we must derive our information respecting Napoleon's conduct are very unworthy of credit. All the Bonapartists, without exception, deny that the Pope was subjected to the slightest MORAL restraint, which, however, he obviously was; whilst two Legitimist writers, on the contrary, who are held in high estimation in France, go so far as to allege that Napoleon himself laid violent hands upon the Pope.

The writers to whom we have just referred, and who desire to be regarded as more orthodox than the Pope himself, are the well-

known enthusiast and legitimist Chateaubriand, in his eulogy on the elder line of the Bourbons, published in 1815, and Artaud, in his life of Pius VII., published in 1836. But even the fanatical Cardinal Pacca, who first encouraged and urged the Pope in Rome to take the most violent steps against the Emperor, does not say a single word in his *Memoirs* of the deeds of which Chateaubriand accuses the Emperor, nor of the furious looks which Artaud ascribes to him. Had these allegations only possessed a shadow of truth, they would not have escaped the attention of De Pradt and Sir Walter Scott in their unjust and bitter libels against Napoleon. During the absence of the Emperor, the negotiations with the Pope remained stationary, especially as he was offended with the proposal made with respect to his future residence, and the limit which it was proposed to establish for his confirmation of the bishops nominated by the crown. As soon, however, as Napoleon returned he resumed the question; and Duvoisin, Bishop of Nantes, and Barral, Archbishop of Tours, were the most active in their mediation.

On the 1st of January, 1813, the Emperor, as son of the Church, caused his compliments to be presented to the Pope, and the latter sent Cardinal Doria to return the usual complimentary salutations on the new year. On this occasion the negotiations were renewed. When they were continued till the 10th without leading to any result, the Emperor resolved to go in person to the Pope, and not to lose sight of him till the matter was brought to a close.

A hunting party at Grosbois furnished the Emperor with an excuse for making his appearance unexpectedly at Fontainebleau on the 19th. The Pope returned his visit in his own apartments on the 20th, and then there took place that famous two hours' conversation of which such very different accounts have been given. What is most probable is, that the Emperor on the one hand gave way to his Corsican and military vehemence which so often led him into the most violent outbreaks towards foreign diplomatists and generals, and, upon the other, had recourse to all that amiability of disposition and manners which made him irresistible. Surprise, long confinement, the persuasion of the clergy, gained over by Napoleon, and the power of the Emperor himself over weaker minds, furnish sufficient explanation of the fact, that in the course of such a conversation the Pope made many concessions, of which he immediately afterwards repented. At first he was as well satisfied with the issue of the conversation as the Emperor himself. Every one rejoiced at the reconciliation; even the Empress with her suite came to Fontainebleau, and conferences were immediately commenced on the articles of the new concordat, which was finished on the 25th. Fain, who acted as secretary on the occasion, informs us that the Emperor dictated literally the terms of the various articles, and the Pope intimated his acquiescence by a nod.

The conditions of the concordat of 1811 were altered only in a



few points; the Pope accepted the proffered compensation of two millions of francs yearly, and the Emperor no longer required a formal cession of the States of the Church. The Emperor no longer insisted on the Pope's taking up his residence in Paris, and the Pope on the other hand accepted of the proffered residence at Avignon. As Napoleon acknowledged in a note that the Pope by the conclusion of the treaty by no means relinquished his claims to the States of the Church, and that the concordat referred to spiritual rights alone, the Pope on his part acquiesced in the demand, made on behalf of the French Church, requiring his confirmation of those nominated as bishops within six months after their nomination. The new concordat was solemnly signed on the 25th; on the following day presents were made to the Pope's councillors, and seventeen cardinals, of whom nine were lodged in the palace, were allowed to have free access to his Holiness. The concordat, moreover, was publicly announced in the churches, and *TE DEUMS* were sung; but notwithstanding great obstructions were put in the way of carrying the agreement into execution, and the Church did not recognise it at all. The Emperor paid no attention whatever to the course pursued by the Church, and on the 13th of February he caused the concordat to be published as a fundamental law of the empire. The cardinal, however, and the Pope alarmed by them, repented of the treaty, and alleged that Napoleon, contrary to agreement, had published the document before the Pope had concluded his consultations with his confidential and orthodox cardinals.

Cardinal Pacca, the organ of Ultramontanism, states in his *Memoirs*, that having congratulated the Pope on his patient endurance, the latter replied: "AND YET AFTER ALL I HAVE DISGRACED MYSELF." He then referred to the three cardinals who had been active in bringing about the issue, and said: "THESE CARDINALS DRAGGED ME TO THE TABLE AND PREVAILED UPON ME TO ATTACH MY SIGNATURE." At first, there was great doubt as to what was to be done; at length it was resolved that the Pope should intimate his repentance, and formally recal his acquiescence. This was really done in a letter written by the Pope to the Emperor on the 24th of March, and in a manifesto addressed to the whole of Christendom, which was called an allocution. In both these documents the Pope acknowledges that he is merely dust and ashes, and that, through human infirmities, he has hastily subscribed his name to a document which he now feels it to be his duty to recal.

The Emperor took no notice whatever of the Pope's recal of the concordat; on the contrary, he created the Cardinal of Bayonne and Bourlier, Bishop of Evreux, whom the Pope accused of having insidiously prevailed upon him to sign the document, senators; and, on the very day on which the Pope recalled the concordat, gave special notice to the archbishops, bishops, and chapters, that he meant to insist upon a strict observance of it. On the same day it was proclaimed in the States of the Church, that all those of the



clergy who had rendered themselves amenable to punishment for refusing to take an oath of allegiance to the Emperor, would be relieved from the penalties due to their offence, provided they now took the oath according to the terms of the concordat. The appearance of a reconciliation now continued, the Pope was no longer persecuted, and the clergy were outwardly observant of the concordat. In reality, however, the division was more bitter than ever; for the leading clergy of the Romish Church still kept alive the opinion among the people, that Napoleon had been excommunicated, and he in his turn took his vengeance upon them. He banished Cardinal de Pietro to Auxerre, for having been particularly busy about the recal of the Pope's consent; and although the other cardinals were allowed to remain about the Pope, they were obliged to refrain from intermeddling with business, and not allowed to perform any clerical functions. The Pope on his part published an allocution on the 9th of May, by the advice of the same cardinals, in which he protested against Napoleon's decrees of the 18th of February and the 26th of March.

#### 4.—ENGLAND—SICILY.

In the beginning of the year 1812, the English ministry was led by Mr. Perceval altogether according to Pitt's principles. The old abuses and oligarchical customs found even more zealous friends in Perceval and his colleagues than in Mr. Pitt himself. This ministry not only carried on the war for the maintenance of the old against the new, with the same vehemence as their Tory predecessors, but they did not adopt the cause of the Catholics as Mr. Pitt did,—nor assist them in the attainment of their political rights. One of the able but dishonest men, of whom such governments as those of England, more anxious about the end than careful as to the means, are accustomed to avail themselves, believed (very unjustly as it appears) that he had not been sufficiently rewarded by Mr. Perceval, and shot him dead on the 17th of May, 1812; his death rendered a complete change in the ministry necessary. The easiest thing to have done would have been to have taken into the cabinet the Marquis of Wellesley, the head of one of the oligarchical houses, and carrying with him the intelligence of the Pitt ministry; they were, however, unwilling to unite with the existing government, and the members of the present cabinet were not disposed to make a place in their ranks for the superior talents of those able statesmen. The Prince Regent, who, at that time, figured in a masterly way as king during his father's incapacity, fell therefore into great perplexity. This uncertainty continued till the end of May, when the parliament at length urged the prince to choose a responsible government without further delay. The regent commissioned the Marquis Wellesley, Lord Wellington's brother, to form an administration, but without success. Lord Wellesley declared as early as the 3rd of June, that he was himself unable to form an administration, and expressed himself

in such terms on the subject in the House of Lords as enables us easily to understand why his brother afterwards had so much reason to complain of the ill-will of the government which was at length appointed.\*

The Whigs in like manner would have nothing to do with the old ministry, and therefore a new government was formed on the 9th of June, composed wholly of men hostile to all progress, and who were heartily ready to cherish and protect all the abuses of the Church and every aristocratic prejudice. Lord Liverpool was appointed chief—Lord Addington, now for eight years Lord Sidmouth, minister of the home department. Lord Liverpool's enmity to the Marquis of Wellesley extended to his whole family, so that Wellington had not that influence in England which would at that moment have been necessary to bring the war in Spain to a speedy termination. As Lord William Bentinck had greater influence than Wellington with the new ministry, the ruling English oligarchist never hesitated to use the means which should have been employed in Spain for the execution of his lordship's wild schemes. He was a vehement and imperious Englishman of the old and rude stamp, and he at that time not only played the part of constitutional king in Sicily, but intermeddled in Spanish affairs.

The English, as has been already observed, not only protected Sicily against the attacks of King Joachim, and of the French by their fleet, but also sent a body of troops to the island. This force was at first under the command of Sir John Stuart; the government, however, was in the hands of the king, who had fled from Naples to Palermo, or rather in those of his masculine and energetic queen, who, even in exile, had not altered her oriental character. She continued to keep up an understanding with her old friends in the kingdom of Naples; with the help of the English, attempted landings in Calabria, and roused up the robber hordes of the coasts and mountains against the foreign king, but only produced murder and calamity without inflicting any serious injury on the French; King Joachim and his Queen Caroline Bonaparte repaid like with like. Joachim made attempts to land on the island, and the queen organised conspiracies and secret associations; both, however, only to the destruction of those who were concerned in them. The old queen, who in the previous century had broken out with all the rage of a fury against her Neapolitan subjects, now began to display the same disposition towards the Sicilians; not only those who were guilty or suspected, but those who were wholly innocent and irreproachable, were so cruelly persecuted and dreadfully treated, that at length the English were obliged to employ their troops to protect her own subjects against a queen who had become a fury.

Acton, who in the foregoing century had been at the head of the

\* The Marquis of Wellesley observed: "He had that day surrendered his commission, lamenting that *dreadful personal animosities* should have interposed obstacles to prevent that union of parties which was most desirable."



royal inquisition, its executioners and bailiffs, was now dead, but the Cavalier Medici, who on his death became the instrument and helpmate of the queen, was even more dreadful than he, for he exceeded him both in duplicity and cowardice. The Sicilians, not merely the people, but nobles also were so thoroughly discontented, that the most troublesome duty which the English had to perform was to maintain the supremacy of the royal government against their own malcontent subjects. The queen and the mistress of the Duke of Ascoli, who next to Medici took the most active share in the government, not merely spent the revenues of the island, but also 300,000*l.* which had been received as subsidies from England for the defence of the city, in very different ways from those intended. The English, therefore, were able to gratify their love of dominion in Sicily as in India, by assuming the office of protectors of the much abused subjects, and they could assert also that, for their own security, a regular government must be instituted in the country occupied by them, instead of an arbitrary and lawless tyranny.

It became more obvious than ever in the year 1810, that the government of Sicily must be completely remodelled in one way or other, inasmuch as the parliament convoked by Medici had given rise to new difficulties and disputes instead of putting an end to the old ones. It was of no avail that Medici was obliged to relinquish the superintendence of the finances, for the government arbitrarily laid on a tax of one per cent., and collected it by force. This step led fifty-two of the nobles to make an application for protection against their own queen to the English government, which at that time, besides the fleet and its crews, maintained an army of 15,000 men in the island. The queen was vehemently enraged on learning that Lord Amherst, the English minister in Palermo, took up the cause of the oppressed Sicilians. She endeavoured to rouse up the people to resist English interference; on which account the British cabinet recalled Lord Amherst, in order to unite the office of minister plenipotentiary and commander of the forces in one person. Lord William Bentinck was selected to act in this double capacity. He was a proud and harsh man, full of aristocratic prejudices, and hostile to monarchical tyranny. He immediately assumed a very imperious tone towards the queen, and declared his intention to protect the protesting barons. He required the queen to recal her last two ordinances, to put an end to the gross and cruel persecution of the discontented Sicilians, and in future to pay respect to the existing laws. The English plenipotentiary required nothing more than was obviously just and right; his tone and manners, however, were harsh and offensive, and a personal interview between the queen and the proud and haughty Englishman led to a formal breach. Violent language was used on both sides; Lord William threatened a revolution, and the queen, in a most offensive manner, forbade his interference in the affairs of home administration. Without being expressly empowered by his own government altogether to remove the



queen, or even to proceed to acts of force, Lord William could do nothing more, because he had been sent to consult and advise, and not to have recourse to action. He, therefore, entrusted the command of the troops in the mean time to General Maitland, and returned to London in order to ask for new powers.

After three months' absence the noble lord returned provided with all the necessary powers to carry out by force what he might prove unable to effect by milder measures; and when circumstances required he did not hesitate to use his power. Having reached Palermo in October, 1811, he collected the greater part of the English troops in the neighbourhood of that city, and, if we may rely upon Bottà, used language to the queen such as any overbearing Englishman for the last eighty years may have employed to an Indian rajah, or as Lord Palmerston very recently used to the minister of the King of Greece, or to the Queen of Spain.\* In the subsequent part of these affairs, we must often hesitate whether most to rejoice in the overthrow of a scandalous and revoltingly cruel despotism, or to be indignant at the pride and insolence of an intolerant aristocrat of the worst description. The queen first of all declared that she had indeed applied to the English for protection, but she was not willing to pay the price which they required; she would therefore do her best to protect the island herself, and the English might withdraw. The English merely smiled at this proposal. The queen having afterwards put herself at the head of her army to resist the English by force, her own ministers proved to her that the Sicilian soldiers were destitute of clothing, arms, and provisions, in short of all the means of resistance, and that besides they were not disposed to fight for the queen's cause. She proved unable to rouse even the clergy and the fanatical people to stand by her against the English heretics. She had written to all the convents and religious houses in vain, and nothing was left but to relinquish the government, leave the capital, and retire to a small country palace in the neighbourhood of Termini.

The following circumstances are rendered credible by the character of the queen; we do not, however, venture to detail all the particulars and their connexion, because Lord William's creatures alleged many things as established, which are, nevertheless, very doubtful. On the 3rd of December a proclamation was issued from the English head-quarters at Messina, in reference to a terrible conspiracy formed by a number of distinguished Sicilians belonging to the court party, in conjunction with the French, against the

\* Bottà, Storia d'Italia, cet., vol. vi., libro 26, p. 227. "Tento Bentinck di nuovo la regina colle persuasioni, di nuovo la regina nella risoluzione, di voler fare da se, non a perta altrui, si fossero o Inglesi, o parlamenti, persiteva. Minaccioso allera venne sul dire, arresterebbe il re, arresterebbe la regina, gli manderebbe in Inghilterra, lascerebbe in Palermo a governare il regno, il figliuolo del principe hereditario Don Francesco, fanciullo di due anni, con assistenza d'una regenza, alla quale chiamerebbe come capi il duca d' Orleans e il principe Belmonti." Here again we see Louis Philippe as an *Iterum Crispinus* behind the curtain.

**English.** At the same time reports of all kinds were propagated concerning attempts to assassinate Lord William Bentinck, and a very considerable number of persons was arrested, who were known to be friends and confidential advisers of the queen. Immediately afterwards, on the 16th of January, 1812, the king resigned the reins of government for an indefinite time. By virtue of a document published at this date, King Ferdinand appointed his son, Francis Januarius Joseph, as his representative, with full royal power, till his own restoration to health. Although this prince was already thirty-five years of age, his father and mother, as well as Lord William Bentinck, used him as a mere man of straw, behind whom they might conceal themselves. Bentinck had already exercised royal power as the plenipotentiary of his master, and commander-in-chief of the English troops; he now caused himself to be appointed, by Prince Francis Januarius, captain-general of the Sicilians, in fact, independent regent of the island, and in this character speedily altered all the former modes of government. The whole of the political prisoners were set at liberty, and the leaders of the Sicilian barons, who had been exiled for their attempt to defend the rights and privileges of the aristocracy (not of the people) against Queen Caroline, especially Prince Belmonti, Ventimiglia, Villa Franca, and Cesena obtained a preponderating influence. In order to throw the shadow or the light of a constitution over the present military government, Lord William Bentinck, as captain-general, convoked a parliament of three chambers at Palermo, to consult and advise upon a new constitution. The parliament, consisting of the three estates of the middle ages, consulting apart, met in July, 1812, and agreed to a constitution after Bonaparte's fashion; that is, Lord William Bentinck caused a number of propositions to be submitted to the Sicilians, which appeared to him, as an Englishman, excellent, but which were by no means agreeable to Italian traditions, nor to Italian customs, nor in the least degree calculated for demoralised men, who had been long accustomed to a system of miserable bondage. The constitution embraced eleven propositions, which are in themselves admirable, and ought to be regarded as fundamental in every civilised state;\* but the particular details, like those of all constitutions discussed and settled, and all laws imposed without

\* The fundamental principles of this ephemeral constitution, concerning which the Sicilians were afterwards grossly deceived, and whose abolition has on one side led to vexatious cruelties from that time till the present, and on the other to a series of revolts and deeds of violence, are as follows:—1. The executive power is to be entrusted to the king. 2. The judicial power belongs to those appointed to judicial offices under the oversight of parliament. 3. The judges, however, to be independent; and the person of the king inviolable. 4. The ministers to be responsible to parliament. 5. The legislature to consist of two houses; and the clergy to be represented in the upper house. 6. The barons to have only one vote each. 7. The right of summoning parliament to be vested in the king; but the legislative bodies must meet at least once in every year. 8. No Sicilian to be tried or condemned except according to law, as recognised by parliament. 9. All feudal rights and privileges to be abolished. 10. The rights of barons over their vassals to be abolished. 11. All money bills to issue from the House of Commons alone.



regard to the usages of those for whom they are intended, were unsuited to their object.

Lord William Bentinck did not hesitate to declare, that institutions which were suited to English nationality, usages, religion, and morals, must of necessity, also, be of universal application; and therefore caused it to be resolved that parliament must remain assembled till the constitution was completed, and added that all possible pains should be taken to form it after the model of that of England.\* Lord William Bentinck, quite in accordance with his High Church wisdom and English exclusiveness, consented, on the earnest desire of the higher clergy, that an article should be added to the constitution, excluding every one from the benefit of its privileges who did not belong to the established form of religion.† It must, however, be admitted, to the honour of Lord William, that he frustrated an attempt made by the Sicilian nobles to introduce a clause of a similar nature respecting feudal rights. When the constitution was completed, Lord William Bentinck governed Sicily under the title of chancellor, and the prince and vicar-general of the king became mere *figurantes*.

As early as January, 1812, and before, therefore, the constitution was ready, Lord Bentinck conceived that he had rendered the Sicilians so happy and contented as to be able to defend the island against the French, by the assistance of an English fleet and a Sicilian army. He wished to employ the English troops elsewhere, and proposed to the English ministry to send 10,000 men to Spain, to support Lord Wellington and the leaders of the Spanish guerillas, from the coast of the Mediterranean. The ministry adopted the proposal; and Lord William sent his brother to make the necessary arrangements with Lord Wellington. When, however, the time for executing the project drew near, Lord William's power of imagination had conjured up other castles in the air. First of all he was desirous of employing the troops DESTINED FOR SPAIN on an expedition to the coast of Dalmatia, in which he was to be supported by the Russian admiral; afterwards he proposed to effect a landing in Upper Italy, till at length the English government ordered him to give up all his other projects, and to proceed to Spain with all the troops which could be spared from Sicily.

### 5.—SPAIN IN THE YEARS 1812 AND 1813.

It having been at length determined that the troops recruited by Lord William Bentinck, from men of all nations, destined first for Dalmatia, then for Upper Italy, and distributed about among the small islands of the Mediterranean, should be sent to Catalonia, it

\* Il parlamento vedesse quante e quale parte della costituzione della Gran Bretagna convenissero alla Sicilia ed esse ad utilità commune si accettassero.

† Che la religione Catholica Romana fosse sola religione del regno che il re la professasse; quando no s'intendesse deposto.



appeared that they were by far too weak to undertake anything considerable. They consisted of something about 6000 men, of whom not the half were English, Germans, or Swiss, in whom confidence could be placed. At their head appeared, not Lord William Bentinck, as he had promised, but General Maitland, who was a distinguished officer, it is true, but who, like all his numerous successors, was the mere deputy of Lord William Bentinck, and obliged to be regulated wholly by his orders. The whole of these troops were first sent from the small islands to Majorca, and from thence, in June, 1812, conveyed to the coast of Catalonia. The English sent provisions and ammunition from Gibraltar and Portugal, together with some distinguished engineer and artillery officers; these were to be joined by the Spanish troops recruited for the Cortes by Roche and Whittingham.

This first expedition from Sicily must necessarily have been ineffective, because it was ill calculated for its purpose, and its commander was too much restrained, General Maitland having been expressly forbidden to undertake anything by which Sicily might be endangered; he therefore again left the coast of Spain in the second week in October. At the end of July he had made some manifestations of landing in Catalonia; Suchet himself, however, hastened to the threatened point, and Maitland found it advisable to give up his design upon Catalonia, and to direct his movements further southward. He then thought he might be able to take Valencia by surprise, but finally landed at Alicante. His army was about 6000 strong, but consisted of all sorts of people—of Sicilians, Calabrians, Germans, English. Maitland's army was no sooner disembarked than Suchet hastened up and encamped opposite to it on the Xucar.

The landing was effected on the 10th of August, on the same day on which Wellington entered Madrid; and in fact Colonel John Jones, whose *History of the War in Spain* we have occasionally quoted, was immediately despatched to Alicante, in order to agree upon a plan of mutual co-operation. This could not be done; Maitland's disembarkation, however, produced two advantages—it detained Suchet on the Xucar, and relieved Alicante. This town would undoubtedly have been taken by the French had it not been for the timely arrival of the Anglo-Sicilian army, because the army raised by O'Donnel in Murcia for the protection of Carthage and Alicante had been previously completely defeated. In the mean time Wellington relinquished the pursuit of the army of Portugal so called, under the command of Clausel since Marmont had been wounded, and marched with 20,000 men to Madrid, which King Joseph, with the army of the centre, had left on the 10th of August, in order to form a junction with Suchet's corps.

In the mean time Wellington left Hill behind to watch the King of Spain's army, and hastened to Valladolid on the 1st of September, where Clausel's army maintained itself till driven out on the 6th. We may just observe in passing, it was alleged as a fault in

the great English general on this occasion, that he did not drive Clausel before him to the Pyrenees instead of going to Madrid, and it was regarded as a still greater error to have remained so long in Burgos, thus giving time to the army of Portugal to be reinforced and newly organised. The badly fortified citadel of Burgos detained Wellington in that city till the 21st of October, and General Dubreton had the honour of having kept the whole English army before the place till the army of Portugal, and the army of the north under Souham, which had been both for a time united under the command of the latter, marched up, and Soult's army of the south united with the army of the centre under the king, threatened to cut off its retreat to Portugal.

On the 22nd of October Wellington broke up from Burgos, and all the French armies in Spain, with the exception of Suchet's, detained on the Xucar, tried to overtake him. Wellington no sooner marched towards Madrid than Soult received orders from the king to hasten to the relief of the capital. This order he not only refused to obey, but, on the other hand, called upon the king to come and join him in Andalusia. He, however, at length broke up his position, when he himself began to be threatened from the south-west. The Cortes having now conferred the supreme command of their armies upon Wellington, he ordered Ballasteros with his Spaniards to press forward from Gibraltar against Soult; General Cook to storm the French general's lines before Cadiz; Hill to attack Drouet from Madrid, and to hasten to Andalusia. Soult did not, however, wait for the execution of this plan. At the very moment when the English were pressing forward against Seville, Soult, on the 24th and 25th of August, destroyed his lines and his heavy artillery before Cadiz. The strong works at Chiclana, Santa Maria, and on the Trocadero were blown up; a thousand guns and his great mortars were knocked to pieces; and having prepared eight days' provision, the scattered troops were collected at Antiquera and marched off. Soult was anxious to give his troops a little time for repose in Granada. The road thither was very weary, leading as it did across waste, bare, and steep mountains; and the army was, at the same time, pressed by Hill on the left, and by Ballasteros on the right. Over this difficult road he had to drag with him not only 72 pieces of artillery, but also about 9000 sick and wounded, and whole crowds of Spanish families who had cast in their lot with the new government. His army still consisted of 45,000 men, of whom 6000 were cavalry; and Drouet, although he had only left Estramadura on the 15th of August, was fortunate enough to form a junction with the main army by marching through Cordova, Jaen, and Huesca. Soult might, indeed, have chosen the highway which would have led him through Murcia to King Joseph and Suchet on the Xucar. This country, however, was infested by a dreadful yellow fever; and he was,



on that account, compelled to choose the mountain road. By this rough and difficult route he reached the main road at Almanza on the 5th of September, and allowed his army some repose till he was informed that Wellington had left Madrid. He then broke up from his quarters and formed a junction with the army of the centre under the king at Albacete on the 29th of September.

On his retirement from Burgos, Wellington was closely pursued by the united armies under Souham, but he again reached the river on the 24th of October without loss; and by the time Joseph had again returned to Madrid on the 1st of November, had formed a junction with Hill's corps. On the 10th of November King Joseph deprived Souham of his command; the latter returned greatly dissatisfied to France, and the chief command of the army was transferred to Drouet d'Erlon. Soult now brought together under his own command the whole of the armies, having first formed a junction with that of the centre under the king. Wellington's retreat from Burgos to the Tormes, which he reached on the 1st of November, has been extolled as a masterpiece in military art, because the army, without any considerable loss or particular exhaustion, again reached the position which it occupied before the battle of the Arapiles. When Soult made his appearance with his army, Wellington was encamped at San Cristoval, in the neighbourhood of Salamanca, where he should have been immediately attacked had Jourdan's advice, who was again the counsellor of the king, been adopted. Soult, however, was of a different opinion; he was desirous of getting before the English army on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, and therefore sought for means of again crossing the river Alba before he made his attack; several bloody affairs between the two armies, however, took place on the 7th and 8th of November. On the 14th Wellington avoided a general engagement by a bold march, and left a position where he was in danger of being cut off from Ciudad Rodrigo, and therefore from a retreat to Portugal. The French translator of Colonel Jones expresses his dissent from the declaration of the English authorities, that Wellington escaped a general engagement on the 15th by the violence of the rain and a thick fog; he alleges, on the contrary, that the French were delayed by divisions in their own head-quarters. Napier states that Wellington's astonishing boldness was favoured by the state of the roads, rendered excessively difficult by the violence of the rain, because the English followed the high military road, whereas the French must have been obliged to use the low foot and side paths. On the 18th he reached the Portuguese frontiers and Ciudad Rodrigo on the Agueda. The whole retreat from Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo, according to Napier, only cost the English from 8000 to 9000 men; Wellington himself, however, in one of his celebrated orders of the day, bitterly complains of his army, and alleges that since his departure from Salamanca all discipline had been lost, and plunder and robbery



been practised to a fearful extent; exhaustion, licentiousness, and want had become so great within the last three months, that one-third of the whole army was in the hospitals.

The army afterwards remained for some time in a state of repose, whilst Wellington was indefatigable in his exertions to stimulate and to encourage the Spaniards and Portuguese, as well as to direct the attention of their respective governments and of his own to the state and condition of their forces. The French armies also, since the beginning of December, drew further into the interior of Spain, and King Joseph, who with Jourdan's assistance had again resumed the command, had dispersed his forces as follows: Drouet's headquarters were established at Valladolid, Soult's at Toledo. Drouet, with his army, occupied the districts between the Tormes and the Esula; Soult, with his left wing, covered the province of La Mancha, with the centre of his army the valley of the Tagus as far as Tintar, and with the right, Avila. The army of the king lay in Segovia, whither the king himself came with his guard, and on the 4th of December marched to Madrid.

Wellington had gone to Cadiz, and from thence travelled to Lisbon, in order to excite the regencies of both countries to make new efforts, whilst he himself waited for fresh reinforcements from England. The Cortes sat *en permanence* in Cadiz, and were engaged in the settlement of a liberal constitution; there was, however, a democratic party, which aimed at giving the constitution a republican form, and called itself *liberal*, whilst the monarchical deputies were called *serviles*. Obstructions and difficulties of all kinds were raised; the greatest of which arose from the clergy and the regency, who were wholly opposed to the abolition of the Inquisition and other decidedly liberal measures. The disputes on these subjects became so warm that many of the prelates took to flight. The committee of government, under the presidency of the servile Duke de l'Infantado, was removed by the liberals, and a new one named in its stead, at the head of which was the Cardinal de Bourbon, an old and weak man. Cabals, disputes, and party threats rose to such a height, that a portion of the liberal members of the Cortes went so far as to make a secret application to King Joseph, to know whether he was really disposed to secure such a democratic constitution as they desired. Joseph understood so little of politics, that on his return to Madrid after the campaign of 1812, he caused an article to be inserted in his official journal, which must show the liberal members of the Cortes, unfavourable to an English constitution, that they had nothing to expect from the French; and yet he could never hope to win the favour of the opposite party. In this article such language as the following was used: "What place of refuge and freedom is there in this violent storm? Look for it not in these *revolutionary and jacobinical principles*, preached by the Cortes in

Cadiz to a nation which has SHOWN ITSELF TO BE THE MOST MONARCHICAL AND RELIGIOUS IN ITS PRINCIPLES OF ANY IN THE WHOLE WORLD."

During the time of Wellington's retreat, and also afterwards when he was engaged in collecting and arranging a new army in order to profit by the favourable circumstances of the year 1813, Suchet remained lying opposite to the army which had been brought from Sicily, and to the Spanish generals, who, on the command of the government installed by the Cortes, were to support it. General Clinton, who had now obtained the chief command of the Anglo-Sicilian force, had been reinforced, and had now an army of 8000 men, of whom 5000 were English; he had also been joined by General Elio with 10,000 Spaniards. Napoleon, however, had a very humble opinion of the capacities of both. This appears from a letter found among King Joseph's correspondence in Vittoria, in which Napoleon stated his opinions to Marshal Suchet, through the minister of war, that his position was no doubt difficult, because the tract of country from the Pyrenees to the Xucar, which he had to defend, was so extensive, that he should do nothing but remain quiet; and that, in fact, the enemies whom he had before him were not very terrible. They were really the less so, because the English and Spaniards were very jealous of one another, and had no mutual confidence. The Spanish commandant of Alicante was unwilling to allow any English whatever in the citadel, and Clinton declared that it was impossible for him to undertake anything unless the citadel was put into his power. This was at length done on the 22nd of November, 1812. Clinton, however, undertook nothing nevertheless, and on the 2nd of December the fourth commander-in-chief arrived, whom Lord William Bentinck had sent within the space of four months. The new commander was General Campbell, who brought with him 4000 men altogether English, and promised the speedy appearance of Bentinck himself. Campbell had now a considerable force under his command, for the Spanish regular troops under Elio, Whittingham, and Roche, were added to his own. Notwithstanding all this, he continued to remain quiet, and the armies of the Spanish generals soon scattered themselves about to a considerable distance from him, because he would not supply them with English stores. From these circumstances, Suchet was but very little endangered by the opposing English and Spanish army; but Napoleon, in the beginning of the year 1813, called away all the best soldiers, officers, and generals to himself, in order to organise his new army, and Suchet was soon no longer able to defend himself from the bands of Spanish adventurers, now become masters by English support. Although General Campbell and the regular Spanish troops caused Suchet little alarm, Villa Campa, Gayan, Duran, Mina in Arragon, Frayle, Ersles, Lasey, and others in Catalonia, soon gave the marshal so much to do, that in a letter

addressed to King Joseph, he alleges that he has lost more people in this little war than if he had fought an important engagement. When at length, in the end of February, 1813, Lord Wellington, now appointed commander-in-chief of the Spanish army, had been considerably reinforced from England, and began to make preparations for pushing forward further into Spain, Lord Bentinck also appeared desirous of coming, in order to make a serious attack upon the town of Valencia; and Elio then again joined the Anglo-Sicilians. Queen Caroline, however, found Lord William so much to occupy him in Sicily, that he was unable to leave the island. At the end of the month, therefore, he sent Sir John Murray to Alicante, when he, like all his predecessors, was so dependent upon the orders of his superior, that no idea could be entertained of any rapid proceedings.

In Sicily all sorts of cabals were carried on by the parliament, especially the barons, who had become almost solely influential through the constitution, by Queen Caroline, who could never forget that she was driven out, and Lord William Bentinck, who was as proud, imperious, and unscrupulous as Queen Caroline herself. In carrying on these cabals Lord William made a tool of the parliament, the parliament of the people, and Queen Caroline of her son, who, as the representative of his father, still possessed some shadow of power. We cannot give credit to the labyrinth of cabals of this hateful queen, nor to the stories of murders, the blowing-up of parliaments, and the like, which she is said to have secretly devised, but must confine ourselves to general and well-known facts. It deserves first of all to be mentioned, that in January, 1813, she suddenly prevailed upon her husband to return to Palermo, and under pretence of his health being restored, to resume the reins of government. The intention was to refuse his assent to the constitution, and with the help of the lower people, gained over for that purpose, to appoint a new monarchical ministry; the plan was, however, frustrated by Bentinck within fourteen hours drawing together 10,000 English troops to Palermo for the protection of the parliament. The miserable king became frightened as soon as he saw a scheme frustrated, the success of which depended wholly on being done by surprise, left Palermo as quickly as he had come, on pretence of having again become ill, and restored his son to the office of his deputy. Lord William, who knew very well that the queen would continue to stimulate the discontented, and, leaning on the support of the people and the clergy, would carry on a continual opposition to that despotic power which he had assumed, caused her to be watched like a prisoner, till after his return from his expedition to Spain, when he adopted the idea of driving her completely out of Sicily. The bad success of his expedition to Spain is closely connected with his being then under Wellington's command, and his constant desire by every means to escape from this subjection.



About the time when Lord William Bentinck was engaged in excluding the King and Queen of Naples anew from all share in the government, Sir John Murray made some preparations for a serious attack upon the town of Valencia. Lord William, however, suddenly recalled two thousand of the English to Sicily, to employ them in the execution of a new project in Italy. This step was the more displeasing to Wellington, as Sir John Murray, immediately after these troops had been embarked on the 5th of April, succeeded in repelling an attack of Suchet's on the 11th of the same month; and as he himself was just about to commence his new campaign in Spain, in the prosecution of which he calculated upon the co-operation of the Anglo-Sicilian army. To this Lord William gave no heed, but preferred landing in Naples, and then placing either the Duke of Orleans or the Archduke Francis on the throne. In order to recommend his ridiculous project to the English ministry, he alleged that King Joachim's government was very weak,—that the Neapolitans and Calabrians would support the landing,—that the Russian admiral had promised the co-operation of 15,000 Russians, and finally, that this diversion must have great influence on affairs in Spain. He further furnished proofs of a conspiracy entered into between the court and the French, founded upon some intercepted letters written by Queen Caroline to Napoleon, and other such documents. To all this Wellington was very unwilling to pay any attention, and alleged that the documents produced afforded no proof of what Lord William alleged, but proved, on the contrary, that Murat felt himself strong enough to attack the English and their allies. Lord William, in order to make a useful landing in Italy, must at least have an army of 40,000 men, because such a force must rely wholly upon itself. The ministry approved of Wellington's views, the Anglo-Sicilians were obliged to remain in Spain, and the beginning of the general operations was fixed for the 1st of May. Sir John Murray, the Duke del Parque, Elio, and Copons began to take some active measures as early as the 21st of April.

In the previous year, during the retreat from Burgos, Wellington had had the chief command over the Spanish generals. When, however, he went to Cadiz in December, 1812, he had new powers conferred upon him by the Cortes, and was entrusted with an army newly organised by him. In the previous year, there was not only no organisation of the Spanish forces, but he could not obtain obedience from the Spanish generals; Ballasteros expressly refused obedience, and wrote an impertinent letter to the minister of war. He was indeed dismissed and sent as a criminal to Ceuta; Wellington, however, required to have an army for the ensuing campaign, which he might be able to organise, as he had done the Portuguese. Fifty thousand men were taken into English pay, organised, and divided into three corps; one of these corps was placed under General Giron in Galicia, the second under Freire, and the third under Count

Bispal in Andalusia. The English commander-in-chief had also succeeded in stimulating the Portuguese government into making new efforts and increasing the troops under Beresford's command, which were disciplined after the English fashion; he had still, however, serious difficulties to overcome before he could bring them into the field, partly because they were incensed by the barbarous discipline of the aristocratic English, which Beresford had introduced, and partly because they had been grossly neglected by their own government. The government was in the habit of anticipating the subsidies and allowing the soldiers to starve, and this compelled Wellington, by threats of causing the money to be kept back, and of paying the soldiers himself, to compel it to get together the arrears due to the army, and to make proper provision for the comforts of the troops; he also succeeded in calming their discontent by appealing to their patriotic feelings. At the same time, therefore, as he was appointed generalissimo of the Spanish armies, and gave them, partly at least, a new form, he reorganised the Portuguese artillery by means of English officers, and the guns belonging to the fortresses; by the aid of Beresford restored order and discipline to the cavalry, and made them in some degree fit for service; and having put the whole army in receipt of full pay, encouraged them to active service. In this way he succeeded in bringing into the field for the new campaign a very tolerable army of 27,000 Portuguese.

Napoleon himself would have been alone equal, under the then circumstances, to cope with the preparations made by Wellington; he, however, in the year 1813, on the earnest entreaties of his brother, had recalled Soult also, and again made the king generalissimo of the French troops in Spain, although he had so little confidence in his brother, and such a decided opinion of Soult's superiority, that he appointed him to a high and honourable office in his guard, and availed himself with great advantage of his aid and advice in the battle of Bautzen. King Joseph neglected his brother's advice, or rather he received the letter too late, in which he was advised to proceed with his whole army in an offensive attitude to the Tormes; to leave all his heavy baggage and stores behind him; to establish hospitals and depôts in Burgos, Vittoria, Pampeluna, Tolosa, and San Sebastian, and to attach no importance to Madrid, but completely to give it up, if necessary, in order to attack Wellington with the whole of his army. He, however, suffered himself, by the march of the Duke del Parque upon Alcaraz, and the movement of the Spanish divisions of Estramadura, to be allured to the Agueda, regarding these as intimations of a general attack upon Madrid, whilst Wellington had no idea of entering by the valley of the Tagus, but intended forcing his way by the line of the Douro. In the middle of May the main body of his army crossed the Douro between Lamego and the frontiers of Portugal, and marched towards Zamora, whilst he himself proceeded direct to Salamanca, having previously taken



care that the brave defender of the place could not defend it against him. Another division of his army had gone round it by a circuitous road. The king, who had received Napoleon's letter too late, on leaving Madrid, to which he never returned, had drawn up his different armies in defensive positions and not concentrated them for attack on the Tormes. Reille, with the army of Portugal, observed Wellington and the Spaniards in Galicia; Caffarelli, with the army of the north, covered the communications with France, and the fortresses of Navarre and Biscay; Drouet d'Erlon, with the army of the centre, proceeded to Burgos, and leaned on the army of the south under Gazan, which was quartered between the Aberche, Avila, and Madrid, and had sent the division of Villate to Salamanca. Reille afterwards united the army of Portugal at Medina del Rio Seco, and extended his positions to the Esla. The king was in Valladolid.

The above distribution of the French troops having been made, at the time at which Napoleon recalled all his old troops for the formation of his new army, a general belief prevailed that Joseph was making preparation for the evacuation of Spain; the courage of the Spaniards was consequently excited, and new risings continually took place. This raised the Emperor's anger, who had not withdrawn more than 10,000 troops in all, and he forthwith despatched General Clausel to take the command of the army of the north, and to draw to himself as many troops as he thought good from the army of Portugal. At the same time, he allowed him to carry on a direct correspondence with himself, irrespective of the king; and this led to jealousy and division. In the mean time Wellington pushed irresistibly forward: Villate was obliged to evacuate Salamanca, Leval surrendered Madrid and joined Erlon, and as the English army pressed forward to Burgos, King Joseph retired into the deep valley of Vittoria. The citadel of Burgos, whose works had been greatly strengthened within the past year, was now declared untenable, and blown up on the near approach of the English. This was done with such carelessness that not only the town was injured, but great mischief done to a French regiment which was passing by at the time the mine was sprung. Whole streets were destroyed; thousands of bombs and other missiles filled with powder flew into the air and covered everything with ruins, fire, and broken metal, through which 300 men of the regiment marching by lost their lives. As early as the 14th of June the left wing of the English army crossed the Ebro at Bocamunde, and on the 15th the right wing at Fuente Arenas. The ability and skill of the English commander excited the admiration of the whole of Europe. By the prudent disposition of his troops and the arrangement of his marches he gained more than another would have done by a victory. By the rapidity of his marches, the French army found itself driven into the narrow valley of Vittoria on the 19th of June. This valley is traversed at various places by the small river Zadora; it is about six miles broad, and



twelve long, with the town of Vittoria at its extremity, and was at that time full of baggage and artillery. Here King Joseph was reduced to great difficulty in consequence of the non-arrival of Foy and Clausel, both of whom were expected. He saw no possibility of proceeding through Salinas, to meet General Foy at Durango, without the loss of his artillery, and did not dare to go through Salvatierra to Pampeluna, in order to form a junction with Suchet, from fear of being cut off from France. He resolved, therefore, against the advice of his best officers, and especially of Marshal Jourdan, to hazard a battle. The engagement took place on the 21st of June. The English force, including the Spaniards, was superior to the French, while the latter was stronger in artillery. The French position was also unfavourable, and the accumulation of baggage, waggons, and guns obstructed a free plan of manœuvring; no other means of escape was possible than that of crossing the steep mountains through Salvatierra to Pampeluna.

The French, whose centre was commanded by the king himself, the right by Reille and the left by Gazan, had the river in their front; in the moment of the commencement of the battle a Spanish peasant showed Wellington a bridge of which he was not aware, and which was not at all guarded. The French were forced to retire fighting; a dreadful confusion took place, the armies of the centre and of Andalusia became inextricably intermixed, and were driven together to Vittoria, about six o'clock in the evening. The king was forced to leave all his baggage, artillery, ammunition, in short, all heavy articles of every description, behind him, in order to be able to make his way over the mountains, and to reach Pampeluna through Salvatierra. In this he succeeded on the 24th, and immediately perceived that after this battle all his prospects and hopes in Spain were at an end. Clausel, with the army of the north, which formed the left wing of the whole force, arrived a day too late to save Vittoria, and marched from thence with all possible haste to Tudela, next to Saragossa, and through the pass of Jaca into France, with the loss of his guns.

The loss of men was about equal on both sides—from 5000 to 6000—the French having for some considerable time committed great havoc with their tremendous artillery; the order of their troops, however, was soon disturbed, and the whole of the *matériel* was lost. The pursuit increased the confusion among these corps to such an extent, that at length the whole became one disordered mass, the cavalry alone having been able to preserve some discipline and to cover the retreat. The ground was traversed by ditches, which prevented the artillery from being drawn off, and 151 guns, 415 powder waggons, more than 14,000 charges for artillery, and 2,000,000 cartridges, were left on the field of battle. The French were only able to carry away with them a single gun and a single howitzer, and on the following day these also fell into the hands of

the English. Close to Vittoria 2000 baggage waggons, the whole of the valuable effects belonging to the king and the court, were relinquished by the fugitives. Joseph himself would have been taken prisoner had he not, at the moment a squadron of English dragoons was advancing, escaped from his carriage and thrown himself on horseback. General Foy, like Clausel, escaped the attacks of the English and Spaniards, by whom he was closely pursued, gathered in all the troops he possibly could, threw 1500 men into the strong city of San Sebastian, and fortunately reached the French soil. In this way, between the middle of May and the end of June, the French were driven out of the whole north and centre of Spain; the frontiers of France, from Roncevaux to the Bidassoa, were occupied; Pampeluna was invested, and regular siege was laid to the fortress of San Sebastian.

Whilst Lord Wellington was thus gaining immortal renown in the north of Spain, Lord William Bentinck and his deputies were bringing discredit upon themselves by the total want of skill displayed on the east coast against Suchet. The French marshal, not having been disturbed for forty days after the battle of Castalla, fortified his position on the Xucar, and Sir John Murray had resolved to attack Tarragona, in order afterwards to be able from Arragon to form a junction with Wellington. For this purpose the Anglo-Sicilian force, with the exception of a small portion which was to remain, was to be marched to Alicante, from thence to be embarked for Catalonia. Lord William Bentinck, who was afraid of having an attack made upon him in Sicily, and of the queen's conspiracies against the English, had shortly before sent for an additional reinforcement of English troops, so that the number of men despatched for the siege of Tarragona, inclusive of a regiment from Carthage, amounted to no more than 14,000, among whom were 8000 English, Germans, and Swiss, and 900 cavalry. The troops were accompanied by a tremendous battering and siege apparatus, and a great number of heavy guns. The fleet which accompanied the army sailed from Alicante on the 30th of May; no great success, however, was to be anticipated, were it only because Admiral Hallowell had no confidence in either General Clinton or Sir John Murray, who differed in opinion between themselves; and Sir John Murray was held in no higher estimation by Donkin, his own quartermaster-general, than he was by Clinton. As early as the 2nd of June the artillery was disembarked, and Suchet, having left General Harispe behind with 7000 men, was not able to reach the scene of action with 9000 before the 7th. The march from the banks of the Xucar to Tarragona was long and difficult. Sir John Murray, as even the English officers in his army alleged, ought to have been able to capture Tarragona before his arrival, which the marshal himself apprehended; Murray, however, suffered himself to be frightened by mere reports on the 10th. He had taken one fort,

his heavy artillery and troops were all safely disembarked, and no enemy was to be seen, when he suddenly gave orders for the re-embarkation of the whole. A rumour was spread that Suchet was hastening from the south, and Maurice Mathieu from Barcelona in the north, for the relief of the place. These orders excited universal disgust in the army, because Suchet could not possibly have effected the march in much less than eight days, even if the danger with which Valencia was threatened should not speedily call him off. Mathieu had the same difficulties and obstructions to contend with. The whole of the officers became thoroughly indignant, and made earnest remonstrances, when Sir John Murray issued orders to spike the guns and to leave them lying on the beach, in order to be able rapidly to embark his army on the 12th. The French did not even attempt on the following day to prevent the embarkation of the horses and stores; when, however, the English were on board, the garrison triumphantly drew eighteen guns of the largest calibre left upon the strand, with a great quantity of shells, balls, and other siege materials which had been long before prepared for the siege, into the fortress. Suchet had not arrived even on the 17th, when Sir John Murray had again disembarked his forces at Balaguer. The fleet also still hovered on the coast, when Mathieu approached with his army. As the English were superior to him in force, their leader appeared resolved to offer battle to the French, and had taken measures accordingly, when he suddenly changed his mind on the 17th, and caused the army again to be re-embarked. At this moment the large Mediterranean fleet was signalled, and Lord William himself arrived from Sicily. Sir John Murray was afterwards brought before a court-martial in England and acquitted, although even that most favourable court could not but acknowledge that he had not shown the necessary capacity for his task.

Lord William had been detained since the beginning of the year 1813, partly by the cabals and conspiracies of Queen Caroline, and partly by fear of a landing of 20,000 Neapolitans which King Joachim was desirous of transporting to Sicily by the assistance of the French fleet; his fears, however, were allayed as early as January by a report that Murat, on the mediation of Austria, had entered into negotiations with England with a view to defection from his brother-in-law. These negotiations were continued during the summer of 1813, although Murat again shone at the head of Napoleon's cavalry; they, however, led to the conclusion of a separate peace immediately after the battle of Leipzig, by which Murat most foolishly hoped to be able to retain the throne. The negotiations had gone so far in the middle of the year 1813 that Lord William, on a hint received in a note from Wellington, which Napier has given in the appendix to the 25th book of his History, thought he might safely leave Sicily. He, however, took no troops with him; and did not, therefore, renew the siege of Tarragona, so shamefully relinquished by Sir John



Murray, but resolved to attack Valencia. On the 27th of June he reached Alicante, and hoped to take Valencia by surprise; his plan, however, was frustrated by Suchet, who hastened from Tortosa in less than forty-eight hours with 10,000 men, before the English troops could be disembarked. Lord William now immediately left the neighbourhood of Valencia, and was about to advance into the country from Alicante, when, in July, the news of Wellington's victory at Vittoria arrived and changed the whole state of affairs.

Suchet believed that Clausel, who had fortunately arrived at Saragossa, might be able to maintain Arragon if he went to his assistance; he therefore relinquished the defence of Valencia, but wished to retain possession of the fortified places. Even had Clausel been able to maintain Arragon, Suchet would not have attained his object; but Clausel took his departure for France, and as early as the 11th of August the French were no longer in possession of a single fortified place in Arragon. On the 9th of July, four days after the departure of the French, Lord William entered Valencia, which he selected as his military depôt. His course of action in Spain, till he was again recalled by disturbances in Sicily, was by no means glorious, although he subdued Valencia, Tarragona, and Villa Franca. These conquests were not ascribed even by his countrymen to any merit of his, but to circumstances. He had been compelled to raise the siege of Tarragona after it was commenced, by Suchet's appearance with his army in the middle of August; the latter, however, did not think it advisable to retain the place. He therefore caused the old Roman walls, of stupendous masonry, to be undermined and blown up, and in this condition left it to the English. Lord William next attacked Tortosa, but soon perceived that greater difficulty would be experienced in reducing the place than had been anticipated; the English, therefore, on the 5th of September, took possession of Villa Franca. The occupation of this place, before Lord William left Spain in the middle of September, led to the engagement at Ordal, which the French regard as a battle; the affair ended to the disadvantage of the English, who were obliged to retire.

Immediately after this engagement Lord William returned to Sicily in order to get rid of the queen, who continued always to find means of stirring up the people against the English, and found active and willing agents in her schemes in such men as Artala, Ferrari, and Trabbia. In 1813, when Lord William dismissed the whole of the Sicilian army, and retained only those Sicilians in service who were in English pay, it was purposed to send her to Sardinia; this, however, she decidedly refused, and required to be allowed to proceed to Vienna. She wrote to the English general in a most violent tone, and filled all the public papers with her complaints against English barbarity and assumption, so that the French journals were full of bitter reproaches against Lord William's tyrannical

nical conduct. In a letter addressed to him, and conveyed by General Macfarlane, she demanded: (1) That her creditors should be satisfied, and her diamonds, lodged in the Bank of Palermo, be restored; (2) That a sum of money should be given her to enable her and her numerous suite to proceed to Vienna in a manner consistent with her rank; (3) That she should receive a monthly stipend in Austria, to enable her to live in a suitable manner; (4) That all those in attendance on herself and Prince Leopold should continue to receive their pay as before; (5) That a royal frigate, a corvette, and the necessary transports for the conveyance of herself, her suite, and their effects, should be placed at her disposal.

Lord William would have immediately agreed to those conditions, but the queen and her creatures had already caused an insurrection in Palermo on the 19th of July and following days, under the pretence of a scarcity of bread, which it was found necessary to put down by force of arms. When, therefore, the English general returned in September, those measures were immediately carried into execution which had been determined on as early as April. The king and his eldest son were to remain behind; Artala, Ferrari, and Trabbia were arrested; Prince Leopold and the queen were allowed to proceed to Vienna, where the latter died in September, 1814. From that time forward Lord William Bentinck governed Sicily as an English dependency, and notwithstanding the fine constitution and its promises, his measures were nothing but those of a military despotism. This will be best illustrated by reference to the haughty and insolent proclamation issued by his lordship when the queen was obliged to leave the country. In this proclamation he alleges, that his duties to the king and his royal highness prevented him from giving effect to the free constitution till good order should prevail, and an end be put to the prevailing confusion, which was not only detrimental to real liberty, but threatened the existence of the state. He therefore felt it to be his duty to maintain public quiet by military means—to treat all disturbers of the peace as murderers, and to take summary proceedings against them.

It will be seen that the course pursued on this occasion was just the same as that followed by Robespierre and his colleagues in France in June, 1793; they prepared the ultra democratic constitution of that year, in a few hours, but first declared it *SUSPENDUE ET VOILÉE*; and next, in October of the same year, decreed that till peace was concluded France must be governed on revolutionary principles—that is, *without a constitution*; by blood and massacre and a committee of safety.

## § IV.

## A.—HISTORY OF THE YEAR 1813.

## PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813—NEGOTIATIONS OF THE PRUSSIAN AND RUSSIAN WITH AUSTRIA, SWEDEN, AND ENGLAND.

WHEN the Russian emperor had arrived in Wilna, he endeavoured to exert over the Poles, through his friend and servant, Adam Czartorinski the younger, the same influence as he exerted in Germany and Prussia through Von Stein and the German patriots, in more or less close connexion with the latter. We have before remarked, that Prince Adam George had at the outbreak of the war of 1812 been placed in a very embarrassing position. His emperor, whose enthusiasm he shared, had at an earlier period, to the great discontent of the Russians, made him minister of foreign affairs, and had always remained his trusty friend, although he had in 1806 removed him from his office, because, as a Pole, the accusation of leaning to the French was always being brought against him. Czartorinski retained the title of a Russian privy councillor, and the dignity of a councillor of the empire, until Napoleon, in the year 1812, sent the frivolous Archbishop de Pradt to Warsaw, in order to incite the Poles by empty hopes to act in his cause. The archbishop instituted a general confederation, at the head of which was placed the aged father of Prince Adam George. This national assembly called the Poles from the Russian service, and commanded them to return to their country; Prince Adam George could not refuse to obey; he gave up the Russian service, and resigned all his honours; but the emperor would not accept his resignation. He allowed him, indeed, to go, but imparted to him as a friend his determination to give the Poles back their national existence under Russian protection. As early as May, 1812, when the Emperor Alexander was in Wilna, he had allowed a report to be spread that he was not disinclined to consent to a re-establishment of a Polish kingdom, dependent on Russia; and henceforth Prince Adam George laboured in Warsaw for Russia, exactly in the same way as Poniatowski did for France.

Poniatowski was only in appearance an adherent of the King of Saxony, as Duke of Warsaw, for the latter could do nothing either for Poland or for him: he canvassed the Poles for Napoleon, and saw in prospect a kingdom of Poland for himself, held in vassalage to France. While Poniatowski helped to form confederations, roused all his fellow-countrymen, got fifty thousand men under arms, and would have got more, had money and arms been better provided, Prince Adam George remained entirely quiet. He had quitted



Russia, because the sixth article of the act of confederation ordered all Poles to leave the Russian service; but he did not attend the sittings of the confederation; and at the end of the year 1812 offered himself to the Poles and Russians as the mediator of a reconciliation, founded on the restoration of Polish nationality. The character of the Russian emperor rendered this reconciliation very possible, and it became very probable, when in December, 1813, he proclaimed and exercised amnesty and mild treatment everywhere in Lithuania. Alexander also, whether sincerely or only in appearance, had presented a far better side of character to the Poles than Napoleon, who had expressed himself very ambiguously, and had treated the country harshly, and whom the Archbishop of Malines made ridiculous and contemptible there.

The behaviour of the Emperor Alexander and of Prince Adam George towards each other appeared far more noble and Polish than the miserable intrigues woven under Napoleon's direction in Poland and Lithuania. The reasons given by Czartorinski in his letter to the emperor for his resignation of command in the Russian service, are as honourable to him as the answer is to the emperor. We do not, indeed, place implicit faith in the sentimental words of a monarch who was capable of the most contradictory actions: but in this case we believe him, because his sentimentality and friendliness happened in this instance to be also the best diplomatic wisdom. In the letter addressed to the emperor on the 4th of July, 1812, Czartorinski says, that since the restoration of Poland is now declared by the general confederation, at the head of which stands his father, he feels bound, notwithstanding all the ties which attach him to the emperor, to lay down all his dignities, especially that of a member of the Russian cabinet. The emperor replied as a friend, that he would not accept the resignation of his titles and places. In the same way as Poniatowski thought of himself in connexion with the restoration of the Polish kingdom, Prince Adam George thought of the Grand-Duke Michael. He first began, after the departure of the French and the establishment of the Russians in Wilna, a very fine-spun cabal, which he succeeded in entirely concealing from the attention of the French, not only under De Pradt, but afterwards, when Bignon was again sent to Warsaw. Bignon, as appears to us, and as he himself declares, received his first information of what the ministers of the King of Saxony had been attempting to negotiate with the Russian emperor during his own presence in Warsaw, after he had gone to Cracow with Poniatowski; and it was probably a hint from the latter which put Bignon on the track.

While Bignon, namely, was still in Warsaw, and living on terms of the greatest confidence with the ministers as with the most faithful friends of France, Matuschewitz, minister of finance, and Motoski, minister of the interior, had already entered into connexion with Prince Adam George, and had through him despatched plans for the restoration of Poland to the Russian emperor. The whole

thing was, under the exciting relations of Russia to Austria and Prussia, entirely chimerical, so much so that we can scarcely believe that a former minister of foreign affairs could have taken it up; but Czartorinski, perhaps, took it up for that very reason, that it was chimerical. Alexander received the proposals and awakened hopes, because the Poles, whose passionate natures lean readily to highflown speeches, brilliant ideas, sounding words and plans, were immediately turned from the French plans. The emperor entered into communication with the Poles: he had plans of a Russian-Poland sent to him by Prince Adam George; but the ever-disunited Poles were not even agreed on the plan which should be laid before the emperor. The ministers drew up one plan, Prince Czartorinski another, without knowing of the one which the ministers were projecting, and, as if the intention was to exhibit on the occasion falsehood of every kind, the ministers afterwards asserted, when Bignon called them to account, that they had only imparted their project to Prince Czartorinski in confidence. Napoleon prudently affected to believe them; but it is evident from the Emperor Alexander's answer, that the communication was, and was intended to be official.

The ministers proposed that a kingdom consisting of Poland and Lithuania should be formed, and the Emperor Alexander declared king. Their plan contained the sketch of the new constitution, and the army was fixed at 100,000. Prince Czartorinski went further; he made a proposal which was as patriotic as it was adventurous and impracticable. We give in a note Czartorinski's letter to the emperor, in which he recommends his project, which proposes not merely that the Poland divided in 1793 or even in 1772 be restored, but that all the provinces which ever belonged to Poland shall be united in one kingdom under a Russian prince, who, from various expressions, must have been the Archduke Michael.\* This letter

\* The letter will be found in Bignon, vol. xi., p. 408, and is as follows: "Les événemens de la guerre ayant pris une tournure qui semble décisive, je crains que personne ne veuille à présent plaider auprès de V. M. I. les intérêts de ma patrie, et je me suis décidé à expédier M. Kluckzewski, mon secrétaire, avec les papiers ci-joints. Je redoute d'une part les insinuations des puissances continentales, qui voudront vous détourner d'une idée qui leur fera ombrage, et qui est trop belle pour que leurs cabinets puissent la comprendre. D'un autre côté je crains les conseils des personnes qui vous entourent. Au fond tout mon espoir n'est que dans vos sentimens, sire. Je crois qu'il est de mon devoir de ne pas cacher à votre majesté qu'une source continuelle d'inquiétude et de frayeur pour les Polonais c'est le Grand-Duc Constantin, qui est votre successeur apparent. . . . Un Roi de Pologne qui aura trois cent mille Russes à ses ordres dès qu'il voudra ne pas tenir ses promesses, on détruire ce que son prédécesseur aura statué, en sera toujours le maître. C'est cet avenir qui rendra les Polonais si insistans à obtenir une constitution bien réglée, quoique après tout les précautions de ce genre le mieux réglées ne puissent pas garantir d'une violence décidée, ni même d'un changement de principe et de volonté dans un souverain futur de la Russie. Si vos intentions son favorables, sire, daignez me les faire savoir en toute hâte. En tardant de traiter, et ne en s'y prenant pas bien, on risque que l'armée Polonoise, qui déjà se réorganise et une foule de militaires distingués ne suivent la retraite et les drapeaux de France. . . . J'ai adhééré à la confédération de toutes mes vœux pour ma patrie, ainsi que mes trois lettres à

was written on the 27th of December, 1812, and accompanied the plan. The packet was detained on the way by the Austrians, and therefore reached the emperor later than was intended. The emperor's answer was, on the one hand, noble, magnanimous, and knightly, as were always his behaviour and expressions when he followed his own feelings; and on the other, deceitful and cunning, like his cabinet. The principal aim of the answer was, however, attained; for the openness with which Alexander spoke for the moment frustrated the intentions of the French Emperor with regard to the Polish nation.

This answer is written partly at Leipuny on the 1st of January (old style), and partly on the 3rd of January (1813) at Krasnopol. We shall give here briefly what the emperor says to Prince Czar-torinski as a friend, and give below, in his own words, what he says to the Polish people through him. He tells him, first, that on the same day that he received his plan, he also received another from Mostowski, minister of the interior, and that he intends to answer them both together. His ideas about Poland, he continues, are the same as they have always been. He thinks not of revenge or punishment, since it is always his greatest pleasure to return good for evil. He has therefore given strict orders to his generals to act in accordance with this principle, and to treat the Poles as friends and brothers. He then adds, that there are two reasons which prevent his *immediately* doing anything for Poland. From the second reason which he gives, we see plainly that he was even then, a month before an alliance with Prussia was formed, quite secure of not only of Prussia but also of Austria. He knew therefore, very well, that no idea could be entertained of the carrying out of either of the projects.\*

In reference to the plans for the future, writes the emperor again, what the prince proposes in regard to a kingdom for the Archduke Michael must be considered as quite impracticable; for every Russian regarded Lithuania, Podolia, and Volhynia, as, properly speaking, Russian provinces, and would never agree to their being placed under the government of any other monarch than that of the whole Russian Empire. The emperor takes no further notice of the

V. M. le temoignent. Ce n'est pas, sans doutes, quand mes compatriotes croient voir approcher le moment où leurs intentions les plus droites, leurs sacrifices les plus héroïques, leurs pertes les plus sensibles, ne seront suivis que de malheurs plus grands encore, ce n'est pas quand toutes les espérances de mon pays semblent en péril, que j'irai me retracter et renier devant votre majesté une cause sauvée pour tout Polonias, et qui restera belle et juste si même elle ne cesse d'être malheureuse. Si vous nous tendez la main, sire, je veux partager complètement la joie de mes compatriotes, si vous nous rejettez, je partagerai leur affliction et leur désespoir."

\* The reasons, he says, is this: "D'abord l'opinion en Russie. La manière dont l'armée Polonoise s'est conduit chez nous, le sac de Smolensk, de Moskou, la dévastation de tout le pays eut ranimé les anciennes haines. Sécondement dans le moment actuel, une publicité intempestive donnée à mes intentions sur la Pologne jetterait complètement l'Austrie et la Prusse dans les bras de la France; résultat, qu'il est très essentiel d'empêcher d'autant plus *queses deux puissances* me témoignent déjà les meilleures dispositions."



plan of the Warsaw ministers. His communications to the Poles through the prince deals almost exclusively in generalities; and it must be confessed that his promises were fulfilled at a later period, except just the most important of all, which Prince Adam George Czartorinski had demanded in the name of his countrymen and for them. This was that the Archduke Constantine should be kept at a distance from Poland.\*

What Czartorinski in vain endeavoured to obtain for Poland, the Baron von Stein actually obtained in reference to Germany and Prussia, uniting for this purpose men of the most different characters and of the most opposite political sentiments. It is true that all of whom he made use for the carrying out of his plan only remained united exactly as long as enthusiasm was necessary to prepare the way for obtaining their object: as soon as this was attained, the diplomatists, rōués, and selfish intriguers, laughed at the simplicity of the few honest people among them, and shared the gains with the princes and their creatures. That period, however, is fortunately not included in this history; and besides Stein's friend and associate, Arndt has sufficiently accounted for it in his Memoirs. Both these worthy men shared in Alexander's religious views and feelings, except that they were more positively Lutheran. The Baron Stein, in connexion with the mother of the emperor and the fanatical anti-French party at court, had been engaged since May, 1812, in counteracting Romanzoff. This latter inclined towards the French, and towards those nations who were tired of an aristocracy—and this appeared to be the tendency of the emperor's liberalism also; the aristocrats of the olden time, therefore, opposed him; whilst the more enthusiastic among those who wished to create a new Germany and a new Prussia, made use of Alexander's liberalism, and his fancies on such points, in favour of the people.

In regard to the differences in the men, the views, the purposes,

\* The Emperor writes: "Voici en résumé ce que j'ai à vous annoncer. La Pologne et les Polonais n'ont à craindre aucune vengeance de ma part. Mes intentions à leur égard sont toujours les mêmes. Pour en donner des preuves toutes les autorités du duché sont conservées par tout le gouvernement, et les membres de la confédération sont invités à demeurer tranquillement à Varsovie. Cette ville ne sera pas occupée par mes troupes, pourvu que toutes les troupes étrangères en sortent et que le nombre des troupes Polonaises qui y restera sera le moindre possible. Tous les généraux Russes ont reçu ordre de traiter les Polonais comme des amis et des frères. A mesure que les succès des armées Russes seront plus grands et plus complets, à mesure aussi la réalisation de mes intentions et de mes plans sur la Pologne sera plus certaine: des revers seuls pourraient y mettre obstacle. Ainsi tout ce que les Polonais feront pour aider à ces succès sera fait en même temps pour réaliser leurs espérances. Mais ce qui pourrait le plus cimenter un bien indissoluble entre les Polonais et moi serait un traité d'alliance, conclu après l'occupation du pays entre le gouvernement du duché et moi. Dès lors je me croirais autorisé de la part de l'empire de Russie, à prendre un engagement sacré, à ne pas poser les armes, tant que les espérances de la Pologne ne seraient pas réalisées, parce que les Polonais auraient prouvé, à la face de la Russie et de l'Europe, qu'ils ont mis toute confiance en moi, et ce n'est jamais en vain qu'on s'en remet à ma loyauté. Finalement, vous êtes certainement l'intermédiaire qui, à tous égards, me convient le mieux, par la confiance entière que j'ai mise en vous."

and tendencies, which then strove for the same object, and in spite of all the efforts of the servile and cowardly governments which summoned all Germany in their speeches and writings, and by their influence, to rise against France, and to unite with Russia, it will be sufficient for us to mention some of the best known names, to make our meaning understood. How different were the people who ranged themselves round the empress-mother, from those whom Stein collected round him, or from those who in Stockholm, in the saloon of Madame de Staël, received as oracles all that fell from that lady and her friend, A. W. von Schlegel! How different were the sophisms, which Genz and F. Schlegel in Metternich's service spread abroad in Vienna, from what Jahn, Fichte, and Schleiermacher were preaching in Berlin, and this again from the ultra-montane fanatical Jacobinism of a Görres and his set! In reference to Stein's influence upon the Emperor Alexander during the year 1812, supported as it was by the aristocracy, Arndt says, in his peculiar style: "The Baron von Stein represented in Petersburg, in 1812, *the good conscience of justice and honour*, and the Orloffs, Solitikoffs, Uwaroffs, Kotschubeys, Lieven, and the band of beautiful and intellectual women, so all-powerful by their enthusiasm, collected around his banner." It will hardly be necessary to remark (continuing in Arndt's flowery style) what must be the final result of serving under the banner of these and similar people. As long as the multitude, which saluted this banner with joy as the standard of freedom, served the purposes of this noble society, they were allowed to enjoy some of the crumbs which fell from the table: afterwards, not even these. At the time, however, this was of less importance; the principal thing was, that all were for the time united under the banner of an energetic and active man of incorruptible honesty and of chivalric character, in order to obtain the same object. It very much conduced to Stein's independence and to his usefulness in the years 1812 and 1813, that he neither entered into the Russian nor the Prussian service, although he attended to and partly directed affairs on behalf of both countries. Baron von Stein's correspondence with the Count Münster, the ideal and the idol of the nobility, and the protector of the so-called well-deserved privileges of the degenerate and bashful descendants of old heroes, is the best proof how the baron was able to bring together for his purposes on the one hand the most furious opponents of progress with the times, and on the other the most enthusiastic preachers of a renovated period. Stein and Count Münster had indeed, in 1813, much more in common than they had two years later; but although the count, like an excellent courtier, contrived to conceal his real sentiments under fine-sounding phrases, their friendly contest towards the end of 1813 respecting *Germanism* and *particularism* sufficiently proves that their objects were entirely different. As long as the Emperor of Russia defended the principles of his teacher Laharpe, and allowed himself to be guided by Stein,



this latter possessed the largest share of influence in Germany; as soon as he threw off the mask, the influence passed to Count Münster, Metternich, and the sophists in his service. In the letters already referred to, mention is made of Stein's *Prussianism* as opposed to the count's *Hanoverianism* (these are their own expressions); which is as much as to say, that Stein's principle of a reforming progression is contrasted with the English conservatism and the determination of Count Münster to leave everything unchanged in the old way, as was really done afterwards in Hesse, Hanover, Mecklenburgh, &c.

The Baron von Stein, who followed the head-quarters of the Emperor of Russia, knew all those persons in Germany who were resolved not merely to speak and write, but also to act, and energetically, if need were; he was completely informed of everything that was planned and discussed in secret from the Niemen to the Rhine, kept up a communication with York, when the latter was before Riga, and appeared at the same time, in the beginning of the year 1813, as Russian commissary-general in Prussia, in order to create a new power there without first obtaining the consent of the king. He had hardly arrived in Königsberg before he summoned a Prussian Diet, and caused to be proposed to them to establish a new popular force, which indeed had been previously proposed, but had not been approved of by General Scharnhorst, because he feared, and with reason, that such a force would prevent the re-establishment of any considerable standing army. Now, however, a regular army of 30,000 men was organised under the name of militia (*Landwehr*), and the Prussian minister Von Dohna, and Colonel Clausewitz, who then served in the Russian staff, assisted Von Stein in organising it. As a reserve to this militia was formed the reserve corps (*Landsturm*), which held the same position in reference to the militia that the latter did to the standing army; and Stein's eagerness and activity settled and arranged in a very short time what under other circumstances could hardly have been brought about without interminable consultation and discussion. Everything was already prepared and arranged in Prussia Proper, before the King of Prussia had separated himself from France; but as soon as this took place, the minister Von Dohna went himself with the plan for the organisation of a militia to Silesia, where the king, on the 17th of March, 1813, confirmed everything that had been done in Prussia. The decree respecting the militia in Prussia ordered the same to be established in the other provinces of the kingdom, and in the same manner as had been done in Prussia. Rühle von Lilienstern, the unsparing critic of the campaign of the old Prussian monarchical army in 1806, made himself, by his continued exertions in the organisation of this armed popular force, as justly celebrated as Scharnhorst with reference to the Prussian standing army, the most brilliant triumph of which he however did not live to witness.

Inasmuch as Von Stein hoped to found upon this new Prussia,



which was forming round him and by his agency, also a new Germany, purified from all abuses, a plan was at this time formed for organising by means of experienced and enthusiastic Prussians a similar popular force all over Germany, in case the princes should continue to hold by the league with France. In arousing that deep feeling for fatherland and honour, and that almost raging fanaticism against Napoleon, France, and everything French, the University of Berlin, founded in 1810, took a very decided part, inasmuch as, at the commencement, it opposed itself to that routine so common among German establishments, and did not so entirely give the preference to merely necessary studies and absolute materialism over the purely elevating sciences, as the older universities had done. Even people like Niebuhr and the historical jurists, as well as the philologists and professors of the *belles lettres*, who afterwards decidedly opposed the popular feeling, bore their share in the earlier years of the university in rousing the zeal of the people. Fichte was, in the proper sense of the word, a popular orator, and preached the holy war. Schleiermacher's sermons were not then doctrinally orthodox, and his philosophy was not yet courtly and aristocratic. The cunning of courts and the craftiness and selfishness of diplomatists and bureaucrats was obliged therefore for a short time in Prussia, and soon afterwards in the whole of Germany, to bow before the mighty voice of the people; the betrayers and enemies of whom, as they always do on such occasions, drew over their wolf's hide for the time the fleece of the sheep.

On the 16th of March, that is, on the day after the arrival of the Emperor of Russia in Breslau, the Comte de St. Marsan received official information of the treaty concluded between Russia and Prussia at Kalitsch, and left his post; on the 27th, General von Krusemark sent to the Duke of Bassano at Paris the Prussian declaration of war, and a note justifying this proceeding. We give in the note a passage from the duke's answer, in which we distinctly trace that haughtiness and contempt on the part of France, which tyrants, confiding in guards and hired soldiers, have at all times and in all places manifested in reference to the spirit which then influenced all Germany, and was even then calling into existence in Prussia armies out of the people itself.\* About the same time, at

\* All the letters, official documents, and explanations, in the least degree connected with the breach between France and Prussia, have been collected by Fain in the "*Manuscrit de 1813*," vol. i., app., s. vi., under the heading, "*Dernières Relations avec la Prusse et Déclaration de Guerre*," pp. 224-280. These documents, and especially the Duc de Bassano's reply, which is a complete book in itself, are to be found in the *Moniteur* of the 5th of April, 1813, p. 36, col. a:—"Aujourd'hui, M. le Baron, que reste-t-il à la Prusse? Elle n'a rien fait pour l'Europe, elle n'a rien fait pour son ancien allié, elle ne fera rien pour la paix. Une puissance, dont les traités ne sont que conditionnels, ne saurait jamais être un intermédiaire utile; elle ne garantit rien, elle n'est qu'un sujet de discussion, elle n'est point une barrière. Le doigt de la Providence est empreint sur les événements de cet hiver, elle les a produits pour démasquer les faux amis et signaler les amis fidèles, elle a donné à S. M. assez de puissance pour assurer la triomphe des uns, et le châtement des autres."

least four weeks before, other Prussian generals besides York, among others Von Bülow, had ceased to obey the French, for the *chef d'escadron* Zuylen von Nieveld, one of Berthier's staff, writes on the 10th of March that Bülow had told him to obey neither Berthier nor Eugene, and adds that the best understanding subsisted between Bülow and Czernitcheff. In fact, Bülow had assisted the Russian general in his passage of the Oder, inasmuch as he had allowed him to pass through his positions. On the 11th of March, Massenbach and York's conduct had been declared to be justifiable; they were replaced in their command, which in point of fact they had never given up, and on the 19th of March, Count Nesselrode and Baron Stein on the part of Russia, and Von Scharnhorst and Hardenberg on the part of Prussia, had signed a treaty in which it was definitively agreed what was to be the conduct of the allied armies in those German provinces which it might be necessary to garrison.

This announcement of the measures to be put in practice was preceded by an excellent and affecting manifesto, which Russia and Prussia regretted enough two years later, in regard to the objects which the two powers proposed to themselves to effect. The two powers, according to this document, had no other object than to free the German nation from French despotism; and therefore called upon princes *and people* (consequently, if the princes refused, the people in opposition to the princes) to aid in the deliverance of their country. In order to procure the means necessary for this purpose, and to arrange and conduct the government of such lands as it might be necessary to occupy, Prussia and Russia intended to appoint a central commission, consisting of commissioners to be named by both powers. This central commission was to distribute the revenues of such occupied provinces in equal portions between Russia and Prussia, except, however, that Hanover should also obtain a portion, to be proportioned to the share it should take in the impending war. All the country, from Saxony to the Rhine and Holland, was to be divided into five districts, with the exception only of such provinces as had formerly belonged to Prussia or Hanover, and in every district a civil and a military governor was to be named by the central commission.

The first commission of this kind was afterwards established in Dresden, when the King of Saxony fled from his capital for a short time, but its efficiency ceased shortly afterwards until the battle of Leipzig. It consisted of the minister Von Stein, Von Schön, and Rödiger, and its president was Count Kotschubey. Two special arrangements were made in reference to the provision for the Russian army on German ground, and to the command in chief of the Russo-Prussian army. The Russian general (first Kutusoff, afterwards Wittgenstein) was to be commander-in-chief of the Prussian army. Supplies were to be furnished, as long as it should be on Prussian ground, by Prussia, but only in accordance with the conditions



mentioned in the treaty, and the compensation agreed upon therein. On the 12th of March an order of merit was established for those, and those alone, who should make patriotic sacrifices in the course of the war, or should suffer injury in person or property; on the 19th, all who had been or still were Prussian subjects were summoned to unite with their king and the princes of his house in a contest to the death for national freedom and independence. On the 6th of April a special proclamation to the inhabitants of formerly Prussian provinces was published, inviting them to join the allied armies. The usually quiet and hearty tone of these proclamations may sometimes have become somewhat too violent, according as Justus Gruner's influence was felt, or Arndt was expressing his exaggerated hatred of Bonaparte and France; their effect, however, as being genuine and really coming direct from the heart, was very different from that produced on the Germans in 1809 by the sophistical speeches and well-arranged manifestoes of Schlegel and Genz, which sufficiently betrayed the manufactory whence they issued.

An immense enthusiasm seized upon all at this time, and its effects lasted much longer than the aristocrats, diplomatists, and bureaucrats fancied; when they, therefore, in their pride and blindness on the one hand only half fulfilled their promises, on the other continued to conspire against the people, a new revolution became unavoidable. At this time, as in France in 1793, it was dangerous not to share in this enthusiasm: authors, therefore, orators, philosophers, even the book-manufacturers, cold as they were, bent upon mere gain, and blown about by any change of opinion, spread abroad a feeling of patriotism and roused the minds of the young. Writers, professors, and officials, however, served not only with the pen, but also in the field, in volunteer corps or in the standing army, against the enemies of the nation. All parties were for the time united, all exertions directed to one point. This enthusiasm was so universal, the feeling of hatred so great, as all can testify who shared in it, that Napoleon, even if he had conquered in the field, would have experienced the same result in Germany that the three powers have always experienced in Poland. Perhaps the best proof of this is to be found in a letter, written by a Spaniard, on the impression which the state of things at the time in Germany made upon him. . This letter from José Pizarro is to be seen among the documents collected by Hardenberg, which give a certain value to the "Memoirs of a Statesman," falsely believed to be the memoirs of the chancellor, because these documents are all that remain of papers which have been sold or dispersed.\* Even Kotzebue (whom at a later period the fanatical youth of Germany condemned to death as an enemy to every noble, free, and patriotic impulse, and as a Russian spy, and on whom they executed their sentence somewhat after the fashion of the secret tribunals of

\* The first number of the "Pièces Justificatives" of the twelfth part of the "Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat" contains the letter of José Pizarro, then Spanish ambassador at Berlin, to Don Antonio Cano at Madrid.



the middle ages) was at this very time, as a paid agent of Russia, urging on the German youth to the same kind of freedom which he afterwards, also in the pay of Russia, for pay wrote down.

Whoever at this time was prevented from taking up arms gave voluntary contributions towards arming the people; and even the female sex took part in rousing and sustaining the enthusiasm. Students, scholars in the higher classes of the gymnasia, professors, even clergymen served in the field. It is necessary to know this to understand how it was possible for Prussia to oppose the enemy in the field towards the end of 1813 with an army of 200,000 men. The Crown Prince of Sweden had long promised to take part in the war against France; but the year 1812, and a considerable part of 1813, had passed before any preparations were made for keeping this promise. When the Swedes, at length, really made their appearance, they delayed to act; and their crown prince gave serious grounds for suspicion, insomuch that, highly dissatisfied with the coldness with which he was treated, he quitted the allied armies after the battle of Leipzig.

In March, 1812, the crown prince had concluded the above-mentioned alliance with Russia; and in June an army had been collected in Schonen, and ships provided, in order, in connexion with Russia, first to conquer Norway, and then to assist in the war. The execution of this plan was, however, put off, for the Danes took up arms; Russia required the troops then stationed in Finland, and had scruples as to proceeding; and England had paid no subsidies. The position of Sweden was at this time somewhat singular; for the friendly relations with France had not ceased, notwithstanding the alliance with Russia. Alquier, indeed, had been dismissed rather unceremoniously in consequence of his cabals, and was, at this time, ambassador at Copenhagen; but the secretary to the embassy, De Cabre, had been left behind as *chargé d'affaires*, and the Swedish ambassador in Paris had not been recalled. The crown prince had afterwards met the Russian Emperor (in August) at Abo, when the original arrangement was altered, the campaign against Norway postponed, and England offered to guarantee that Norway should be united with Sweden, and promised subsidies; but De Cabre still remained in Sweden.

De Cabre was engaged in spying, and, in conjunction with Alquier, who was in Copenhagen, in exciting discontent in Sweden; and, during the ten months that he passed in Stockholm he received only two despatches from the minister of foreign affairs in Paris. He exercised his diplomatic arts in such a manner during the assembling of the States, after peace had been formally concluded with England on the 18th of July, and the Swedish ports had been opened on the 29th to English vessels, that the king, in his concluding speech to the States on the 18th of August, expressly thanked them *for not having permitted themselves to be turned from their duties towards the crown prince by any foreign interference*. It was to no purpose that

the Swedish government asked M. de Cabre expressly in what capacity he still remained at Stockholm—he remained. It was afterwards discovered that he was in the habit of forwarding false and scandalous reports to Paris, in which he and his people used very bitter language respecting the crown prince:\* it was even said that he had contrived a plan for carrying off the crown prince and conveying him to France. The Swedish minister in Paris refers to this latter point in a note presented by him on the 7th of February, 1813. It had been hinted to M. de Cabre, who would not leave his post without being recalled, that it would be as well for him if he would make a tour through Sweden in the mean time; but he did not choose to take the hint. He continued to play his disgraceful part until Russia and England, who still did not quite trust the gasconading crown prince, seriously insisted on his removal. Upon this, the minister for foreign affairs wrote by Bernadotte's command to De Cabre, whom he merely regards and addresses as an auditor of the French council of state, informing him that, since no official business had been transacted with him for ten months, he could no longer regard him as other than a private individual, and desiring him as such to quit Sweden. De Cabre obstinately refused to leave Sweden without orders from his court, and an exceedingly unpleasant correspondence between him and the minister was the result, which lasted from the 1st to the 25th of December, 1812.

The Swedish minister at last became rude, and wrote to him that he would be removed by the police if he did not quit Stockholm within twenty-four hours: any further scandal was prevented by M. de Tarrach, the Prussian minister. This latter attempted to mediate, but, notwithstanding this, De Cabre was accompanied on his departure by a Swedish agent of police. D'Ohson, the Swedish ambassador at Paris, was now compelled to demand his passports, but he remained, suspiciously enough, in Paris for another month. On the 7th of January, 1813, Sweden published a long manifesto, in which a very full account is given of the manner in which she had been treated by Napoleon. Venturini, in whose book this long manifesto is to be seen,† thinks it was contrary to the usual form in Sweden, that this string of invectives against France should be put into the form of a report from the minister Engeström to the king, as was the custom in France. An offensive alliance between England and Sweden against France was concluded on the 3rd of March, 1813; but the Swedish people were very averse to a war with France, and the crown prince hoped until August that he should obtain from Napoleon what had been promised him by England and Russia—viz., the possession of Norway. The declaration of war, therefore, was not made till August.

\* The crown prince wrote on this subject to his wife, who was then living in Paris: "*Je veux bien croire, que le prince qu'ils servent me hait (Napoleon), puisque tout me l'ont dit, mais je ne puis croire qu'il les approuve.*"

† "*Scandinavien und Carl XIV.*," Johann von Venturini, vol. ii., pp. 17-41.

In the treaty with England in March, 1813, Sweden had promised to convey a force of 30,000 men into Germany, with which body of men, according to the former treaty, a Russian body of troops should unite; and this united force was to be commanded by the crown prince. England engaged to furnish a large proportion of the equipment and necessities of the above-mentioned Swedish force, and 20,000*l.* a month (or 1,000,000*l.* at once) towards their maintenance and pay. Besides this, England guaranteed the union of Norway with Sweden, but stipulated that no hostile movements should take place on this head before negotiations should have been begun with Denmark in reference to it. By the fifth article of this treaty, England ceded to Sweden the island of Guadeloupe, which had been taken from the French; and a special note was added to the treaty respecting the conditions of this cession. Napoleon was very angry that the English should treat Guadeloupe as he himself had treated Hanover—that is, that they should give it up to a third party before it had been ceded to them. He caused his senate, therefore, which he had made in fact the law-giver to France, to publish a decree, according to which France was not to enter upon any negotiations for a peace with Sweden until Sweden had previously given up possession of Guadeloupe.

The letter which was at this time printed and circulated as a letter from the crown prince to Napoleon, and which made a great sensation in Europe, appears to us rather a production of the philosophy of the saloons, and a result of the anger of Madame de Staël, who was at this time holding her court at Stockholm, against Napoleon, than a *bonâ fide* letter of the crown prince to the Emperor. It was circulated in many thousand copies after the 23rd of March; but Bignon expresses very reasonable doubts whether the Emperor ever saw it. The letter, as Bignon rightly states, was at the commencement circulated as a pamphlet in England and on the continent; but a fact that very decidedly connects it with A. W. Schlegel and Madame de Staël, is that it was read for the very first time in the saloon of Madame de Staël in Stockholm. That Montholon and the other fabricators of Memoirs of Napoleon at St. Helena place words in the mouth of their hero in which he denies having received the letter, would produce no effect at all upon us, inasmuch as they make him deny so many other things which quite certainly took place; but the style and substance of the letter are of such a kind that it is impossible Bernadotte could have written it to a fellow-soldier, relative, general-in-chief, and benefactor, or, if one prefers the phrase, fellow-robber. If he had done so, a violent answer, such as might easily have been given, would certainly have appeared in the *Moniteur*; instead of which the letter is only noticed in second-rate papers.

The letter, or perhaps better, the pamphlet, is given in a German translation in Venturini's often-quoted book; and we quote a passage in a note, which will be sufficient to show that it would



have been impossible for Bernadotte to write in such a manner to the Emperor without a violation of all common sense and decency.\* The French papers which notice the letter, remark, therefore, very coolly and with great soundness of judgment, that Bernadotte must have been wrong in the head if he had written such a thing. The crown prince, as Regent of Sweden, had indeed at this time formally broken off all friendly relations with his brother-in-law, King Joseph of Spain. He had made a treaty with the Spanish Cortes on the 19th of March, and had recognised them and their ultra-liberal constitution. He had even on the same day despatched 12,000 Swedes into Pomerania; and yet he was by no means quite serious about the wish to make war. General Sandels, who commanded the Swedes, had, indeed, immediately issued a proclamation to the effect that all the grants of properties in Pomerania and in Rügen, which the Emperor had very generously lavished, were to be considered null and void; he had taken possession of these lands again in the name of the king, and had given notice to the farmers to pay their rents into the royal treasury; but he came to the assistance of the Hamburgers so late, and managed matters so badly even then, that it was found advisable to lay the blame upon General von Döbeln.

**B.—PREPARATIONS ON THE PART OF THE FRENCH FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813—STATE OF THINGS IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF 1813.**

We regard the assertions of French writers as ridiculous when they assume that, if Napoleon had remained with his army in Lithuania in 1812, he would have been able to have kept back the Russians between the Niemen and the Vistula: we are compelled, however, to confess that it was unfortunate for him that on his departure for Paris he should have been obliged to leave his army to the King of Naples and to the Prince of Neufchatel (Berthier). The former behaved in an unaccountably thoughtless and ungrateful manner; the latter had never been anything more than a good journeyman of Napoleon's, and now he was no longer even the same man that he had been. It was a misfortune that, according to the old plan, which Napoleon had everywhere restored, the com-

\* Venturini, vol. ii., pp. 44-53: "Du moment (in the original text) que V. M. s'enfonça dans l'intérieur de la Russie l'issue ne fut plus douteuse, l'Empereur Alexandre et le roi prévirent déjà dès le mois d'Août la fin de la campagne et ses immenses résultats, toutes les combinaisons militaires assuraient que V. M. serait prisonnière. Vous avez échappé à ce danger, sire, mais votre armée, l'élite de la France, de l'Allemagne, de l'Italie n'existe plus. Là sont restés sans sépultures les braves qui servirent la France à Fleurus, qui vainquirent en Italie, qui résistèrent au climat brûlant de l'Egypte, qui fixèrent la victoire sous vos drapeaux à Marengo, à Austerlitz, à Jena, à Friedland." Afterwards, this pseudo-Bernadotte conjures the Emperor: "Au nom de l'humanité de faire cesser un état de guerre qui a causé la mort de plus d'un million de Français." This passage alone shows very plainly, that even in reference to the form this is a manifesto of declamation à la Schlegel and Gentz, and not a letter.

mand must be conferred according to rank, although the Emperor knew that neither Murat nor Berthier were fitted for the command under the circumstances of the case. Even on the 16th of December, Napoleon had very clearly expressed his dissatisfaction at the conduct of the Prince of Neufchatel, although without any reference to circumstances with which he must have been well acquainted.\* King Joachim, who had heard from Naples that his Caroline was beginning, like the Caroline of poor Ferdinand of Sicily, to ignore him entirely and to govern Naples without consulting him at all, could not be induced by any representations to remain with the army, although Berthier absolutely refused to take the command, and Eugene Beauharnais was very unwilling to do so. Once before, before Murat left Gumbinen for Königsberg on the 13th of December, he had made use of expressions in reference to the Emperor in an assembly of the generals which had caused a scene between him and the Prince of Eckmühl. We quote in the note the account given of this scene by a somewhat rhetorical courtier, because other authorities have represented this scene as even more revolting and unreasonable.†

After this scene in Gumbinen it was impossible to have any further confidence in the King of Naples; yet he still commanded the army as far as Königsberg, and, in order to increase the number of the troops, sent for Heudelet's division from Dantzic (whither Macdonald had retired with the troops left him after the defalcation of the Prussians, and where the remains of Victor's corps had assembled), before he proceeded to Posen. In Posen, without waiting for any command or permission, he transferred the command of his

\* He writes from Paris on the 16th of December, to his major-general: "Je vois avec peine, que vous ne vous soyez pas arrêté à Wilna sept à huit jours, afin de profiter des effets d'habillement et de rallier un peu l'armée, j'espère que vous aurez pris position sur la Pregel. Nulle part il n'est possible d'avoir autant de ressources que sur cette ligne et à Königsberg. J'espère que les généraux Schwarzenberg et Regnier auront convert Varsovie. La Prusse se prepare à envoyer des renforts pour couvrir son territoire."—Chambray says, namely (and this must serve to explain Napoleon's dissatisfaction), that there was in Wilna bread and meat and biscuit enough for 100,000 men for forty days, without reckoning the corn in the winter-magazine, which had been brought from Samogidia. There was also meat enough for 100,000 men for thirty-six days, beer and brandy in still larger quantities, 30,000 pair of shoes, 27,000 muskets, and large quantities of horse-furniture, clothes, and equipments.

† Ségur, "Hist. de Napoléon et de la Grande Armée," Paris, Houdaille, 1838., vol. ii., p. 399, livre xii., chap. 5: "Le voila donc," says Ségur, "au milieu des chefs dont son beaufrère lui a confié la conduite, accusant son ambition qu'il a partagé pour s'en absoudre. Il s'écrie: 'Il n'est plus possible de servir un insensé; il n'y a plus de salut dans sa cause; aucun prince de l'Europe ne croit plus à ses paroles ni à ses traités. Je suis Roi de Naples, comme François est Empereur d'Autriche; je désespère d'avoir rejeté les propositions des Anglais.'" (Other authorities add even more than this.) Ségur proceeds: "Un cri de Davoust l'interrompt: 'Le Roi de Prusse, l'Empereur d'Autriche,' lui repartit-il brusquement, 'sont princes par la grâce de Dieu, du temps et de l'habitude des peuples. Mais vous, vous n'êtes roi que par la grâce de Napoléon et du sang Français. Vous ne pouvez l'être que par Napoléon, et en restant uni à la France. C'est une noire ingratitude, qui vous aveugle.' Et aussitôt il lui déclare qu'il va le dénoncer à son Empereur; les autres chefs se turent."

troops to the Viceroy Eugene on the 13th of January, 1813, and set off direct for Naples. The army of Prince Eugene, after collecting all the scattered troops, amounted to hardly 20,000 men. The Emperor was at this time very much dissatisfied with his brother-in-law, whom he accused, not unjustly, of ingratitude, because he knew very well that Murat was secretly intriguing with the English, in order to free himself from his dependence on France. Napoleon wrote a letter to his sister, in which he said to her: "Your husband is bold enough in the field, but as soon as he ceases to see the enemy, he is weaker than a woman or a monk; for he is quite wanting in moral courage." To the king himself he made use of much more severe expressions.\*

The French had, however, some time during the winter of 1812 and 1813, to collect and arrange themselves somewhat. The weakened and exhausted Russian army required rest, and had to wait for reinforcements; the French united with the main body all scattered troops that they found, as soon as they arrived at the Vistula. Besides the army of the viceroy they had, as we shall show by numbers in the note, in Poland, in the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder, small armies and much provision and ammunition. The King of Naples was even blamed for having left behind him beyond the Oder so many good soldiers.† The viceroy remained in Posen with the army, which he had increased by his junction with Grenier, as soon as he had crossed the Elbe, to 50,000 men, from the 16th of January till the 12th of February; he arrived in Frankfort (on the Oder) on his return on the 18th of February, and in Berlin on the 22nd. Whilst he was lying there he saw Czernitcheff's Cossacks, whom Bülow had allowed to cross the Oder, foraging on the other side of the Spree. When Wittgenstein's Russian army afterwards crossed the Oder between Stettin and Küstrin, he quitted Berlin in the night between the 2nd and 3rd of March. About this time Frimont, who had taken Schwarzenberg's place, was with the Austrian army, which was still nominally under Napoleon's command on the Pilica, Poniatowski had followed this army with his Poles, whilst Regnier conducted the Saxons home. Poniatowski had saved 20,000 men and his artillery from the Russian campaign, and joined Napoleon with these when he had advanced into Lusatia. The French, therefore, were tolerably strong even before the arrival of the troops, especially when we consider that Lauriston, even in February, had organised three divisions in Magdeburg, that Victor, Duc de Belluno, had

\* "Je suppose," he writes to him sarcastically, "que vous n'êtes pas de ceux, qui pensent que le lion est mort. Si vous faisiez ce calcul, il serait faux. Vous n'avez fait tout le mal que vous pouviez depuis mon départ de Wilna: le titre de roi vous a tourné la tête."

† Murat left, besides the 1200 men in Pillau, who were soon obliged to capitulate, 35,000 men in Dantzic, 5500 in Thorn, 5500 in Modlin, 4000 in Zamoisk, 900 in Czenstochow; consequently, in all, 52,100 men; amongst whom were 4000 Bavarians, 10,999 Poles, and consequently 36,200 French.



united two divisions from Mayence with a corps, that the Prince d'Eckmühl had at least organised one division of the corps which he was to command by means of General Legrange in Osnaburg, and that Regnier was in Dresden.

The whole world was astonished when Napoleon, in the first few months of 1813, and with the assistance of the wrecks of his former army, created a new army superior to the former in numbers and equipment, by the exertions of the enthusiasm of the nation, urged on, or forced on, with a truly revolutionary energy. Nothing can be a more convincing proof of the influence which an exalted and firm character and a superior mind can exert over man, than the manner in which the French fought for Napoleon's objects as for their own. Yet even a man like Napoleon would have failed, like many others, in performing this new miracle, had it not been for the feeling of nationality so powerful with the French, and the blind admiration and respect with which the Emperor was regarded as the ideal and the idol of a military nation, and as the representative of its aims. Inasmuch as all Frenchmen, who at this time had votes (the number, as is well known, has varied considerably since 1789, being at one time all the inhabitants of the kingdom, at another, as during the latter years of Louis Philippe, some 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 men), felt clearly that only the man who, by his gigantic plans in the year 1812, had brought such unspeakable misery on France, could by his gigantic and dictatorial measures save the state, now threatened with destruction, he ventured to assemble the legislative assembly. He had expressly intended his notorious bulletin to produce its effect by fear, as his first protectors had done during the reign of terror; and he now had an opportunity, from the alliance between Sweden, Prussia, and Russia, to add to the fear produced by his bulletin that produced by this new and threatening coalition, so as to be in a position to require unheard-of sacrifices.

Before the opening of the legislative assembly on the 14th of February, Montalivet, the minister of the interior, made a dazzling report, furnished with statistics and numbers, with documentary evidence and particular references, which indeed by no means proves what Napoleon intended it to prove, and what all the authorities we have consulted consider it to have proved, but which clearly shows, notwithstanding, that France had materially gained more by the measures adopted since 1789 than during the whole of the remainder of the 18th century. This report is worthy of attention, though the minister was a servile courtier, and as such attributed all the effects of the times and of the efforts of the most deserving and noblest men of the nation, all the new exertions of the people, all the wonders which the new division of the land, the new facilities afforded to trade, and the admissibility to all offices now open to all persons properly qualified, had produced, solely and entirely to the man to whom his homage is devoted. He reckons that the population of the eighty-three departments of France had increased from twenty-five to twenty-eight

millions in the twenty-three years from 1789 to 1812. By the triumphs of the republican armies the population of the French territory had been raised in 1801 to thirty-four millions, and since 1801 Napoleon had raised it to forty-two millions. The advantages of this enormous increase in the number of Napoleon's subjects are not, we must confess, quite clear to us, but other improvements in the circumstances of the nation are open to no doubts.

The minister states, namely, that, during Napoleon's government, 683 millions had been expended on public works, roads, bridges, canals, and works of art. We give the particulars in the note.\* We believe it would have been much more conducive to the fame of Napoleon, if Montalivet and the other ministers had not practised on this occasion so much useless jugglery with words, statements, and figures, because distrust is thus excited even of that which is true in reports. That they contain some truth is undoubted. Thus it seems to us clearly proved, by the figures of the minister, that agriculture had been much more attended to since the revolution in the original kingdom of France; but we consider it very doubtful, notwithstanding his documents, that in the eighty-three departments of imperial France four times as much corn was grown as in France under the kings before 1789. Some passages in Montalivet's report again show us in what a disgraceful way these sophists and favourites of the Emperor praise unconditionally everything that he had done. The minister says, for example, among other things: "The conscription" (which in each year consumed the best part of the population) "actually tended to increase the population, inasmuch as it had increased the number of marriages, since every Frenchman knew that, after having once completed his time of service, he should be then certain for the future of living for his family alone." The conclusion contains a contemptible piece of flattery, exceeding everything that the flatterers of the Roman or Byzantine despots ever uttered in the way of absurdity. If a contemporary of the Medici, they say, or Louis XIV. could again appear upon earth, and on considering all these wonderful results, should ask how many glorious reigns, how many centuries of peace had been required to produce such effects, you could answer him, "twelve years of war and one single man." The session of this legislative assembly, which had been assembled merely for form and for the presentation of addresses and reports, was closed on the 25th of March without anything of importance having been laid before the assembly except bills, for the requisite

\* The report states, that from 1804 to the 1st of January, 1813, had been expended on public works, in the departments of France, the following sums—namely, bridges, 27 millions; canals, 55 millions; drainage and works for the advancement of navigation, roads (including that over Mount Cenis, Mount Genève, and the high road to Hamburg, this last almost entirely out of France), 180 millions; harbours, 73 millions; works in Paris, 102 millions; imperial palaces and other buildings connected with the crown, 62 millions; various useful works, poorhouses, rebuilding of houses and churches in the western departments, baths, towns, as Napoleon (Bourbon-Vendée) and Napoleonville (*i.e.* Pontivy, in department Morbihan), 147 millions.

investigation of which no time was allowed. During the five weeks of the sittings all sorts of formal ceremonies were gone through, reports and other stop-gaps were made use of to occupy the assembly for at any rate a short time: the minister hardly scrupled to assert that he considered the legislative assembly as in fact nothing more than a sort of account-room. This made a very bad impression in the whole country, and was a more immediate cause of the overthrow of Napoleon's empire in the following year than the losses he sustained in the course of 1813. Besides, the Emperor had already, before the meeting of the legislative assembly, made his great preparations for a new campaign, and had summoned to the field half a million of men, not for the defence of France, but for the preservation of his own military government.

The conscriptions of 1812, which the Emperor found ready on his return, were by no means sufficient for him: he caused a decree of the senate, therefore, to be issued on the 10th of January, by which 100,000 men were summoned from the cohorts of the national guards; then 100,000 from the conscriptions of the four last years; and finally 100,000 from the conscription of 1814. When this latter part of the decree came to be put in practice, namely, that relating to the conscripts of 1814, the 100,000 were increased to 150,000. By June, 1813, therefore, the army had been increased by 350,000 men. Besides these imperial and dictatorial decrees issued by the senate, the Emperor also made use of the arts of the demagogues of 1793 to rouse the nation. The proclamations of the Emperor of Russia to the German nation, and the declaration of war on the part of Prussia, furnished an opportunity for these. The cry of 1793 about a coalition of powers was again raised, the country was declared to be endangered by the enviers of the French, and the men of the reign of terror, whom Napoleon had taken into his service, were employed for this purpose and to prepare addresses and exciting proclamations. Paris was obliged to give the example, which all the other cities followed, and column after column of the *Moniteur* was filled with enthusiastic addresses. These addresses contained, besides plenty of fine phrases, a voluntary offer on the part of the cities to furnish cavalry. The actual profit of these addresses was not the main point: the object was to turn to good account the fanaticism for the honour of the nation and the enthusiasm against the coalition, in reliance upon which another decree of the senate was issued in April, summoning into the field 100,000 men more.

The senate decreed, on the 3rd of April, that 180,000 additional men should be incorporated with the French army. First, 10,000 young men of the richest and most influential families of France were to form a privileged corps under the title of a guard of honour, furnishing everything that was necessary themselves. This corps, which Savary reckons as if it really existed at the time, was, however, never completely organised; and even that portion of it that



was formed was never completely exercised, as the author is enabled to testify from having seen in Frankfort many who belonged to the corps. Besides these ten thousand hostages for the fidelity of the notables of the empire, as we may call this guard of honour, 80,000 men were to be taken from the first rank (*ban*) of the national guard, and used to strengthen the hundred cohorts formed in March. In addition to these two, 90,000 more men were to be taken from the conscription of 1814. The new army, then, in reference to infantry, which, by means of the old officers and the number of veterans, was soon in an efficient state, was superior in numbers to the allied army; but it was different in respect to cavalry. The Russians and Prussians were, for the most part, quite raw levies; the army of the viceroy alone would, should Poniatowski succeed in joining it from Cracow, number more than 70,000 veteran troops. Cavalry were sent for from Spain and Italy, and two regiments of Saxon cavalry were also employed afterwards. All the large towns furnished cavalry; the Emperor procured horses; the guard of honour served at Bautzen; but this latter corps was not properly drilled, and as to the other cavalry, if it is not too much to say that the horses and riders were useless, at any rate one or the other were always so.\* This want of cavalry was the more felt, as the Russian armies were always enclosed in complete clouds of light horsemen, and as the result showed, that, on account of the want of well-drilled cavalry, but especially light cavalry, all Napoleon's victories in 1813 remained without any satisfactory result. The artillery was easier replaced, although not merely a large number of cannon had been lost in Russia, but many of the best artillerymen had perished. Cannons were found in sufficient quantity in the arsenals, after the supplies had been continually increased for several years, and the fleet furnished artillerymen, inasmuch as the ships, which were still left, were obliged to be left unemployed in the harbours. The German princes of the Rhenish alliance assisted Napoleon to the utmost of their power, and so much the more as the Russian proclamations, and the expression of public opinion in Prussia respecting external pressure, had excited the people, and had separated their interests from those of the princes. In consequence of this fear of the people, Saxony, Bavaria, and Wirtemberg especially, had more or less made terms for themselves with Austria before the opening of the campaign, in case of the success of the attempts of Russia and Prussia, because they felt that the cause of the people was by no means theirs.

\* Bignon, vol. xii., p. 41, defends Napoleon's decree respecting the formation of this cavalry corps (April 5) in the following manner: "Par la création de dix mille gardes d'honneur il atteignit beaucoup de jeunes gens riches dont l'oisiveté pouvait devenir dangereuse dans des circonstances difficiles. Cette mesure est une de celles, qui ont été le plus fortement taxées d'arbitraire, et ce n'est pas sûrement la plus blâmable. Au moment où le situation de la France nécessite de nouveaux appels sur les conscriptions des années antérieures, l'Empereur Napoléon n'est il pas excusable de contraindre en quelque sorte les riches à prendre aussi leur part des *perils glorieux du service militaire*?" When a rational and intelligent Frenchman can write thus, what sort of sophistry may we not expect from the others!!

The summons to the militia, which had been issued by Prussia from Breslau on the 21st of April, was, in fact, couched in very revolutionary terms, and threatened with the vengeance of the people not only the French but also their slaves, the princes of the Rhenish confederation. These princes, therefore, did everything in their power to compel their subjects to bring a new army into the field, and to furnish a new equipment. In January, the courts of Carlsruhe, Stuttgart, Darmstadt, and Munich had been summoned to furnish their complete contingents, and no one was more anxious to do this than the terrible King of Wirtemberg. Bignon, who of all Frenchmen is best acquainted with and judges most correctly of the Germans and their courts, considers, therefore, the servile devotion which this otherwise brutal and haughty king manifests, in a note of the 26th of January, as quite sincere (*un dévouement qui paraît sincère*). He informs the Emperor that his army had lost 205 officers out of 378, and all its cavalry and artillery: he promises, notwithstanding, to send by the beginning of April ten battalions of infantry, three squadrons of light cavalry, and a battery of ten guns, to join the French army. Equally great was the activity of the King of Bavaria; for this monarch was so ready to sacrifice the lives and properties of his subjects for Napoleon's fame and the supremacy of France, that the Emperor once said to the Count de Narbonne, *he is as they all ought to be*. He even undertook the office of spy for France upon the Austrians, and not only brought a new army into the field, but gave information concerning the most secret movements of others. Even at this time King Joachim Murat had conceived the foolish plan of securing his kingdom by an alliance with England and Austria, in case his brother-in-law should fall; and the Emperor received the first hint of the secret negotiations of the King of Naples, which were afterwards continued and only ceased in the autumn, from the King of Bavaria.

Saxony was in a critical position; it was obliged, however, to keep with France; for the old and bigotedly Catholic king had for many reasons everything to fear from the ultra-Protestant King of Prussia, seeing that King Frederic William III. was quite as full of prejudices, but also quite as pedantically honourable and just, as the King of Saxony. Both were very much esteemed by their subjects as upright and honourable men; although the King of Saxony, by his fidelity to the French in 1813, brought unspeakable misery on his already ruined country, and the King of Prussia, by his acceptance of Metternich's jesuitical system of government, deprived his subjects of the enjoyment of the rewards promised to them for their sacrifices for their country. Saxony was frightened by the occupation of the district of Cottbus, which had before the war belonged to Prussia, and the old king, formal and ceremonious as he was, was very decidedly displeased at the extreme revolutionary tone of the proclamations issued to the Saxons and to the Germans in general. He undoubtedly intended the good of his subjects; he endeavoured to further it also for some time by an

approximation to Austria, and Napoleon was the more disquieted at the ambiguous position which he assumed at the commencement of the campaign, as the Saxon people shared with the Prussians their hatred of the French. The king indeed did not know that Poniatowski and his Poles, whom Gabelenz was to join with the Saxon cavalry which had been separated from Regnier at Kalitsch, had been intentionally taken to Cracow by the Austrians and detained there; and still less, that on the 15th of April a treaty had been concluded by Metternich with Russia respecting his duchy of Warsaw: he allowed himself to be enticed into Metternich's net, when the Russians were advancing upon Saxony.

Napoleon requested the king, when obliged to leave Dresden, to come to Mayence; the latter, however, did not choose to throw himself entirely into the hands of the French, and went first to Plauen, then to Ratisbon, and from thence by Linz to Prague. That this was a consequence of Metternich's cabals is clear; for although Metternich told the Count de Narbonne that the king had fallen into Prague like a bombshell without his knowledge or co-operation, the honest King of Saxony wrote to the Emperor himself, who had thus an opportunity of seeing how he was deceived by Metternich. The king writes on the 19th of April to General Thielemann, whom he had sent to Torgau, that he should set off the next day by Linz to Prague, *in consequence of an arrangement concluded with the Emperor of Austria*. In another letter, which was submitted to the Emperor of the French, because in it mention is made of the endeavours of Austria to mediate a peace, and the reasons why this mediation ought to be decisive, he says further: "The coincidence of his wishes with the views of the Emperor of Austria had induced him, *at the request of the Emperor*, to proceed to Prague." By this intrigue the French Emperor was injured in two ways. In the first place, the king did not send his troops to join the French army in March; in the second, he named General Thielemann commandant of Torgau. General Thielemann was rendered independent of the commander-in-chief of the French army, the Viceroy Eugene, by the command he received not to admit into the fortress or its neighbourhood without the king's express command, which would only be given by the consent of the Emperor of Austria, any *foreign* troops whatever, whether French or others. This order was afterwards several times repeated in letters to Thielemann, and Napoleon's attempts to occupy Torgau, or to make use of the heavy artillery of the fortress elsewhere, failed. Even Regnier, although commander-in-chief of the Saxons, was not listened to: at a later period the Saxon troops joined the French; and Torgau received from them a garrison and another commandant.

This time also Napoleon reckoned a good deal on the terror and surprise which he should spread among his enemies, if he, whose military force was considered as almost annihilated, could burst upon the allies with an army superior to their own. We have



already mentioned that the Viceroy Eugene, who had joined with his force the 7000 men in Frankfort with General Grenier, had recrossed the Elbe in the beginning of March.\* His head-quarters were on the 6th at Wittenberg, on the 9th at Leipzig; his left wing rested on Magdeburg, his right extended as far as Dresden. The Russian army under Kutusoff, as soon as Prussia had declared war, advanced with the Prussians through Lusatia upon Meissen and Dresden. Wittgenstein's army was marching by Berlin to Wittenberg, Torgau, Madgeburg. Czernitcheff and Tettenborn, who belonged to this army, had induced the Duke of Mecklenburg to separate himself from the Confederation of the Rhine on the 23rd of March, and to unite with Russia and Prussia; the Cossacks even advanced as far as Hamburg, and induced the citizens to make an unsuccessful attempt to get rid of the French.

In the month of February the whole of Germany was cleared of French troops, as Lauriston had received orders to organise the fifth corps in Madgeburg, and had drawn to that point any troops that might be scattered about in that district. St. Cyr, the commander in Hamburg, was therefore very much weakened, but was obliged at the same time to render his police more stringent, and his measures in reference to the inhabitants more strict. The strictness, rudeness, and capricious conduct of the custom-house officers and the toll-takers particularly exasperated the lower classes of the people, which at any rate suffered most from the stoppage of business and trade, and caused a rising on the 24th of February, in which many of the French lost their lives. This rising was indeed summarily repressed by the military assistance of the Danes; but this cruel vengeance of the French still more embittered men's minds, and when similar scenes occurred in Lübeck, the enthusiastic portion of the citizens, especially of the middle and lower classes, could no longer be restrained by the richer and more respectable. The Hamburgers, who had been moreover excited by the tone and substance of the proclamations to the allied armies, put themselves in communication with the advanced guard of the Russians, as soon as these latter approached the Elbe from Berlin. Tettenborn, at the head of a small body of troops, chiefly Cossacks, advanced through Brandenburg, where the whole population had risen in arms, to Mecklenburg in the beginning of March, that is to say, before Prussia had declared war; and from thence he ventured as far as Hamburg. Upon this the Danes retired from the town, and Carra St. Cyr himself did not consider it advisable to await the enemy there.

St. Cyr believed that Tettenborn was at the head of a whole corps;

\* Bülow had long since let the Russians through, for, ten weeks before the declaration of war, he had written to General York on the 11th of January from New Stettin: "The war is inevitable, and we must the rather expect it, as it is not to be hoped that the Russians will suffer a defeat on this side the Vistula, or even experience any obstinate resistance. Without orders we cannot yet commence hostilities; it will be advisable, however, in expectation of the declaration of war, to make all necessary preparations, in order to be able to act at once with effect."

he would not venture, therefore, to oppose at the same time an embittered population of 100,000, and the advancing troops of Tettenborn, but, joining his forces with those of General Morand, who had retired from Pomerania, at Lollenspieker, evacuated Hamburg on the 12th of March, and retired to Bremen. The patriotism and enthusiasm which the Duke of Mecklenburg and the citizens of Hamburg showed on this occasion, proved exceedingly dangerous to the latter. The duke was the first of the princes who separated from the confederation, and promised to send 5000 men to join the allied army; the Hamburgers received the Russians as their deliverers with enthusiasm, and established the so-called Hanseatic legion; the war on the Upper Elbe, however, did not permit the allies to occupy the Lower Elbe; and Tettenborn with his 1600 men, principally light troops, was not able to afford them much assistance.

The terrible Davoust, Prince of Eckmühl, who was afterwards selected as the instrument of Napoleon's vengeance on Hamburg, had been despatched at this time up the Elbe on the left bank with Lagrange's division, because Kutusoff's army, to which Winzingerode and Blücher formed the vanguard, was advancing through Silesia and Lusatia against Meissen and Dresden, burnt down the bridges at Meissen, and arrived on the 13th of March at Dresden. He endeavoured then, in vain, to enter Torgau: Thielemann referred to the autograph letters of his king, and absolutely refused. In Dresden, Davoust found General Regnier and the remains of the 7th corps already driven so far back by the Russian advanced guard that he had found it necessary to make preparations for blowing up one or two arches of the splendid bridge between the old and the new towns. The Saxons, like all the Germans, when not restrained by their princes, officials, or soldiers, everywhere manifested their hatred of the French; they received the Russians as deliverers, and drove away by force the soldiers who were making preparations for blowing up the bridge, crying out, "Down with the French!" Regnier certainly intended to carry out his plan: he behaved, however, very well to the Saxons, and the Saxon General le Coq assisted him in his views on the 11th of March; he showed him, however, that the advances of the Russians could not be hindered by the destruction of this beautiful bridge, and Regnier appeared inclined to listen to him, until Davoust arrived.\*

\* The best account of these matters is to be found in Von Holzendorff's "Beiträgen zur Biographie des Generals von Thielemann." We find there in a note, pp. 93-96: "General le Coq endeavoured to induce General Regnier not to insist on blowing up the bridge, as he did not believe that such a proceeding would be of any great service in a military point of view; and he could not in that case guarantee the non-occurrence of disagreeable scenes, which might render necessary severe, perhaps bloody measures on the part of the soldiers towards the citizens. These pressing representations were of no avail. Regnier believed that he owed the completion of a once expressed wish to his honour, *but declared, that in doing so, he merely intended to terrify the enemy, and by no means purposed to destroy this beautiful work of art.*" Then, in p. 96: "Davoust found it necessary to carry out the plan of blowing up the bridge, probably rather out of opposition to Regnier, and as a piece



As on all other occasions, so here, also, did the Prince of Eckmühl manifest the utmost harshness, and he, a man of education and of good family, showed himself as brutal as Vandamme, who, born and brought up among the lowest populace, had been made a general at the end of 1792. He caused not only one, but two arches of the bridge to be blown up on the 19th of March. On the 25th Regnier evacuated the new town; on the 26th and 27th the old town also. After the evacuation of Dresden, the Prince of Eckmühl returned to the army of the Viceroy Eugene; Regnier, with the 7th corps, was directed to proceed to Torgau; but Thielemann steadfastly refused to obey his orders or Prince Eugene's, because he had received orders not to open the fortress to any troops without the express command of his king. The viceroy had by this time encamped with his 40,000 or 50,000 men behind the Saale, between the points where the Saale and the Havel fall into the Elbe; the divisions of his army which had been forced to quit Dresden were encamped below the Harz Mountains; Calbe, Bernburg, and Magdeburg were occupied by the French. The French who had been driven from Hamburg had come out of Bremen, but had suffered a defeat at Lüneburg from Czernitcheff, who was then in Hamburg, and was making use of Dörenberg to summon the Hanoverians to arms, assisted materially in his plans by English money. Count Walmoden was made commander-in-chief of the newly-raised troops, and Czernitcheff and Tettenborn were placed temporarily under his command. The result of this, however, is easily anticipated, for the members of the former notorious Hanoverian government and their president, Count Kielmansegge, constituted themselves again in Hamburg, and from thence caballed and intrigued and governed as before. Their proceedings again were crossed and thwarted by Lord Charles Stewart (afterwards Marquis of Londonderry), and, in order to complete the confusion, after Lord Stewart the Duke of Cumberland came over to the continent, who settled himself in Hanover immediately after the battle of Leipzig.

Czernitcheff had suddenly attacked Morand, who had too hastily ventured to Lüneburg on the 2nd of April; he himself had been mortally wounded, and his troops were obliged to capitulate; but Montbrun, who had been obliged to quit Stendal, arrived in Lüneburg soon enough to rescue some of the prisoners, and to occupy the town again. Before Napoleon's arrival with his new army, the viceroy also suffered a considerable loss at Moeckern, and Lauriston's troops were driven back into Magdeburg. When Wittgenstein and Bülow had crossed to the left bank of the Elbe, between Wittenberg and Magdeburg, the viceroy had been afraid

of bravado for the Dresdeners, than for any military reasons. He caused a French officer of pioneers to be sent for from Leipzig, and obtained from General Thielemann the principal of the miners belonging to a company of sappers and miners then in Torgau. The work, formerly begun and now acknowledged to be unnecessary, was then carried on by Saxon sappers and miners, and the bridge was blown up on the 19th of March."



of being attacked near Leipzig, and made a movement upon Berlin, in order that they might go back again; and although his object was attained, he suffered considerable loss at Moeckern.

### C.—CAMPAIGN OF 1813.

#### 1.—TILL THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN AND THE ARMISTICE OF PLEISWITZ.

Inasmuch as the history of a war can only be properly treated by a person acquainted with matters connected with such subjects—and we have several excellent accounts of the campaign of 1813 (for example, Bade's, General von Hofmann's, and others)—we shall be as concise as possible, and merely relate the principal events in a summary manner. Just at the time when Napoleon's army on the Elbe had suffered the above-mentioned defeat at Moeckern—that is to say, in the first week of the month of April—the Emperor had finished all his preparations, and had proceeded from Paris to Mayence, where he remained from the 16th to the 24th of April. From thence he himself directed, even to the minutest details, the marches and exercises of the new army which was arriving in great numbers from beyond the Rhine.\* He was waiting also until the Italians, who were coming by the Tyrol, and the regiments summoned from Illyria, should have reached the Maine. The King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia made their entry into Dresden on the same day on which Napoleon quitted Mayence—namely, the 24th of April; Miloradowitsch had advanced still further with the principal army; Mecklenburg, which, as we have already mentioned, had first joined the allies, was collecting troops; Hamburg had restored its former constitution and replaced its senate, and was forming a Hanseatic legion; Czenstochau had capitulated on the 25th of March, Thorn on the 17th of April, and Spandau on the 25th. The Duke of Dessau also had ventured, when Wittgenstein had again crossed the Elbe on the 11th, to follow the general movement in favour of German patriotism which had begun in Prussia, and to separate himself from the Confederation of the Rhine.

The Emperor thought he should be able to repress this general movement by measures founded on a system of military police; he hoped, by the vengeance and punishment he inflicted on the deserters

\* The new corps which were to join the army were: 1. The 3rd corps, under Ney, consisting of four divisions of conscripts and cohorts of the national guards, and one division of Hessian and Baden troops. 2. The 4th, under Bertrand, consisting of three divisions of Italian, French, and Wirtemberg troops. 3. The 6th, under Marmont, consisting of two divisions of marines. 4. The 12th, under Oudinot, consisting of two divisions summoned from Italy, and one Bavarian division. Besides these, we must include sixteen battalions of the young imperial guard. These united corps amounted not merely upon paper, but in reality, to 100,000 men. The 2nd, 5th, and 11th corps, or the army of the viceroy, amounted to 40,000 men, but the cavalry had been despatched to the Lower Elbe, where it was required for the 1st corps. The whole French army had, however, only a single division of cavalry, amounting to 4000 men.

from his party,\* to put an end to this patriotic feeling; but he increased the anger of the Germans, and rendered the deserters more numerous, by choosing the Prince of Eckmühl for the instrument of his vengeance—a man whose very name filled Germany with fear and disgust. To what an extent this idol of his age, held up to universal admiration even till the present day, not merely by French but even by German authors, as a model for rulers and a miracle of wisdom, trampled upon all human rights and feelings, is particularly shown by what he caused to be decreed by his senate, and decreed himself on this occasion. On the 3rd of April the senate published a decree, by which all constitutional government was entirely suspended in the 32nd military division, and this without at all consulting the legislative assembly. On the 10th, a totally arbitrary system of government was introduced by a decree of the Emperor. The Prince of Eckmühl, as commander-in-chief in this division, received by this decree an amount of power which rendered it easy for him to introduce an unheard-of system of terror, instead of the legal and constitutional courses of proceeding.

The imperial decree is divided into three chapters (*Titres*) and twenty-two articles: we will, however, only mention the first three articles, and afterwards the further commands from the Emperor to the marshal on the 7th of May, in order to give some idea of the manner of proceeding always and everywhere at that time. We can ourselves bear witness to this, as eye-witnesses of what took place between Frankfort and the island of Wangeroge. As a proof of how far even the better class of Bonapartists forget all human feeling when foreigners, military fame, or the character of their idol is concerned, we refer to Thibeaudeau's opinion, that the Prince of Eckmühl was fully justified in committing the barbarities which he did commit, because, according to the terms of the Emperor's letter, no other course was left open to him. The first article of the Emperor's decree declares that the commander-in-chief of the division, exclusive of all other duties of his office, is specially charged with the duty of restoring order and quietness in all the departments of that division. The second article places under his control the whole police of the three departments, and permits him, by his mere decrees, to attach any penalty contained in the criminal code to certain offences defined by himself. He can, moreover, suspend temporarily *sous-prefets*, judges, mayors of cities or towns, and police magistrates, and name others in their stead. The third article gives him the power of levying contributions or

\* This is not merely suspicion: the Emperor himself caused it to be announced in the *Moniteur* of April 4. In the *Moniteur*, No. 49, p. 355, col. *a*, we find: "Indépendamment de l'armée des vice-roi, des armées du main et du corps du Roi de Westphalie, il y aura dans la première quinzaine d'Avril près de 50,000 hommes dans la 32 division militaire, afin de faire un exemple sévère des insurrections qui ont troublé cette division. Le Comte de Bentink, maire de Varel, a eu l'infamie de se mettre à la tête des revoltés. Les propriétés seront confisquées; et il aura par sa trahison consommé la ruine de sa famille."

sums to be paid as penalty by particular towns or communes, or by whole districts or departments; and of compelling the payment of such sums by taking hostages, by threats of military execution, &c.; in a word, authorises him to proceed exactly as it is customary to act in an enemy's country.

For the execution of the most severe measures, the most terrible of the descendants of the old nobility among Napoleon's generals was preceded by the rudest, coarsest, and most brutal of the plebeian generals of the reign of terror. Vandamme, with two divisions of the newly-raised French army, destined to form the nucleus of the 1st corps, was marching through Lower Saxony almost at the same time that Napoleon appeared in Upper Saxony. Vandamme knew neither shame, human compassion, nor mercy; he was entirely the soldier, and sacrificed to his military purposes everything that came in his way: he pressed on to the Elbe, took the fort of Haaburg by storm on the 27th of April, and immediately attacked the Elbe islands. We shall have occasion presently to mention his conduct at the taking of Hamburg. We must, however, here mention the letter which Napoleon wrote to the Prince of Eckmühl on the 7th of May, and in which he laid down very definitely the measures he was to carry out after having obtained possession of Hamburg. All the expenses of the war were to be borne by the military divisions, with the sole exception of the pay of the troops, and consequently, for every franc of taxes, *some* centimes of war-taxes should be raised in addition. Seven thousand horses should be furnished and paid for out of the fine imposed upon Hamburg. Hamburg and Lübeck were declared in a state of siege; no citizen should carry arms or even have them in his house, under pain of being immediately tried and condemned to death by a military tribunal. On the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June, new and more severe decrees appeared: "A list of all absentees, comprising six different classes, shall be made, and the property of the same confiscated. Of the fine of fifty millions, thirty shall be immediately paid in cash, ten in bills upon the town, and ten shall be furnished in corn, equipments, and other supplies." Everything was most literally carried out, and as the Emperor had entirely left to the prince the selection of those whose names were to be inserted in the list published on the 24th of July, this confiscation produced a very rich harvest. A sufficient proof of Napoleon's feeling towards Germany, without mentioning the barbarities of the ravages committed in Saxony and in Lusatia, will be found in the fact, that while he especially committed the destruction of the flower of Northern Germany to people like Eckmühl and Vandamme, he appointed a man like Augereau governor-general of the duchies of Frankfort and Würzburg.

Kutusoff, who, as the letters in Danielewski proved, lived in continual disagreement with Wittgenstein, died fortunately on the 17th of April, so that Wittgenstein's conduct no longer depended at any rate on the caprices of a sick old man, when Napoleon, on the



25th of April, proceeded from Erfurt to Leipzig, and united his whole army there. Previous to this, Blücher had hastened on in advance of the Russians, Miloradowitsch had stopped in Lusatia, Tormasoff on the Oder; and Miloradowitsch was only at Zeitz at the time when Napoleon arrived in Leipzig. Wittgenstein, who was commander-in-chief, still remained on the Saale; Blücher ought, therefore, to have halted in Altenburg to wait for the other armies. As Napoleon advanced rapidly, Wittgenstein determined on an engagement and left his former position, although the French were far more numerous than his troops and Blücher's combined. Blücher then received orders to make his appearance with the Prussian army at Pegau, in the night from the 1st to the 2nd of May. Napoleon had so made his arrangements, that in case of necessity he could have availed himself during the battle of the viceroy's army and of Bertrand's Italians, who had just arrived by forced marches; and he contrived so to encourage his conscripts, and to lead them by means of officers and veteran troops mixed up with their lines, that he was enabled after the battle to compliment them upon having fought like veterans. The same was, however, the case with Blücher's enthusiastically patriotic Prussians, of whom many had never been in the field before. The Prussians, according to Danielewski, numbered 33,350 men at the battle of Lützen; the Russians, 35,775, for their infantry had for the most part not come up; in artillery and cavalry, however, they were so superior, that the French, though they conquered, were unable to profit by their victory. The French had only 350 pieces of cannon, but before the end of the summer a thousand more had been added to these.

The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia joined the army before daybreak on the 2nd of May, because Wittgenstein refused to follow the advice of retiring in battle array and awaiting on the Elbe the approach of reinforcements and the attack of the enemy. The battle which was fought on the 2nd of May is always named after the little town of Lützen, but the contest was, properly speaking, for the occupation of the villages of Kaja and Rana, of Gross-and Klein-Görschen. The superior and native military genius of Napoleon, his incomparable activity and energy, his presence of mind and his quickness of decision, showed themselves in this battle as in every other; and when we add that he was seconded in this engagement by Soult, Bessières, Marmont, Oudinot, Victor, Mortier, Macdonald, and Lauriston, it will be seen that it was difficult to prevent his gaining the victory. The Emperor was, however, attacked in a direction from which he expected no attack,\* and was obliged, in sight of the enemy, to change his whole position by a series of masterly manœuvres: he would, probably, have been placed by this

\* Odeleben (3rd ed., 1840) says, p. 28: "The Emperor did not expect to be attacked that day, or at any rate, not from that direction. In so far, therefore, the battle of Gross-Görschen, although the result may be admitted to have been doubtful, deserves to be classed among the most successful manœuvres of the Emperor."

means in a very precarious, position had not Blücher, by a most unaccountable carelessness, received Wittgenstein's despatch several hours too late. Wittgenstein's order to Blücher of the 1st was, it appears, more carelessly treated than is usually the case with ordinary mercantile letters,\* so that the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia expected to find the army commanded by Blücher, York, and Berg, in its position at four o'clock, whereas, in spite of the greatest exertions on the part of Blücher, who never delayed at any rate, it was unable to arrive till eleven o'clock.

The battle was obstinate and bloody; the allies were driven from the field, and retreated afterwards to and across the Elbe. Napoleon had, consequently, gained his object, and was able to announce a victory, but took neither prisoners nor cannon, and was unable, from his want of cavalry, even to pursue the enemy. He perceived that he had no longer to fight with mercenary hirelings, but with the people themselves; every one was astonished, therefore, that he did not, after having, by the advantages he had gained, thrown a veil over the misfortunes of the former year, endeavoured to obtain peace by magnanimously-offered concessions. Neither on this occasion did he boast in such a disgraceful manner as usual of his victory, although the several bulletins were still full of false statements. The bulletin which he himself dictated, and which was printed in the *Moniteur* of the 9th of May, represents everything in such a manner, that Napoleon himself appears as a magician and the French soldiers as heroes, who, though far inferior to the allies in numerical force, yet gain a brilliant victory. The Prussians and Russians, together, are stated in this bulletin to amount to 150,000 or 200,000 men. There was, however, no need of lying on the occasion, for even the enemy acknowledged the Emperor's skill, unwearied activity, and prudent conduct of the affair, and the courage of his conscripts.

The loss of the French in the action was reckoned at 15,000 men; the Russians lost 2000; the Prussians, who rushed headlong into the battle, 10,000. Blücher himself was wounded; Prince Leopold of Hesse-Homburg and the Prince of Mecklenburg-Strelitz were left dead on the field; Scharnhorst was so seriously wounded that he died of his wounds on the 20th of June, on his way from Vienna to Prague. Napoleon lost his old comrade, Bessières, before the battle had properly even begun. Savary, whose account of the battle corresponds exactly with those of German authors, mentions in his Memoirs that the allies, after having occupied the village of

\* Danielewski says, p. 75: "The delay was caused in this manner: the despatch which had been sent off late the evening before to Blücher's head-quarters was delivered to an official so overpowered with sleep, that, after having given the requisite receipt for it to the bearer, he placed it under his pillow without reading it. On awaking, he remembers that some despatch had been brought to him during the night; opens it, finds therein the plan of the battle, and sees, to his amazement, that the hour appointed by the commander-in-chief is long past." This sounds somewhat fabulous, and bears the impress of falsehood on the face of it; the main fact, however, concerning the delay of the delivery of the despatch is certain.



Kaja at four o'clock in the evening, and thus having separated the French into two parts, and having routed the portion commanded by Ney, would have gained a complete victory had not General Drouet, of the artillery, at the express command of the Emperor, caused sixty guns to be so placed in a ditch, that the compact columns of the enemy were quite cut through by the balls. He adds, that if Napoleon had had 20,000 cavalry his victory would have been decisive. As it was, the victory was by no means decisive, although the French afterwards reaped all the advantages of a victory;\* for the French army was obliged to remain all the evening under arms and in battle array, and was several times attacked during the night by the enemy's cavalry; and the Russian emperor and his commander-in-chief were even for some time undecided whether they should not renew the battle on the following day. Curiously enough, however, it was found that they had not ammunition enough.

Bade, whose history of the campaign of 1813 is in other respects one of the best, is wrong in representing the French army as consisting of 150,000 men; for Eugene Beauharnais, as well as Bertrand with his Italians, did not arrive on the field till late, and with only a portion of their troops. On the 3rd and 4th of June the Russians retreated from the district about Leipzig over the Elbe by Altenburg, the Prussians by Kolditz. Miloradowitsch covered their retreat, for his army had remained as a reserve at Zeitz during the battle, and Wittgenstein was very much blamed for not having sent for this army before the battle. Napoleon himself appears to have feared something of the kind, for Odeleben, who was constantly with him, informs us, that as he advanced he continually asked any peasants that met him the way to *Saxe*. The King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia were in Dresden again on the 4th; on the 8th, Napoleon also arrived there; so that by that date the whole of the right bank of the Elbe, from the Bohemian mountains to the mouth of the Elbe, was in the hands of the French. The Emperor's first care in Dresden was to settle himself firmly in the Hanse Towns by means of negotiations with Denmark, and to compel the King of Saxony to place himself once more unconditionally in his hands. This latter point was very important, not merely on account of the Saxon contingent, whose cavalry he very much wanted just now, but also in reference to the fortress of Torgau. If Thielemann could be induced to open this to the French, they would be masters of all the fortresses along the Elbe, as they had already fixed themselves firmly in Wittenberg.

The fate of Hamburg depended at this time entirely on the Danish policy, for the Russians had been obliged to withdraw their troops as soon as the campaign began, and the Swedes, when they landed in Pomerania, were not strong enough to oppose with any

\* That the allies claimed the victory because they had taken a dozen cannon and 800 prisoners, was ridiculous even as a bulletin.



good effect the attacks of the French upon the town. The Danes were at this time on friendly relations with the French; they were, however, threatened with the loss of Norway, which they could not defend, even with the aid of France, against England, Russia, and Sweden; they therefore kept up friendly relations with France, but at the same time lent a favourable ear to the proposals of Russia, made through Count Dolgorucki in Copenhagen. The relations between France and Denmark are so exactly laid down in a document inserted in the *Moniteur* of the 20th of June (No. 171), and as far as we know never contradicted, that we believe ourselves justified in following this statement.

After the expedition of the English against Copenhagen in 1807, a treaty of alliance was concluded between Denmark and France, by which France guaranteed to the King of Denmark that he should not be deprived of any portion of his dominions, in return for which the king took upon himself the whole burden of carrying out the continental system, and all the difficulties which at that time attended an alliance with France. In the year 1811, continues the French report, Sweden had hinted that it wished, by the help of France, to obtain possession of Norway; the Emperor, however, would not hear of such a proposal, and since that time Sweden had sought the alliance of the enemies of France. Notwithstanding this, when a war between France and Russia became unavoidable, Sweden had again offered an alliance, had hinted at the ancient friendship between France and that country, and had shown, in case Norway belonged to Sweden, how easy it would be to effect a landing in Scotland from the former country. The French cabinet had, however, replied, that its treaties with Denmark did not permit of its entering into any engagements by means of which Norway would be separated from Denmark.

After this, the document mentions the principal points of the arrangements of Sweden with England and Russia which we have already noticed; and the misfortunes are referred to which had occurred to the French armies in 1812, and had rendered it possible for the Russians to advance as far as the Lower Elbe. During the first months of the year 1813, continues the author of the document, when the French were for the moment unable to protect the Danes from an attack of the Cossacks, the French Emperor had magnanimously permitted the King of Denmark, at his request, to negotiate with England, so as to secure, if possible, the unmolested possession of his whole territory. The king had expressed his gratitude for this; and we add, because it is not said in the document referred to, the treaty of 1807 was given up. A great fuss is made in all French authors in the usual manner about a magnanimous action on the part of the Emperor, which was, after all, merely a piece of ordinary prudence. Mention is made in the document that the Emperor permitted the crews of four ships of war in the Schelde, who were Danes, to return unmolested, when summoned

to do so by their king. The first offers which the English and Russians made to the Danes, continues the author of this document, in order to induce them to cede Norway for a certain compensation, were ridiculous, and King Frederic VI. of Denmark (for Christian VII. had died in the autumn of 1808) would not listen to them for a moment; in consequence of which Dolgorucki had been sent to Copenhagen. This latter, just at the time when the French were making great preparations to recapture Hamburg, had offered the Danes, as the price of their uniting with the allies against France, that Norway should not be separated from Denmark. Denmark had then despatched Count Bernstorff to London, and Count Moltke to the Emperor of Russia. The English and Russian cabinets, however, fancying that Denmark was now entirely separated from France, and had no other choice than to unite with the allies, threw Dolgorucki overboard, refused to acknowledge his treaty with the Danes, and demanded the unconditional surrender of Norway. By this proceeding the eyes of the Danes had been opened at the very moment when the Danish troops had already proceeded to Hamburg, and were fighting against the French in the Elbe islands, and they had in secret again joined France.

When the French writers on this occasion inveigh against the deceitful conduct of the English and Russian diplomatists, they may be in point of fact quite right; but it is a little remarkable that they speak so harshly of a line of policy which they themselves daily practised.\* Alquier took advantage of the dissatisfaction of King Frederic VI. at the refusal of the allied powers to ratify Dolgorucki's treaty, and induced the Danish government to send the chancellor, Von Kaas, to Dresden to Napoleon. The nominal object of the Danish minister was to excuse the interference of the Danes in the affairs of Hamburg; his real one, however, to conclude a treaty, by which Hamburg should be again placed in the hands of the French. The Swedish agent, Wetterstedt, the English ones, Thornton and Hope, and the Russian General Suchtelen, who were on board an English vessel in Kiøge Bay, in vain endeavoured, towards the end of May, to prevent this mission: these ministers were not allowed to come to Copenhagen. De Kaas had an interview with the French Emperor immediately after the battle of Bautzen, and by his advice negotiated a treaty with the Duc de Bassano, which again brought Denmark into intimate connexion with France. De Kaas returned to Copenhagen with this treaty on the 10th of June.

The Emperor was very much dissatisfied with the King of Saxony

\* Bignon's long declamations concerning Dolgorucki's mission are to be found in the 12th part of his "Histoire," &c. The passage in the *Moniteur*, p. 670, col. *a*, is as follows: "C'est en vain qu'on ouvrirait les annales des nations pour y voir une politique plus immorale. C'est au moment où la Danemark se trouve ainsi engagé dans un état de guerre avec la France, que le traité auquel il croit se conformer est à la fois désavoué à Londres et en Russie, et qu'on profite de l'embarras où cette puissance est placée, pour lui présenter comme ultimatum un traité qui l'engagerait à reconnaître la cession de la Norwège."



for having connected himself with Austria, and took advantage of the first opportunity which offered of demanding with threats the king's speedy return to his capital. On his arrival in Saxony he had taken no notice of the Saxon neutrality, but had urged the king with threats to give up to him Torgau and the 12,000 men stationed in Franconia, among whom were two regiments of Saxon cavalry, which the Emperor very particularly required at this time. Even before the battle of Lützen the Emperor had repeatedly complained of the prolonged residence of the king in Prague, and among other things, had given the Duke of Weimar, on his passage through that state, a message to him, which we give in the duke's words. "The Emperor requests me," says he, "to write to your majesty the following words: '*I demand (je veux),*' says he, '*that the king should explain himself. I shall then see what I shall have to do; but if he is against me, he will lose everything that he has.*'" Thielemann's conduct had long appeared suspicious to the Emperor, and became still more so when he came to Dresden during the time the allies were in possession of the city: it was said, also, that the king had made a separate alliance with Austria. This was confirmed in the course of the negotiations with him. It does not appear, however, that Austria undertook his defence to any great extent, except at a later period against Prussia. After Narbonne, who was at Prague as ambassador, had long tried in vain to induce the king to return, Napoleon sent Count Montesquieu, adjutant of the Viceroy Eugene, to Prague, expressly to say to him, "That he would declare him a deserter, who no longer enjoyed his protection, and that he would immediately cease to be king, unless he gave up Torgau, and ordered his troops to join the French army." This produced the desired effect. The king returned to Dresden, and after having hardly six days before expressly approved of Thielemann's conduct in refusing to open the fortress not merely to the commander-in-chief of the 7th corps, but even to Marshal Ney, wrote to the commandant on the 8th of May an order to surrender the fortress to Regnier.

Thielemann had involved himself too deeply with the allies, and had too much promoted the German patriotism of the time among the Saxon army, to feel himself quite safe with the French; he gave up the command to another general, who executed the king's commands; he himself went over to the allies, and was afterwards at the head of a corps of light troops in the Prussian service, of great use to the German cause. After the return of the king to his capital, 10,000 Saxon troops joined the French, of which at any rate the cavalry was very much wanted. When the king returned to Dresden on the 12th of May, he very soon perceived that he had taken a resolution which agreed as little with the feelings of his faithful people as with the wishes of his army. In whatever manner we may think of General Thielemann, who wished to bring the king over to the side of the allies, or of Baron von Senft Pilsach



and General von Langenau, who wished to induce him to throw himself into the arms of Austria, his fidelity to his allies, which the French praise so highly, became destructive to him and to the Grand-Duke of Frankfort, whilst a tyrant, like the King of Wirtemberg, and a friend of the French party, like the King of Bavaria, who had sold Germany to the invaders, escaped unpunished.

The Emperor of Austria, or rather his minister Metternich, could not, however, be terrified by Napoleon like the King of Saxony, or gained over by any representations as to fidelity in alliances, when so totally opposed to good policy. Austria had been playing a double game since the month of February. She kept together the reserve corps, appeared to be covering Warsaw with friendly intentions, and Schwarzenberg, and afterwards Frimont, who commanded this corps, professed to be under Napoleon's command; and yet Baron von Lebzeltern was present at an arrangement made in the enemy's camp as to the best means by which this reserve corps could assist the entrance of the Russians into the duchy of Warsaw, and induce Poniatowski's Poles to march to Cracow. In order to secure the confidence of the allies, Count Stadion, whom Napoleon considered as his peculiar enemy, and whose dismissal he had formerly demanded with threats, was again employed in active service, and some time afterwards was sent to the head-quarters of the allies, whither also Sir Charles Stewart (Lord Londonderry) proceeded. As, however, it was not considered advisable to drop the mask just at that time, Bubna was sent at the same time to Paris, to deceive the French. The day before Napoleon's departure for the army, Schwarzenberg also arrived in Paris, and when the Emperor said to him,\*on his departure, that he should send orders to Frimont to join him with the auxiliary corps from Cracow, he answered that he had no doubt that Frimont would obey the order; although he was quite convinced of the contrary. This equivocal policy was pursued in May. Austria, indeed, since Wessenberg had been despatched to London, affected neutrality; but there was still a good deal of talk about the relationship, although even at that time Schwarzenberg had given the Duke of Bassano, minister for foreign affairs, to understand that he ought not to reckon too much upon this bond of union. When the duke had once referred to this point, Schwarzenberg had answered, "Policy alone formed this bond; but——" The minister was too much of a courtier to relate this conversation to his Emperor; but he would have done better had he done so. Austria therefore made no opposition when the King of Saxony returned to the French party, when Torgau received a French garrison, and the Saxon contingent joined the French army. She would very willingly have kept back Poniatowski and his Poles when the French advanced into Lusatia and Silesia, and they were even expressly refused permission to march through the Austrian territory armed; but she still hesitated as to declaring her intentions openly. Napoleon, however, knew perfectly well what he

had to expect; for Narbonne on the 10th of May gives the Emperor full information of the suspicious negotiations which Prince Cariati, Joachim Murat's ambassador at the court of Vienna, was carrying on with Metternich in the name of his king.

Austria still hoped that, by proceeding slowly and by degrees, Napoleon might be induced to make some sacrifices in her favour, rather than make a new enemy at such a decisive crisis. Bubna, therefore, Napoleon's old acquaintance, who understood how to deal with him, was sent to Dresden, where he arrived on the 16th of May. The distrust of the French Emperor had become so great, that immediately after the battle of Lutzen he had sent the Viceroy Eugene to Italy to organise a new army. Bubna was to announce finally that Austria no longer considered herself bound by the treaty formerly concluded with France, at least in its most important point, namely, furnishing an auxiliary force; and yet the Austrian emperor writes in the autograph letter which Bubna delivered to Napoleon, that he only wished to remain neutral in order to establish Napoleon's dynasty on a firm and immovable basis (*d'asseoir sur des bases inébranlables votre dynastie, dont l'existence s'est con fondue avec la mienne*). Napoleon replied to Bubna's vague hints as to the basis of an Austrian mediation, seeing that this basis appeared to him inadmissible, not merely by a refusal, but by a boastful and a threatening refusal;\* and this was not reasonable. The basis thus referred to by Bubna was for Austria the restoration of the Illyrian provinces, the increase of its territory in Poland, and the extension of its frontier on the side of Bavaria; the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine, and a slight increase of territory for Prussia. Although the Emperor, however, thus rejected any mediation, and refused the offers of the mediators, he by no means objected to another proposal of Bubna's, namely, that an armistice should be concluded, and a congress held in Prague or some other equally convenient place; he even permitted Bubna to announce to the allies directly his willingness that such a congress should take place. Bubna was not only allowed to communicate directly to Count Stadion, who was at this time at the head-quarters of the allies, what the Emperor had said, but Napoleon himself actually corrected the draft of the letter written by Bubna on this occasion.

Bubna had only very generally mentioned the conditions which Austria might probably propose; he returned, therefore, to bring back with him a written proposal, and to convey a letter to the Emperor Francis. This letter is contained in Bignon's collection, published after his death; and for the then state of affairs it sounds

\* *Boastful*: for he wrote to Narbonne "that he should tell Metternich that Bubna and Schwarzenberg could testify that, without reckoning the Italian troops or the contingent of the Rhenish alliance, he had at the time 1,100,000 men on foot." *Threatening*: he wrote, "If that which I require from Austria according to the terms of the treaty of 1812 be not fulfilled, a decree of the senate is now ready, by which a levy of 200,000 men is ordered." The date of the last letter is May 4th.



rather decisive.\* “If your majesty,” he writes, “is at all interested in my happiness, I must entreat you also to have some regard for my honour. I am resolved rather to die at the head of those Frenchmen whose feelings and ideas are noble, than to become an object of ridicule to the English, and to yield a triumph to the enemies of our nation. I entreat your majesty to think of the future, and not yourself to destroy the fruits of a friendship of three years’ duration.” A declaration of his willingness for peace, which the Emperor caused to be printed in the *Moniteur* of the 24th of May, proves that even then, when the Russians and Prussians were making the disposition of their troops on the understanding that Austria intended taking part in the war, Napoleon had no idea of admitting any Austrian mediation.

At the head of the allied armies at the battle of Lützen was Count Wittgenstein, under whose command were both Blücher and Miloradowitsch, who had several causes for being dissatisfied with him. After this battle he had made, as was said, so many mistakes, that the Emperor Alexander again temporarily left the command with Barclay de Tolly, who also happened to be older in the service. The allied army had retreated before the advance of the French by Meissen and Dresden, until they arrived in the neighbourhood of the sources of the Spree, and took up a position in the neighbourhood of Hochkirch, near Bautzen and Wurschen, already well known from the events of the seven years’ war, such as to imply that they intended to await an attack there. When Napoleon heard of this, as his army (consisting of 100,000 men) was not superior in number to that of the allies, he sent orders to Ney and Lauriston, who were to have set out at the head of between 60,000 and 70,000 men from Torgau against Berlin, to join him, hastened on the 18th to his army, continued his march on the 19th, and commenced the attack on the 20th. This time also, by the skill of his arrangements, he drove the allies from most of their positions: Blücher alone had retained the part of the first line immediately before himself. This time, too, as at Lützen, the French paid dearly for the advantages they obtained, and particularly because the Russians were partly covered by their position. On the 21st the battle was renewed, and in the opinion of all judges the allies would have been surrounded on this day had not the Emperor committed an important error: the French, however, kept possession of the field of battle. The accounts given by the two parties of the number of

\* Bignon, vol. xii., pp. 97-98: “J’ai entretenu,” he wrote to the Emperor Francis, “le Comte de Bubna pendant plusieurs heures; je désire la paix plus que personne. Je consens à l’ouverture d’une négociation pour une paix générale et à l’ouverture d’un congrès des plénipotentiaires des insurgés d’Espagne, pour qu’ils puissent y stipuler leurs intérêts. Si la Russie et la Prusse et les autres puissances belligérantes veulent traiter avec l’Angleterre, j’y consens également. Si une fait le congrès ouvert, il est dans l’intention des puissances belligérantes de conclure un armistice, comme cela s’est fait dans plusieurs circonstances et comme il en a été question à Paris avec le Prince de Schwarzenberg, je suis prêt à y adhérer.”



killed and wounded differ very considerably from each other. The Russian and German accounts state that the number of killed and wounded on the part of the French was double that of the allies: the French authors assert the contrary. The allies were by this time pretty certain that Austria would declare in their favour; they left in their retreat, therefore, the road to Breslau open, and retired in the direction of Bohemia towards the furthest corner of Silesia, where the fortress of Schweidnitz offered them a safe asylum. These movements were, to a certain extent, perplexing to Napoleon. The further he advanced the more he was removing himself from his auxiliaries, and from the reinforcements which he expected: the allies were approaching their reinforcements in exactly the same proportion. The battle itself had brought into the hands of the conquerors neither trophies nor large numbers of prisoners, as living witnesses of the truth of the boasting announcements of victory, so that, according to the testimony of the Emperor's most zealous servant, panegyrist, and defender, he was rather grieved than rejoiced at the victory gained by such great sacrifices.\* What most grieved him, and what still makes the French bitter, and at times unjust, against the Prussians, was, that the Prussians, whom he had so despised, fought like heroes in all the skirmishes and in the battles of Lützen and Bautzen, and that they had brought into the field an entirely new kind of national force, the militia (*landwehr*), at first despised by him, but which he afterwards found formidable enough. He was destined to feel that, under proper guidance, they could offer a resistance which he had never expected from his experience of them in 1806 and 1807. He was struck at the orderly and regular retreat of the allies, which bore not the least resemblance to a flight; and on one occasion, when he visited his advanced guard, he was an eye-witness of the resistance which his army still experienced from the retreating enemy. Not far from Görlitz he was riding a little in advance of his immediate companions, Mortier, Caulaincourt (Duc de Vienne), Kirgener, an engineer officer, and Duroc, the marshal of the palace: the three latter were a few paces behind the Emperor, and on his turning suddenly he only saw Caulaincourt still standing. Kirgener had been killed on the spot, and Duroc was so dangerously wounded that he died the next day in great agony. The visit which the Emperor paid Duroc on his death-bed has been shamefully abused by the French writers, so as to form a kind of romantic and sentimental scene: and in this representation of the matter they were preceded by the thirtieth bulletin,

\* Bignon, at the conclusion of the 2nd chapter of the 12th part (pp. 141-115) says: "Ces mêlées formidables, où triomphe encore le génie de Napoléon, n'ont plus le prestige de ses anciennes victoires; elles n'exaltent pas les vainqueurs, ne découragent pas les vaincus. Quelle différence entre le soir de Bautzen et celui d'Austerlitz et de Jéna! *Quoi! pas de canons, pas de prisonniers!* s'écrie Napoléon lui-même. Aucun de ces résultats, qui consolent du sang versé! Bien que des blessés et des morts; la guerre dans tout son horreur et sans l'ivresse du triomphe; la guerre indéfinie, interminable!"

composed in the name of the Emperor, and to a certain extent by himself. This scene is described in all the books, and has been made immortal by innumerable prints: we do not ourselves venture to express an opinion on the point, seeing that Plutarch's style of history is certainly the popular one, but shall rather quote in a note a few words from a French author, who is in general no very decided enemy to the rhetorical style of historical composition.\* The pursuit was carried on vigorously notwithstanding this resistance, and the French rapidly advanced towards Silesia: on the 25th they crossed the Bober, and on the 27th the Katzbach; the head-quarters of the Emperor were at Liegnitz, and Lauriston advanced as far as Breslau.

Before Bubna's return with the formal declaration of Austria respecting the above-mentioned basis of a mediation, Napoleon had endeavoured, by offers to the Emperor of Russia, to induce the latter to enter into a separate negotiation with him. He intended that Caulaincourt should take advantage of the personal favour which the Emperor Alexander had shown him at Petersburg; he sent him, therefore, before the battle of Bautzen, with offers of concessions to Russia to the Emperor; he was not admitted to an interview, however, but was required to communicate his offers in writing. When he again, after the battle, pressed for an answer to his request to be allowed to come into the camp, a direct answer was politely evaded. Bubna returned on the 10th of May with Austria's proposals respecting a mediation, and the Emperor Alexander could not so far offend Count Stadion, who was at the time in his camp, as to admit Caulaincourt to a private interview; he caused him to be told, therefore, to make arrangements with Schouwaloff at the outposts respecting an armistice, and that the proposals of Austria should be waited for before arranging a peace. During the negotiations respecting the armistice, which lasted from the 1st till the 4th of June, Napoleon wrote several times to Caulaincourt, urging him to endeavour to induce Schouwaloff to enter into special negotiations with him; but the Russians were as cunning as the Corsican, and Schouwaloff would agree to nothing without the consent of Kleist, who was acting for Prussia.

The armistice was at length concluded in the village of Pleischwitz or Peischwitz, not far from Jauer, on the 5th of June. It was at the time generally stated, is Thibaudeau's opinion, and is even put into the Emperor's own mouth by the authors of *Memoirs of Napoleon* as a maxim, that the armistice was disadvantageous to the French, and of advantage to the allies.† The armistice was ori-

\* Thibaudeau, "Empire," vol. vi., p. 292: "Le bulletin (*Moniteur* du 30 Mai) rapporta quelques phrases à effet échangées dans cette entrevue. C'est une supposition dont il est facile de voir le but."

† We shall quote the passage, because we like to let the French themselves speak in these matters. It is to be found at the commencement of chap. 90 (vol. vi., p. 305): "L'opinion générale est que l'armistice fut une faute. Il donnait à l'armée Française le tems de se refaire, de se renforcer, d'assurer ses communications. Ce n'était pas un avantage, dès qu'il était commun à l'ennemi. Mais il avait un inconvénient ma-



ginally to last till the 20th of July, and to include six days more before recommencing hostilities. Both armies were to withdraw and to leave a certain space between them. The French were to evacuate Breslau, but were to remain in possession of Liegnitz. The line of separation was to commence at the point where the Katzbach falls into the Oder; was to follow the course of the Oder as far as the borders of Saxony, and thence to continue by the frontier of Prussian Saxony along the Elbe, in such a manner, however, that Saxony and Anhalt should remain in the hands of the French, and the Prussian provinces in the possession of the allies. This last provision was to the disadvantage of the French, for the portions of Silesia and Upper Saxony which were given up to them were already exhausted and ruined by the war, whereas the portions occupied by the allies had not yet suffered at all. The garrisons in all the fortresses in Poland and on the Oder, which the allies were then besieging, were to be furnished every five days during the armistice with provisions sufficient to last them that time. Hamburg would have been rescued by this armistice, had it not already fallen; and this the French took for granted when they agreed to the conditions. Hamburg was not only in the power of the French, but had already suffered all that the Emperor had previously with great severity prescribed for its punishment.

## 2.—PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND OF THE ARMISTICE.

At the time when the armistice was agreed on the allies were quite certain of obtaining the assistance of Austria; the French Emperor, on the other hand, calculated very confidently on being enabled, by the assistance of the Danes, to secure for himself the district of the Lower Elbe, and by a well-directed expedition against Berlin, to render useless the plans of the allies on the Upper Elbe. We have already mentioned that the Emperor was excessively annoyed at the sudden patriotism of the Hamburgers of the old school, celebrated and even notorious for their careful observance of the times, and for an excessive regard for everything which might interfere with their commercial profits. On the former occasion, the address of the old Syndic Doormann after the capture of the city had vied in contemptible eloquence with that of the Hanoverian, M. von Grote, and now the city suddenly threw itself into the arms of Czernitcheff and Tettenborn, and organised a legion for the purpose of stopping Napoleon at the Elbe. He let loose upon the town, which was afterwards betrayed and sold by the Danes, the terrible Vandamme and the inexorable Davoust, as we have also

jeur, il donnait à l'Autriche les deux mois dont elle avait besoin pour compléter ses armemens, rompre ouvertement l'alliance et s'unir à la coalition. Napoléon le pressentait; la fatalité l'entraîna: En faisant les premières ouvertures, lui victorieux il semblait douter de la constance de la fortune et autoriser ses ennemis à ne plus y croire. En quittant Neumark il dit: 'Si les alliés ne veulent pas de bonne foi la paix, cet armistice peut nous devenir bien fatal.'



already noticed. By a decree of the senate of the 4th of April, the Emperor had caused the constitutional course of proceeding to be suspended in the departments of the Upper Ems, the mouths of the Ems, and the mouths of the Weser, which together composed the 32nd military division, and had invested the general in command with dictatorial and irresponsible powers. On the 16th of April the Viceroy Eugene sent to the Prince of Eckmühl his appointment from the Emperor as general of the district and of the army destined to act against Hamburg, which at that time consisted at most of 12,000 men. As long as the Danes were negotiating with Russia, and were flattering themselves that they should be able to save Norway by means of the very equivocal assistance they were giving to Hamburg, this army merely blockaded the city, and Danish soldiers fought on the Elbe islands with Vandamme, who had marked his route from Oldenburg to Haarbùrg with bloody executions. It is unfortunately quite clear, from Napoleon's own letters, not merely that he fully approved of the brutal conduct of a man like Vandamme, but that he expressly laid down directions for the Prince of Eckmühl, as to the manner in which he should inflict upon Hamburg, Lübeck, and Mecklenburg, a vengeance revolting to all feelings of humanity. After the battle of Lutzen the Emperor's first thought was of a kind of Turkish government, and a terrible example in Hamburg and on the Baltic. During the march to Dresden he wrote from his head-quarters at Waldheim to Davoust, ordering him immediately to advance upon Hamburg, get possession of the town, and send on Vandamme to Mecklenburg. In Hamburg he was immediately to cause all citizens to be arrested who had ever acted as senators. Their properties were to be sealed up and confiscated. All the inhabitants were to be disarmed, Hamburg and Lübeck were to be rated at a contribution of fifty millions. All arms were to be taken from the inhabitants of the surrounding district; all gendarmes, cannoniers, coast-guards, officers and official persons of every class were to be disarmed, if they had been formerly in service and had not remained faithful; no private property was to be respected. The town was to be declared in a state of siege, drawbridges were to be built at the gates, cannon placed on the walls, breastworks formed, a citadel\* built on the side next Haarbùrg, large enough, in case of need, to protect four or five thousand men against any sudden rising or the violence of the mob. Lübeck was also to be declared in a state of siege, and the preparations to resist the enemy which had formerly existed at Cuxhaven were to be renewed. Finally, the Swedish General von Döbeln was ordered to Hamburg to assist; he retired, however, without accomplishing anything; and at last Hamburg received the Danish troops,

\* Napoleon's orders respecting the conversion of Hamburg into a fortress, and the violent and tyrannical proceedings to which this was to give rise, may be found in full among the documents appended to the "*Manuscrit de 1813*," in the 2nd Part, No. 1, pp. 105-109.

who were fighting as late as the 14th of May with the French troops on the island of Willemshagen.

The Emperor was exceedingly angry at the share the Danes had taken in the defence of Hamburg, but the conduct of the Russians and English brought about a reconciliation. They refused to fulfil the promise respecting Norway, which Dolgorucki had given the Danish court at Copenhagen. The French ambassador Alquier, who was still in Copenhagen, took advantage of the opportunity without loss of time to reconcile the Danes with his countrymen. He hastened himself to the island where the contest was going on, and had sufficient influence to induce the Danish troops either to leave the island or to surrender the positions they were defending to the French; and in return for this the Emperor permitted a Danish ambassador to wait upon him in Dresden. The unfortunate Hamburgers were sacrificed to the reconciliation of the Danes and the French, and to the diplomatic skill of Alquier. The Danish chancellor De Kaas, who was afterwards sent to Dresden during the armistice, was at first empowered to negotiate with the French on the Elbe as to the means by which Hamburg might be delivered up to the French without any contest, or without causing any confusion after Tettenborn's departure. It was agreed that the Danes should continue to garrison the town after the departure of Tettenborn and the Hanseatic legion, until they could find an opportunity of surrendering it to the French. As soon as it was surrendered, De Kaas proceeded to Dresden, to conclude an alliance of the most intimate kind with Napoleon. At the time when the armistice of Pleischwitz was concluded, the surrender of Hamburg was not generally known; it was provided, therefore, that in case the town should not yet be in the possession of the French, the armistice should protect it also; but the Danes and French had taken possession of Hamburg on the 31st of May, and had already introduced all the most vexatious arrangements of a garrison town in full force. De Kaas negotiated during the month of June with the Emperor and his minister respecting a treaty, which was afterwards signed in Copenhagen on the 10th of July by Alquier and Rosenkranz. This treaty has never been completely made known; as, however, we are not writing a diplomatic history, it is enough for our purpose to know that France engaged that Denmark should retain Norway, and that Denmark, on the other hand, promised to declare war against Russia, Sweden, and Prussia, and to add 12,000 men to the French army, who might be employed anywhere between the Elbe and the Vistula.

At the time when this treaty was concluded, it was Napoleon's intention to attack Berlin at the same time from the south-east and from the north-west. The attack from the Lower Elbe was entrusted to the Prince of Eckmühl, who was also appointed to the command of the Danish auxiliary force. The historians of that time maintain that Napoleon laid much more weight upon the possession of Berlin, which, before the battle of Lützen, was only protected by



Bülow's corps, than he was justified in doing, and had consequently, even before the battle of Bautzen, thought of an expedition against the Mark. The Crown Prince of Sweden only arrived in Pomerania towards the end of May with the whole of the army he had promised; and Czernitcheff and Woronzoff, who had previously been protecting Berlin, had been compelled to join the army of the allies. Ney and Oudinot had received orders before the battle of Bautzen to march upon Berlin; but Napoleon afterwards discovered that Generals York and Barclay de Tolly had brought considerable reinforcements to the army in Lusatia, and had consequently retained with him the two marshals, who afterwards rendered important services in the battle of Bautzen. Oudinot left the field of battle to march against Bülow. His advanced guard was only distant some forty-five miles from Berlin, when he was driven back from Lücknau on the 5th of June, and was then obliged by the armistice just concluded to remain stationary.

At this time the Danes had not merely delivered up to the French Hamburg, which they had garrisoned, but were besieging Lübeck: Berlin was, therefore, threatened on all sides, and not merely by Oudinot alone. Vandamme was to advance against it from Magdeburg by Wittenberg, the Prince of Eckmühl was to leave a garrison in Hamburg, and to advance upon it through Mecklenburg. This plan was postponed on account of the armistice, but afterwards resumed. Austria had, in the mean time, during the negotiations for the armistice, taken a new step, which apparently was to lead to a peace, but which was really intended to give that power an excuse for breaking, in the course of the war, the engagements entered into by the treaty of Paris of 1812 respecting mutual assistance. Bubna returned on the 30th with the conditions, in writing, which he had formerly expressed verbally, according to which Austria was willing to undertake the office of mediator, and asserted boldly that the treaty of Paris still existed, and only required to be altered in one or two points. Napoleon, who knew very well that Count Stadion had already concluded in the camp of the allies an agreement quite incompatible with the treaty of Paris, referred the Austrian ambassador to the Duc de Bassano, in order to negotiate with him (in Liegnitz) concerning the points in this treaty which he wished to have altered. When this negotiation had gone so far as to bring on a treaty respecting these points, Bubna was obliged to confess that he had no power to conclude such a treaty.

Neither the Prussians nor the Russians had anything to do with this system of deceit: everything was conducted by Metternich and the English Tories. When, however, as we shall have to mention presently, Metternich himself came to the French Emperor to Dresden, to effect what Bubna had failed to do in Liegnitz, the Emperor met cunning with cunning, and in the mean time made a most excellent use of the time afforded him by the armistice.

He studied day and night, as Odeleben tells us, mentioning the various subjects carefully, the geography, orthography, and topo-



graphy of the country between Dresden and Prague, not merely in books and maps, with the assistance of the clever men engaged in his geographical and topographical commissions, but in the field, and by fatiguing exertions on horseback, and rides undertaken for the purpose of satisfying himself, which sometimes extended far into the mountains; his intention being, if it should be necessary, to attack the Austrian army then collected in Bohemia. Berthier, Soult, who was afterwards sent back to Spain, and the engineer and geographer Bacler d'Albe, studied with the Emperor through the whole of the month of June, maps and plans, in order to lay down the plan of a campaign, founded upon the union of the Austrians with the Prussians and Russians, to prepare for the time when the armistice should cease. Dresden was fortified as well as possible. The English, in the mean time, had been long endeavouring to organise a formal coalition to obtain Hanover again for their king and his sons, and to take advantage of the misery of the continent, which they appeared to be relieving by rich alms, and for the liberation of which they were paying subsidies to increase their commerce and their industry, and to extend their power over all seas, sea-coasts, and islands.

Lord Cathcart had long been English commissioner and ambassador at the court of Russia; and in the spring, the emptiest and proudest of the English Tories, Sir Charles Stewart (who afterwards, as Lord Londonderry, was treated by the Emperor Nicholas like a sovereign prince, as he himself with great complacency tells us in his *Travels*), had been sent to the Prussian camp. Baron Wessenburg was sent to England by Austria, nominally to mediate between England and France, but really to announce the true intentions of his court. Lord Cathcart had in the former year been present at the conference between the Emperor of Russia and the Crown Prince of Sweden at Abo in Finland, and had taken part in their military councils respecting the conduct of the war; and, since that time, he had furthered by every means in his power a closer connexion between England and Russia. He was now empowered to conclude a subsidy treaty founded on a new coalition against France, and at the same time to follow the army and to take a leading part in its operations. This latter could not well be refused him, as the English not only paid the troops, but when it was necessary, furnished arms, ammunition, and provisions. Sir Charles Stewart (brother of the minister, Castlereagh) had been sent to the continent to negotiate with Prussia in the same manner as Lord Cathcart did with Russia; but as he was in the army, he also took part in the operations of the war, and was especially charged to watch the proceedings of the Crown Prince of Sweden, who was not quite trusted, and to whom Thornton was accredited as *chargé d'affaires*. Sir Charles Stewart concluded a treaty with the King of Prussia on the 14th of June, and Lord Cathcart one with the Emperor Alexander on the 15th, at Reichenbach, with the contents of which Count Stadion, who was present, was acquainted, and which he approved; so that these

treaties may be regarded as the commencement of the last coalition against France. The two treaties of Reichenbach are very nearly of the same import. Prussia engaged to furnish 80,000 more men for the active carrying on of the war, and England to pay 666,666*l.* by monthly instalments. England engaged that Prussia should obtain the whole of the territory it had possessed previous to 1806, and Prussia undertook to engage that the Elector of Hanover, and the son of the Duke of Brunswick, who had been mortally wounded at the battle of Jena, should be replaced in their possessions. Prussia also promised, at the same time, to the Elector of Hanover, an increase of territory with 100,000 inhabitants.

Russia promised a force of 160,000 men, and England was to pay for them 1,133,134*l.* by monthly instalments. Prussia, England, and Russia further guaranteed, in common, five millions sterling of paper money to make up for the temporary want of cash. A separate treaty was concluded between Russia and England in the month of July at Peterswalde, by which England promised to furnish pay for the 10,000 German troops which the Emperor Alexander had formed, from the prisoners, the deserters from the states on the Rhine, and the German patriots who flocked to his camp from all quarters.

Even in this treaty we find proofs enough that Austria had long had a secret understanding with the two powers. The treaty contains an article, regarding which, for the sake of appearances, the ratification of the Emperor Francis is made necessary, which provided that Austria should recover all her lost territories, and that the Pope should be restored to his temporal authority. Besides this, in case the Emperor Francis should agree to ratify the treaty, the sum is specified which England was to pay, as soon as the Austrian armies should join those of the allies. This article is neither to be found in Schöll ("Pièces Officielles," vol. iii., p. 11), nor in Martens (vol. v., p. 569), because Metternich was playing a double game, and wished to keep the affair secret for the time: for the same reason he caused the emperor to delay his ratification; but it became public after some time. Austria intended during the congress, which it had proposed, and which was to be held in Prague, to preserve for some time longer the mask of neutrality and impartiality, though it was well known that the plan of the campaign had been drawn up and arranged with Austria, and in presence of Austrian plenipotentiaries. The proposal of the Austrian minister was, that the negotiations in Prague should be carried on, not verbally, but by notes, which were to be given by the French minister to the Austrian, and by him to the allies, and *vice versâ*. If the French were not honest and straightforward in the matter, as we well believe, Metternich was still less so. Before he himself finally visited Napoleon at Dresden on the 27th of June, he had had two secret meetings with the Emperor of Russia, in which exactly the contrary of that was arranged, which he afterwards at-



tempted to make even Napoleon believe, that the Emperor Francis was rather inclined to Napoleon's side, in consequence of his connexion with him, than to that of the allies.

Napoleon had too many friends and spies at the different courts, and paid those who told him secret intelligence too well, not to be informed of Metternich and Stadion's intrigues, and of the article which the latter had approved of in the treaty concluded between the Russians and the English: and hence we must explain the imprudent and even rude terms which the Emperor, only too easily excited as he was, made use of in his interview with Metternich, when he visited him at Dresden.

Metternich arrived in Dresden in person on the 27th of June, nominally to convey a letter from his emperor to Napoleon, but really to make the necessary preliminary arrangements for announcing the changed position of Austria in respect to France; and this was rendered much easier for him by the Emperor's hastiness. Napoleon, who knew that Stadion had already concluded a conditional treaty with the allies, saw that the Austrians wished to deceive him; he was, and justly, vexed at it, and became violent; and in this way we must explain his violence and rudeness to Metternich when they met in Dresden. When the Austrian minister appeared in Dresden, Napoleon was so imprudent as to undertake himself the conduct of the conversation with him respecting the letter which he had brought, instead of leaving this task, as he ought to have done, to the very coolest of his diplomatists; and he conducted the conversation in his rudely and violently open manner. When it was already too late he sent for Fouché, with whom he had been reconciled before his departure for the government of Illyria, to send him to Prague. This embassy was only of use in reference to Murat's cabals, as carried on by Prince Cariati.

Metternich is said to have left an account of this conversation in his unpublished Memoirs; but Bignon, who heard the passage read, says nothing more of it, than that it was written quite in Metternich's style, and showed the affair to great advantage to him. We have, however, an account of it by an eye and ear witness, which bears upon the face of it the stamp of truth for any one who is at all acquainted with Napoleon's style and manner. The private secretary of the French Emperor, Baron Fain, was within earshot during the whole interview, carried on at one time nearer his position, in the room next the garden, at another further off, in the Emperor's study, and in the course of which the Emperor in his violence frequently spoke very loud. The negotiations on the 27th, which were carried on in all diplomatic form between Metternich and Maret, related to the congress to be held in Prague, and particularly to the manner in which the offers of the French Emperor to the allies were to be conveyed in writing by the hands of the Austrian minister, and all verbal communications between the parties avoided; but upon the 28th, Napoleon himself undertook to remonstrate with Metternich concerning the alliance. The whole conversation is to be found in



Fain's book, which he calls the "Manuscript of 1813." We have to do with very little of it here, but we will give some passages in the note from the original, because the military *sans-culottes* style of the Emperor is easily recognised in them. The same remark applies here as to the "Memorabilia" at St. Helena; the facts may be entirely false, or at any rate much distorted; the tone of the Emperor is not to be mistaken. The conversation begins with a kind of apostrophe of the Emperor's to Metternich,\* and a hint that he very well knew what Stadion had been doing in the camp of the allies, and what treaties had been concluded at Reichenbach.

"I know," says the Emperor, "that Austria has collected an army. I know that Schwarzenberg is to take the command of it." Then he gesticulated wildly, goes to a point from which he can obtain a view of the Bohemian mountains, points to them with his finger, and exclaims, "There stands your army! But," he continues, "you wish to see first, whether you cannot cheat me, without being obliged to fight." We give the words themselves in the note, that our readers may see that this is their meaning, although the word itself is not used.† Metternich might have quickly answered, that he wished to take the same advantage of circumstances that the Emperor himself had done in 1812; but the minister avoided the question, made use of several fine phrases, and slowly and sneakingly hinted at one supposition after the other as to the proposals about to be made to the Emperor at Prague. This sort of conduct made the Emperor so angry that he rushed out of the cabinet, shouting and stamping, lost his senses altogether, and insulted Metternich personally in the grossest manner.‡ We give the words in the note, and merely add as some excuse, that even if Napoleon was not at that time cognisant of Metternich's two secret and *incognito* journeys to the Emperor of Russia, he certainly knew

\* "Quels ont été jusqu'ici les résultats de l'armistice? Je n'en connais point d'autres, que les deux traités de Reichenbach que l'Angleterre vient d'obtenir de la Prusse et de la Russie. On parle aussi d'un traité avec une troisième puissance; mais vous aviez M. de Stadion sur les lieux, Metternich, et vous devez être mieux informé que moi à cet égard. Convenez en, depuis que l'Autriche a pris le titre de médiateur, elle n'est plus de mon côté."

† "Je vous ai deviné, Metternich, votre cabinet veut profiter de mes embarras et les augmenter autant que possible, pour recouvrer tout ou partie de ce qu'il a perdu. La grande question pour vous est de savoir, si vous pouvez me rançonner sans combattre, ou s'il faudra vous jeter décidément au rang de mes ennemis; vous ne savez pas encore bien lequel des deux partis doit vous offrir le plus d'avantages, et peut-être ne venez ici que pour mieux vous en éclairer. Eh bien! voyons, traitons; j'y consens. Que voulez-vous?"

‡ "... "Et c'est mon beau-père, qui accueille un tel projet! C'est lui qui vous envoie! Dans quelle attitude veut-il, donc, me placer en présence du peuple Français? Il s'abuse étrangement s'il croit qu'un trône mutilé puisse être en France un refuge pour sa fille et son petit-fils. . . Ah! Metternich! combien l'Angleterre vous a-t-elle donné pour jouer ce rôle contre moi?" Fain, who was observing this scene, here adds: "A ces mots, qu'il n'est plus possible de retenir, M. de Metternich a changé de couleur; un profond silence succède, et l'on continue de marcher à grands pas. Le chapeau de l'Empereur est tombé à terre; on passe et repasse plusieurs fois devant. Dans toute autre situation M. de Metternich se serait empressé de le relever. . . L'Empereur le ramasse lui-même. De part et d'autre on est quelque temps à se remettre."

of Stadion's proceedings with Sir Charles Stewart in the camp of the allies. Napoleon, however, immediately repented, having forgotten himself in so inexcusable a manner towards the representative of his father-in-law, having laid himself so open, and having mortally offended this Jesuitical courtier. Metternich, on the other hand, entirely succeeded in his object.

On the very same day, the 27th of June, on which Metternich made his appearance with his hypocritical proposals in Dresden, and Austria offered to conduct the negotiations for peace apparently as a mediator, but in reality as an arbitrary judge, a formal treaty was concluded at Reichenbach respecting the conditions which were to be proposed to France at Prague. By this treaty Austria engaged to declare war against France, in case these conditions should not be accepted. This treaty, signed by Count Stadion, the Chancellor von Hardenberg, and the Russian minister Nesselrode, was for a long time kept absolutely secret. It was only known to us previously by two references, found in a note of Metternich's of the year 1815; but Horace had already said, that gold corrupts the satellites of tyrants, and can even open the doors of a tower where a Danaë is confined. Napoleon had the treaty in his possession, and Bignon has given it word for word in his history of the negotiations of Napoleon. This treaty contains twelve articles, and in the very first Austria engages to declare war in case the conditions contained in it should not be accepted by France. The treaty itself our readers will find in Bignon; from what we shall give of it, however, it will be perfectly clear that the congress of Prague was something more than a mere diplomatic farce. According to this treaty, the Duchy of Warsaw shall cease to exist; the French shall evacuate the towns which they had garrisoned, and Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, and the other towns in the thirty-second military division, shall receive their old constitution again. In the verbal negotiation, Metternich had also mentioned Holland, Spain, Switzerland, the provinces of the Confederation of the Rhine, &c. The 5th article provided that all *three* powers should take the field with their *whole* force, and should keep this force always complete as to number. All *three* powers further engage not to make any peace without the consent of all; nay, not even to listen to any proposal which is not made to all three together. In the 11th article the three powers promise to observe the greatest secrecy as to the treaty for all future time (*à jamais*), and not even to communicate it to their allies without the consent of Austria.

The whole affair, therefore, was lying and deceit: neither Metternich nor Napoleon was straightforward or open, but both followed the same system of diplomacy. They both knew beforehand that the congress of Prague could produce no result, and yet acted as if they were quite serious in regard to it. Napoleon for the present accepted Austria's offer, promised to send a plenipotentiary to Prague, and agreed to extend the duration of the armistice to the 10th of August.



We give in the note the treaty, signed by Metternich before his departure from Dresden on the 30th, respecting the congress of Prague;\* the treaty was to be kept a secret. The French Emperor, however, hesitated a considerable time before proving by any action that he was in earnest. He certainly sent his minister at the court of Vienna, Count Narbonne, back to Prague; but his powers were not to have any force till Caulaincourt should arrive at Prague. This latter could not leave without again seeing the Emperor, who had in the mean time undertaken a journey to Mayence. When finally the interchange of notes, for it was nothing more, was about to begin, the Emperor very properly objected to the individual appointed to carry on the negotiation on the part of Russia, the Baron von Anstetten, an Alsatian—a man notorious for his passion for the pleasures of the table, and who had been employed by the Russian government in Poland in 1805, and elsewhere, wherever there was occasion for cunning without any admixture of conscience. He objected that this individual was an *émigré*, a rebellious French subject, and that his appointment was an insult; the Russians, on the other hand, made difficulties as to the extension of the armistice till the 10th of August, which Metternich had agreed upon. These difficulties were not got over till the 26th of July; so that there only remained fourteen days for the negotiations and for the conclusion of the treaty. Even this short period was much abridged, inasmuch as Napoleon, who was evidently only desirous of gaining time, as the allies this time perceived, chose not to return from Mayence till the 4th of August. He then endeavoured to reach Metternich in another way, for Fouché, whom he had despatched to Prague, was ordered to throw out hints, as if Maria Louisa, whom Napoleon had left at Paris as regent, might be entrusted with a kind of provisional government. No one believed in the possibility of a reconciliation; particularly since the announcement that after the stroke of twelve, in the night between the 10th and 11th of August, no further French notes could be received. Just about this time the Russian emperor caused General Moreau, whom he had induced by means of the Crown Prince of Sweden to return from North America, to come to his head-quarters. From the very commencement the renewal of hostilities was so confidently reckoned on, that even in July treaties were concluded concerning the carrying on of the war; and the English, Russians, Prussians, Swedes, and Austrians had agreed upon a plan of the forthcoming

\* This is as follows: "1. S. M. l'Empereur d'Autriche offre sa médiation pour la paix générale ou continentale. 2. S. M. l'Empereur des Français accepte cette médiation. 3. Les plénipotentiaires Français, Russiens et Prussiens se réuniront avant le 5 Juillet dans la ville de Prague. 4. Vu l'insuffisance des temps qui reste à courir jusqu'au 20 Juillet, terme fixé pour l'expiration de l'armistice par la convention signée à Pleiswitz le 4 Juin, S. M. l'Empereur des Français s'engage à ne pas dénoncer le dit armistice avant le 10 Août, et S. M. l'Empereur d'Autriche se réserve de faire agréer le même engagement à la Russie et à la Prusse. 5. La présente convention ne sera pas rendue publique."



campaign. The Russian general had even firmly refused to allow the six days' grace, which had been agreed upon after the termination of the armistice on the 20th of July, to hold on the extension of this period till the 10th of August.

The allies had held a council of war at Trachenberg on the 9th of July, and the result of this council was a treaty drawn up and signed there on the 12th, according to which Prince Schwarzenberg was named commander-in-chief by the Emperor of Russia; not because he was the best general, but because he was the most accomplished courtier. Russians, Prussians, and Austrians had different views and various little jealousies: the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia were with the army, and the latter, urged on by the Russian nobles, took a considerable share in all that went on; only a diplomatist like Schwarzenberg, therefore, conciliating and without any very considerable military talents, would be able to keep matters straight. This, however, did not last long. In the treaty concluded at Goldberg, the detailed plan of the campaign was laid down, as we have already remarked, and the possibility of an extension of the armistice was not even alluded to. This treaty provided that even before the conclusion of the armistice an army of 98,000 men should join the Austrian force by the shortest road by Landshut and Glatz to Jung-Bunzlau and Bodin, and in this way a united army of from 200 to 220,000 men should be formed. This army was to advance upon the Elbe either through Saxony or through Silesia. The Crown Prince of Sweden was to cross the Elbe with 50,000 men and besiege Leipzig; Blücher, with 15,000 men, was to advance upon Dresden from Silesia. All general engagements were to be avoided, unless there could be no doubt of a successful result. The reserve, which was still in Silesia under Benningsen, was either to attack the enemy in Silesia, or at any rate prevent them from penetrating into Poland. We see clearly on this occasion how entirely careless the higher nobility of Germany were of all duties to their country when placed in opposition to offices, honours, advantages, or court favour; and how entirely and thoroughly many noble generals, doing homage to the enemies of their nation, in the service of the Confederation of the Rhine, and not even compelled, or for the sake of their princes, but with a zeal, to which we do not venture to attach the proper epithet, allowed themselves to be used for honourable and dishonourable purposes by the Emperor of the French. Lieutenant-General von Gersdorf, for instance, at this period so critical for the liberation of Germany, was not only directing the egotistical policy of his old master, the King of Saxony, but also Napoleon's system of espionage against the allies. He it was also, as Major von Odeleben informs us, mentioning it to do honour to his countryman, and to praise his merits as regarded the French cause and the private interests of Saxony, who, by his secret channels, conveyed to the Emperor of the French copies of the plan of the campaign of the allies, written

down and agreed upon for the liberation of Germany at Trachenberg and Goldberg. Odeleben boasts of his having done more in the way of *espionage* than the regular professors of this art of the schools of Fouché, Savary, and Davoust were able to accomplish.\*

In regard to the negotiations at Prague, we feel justified in being very concise, as we have already clearly shown that neither party was in earnest, and, in fact, could not have been, from the very fact that the time definitely fixed on, from the 26th of July to the 10th of August, was evidently much too short. Not till the 26th of July was the treaty concluded, lengthening the armistice till the 10th of August, and then only on the express condition that hostilities should be resumed on the 16th, in case some definite agreement were not made before twelve o'clock on the night of the 10th of August. However eagerly the French writers, and particularly Bignon, have defended the Emperor in reference to the Congress of Prague, it is not to be denied, that till the last moment he was quite as little in earnest as the allies. Caulaincourt did not receive his instructions till the 26th of July, and even then protests in a letter, which M. de Caraman transmitted to the Emperor, against the directions given him. Caulaincourt's propositions were submitted to the allies by Metternich in a note of the 29th, and they at once refused to entertain them. On the 5th of August Caulaincourt received new instructions, and was authorised to offer the Austrians on the 6th special advantages, and to demand a last definite answer from Metternich. To obtain this answer Metternich set off for Vienna on the 7th, and on the 8th, without communicating with the allies, handed in an answer containing his ultimatum, which Caulaincourt urgently entreated his Emperor to accept unconditionally, in order even at the last moment to prevent the Austrians from fulfilling the promises they had made to the allies.† Caulaincourt wished the

\* "[Napoleon's Campaign in Saxony, 1813," third ed., p. 88: "There has seldom been a general supplied with such a perfect système d'espionnage as Gersdorf. Men like himself, equally active in the cause of their king and country, (???) were not ashamed to enter under different disguises the ranks of the hostile armies, and to convey to distant points the most exact and correct information by means of swift and faithful messengers. Thus, for example, a copy of the very important convention at Trachenberg, which contained the new plan of operations, was in his hands a few days afterwards, and, in fact, before the Emperor Francis received it at Gitschin: he had, however," adds the author, laying great stress, after the manner of Saxons, on money, "paid 250 Napoleons-d'or for it. For this reason not a day passed in which he was not several times sent for by the Emperor, who was satisfied when he called out, '*Faites chercher Gersdorf*,' of receiving the most accurate information."

† Caulaincourt writes to Napoleon on the 8th in the following terms: "Sans doute V. M. verra dans cet ultimatum quelques sacrifices d'amour propre, mais la France n'en fera de réel. On n'en demande donc pas à votre véritable gloire. De grâce, sire, mettez dans la balance de la paix toutes les chances de la guerre. Voyez l'irritation des esprits, l'état de l'Allemagne dès que l'Autriche se déclarera, la lassitude de la France, son noble dévouement, ses sacrifices après les désastres de Russie. Ecoutez tous les vœux qu'on fait dans cette France pour la paix ceux de vos fidèles serviteurs, qui, comme moi, doivent vous dire qu'il faut calmer cette fièvre Européenne, dénouer cette coalition par la paix, et quels que soient vos projets attendre de l'avenir ce que les plus grands succès ne vous donneraient pas



Emperor to despatch the Duc de Bassano to Prague at once, with full powers to conclude the treaty; but instead of this, Napoleon sent back on the 10th a very vague and general answer. This is easily explained when we know that Napoleon wrote to the Prince of Eckmühl at Hamburg on the 9th, that the negotiations for the peace would end in nothing.\* At last M. de Maussion was sent to Prague, but did not arrive till the morning of the 11th, whereas the Prussian and Russian plenipotentiaries had declared their full powers to be at an end on the 10th, at midnight, and just after the Austrian declaration of war had been put into the hands of Count Narbonne. This manifesto was composed at Metternich's order by his Berlin workmen, and Genz's style and manner is not to be mistaken; for which reason also, the reader frequently looks very suspiciously upon even the truths contained in it.

Who, in fact, would be inclined to believe any assertions without having had some opportunity of testing their truth, when he hears that Metternich excuses his refusal to listen to Napoleon's proposals by an absolute falsehood, disproved by the clearest documentary evidence, all now in print, namely, that in consequence of the delay in answering his note, he had concluded a treaty with Russia and Prussia *the day before*? We know that this had been done six weeks before at Reichenbach, and that at Trachenberg, Prince Schwarzenberg, however unfit he may have been for a duty requiring so much talent, had been appointed commander-in-chief of the army, to be formed of the contingents of the allied powers in Bohemia.

### 3.—HISTORY OF THE WAR FROM AUGUST 16 TO THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER.

Napoleon had not been brought to his senses by the Russian campaign, or he would certainly have been convinced by Caulaincourt's second letter (we have quoted from his first above) that the moment was arrived for him to make good his retreat even at some sacrifice. He laughed at and jested about Bernadotte's talents, when the latter made his appearance in Northern Germany at the head of a mixed army; he pretended to be indifferent when Moreau hastened to the head-quarters of the Emperor of Russia; he failed, as Louis Philippe and Metternich have done still more lately, to unite the separate, and as such insignificant, threatening appearances into a single warning representation. We refer now to the renewed agitation on the part of the legitimists in France, and the proceedings of the

aujourd'hui. Après tant de tems perdue les heures sont maintenant comptées. Trop de passions veulent la guerre, pour que la modération accorde le moindre délai à la paix."

\* The Emperor writes to him, in reference to his march on Berlin, on the 9th: "C'est aujourd'hui le 9, le congrès de Prague va fort mal; probablement l'armistice sera dénoncé le 11 par les alliés, et la déclaration de guerre de l'Autriche vous sera signifiée; prenez cela pour votre gouverne."



princes and the presumptive heir; the ridiculous proceedings of his brother-in-law, Murat, to secure himself possession of the kingdom of Naples by means of the English and the Austrians; the discontent of his own adherents in France; and Talleyrand and Fouché's intrigues.

Napoleon was disposed just at this time to overlook the treacherous negotiations of the King of Naples, which he was still carrying on with Austria by means of his minister, even at the time when he took his place at the head of the French cavalry, because he considered him the only one of his generals capable of commanding large bodies of cavalry well. The Emperor had at last raised a body of cavalry, 40,000 strong, and had also so considerably increased the number of his cannon, that, according to the special reports, 1300 pieces of artillery were employed partly in the fortresses between Dresden and Hamburg, and partly in the field. The war, after the 16th of August, was carried on in three districts at once: in the Mark (Brandenburg), Silesia, and the Bohemian mountains. In the Mark, the Crown Prince of Sweden commanded the allied army, composed of Swedes, Russians, and Prussians; and General von Bülow, who was intended to defend Berlin, was under his orders. Against this army Napoleon despatched Oudinot's (Duc de Reggio) corps, which had been previously driven back at Lüchnau. Napoleon was so certain of victory this time, that Caraman, who brought the marshal his orders for the attack, was desired to remain with him until he should be in Berlin. The corps of General Bertrand, that of General Regnier, and the cavalry of the Duke of Padua (Arrighi), were united with Oudinot's corps, and formed an army of 80,000 men, with which he marched from Dahme and Lüchnau. The Prince of Eckmühl had taken up a position at Bergedorf, near Hamburg, and was directed, assisted by the Danes, to march to Wismar and Rostock to assist Oudinot. General Lemarrois, at that time Governor of Magdeburg, was ordered to dispatch 6000 men to assist in bringing about the junction between Oudinot and Eckmühl. In Bohemia, Prince Schwarzenberg commanded the allied army, consisting of Austrians and Russians, with Kleist's corps of Prussian troops. This army was reported to amount to 240,000 men; and Napoleon had intended to march against it himself, but was suddenly called away by the Prussians, under Blücher and Gneisenau, with whom were also three divisions of Russian troops, and compelled to postpone his campaign. These troops occupied Silesia, and were opposed to the French army under Ney, Lauriston, Macdonald, and Marmont. Barclay de Tolly was commander-in-chief of all the troops to the east of that neutral district, which, according to the agreement, had been left unoccupied between the French and the allied armies. The French were encamped at Löwenberg, Liegnitz, and Goldberg, and between them and the Prussians was an unoccupied district of two days' march in breadth; the French cavalry was commanded by Latour,

Maubourg, and Valmy. On the 13th the French gave Blücher a pretext for entering this neutral ground two days before the termination of the armistice. It appeared that they had levied contributions within that district, and Blücher therefore occupied Breslau as a compensation for this. After occupying Breslau, Blücher drove back the French from Goldberg and Liegnitz on the 17th, and continued to advance irresistibly. Napoleon had reckoned upon this, and had expected that Blücher's eagerness and that of his Prussians would bring about a general engagement. It was in reference to this general engagement, before he should leave that part of the country for Bohemia, that Napoleon had undertaken the observations and fatiguing journeys during the armistice, of which Odeleben gives us an account, although the Emperor, when he left Dresden on the 15th with his guards, and marched in the direction of Pirna, evidently wished the allies to believe that he was about to anticipate the attack, with which Prince Schwarzenberg and his 240,000 men threatened him from Bohemia.

Blücher had driven back the French beyond the Bober, when Napoleon hastened back with his guards from the borders of Bohemia to Dresden, only leaving behind him in the mountains the Marshal St. Cyr (whom Vandamme was at the time marching through Dresden to join) to stop Schwarzenberg's march, in case he should advance upon Dresden. As soon as Napoleon had arrived in Löwenberg, the French recrossed the Bober on the 21st, and hoped that Blücher would accept the battle which they offered; they were, however, disappointed, as it had already been determined, that a battle was always to be avoided, except when a victory was inevitable. On this occasion Napoleon had the additional mortification of learning that Jomini, the chief of Ney's staff, had gone over to the enemy. He was accused of having played the traitor long previously in Paris, and of having been in communication with Czernitcheff; he denies these accusations, however, in his written remains, but complains of neglect and unjust treatment on the part of the Emperor. The Prussian armies under Blücher and York, and the Russian, under Sacken and Langeron, retreated with a loss of some thousand men to beyond Jauer, and the Emperor's principal object, that of inducing them to risk a battle, failed. Napoleon had also miscalculated, when he hoped to be able to beat Blücher before Schwarzenberg had reached Dresden; for he was obliged to leave to Macdonald the further pursuit of the Prussians, and to hasten with his guards to Dresden. Latour Maubourg and Marmont were also ordered to Dresden.

An error or a misunderstanding happened on this occasion very favourable to the Prussians. The Emperor had sent for Ney, and he had understood that he was to bring his corps with him, whereas the order had been intended merely for himself. When he found out his mistake, the corps was obliged to return, but was so fatigued

by the marching and counter-marching, that it was unable to do such good service as it otherwise would have done.\* We may notice here, however, the extraordinary exertions which Napoleon's soldiers were able to endure, and the effect produced by the rhodomontades and bombastic phrases of the bulletins, which we are accustomed to laugh at, as exemplified upon this occasion among others. The troops which had fought at Löwenberg on the 23rd, fought at Dresden on the 26th, after having, though previously exhausted by fighting and marching, performed in the interval a journey of nineteen German, or 90 English miles.

On the Emperor's return to Dresden, Blücher had encamped between Liegnitz, Jauer, and Goldberg; and he resolved to attack the French on the very same day, the 26th, that Macdonald set out to make an attack on him. The armies met, therefore, quite unexpectedly on the Katzbach. The Weiss, which is justly designated by the epithet "raging" and the Katzbach, were swollen by a continuance of rainy weather; the roads were impassable, and the mountain torrents too deep to be forded. In the valley of the Weiss first, and afterwards on the Katzbach, the battle raged man to man; but the Prussians in their enthusiasm were quite irresistible in a battle fought at the point of the bayonet. The terrible slaughter of the 26th, which is known by the name of the battle of Wahlstadt, from the abbey of Wahlstadt, where Blücher took his stand, was, properly speaking, not a regular engagement, but four separate skirmishes in four different places, all of which ended in favour of the Prussians. A more brilliant victory than that gained by Blücher on the Katzbach has seldom been won with so little loss to the victors. On the 27th, also, several prisoners and some pieces of cannon were taken on the Bober. A hundred and three cannons, 150 waggons, two eagles, and 18,000 prisoners were the result of the advantages obtained on the 26th and 27th. The French only casually refer to this victory of the Prussians, but Blücher followed it up actively, as he was accustomed to do, until he reached the Queiss, where he halted on the 1st of September.

Whilst Blücher was thus destroying Macdonald's army, Napoleon was proving his superiority in the art of war to Schwarzenberg, and the systematically slow Austrian generals who served under him. In addition to the really courageous and respectable Bianchi, who deserves to be excepted from the general censure, we find with this Bohemian army the Marquis Chasteller, not very favourably known by his conduct in the affairs of the Tyrol; a Count Colloredo, Giulay, and others, who very often held councils of war, but marched

\* Bignon gives in his note to vol. xii., p. 291, the following additional information, which Odeleben also gives: "Par un fâcheux malentendu Ney avait cru, que l'ordre de rejoindre l'Empereur était pour lui et pour son corps, et l'avait ramené en effet jusqu'à Bunzlau, d'où il fallut le renvoyer de suite sur le Katzbach. Ces deux marches forcées, qui avaient exténué les troupes, n'ont pas été sans influence sur les désastres de notre armée de Silésie."



very slowly. Schwarzenberg, like a courtier and diplomatist as he was, did not decide, but consulted the three monarchs and their several intimates, and contrived by his mediation and his cajolery to manage some decision, so that now one, and now another, should appear to be right. It is not astonishing, therefore, that matters went on with the Austrians in the old way, when opposed to a general who united in himself council, decision, and action, inasmuch as their generals were men of the old period.\* Jomini (iv., p. 374) has very well shown the way in which they caballed in the allied camp, instead of acting; and Danielewski asserts, that not only were circumstances not taken advantage of, so as to obtain a proper knowledge of the position of the enemy, but that there was not even a definite point of attack fixed upon.† Other proofs of the slowness of the Austrians, and of the incapacity of their generals, are very easy to be found. Thus, for example, Klenau's corps was stationed on the Bavarian frontier: this might have been sent for at the beginning of August, but was not summoned till the 22nd. The Austrians were, moreover, not bound to observe the six days allowed for declaring the termination of the armistice, as they had declared war on the 11th, and ought, therefore, to have been ready to march at least then, but they were not so till the 24th.

The hostilities in Bohemia commenced on the 21st, because the Russians and Prussians were less systematic than the Austrians. Wittgenstein and Kleist's armies advanced upon Saxony through the valley of Peterswalde, and the Austrians by Kommotau; and Gouvion St. Cyr, who had only 15,000 men with him, was obliged to give up Pirna. The allies appeared on the 26th before Dresden, the French having retreated partly into their fortified camp at Königstein, and partly into the fortifications erected by them round Dresden. Sir Charles Stewart, although he everywhere praises in a courtier-like style the allies, their generals, and the monarchs, is obliged to confess in his *Memoirs*, that the siege of Dresden, for which the allies were provided neither with fascines nor ladders, appeared to him rather more

\* All historians agree with Bignon, when he says (vol. xii., p. 291): "*Il est incontestable que la reserve, la temporisation, qui étaient dans le caractère du Prince de Schwarzenberg et qu'il appliquait à tout, contribuèrent puissamment à faire avorter l'expédition de Dresde, coup d'audace, qui réclamait plutôt un Camille qu'un Fabius.*"

† Danielewski says, (vol. i., 136): "The ignorance of the fact that Napoleon was in Silesia on the 23rd, must, in fact, appear very extraordinary, for we were at the time in a friendly country, where, according to all appearance, it must have been easy to obtain correct information as to the real position of the enemy." He adds a piece of information, which is very remarkable, as compared with the account given by Odeleben, of the manner in which Napoleon had passed the six weeks of the armistice, studying and reconnoitring, day after day, the country, the roads, passes, and productions of the districts between Dresden and Prague: "The corps of the principal army marched very slowly, for at the beginning of the war it was not considered advisable to expose any portion of the army to danger by overhastiness or rashness, and besides in this advance there was no definite and fixed point before them in the line of communication of the enemy, on which the army was to concentrate its attack."

than doubtful policy, as soon as he heard that Napoleon and Ney had hastened back to Dresden, and that Marmont and Latour Maubourg had also received orders to do the same. He perceived that the possession of Königstein rendered the passage of the Emperor Napoleon to the left bank of the Elbe very easy, so that he would be in a position to occupy the Bohemian mountain passes, and to act against the point on which all the movements of the allies turned; and that the attack upon Dresden, if it failed, would thus produce the most fatal consequences. Just at the time when the storming of Dresden commenced on the 26th, Napoleon entered the town with his guards, and then at intervals a force of 130,000 men. The storming should then have been given up, but, in spite of the resolution to that effect, the order already given was, from some neglect not countermanded, the storm was begun, and repulsed with a loss of some 5000 men, principally Austrians. It was remarked on this occasion that the union, energy, and foresight which showed themselves in the French army, and in that of the Prussians under Blücher and Gneisenau, were entirely wanting in the allied army.

After this failure the allies retreated to some distance from the town, and after having suffered considerable loss on the 27th from the field-pieces which Napoleon had distributed in a most masterly manner, were attacked by the Emperor with his whole force. He was so certain of victory in the battle which he was going to commence, that even before he arrived in Dresden he had sent General Vandamme with a division to Peterswalde, to prevent the retreat of the army and to annihilate it entirely in the mountain passes.

As Napoleon had foreseen, the allies were defeated, lost 18,000 prisoners, and Moreau was mortally wounded as he was conversing with the Emperor Alexander; and the Russians and Prussians believed that they had good grounds of complaint against the Austrians for their conduct in reference to the whole affair. They asserted that if they had been allowed to begin the storm on the 25th, when they advanced from Pirna and Dohna, Dresden would have been taken on the 26th; the Austrians, however, who were advancing from Dippoldiswald, were still behind, and the assault was not therefore made immediately before the arrival of the guards, but a halt was called, and a great council of war held on the heights of Racknitz. The allies were, notwithstanding, so little conquered, that the Russians and Prussians would have renewed the contest on the following day, but that the Austrians refused; and yet the French boast of having taken in the pursuit two hundred ammunition waggons, a thousand waggons, and many wounded and stragglers. On the 28th it was determined that the army should retreat beyond the Eger; it was fortunate, however, that the pursuit was not very active on the part of the French, inasmuch as the roads in the ravines and passes are indescribably bad, and it was

often impossible to get the baggage and cannon through. The Emperor Alexander acted the commander-in-chief now and then, and Danielewsky ascribes to him everything that came to a successful issue, while Schwarzenberg is made to bear the blame of every failure.

Whilst the Austrians under Schwarzenberg had failed disgracefully in their attack on Dresden, because it was found when they were about to commence that they had no pioneers to cut down the palisades, which had to be passed first, no fascines to fill up the ditches, no ladders to scale the walls, and no cannon to make a practicable breach, the Prussians, soldiers, militia, and inhabitants of Berlin, gained immortal fame by their defence of that city. Oudinot, Duke of Reggio, as we have above mentioned, had received orders to set out against Berlin, in conjunction with Bertrand, Regnier, and Arrighi, on the 15th of August; and instead of Vandamme, who had been ordered to another quarter, Girard, with 8600 men from Magdeburg, and Dombrowski, with 3000 men from Wittenberg, were to reinforce Oudinot's corps. The Prince of Eckmühl and the Danes, who were to march upon Mecklenburg to attack the Crown Prince of Sweden from the Lower Elbe, were observed by the Hanoverian corps of Count Walmoden, paid with English money, by General Gibbs, who had been landed with some English troops, by the Germans in English pay, commanded by General Lyon, and by the Hanseatic legion.

It was asserted that the army commanded by the Crown Prince of Sweden numbered 100,000 men; if this were really the case, we have increased grounds for wondering that he did so little on the 23rd and 25th, and left to Bülow the whole honour of the brilliant victory of Grossbeeren, and even showed so little eagerness in following up this advantage. Oudinot had manœuvred more slowly than usual, so that the crown prince had time to concentrate his army, which had previously been scattered upon the plains of Berlin, and to remove his head-quarters from Charlottenburg to Potsdam. Oudinot was advised, therefore, not to advance any further towards Berlin, as he was far out-numbered by the enemy; he advanced, notwithstanding, till within a very short distance of the city, and the result was an engagement on the 23rd. The seventh corps of the French, which included the Saxon contingent, and was commanded by Regnier, advanced against the villages of Kleinbeeren and Grossbeeren, which occupied the centre of the line, in order to break through the order of battle, and in these villages the most hardly contested struggle took place. Bülow at the head of the Prussian troops, and the militia, was unable to stop the French, and was obliged at first to evacuate Grossbeeren. In the afternoon, however, he received a reinforcement from the Swedes, and a new struggle began for the recovery of this point. The Prussians fought as on the Katzbach, with bayonets and the



butt-ends of their muskets, drove the enemy from the village, and forced the centre of the French to retreat. The defeat which the French suffered at Grossbeeren was all the bitterer for Napoleon, as coming from a portion of the Prussian troops whom he so entirely despised, that he had previously written to Oudinot *that he was to destroy the Prussian militia and all the rest of the rubbish*. The French lost twenty-six guns, 1500 prisoners, and a great deal of baggage; and Napoleon felt Oudinot's defeat all the more, because he had caused to be printed twice in his official paper, as may be seen in the *Moniteur* of August 30 and September 3, *that his troops must by this time be in Berlin*. General Girard, in the mean time, had left Magdeburg with 8000 men on the 21st, but fell in with the Russians under Czernitcheff. He halted, therefore, at Belzig, not far from Lüben, and caused his camp to be fortified. In this camp he was attacked on the 28th by the Prussians under General Hirschfeld, and after a very brave resistance and a dreadful slaughter on the part of the Prussians, his corps was almost annihilated, as Czernitcheff's Cossacks completed what the Prussians had begun; 3800 men and eight guns were taken. Oudinot was very much blamed, because instead of marching towards Torgau, so as to approach the main body of the French army, he went further from it by retreating towards Wittenberg. And as we have before mentioned, the Crown Prince of Sweden was blamed for not having sooner reinforced the Prussians at Grossbeeren, and not pursuing the enemy vigorously after their defeat.

As the French Emperor had boasted too soon of the capture of Berlin, and thus made himself ridiculous in the eyes of all Europe, so he injured himself very much in public opinion by inserting in the *Moniteur*, after a description, as usual, grossly exaggerated, of the victory at Dresden, that the army of the allies, defeated before Dresden, had been cut off in Bohemia. He thus represented as having really taken place what he supposed must have occurred. He was wrong, however, and perhaps this assertion was the cause of Vandamme's committing an error, which lost for Napoleon all the advantages gained at Dresden. These advantages are, however, exaggerated by Napoleon in a manner bordering on the fabulous, when he says that 40,000 men and forty guns were taken.

Vandamme had marched from Stolpen straight to Peterswalde, in order to occupy all the roads leading from Pirna to Prague, whilst Murat pursued the retreating armies of the allies on the road by Freiberg. The pursuit was not very vigorous, and the French Emperor was not exactly informed of the direction in which the enemy were retreating. He thought they were marching, without any fixed order, by Marienberg and Annaberg into the plains of Kommotau, in order to collect and re-arrange themselves there, whereas this was only the case with Klenau's division; the other generals had marched in the direction of Töplitz. Schwar-

zenberg and Barclay de Tolly marched by Altenberg and Zinnewald, Kleist and his Prussians by Maren and Glashütte. If a sudden indisposition had not compelled the French Emperor to return from Pirna to Dresden, he would probably have recalled the order, the obedience to which brought Vandamme down from the heights into the valley of Töplitz, or, at any rate, would have taken care that he should receive assistance at the proper time. The Emperor had intended to shut in the allies on two sides—on the one by Murat, on the other by Vandamme; he consequently despatched orders to Vandamme on the 28th, to penetrate from Peterswalde further into Bohemia. He thought himself so certain at the time of the correctness of his calculations, that he inserted a paragraph in the *Moniteur* of the 30th, to the effect that Vandamme was then on the upper heights of the mountain range, and was sending out expeditions into Bohemia, to obtain possession of the enemy's magazines.

From that moment the fate of the army depended entirely upon the question, whether Vandamme, starting from Peterswalde, would arrive at Töplitz before the allies, who had no force there capable of opposing him; and but for the boldness, military skill, and self-devotion of the Russian General Ostermann, this would certainly have been the case. General Ostermann, however, cut his way with 18,000 men of the Russian guard through a portion of Vandamme's army from Peterswalde to Töplitz, and threw himself in his way in the valley, in order to dispute with him every inch of ground. The contest was obstinate and bloody; Ostermann lost, on the 29th, 600 men, and was himself so dangerously wounded in the arm, that it had to be taken off; and Vandamme had advanced to within a couple of miles of Töplitz when Ostermann received reinforcements. The Emperor Alexander had, by the advice of Jomini, despatched at the critical moment a body of Austrians by Eichwald to Töplitz. This corps reinforced the Russians between Rosenthal and Serblitz, and a battle ensued near Culm. Vandamme ought to have retired quickly along the heights of Peterswalde, as soon as he met with resistance in the valley; he believed, however, in consequence of the order of the 28th, that the Emperor himself was following him from Pirna. He thought that the heights were occupied by the French, and ventured upon another battle on the 30th, against Ostermann's Russians and Austrians, whose number exceeded that of his force by the half. During this time a colonel, despatched by the Emperor Alexander, had forced his way through the pass, blocked up as it was by waggons and attendants; and as he could not arrive on horseback, had conveyed to General Kleist on foot the order not to march by Dux to Töplitz, according to previous orders, but by the pass of Geyersberg to Nollendorf. This pass, like all the rest, was completely blocked up with waggons, carts, cannon, and troops. Kleist proceeded therefore by a more difficult road through the wood of Schönwald and the valley of Telnitz to the heights of Nollendorf, at the foot of which Vandamme had taken up his posi-

tion, fully expecting that the Emperor had marched from Pirna to the heights of Peterswalde, or, at any rate, that St. Cyr covered his rear. Vandamme was so certain that the Emperor would come, that when at eleven o'clock in the morning he saw the Prussians appearing on the heights, he took them for French troops. He soon, however, found out his mistake. He was driven back from Culm, found the heights occupied, and was soon shut in on all sides.

Out of an army of 30,000 men, about a third part escaped in separate regiments, companies, and troops, partly by taking refuge in their despair in ravines and abysses, after having cut their way up to the heights, partly by retreating by cross roads and joining St. Cyr's division, which was stationed at Libenau. Ten thousand men were made prisoners, and among them Generals Vandamme, Haxo, Guyot, and seventy or eighty guns were captured. Danielowski and Bignon express great commiseration for Vandamme, because he was exposed to the popular vengeance of the Silesians, whom he had shamefully maltreated in 1807; we do not profess to entertain the same deep respect for rude and brutal courage and skill in the field, which the Russians and the French think it necessary to express, and cannot therefore feel great surprise that brutal and vulgar conduct should be avenged by the lower classes in their own way, especially as this happened without any command or desire on the part of the authorities. It does appear to us, however, rather remarkable, that the Russian only mentions Kleist's name as it were accidentally, inasmuch as the Russians owed it entirely to him and his Prussians, that Ostermann's heroic conduct and the victory of Culm produced the brilliant result they did.

After the defeat at Culm, it was expected that the Emperor would entirely change his position; this, however, did not happen till it was too late. Blücher, encamped along the Queiss and the Neiss, was threatening Bautzen, and only awaiting a favourable opportunity to march upon the Elbe; the Prince of Eckmühl had encamped behind the Stecknitz after Bülow's victory at Grossbeeren, and was obliged to confine himself to the defence of Hamburg, which he had strongly fortified; and a new expedition planned by Napoleon against Berlin failed more disgracefully even than the first. Napoleon transferred the command of Oudinot's corps, which had occupied a strong position at Wittenberg on the 3rd of September, to Marshal Ney, who had hardly arrived there with the reinforcements which he brought with him on the 4th, when he received orders on the 5th to march immediately against Berlin from Jüterbock, and upon the same day fell in with Tauenzien's division. Tauenzien was driven back, but Bülow came up on the 6th, and an engagement followed. This battle is named after the village of Dennewitz, because the battle was most fiercely contested at a bridge in this village over the brook Aa. The Crown Prince of Sweden was commander-in-chief, and Swedes and Russians took part in the battle; but the Prussians and their generals, Bülow, Tauenzien, and Borstel



earned by their exertions the credit of this brilliant victory over one of Napoleon's best generals. The French lost in the battle of Dennewitz, and in the few days after the battle, 15,000 men, eighty guns, and 400 waggons; the Prussians paid dear for their victory by a loss of 300 officers and 9000 subalterns and privates. After losing this battle, Ney advised the Emperor to give up altogether his position on the Elbe, and to take up another behind the Saale. Bignon, though generally an admirer and a panegyrist of Napoleon, is obliged to confess on this occasion that his hero was wrong to call the brave Prussians, who had slaughtered his freshly exercised conscripts by thousands on the Katzbach, at Grossbeeren, and at Dennewitz, a pack of wretched infantry.\* Bülow, Blücher, Kleist, and the other generals of Prussia, rose in popular estimation in proportion to the quickness with which they acted, and so much the more as Schwarzenberg and other generals of the nobility, and of Metternich's school of diplomacy, made themselves ridiculous by their frequent consultations and plans. Schwarzenberg first marched, as we have seen, against the ditches and fortified walls of Dresden without fascines or ladders or heavy artillery; and, on the other hand, he hesitated, listening first to the one and then to the other, and acting the courtier when he should himself have decided, and been commander-in-chief. Blücher was very much on his guard with the Crown Prince of Sweden, whom he never properly trusted; and Metternich's diplomatic speculations caused many mistakes in Schwarzenberg's army. Metternich secretly disapproved of the resolution and energy of the minister Von Stein and his addresses to the people, and considered the liberalism of Alexander and the promises of the King of Prussia as to bestowing new rights on the people, excessively dangerous; he interfered with, and hindered everything that was intended to take place openly and in accordance with the spirit of the time, and supported with all his influence the policy of the cabinet and the old diplomacy of courts.

Metternich's unfortunate influence in the war, which had been originally a war of the people, and which, so long as Stein and others of his opinions had an overpowering influence, had been carried on for the promotion of freedom, but which afterwards only benefited the despots and aristocrats, began first to be clearly apparent after the 9th of September. The plan which Prussia had adopted of proclamations, promising freedom and increased rights, and the Emperor Alexander of favouring men whose opinions agreed with the principles of the revolution, was avoided from this period; and instead of appealing to the people, the old diplomatic plan of negotiating with the princes was resumed. Metternich,

\* "Les instructions que Ney reçut (Bignon, vol. xii., p. 334) pour son expédition paraissent avoir été rédigées sous l'impression d'un injuste mépris pour les troupes Prussiennes, auxquelles Ney devait avoir principalement affaire en faisant sa pointe sur Barutz par la route de Jüterbock. Toute cette nuée de Cosaques, disait l'Empereur, *et ce tas de mauvaise infanterie de Landwehr*, se replieront de tous cotés sur Berlin quand votre marche sera décidée."

Pozzo di Borgo, Sir Charles Stewart, Lord Castlereagh, and the aristocrats of every class, even the representatives of the emigrated princes, again obtained influence; and the kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg were principally induced to fail in their allegiance to the French Emperor by a secret promise made by Austria, that they should be protected against the anger of the people, and should be enriched with property not their own.

In spite of all the arts of Austria, however, the King of Wirtemberg remained till the last moment firm in his alliance with the enemies of the nation, and only joined the cause of the people compulsorily, and with signs of the greatest dissatisfaction, when the troops had already revolted, and no other means of arranging matters was left. The Austrians apparently threatened the Bavarian frontier on the Inn, and Bavaria had an army there to oppose them under General Wrede; but negotiations had been already carried on for some time. Mongelas, indeed, acceded with great reluctance to this alliance with Austria. The King of Bavaria was informed of all the negotiations that were carried on in the Austrian cabinet, and he and the King of Wirtemberg had been Napoleon's most useful spies; but now everything was changed. The Bavarians were so excited, that the king felt his subjects would certainly revolt unless he gave up the alliance with France. He wrote to Napoleon therefore on the 2nd of September, that it would be impossible for him to resist the general feeling of the German nation, and the disinclination for the continuance of the war, which had extended even to his subjects, longer than till November; and that he wished therefore peace might be concluded before that time. When the King of Bavaria wrote thus, he knew that Austria had offered to declare the city of Prague neutral ground, in order that negotiations for peace might be carried on there, even during the war, on condition that Napoleon would previously promise: 1. That Illyria and the Tyrol should be restored to Austria; 2. That King Ferdinand VII. of Spain should be restored; 3. That Holland should be governed by a king named by Napoleon, but independent of him; 4. That the Princes of Germany should be declared independent. They required further that the Rhine should be considered the boundary of France, but permitted King Joachim to retain Naples, and that no change should be made in the relations between France and Italy. In reference to this new congress, to be held, so to speak, during the war, Austria had fixed upon the 3rd of September, as the time when the Emperor's decision must be received.

When therefore at this date, no French plenipotentiary had arrived in Prague, the Austrian cabinet had the long desired pretext for signing the treaty of Reichenbach, which had not yet been done, though hostilities had commenced. At the same time, by the treaty of Töplitz of the 9th of September, Austria united her cause inseparably with that of the allies. This treaty was, even in its external form, a production of the light-fearing diplomatic policy of

Metternich and his fellows. That portion of it which was made public was the least important part; the most important points were contained in the so-called secret treaty, which was besides a double one, inasmuch as a special treaty was concluded between Austria and Prussia, and another between Russia and Austria. In the public treaty the three powers guaranteed to each other the undiminished possession of their dominions, and promised if any one should be attacked to contribute 6000 men each towards its defence. The secret articles were the following: 1st. That the Austrian monarchy should be restored to the condition in which it was before the unfortunate campaign of 1805, and the Prussian monarchy to its condition prior to 1806; 2nd. The Confederation of the Rhine should be dissolved, and the German States, lying between the Prussian and Austrian dominions, should be declared independent; 3rd. The possessions of the House of Brunswick-Luneburg should be restored to that house; 4th. The future fate of the duchy (not Grand Duchy as it is written there) should be regulated by a congress of the three powers. Besides these special articles, the secret articles of the treaties of Trachenberg, Reichenbach, and Peterswalde were confirmed, and each of the three powers engaged to maintain at least 150,000 men in the field.

There was plenty of time for negotiation; for the principal army remained quiet in Bohemia till the beginning of October, when it was resolved to leave the mountains, after it had been decided to transfer the seat of war to the plain round Leipzig. Before they, however, really came out, the English had, by means of the treaty concluded between Lord Aberdeen and Metternich from the 3rd to the 8th of October, managed to take possession of the chief conduct of the war in a very skilful manner. England paid large sums of money, and required in return much power and exclusive trade; and the Tories, who were named commissioners in the several armies of the allies, to observe what was being done with England's money in the field, took upon themselves all the airs of sovereign princes; and they received from the princes plenty of flattery and so-called honours, as Bonaparte's creatures had formerly done. The Emperor of the French, until he left Dresden, continued to manifest the same qualities which had made him great, and shamed the whole military aristocracy of Europe which was united against him, by his personal activity, and by the superiority of his native and personal talents; but he was blamed for remaining much too long in Dresden in order to show these great military talents. The manner in which the Emperor manifested these talents, and in which he was in continual movement, and everywhere present, will be sufficiently clear to our readers from a short sketch of the attacks which he made till the middle of September, sometimes against Blücher, sometimes against the Austrians and Russians, without its being necessary for us to go more specially into his military operations, which lie somewhat beyond our province.



In the beginning of September he marched against Blücher, who was threatening Bautzen, was on the 3rd at Bischoffswerda, and on the 4th, seeking Blücher's army between Bautzen and Görlitz. Under a mistaken idea of Blücher's eagerness and desire for fighting, he offered him battle. Blücher, however, retired without accepting it over the Neiss and the Queiss, and the Emperor was obliged to hasten back from Görlitz to Dresden, because that city was threatened with an attack on the side of Bohemia. On his way he heard of Ney's defeat, but could not resolve to follow his advice and retire behind the Saale. When the Emperor arrived in Dresden, Wittgenstein had advanced as far as Pirna. Napoleon immediately hastens to meet him, and arrived on the 8th in Dohna, on the 9th in Liebstadt. Wittgenstein had in the mean time retired to Bohemia, the Emperor pursued him as far as the heights of Geyersberg, returning by the valley of Töplitz to Breitenau on the 11th. On the 12th he was again in Dresden. He was just on the point of proceeding again against Blücher, when he learnt that Wittgenstein had again occupied Peterswalde, and come down as far as Gieshübel. On the evening of the 15th again in Pirna, and on the 16th drove out the allies from Peterswalde to Töplitz. This time a battle was expected, but the Emperor turned suddenly, and was in Pirna again on the 18th, but did not arrive in Dresden till the 21st. He rested there a few hours, and then set out again after Blücher, who had advanced as far as Bautzen, but retired as soon as he heard of the Emperor's arrival. On the 22nd Napoleon transferred his head-quarters to the little castle of Hartau, near Bischoffswerda, pursued Blücher as far as the Spree, and then returned; and on the 24th was again in Dresden.

From this moment Napoleon perceived that it was no longer advisable to remain in Dresden, inasmuch as he was enclosed by enemies on all sides in a considerable circuit; and yet, at this very time, he caused works to be undertaken for the better fortification of that city. At this time, though in the midst of the war, Wrede and the Austrians on the Inn were merely looking at one another, and as soon as the treaty of Ried was concluded, they united and formed one army. Croatia and Dalmatia rose in revolt, and drove the French into the fortresses; Illyria revolted, and Fouché was obliged to fly to Rome; General Pino left the Italian army, and the discontented Italians refused to serve. The viceroy thought it only prudent not to expose himself to the danger of being betrayed; he gave up the Illyrian provinces entirely, and retired beyond the Isonzo.

The circle within which the French in Dresden were able to move was becoming continually narrower at the time when Bernadotte took up his position on the Elbe from Magdeburg to Torgau; for Blücher was extending his operations more and more towards the Elbe, and Bubna's corps was filling up the gap to the east, so as to unite Blücher's army with the principal force. Benningen, with

the corps of reserve which he had formed on the Polish frontier, was advancing upon Bohemia, so as to be enabled to share in the contest as soon as the principal army should advance. Even in the rear the French were threatened, couriers and despatches were seized, transports captured, and single troops or regiments fallen upon and cut off. After the Crown Prince of Sweden had encamped on the upper part of the Elbe, Dörenberg and Tettenborn poured out their light troops over the Hanoverian district, whilst Czernitcheff scoured the Harz district as far as Westphalia, and at last as far as Cassel. Thielemann, now a general in the Prussian service, collected recruits in the Saale district about Naumburg and Merseburg, and connected himself from thence with Mensdorf's irregular corps, which had been detached from the Bohemian army in the direction of Colditz and Altenburg. Thielemann and Mensdorf had a severe conflict to sustain with General Lefèvre Desnonettes, who had been despatched from Leipzig against them, until the 24th, when Platoff joined them with his Cossacks, and they completely annihilated Lefèvre Desnonette's force on the 28th at Penig. Tettenborn compelled the garrison of Bremen to capitulate. Dörenberg cut off the division of Pécheur in the district of Hamburg, and Czernitcheff compelled the King of Westphalia to retire to Wetzlar. At last the principal armies set themselves in motion.

In accordance with the plan agreed on, the principal army did not march this time on Dresden, but immediately from Bohemia to the plains round Leipzig, at the same time that Blücher, in conjunction with the Crown Prince of Sweden, crossed from the right to the left bank of the Elbe. The King of Naples had formerly been stationed on the right bank; but when Blücher approached that neighbourhood, he had lost several men in various cavalry skirmishes, and proceeded on the 26th and 27th of September, before Blücher began his remarkable march in the neighbourhood of Meissen to the left bank, and endeavoured to stop the corps of Klenau and Lichtenstein, which formed the advanced guard of Prince Schwarzenberg's army, advancing from Bohemia into the plain. Blücher's march from Kamenz to Wittenberg is praised even by the French. He did not allow himself to be stopped by Macdonald, avoided the French position at Dresden by the way of Königsbruck and Elsterswerda, at the same time that the Crown Prince of Sweden, on the 27th of September, was building bridges at Acken and Rosla, and crossing the Elbe. The crown prince marched to Dessau, and drove the advance guard of the Prince of Moskwa back over the Mulda. Blücher had, in the mean time, collected vessels in the Black Elster, and brought them from thence into the Elbe, and crossed on the 3rd of October at Wittenberg, after a well contested struggle with Bertrand's division, who were protected from the artillery by the dykes.

All the French historians speak of it as treachery when, even at this period, Saxon and Westphalian regiments and other German

soldiers singly left the ranks, in which the selfishness of their rulers had placed and wished to retain them, and call it fidelity and honourable conduct when the old bigoted King of Saxony followed even in his retreat from Dresden the man who was even then engaged in making Saxony a desert. We consider it best to place our readers in a condition to judge for themselves, by quoting a passage in the note, to show in what manner Napoleon treated Germany and Germans. We quote the passage the more willingly as coming from the mouth of an officer who honours Napoleon as an idol; who writes not as a German, but as a Saxon, and who especially honours the Saxon Savary, Herr von Gersdoof.\* It was certainly high time for Napoleon, accompanied by the King of Saxony, to leave Dresden on the 7th of October, to look for Blücher; inasmuch as just at this time the whole of Germany, except the Kings of Wirtemberg and Saxony, and the Grand Dukes of Hesse and Baden, was freeing itself from the yoke of the French. In order to give a comprehensive view of the condition of Germany at the beginning of October, we shall refer shortly, before proceeding to the decisive battle, to the circumstances attending the desertion of the various princes who were afraid of their people. We begin with Bavaria.

Wrede, with his Bavarians, and Prince Reuss, with the Austrian troops, remained for a long time observing one another on the Inn; for Wrede himself, but especially Mongelas, had long been in communication with Russia, and latterly with Austria, and had received all sorts of offers. The nature of this connexion, of which the King of Bavaria himself knew nothing, remained for some time a secret to Napoleon, because his ambassador at Munich, the Belgian Count Mercy d'Argenteau, belonged to the high Austrian aristocracy, among whom his family had occupied some years before a very prominent place. He therefore only kept up a connexion with the higher aristocracy, and was easily deceived. Wrede was himself very carefully observed as long as Augereau was occupied in organising the reserve of the French army in Franconia; but as soon as this latter was summoned to Saxony, the King of Bavaria was taken into confidence. He was shown that he would become an isolated sacrifice to his fidelity, and he wrote, as we have already mentioned, to Napoleon on the 3rd of September, that he should be unable to remain in his present relation to him longer than November, unless he were prepared to be deserted by his subjects. In the middle of September, Mercy d'Argenteau perceived that negotiations were being actively carried on; Wrede was

\* Odeleben, p. 198: "The inhuman orders which the Emperor at that time issued to the commanders of divisions, according to which all cattle were to be driven away, the woods burnt down, fruit-trees and all other sources of food destroyed, and by an obedience to which, that portion of Saxony situated on the right bank of the Elbe would have been reduced to the condition of a desert, inhabited by nomad tribes, were disregarded by the better sort of commanders. All sorts of property were, however, destroyed, and only the quick advance of the allies prevented the French, who, at that time (end of September), were only in possession of the district round Dresden, from completing the destruction of the eastern portion of Saxony."



a good deal with the Austrians, and Prince Reuss was in communication with the Bavarians, until at length Wrede arrived in Munich with the treaty. He received there the last orders, and on the 7th of October, at Ried, the treaty was concluded, by which Bavaria joined the alliance against France.

It had been agreed that immediately after the ratification of this treaty, which only bore the signatures of Wrede and Reuss, Wrede should march down the Main through Frankfort upon Mayence at the head of his Bavarian army, reinforced by 20,000 Austrians. This treaty, as is unfortunately too much the case in such matters, was only partly such that the contents might be openly avowed, and consisted partly of articles which it was considered necessary to keep secret. The eleven articles of the published portion are very general, and contain for the most part only military arrangements; the most important is the 6th, which provides "that the Bavarian and Austrian troops shall commence operations as soon as the present treaty is ratified." In the secret part of the treaty there is much also that is very general. It was especially provided, however, that for the present Bavaria should cede Tyrol, and should receive compensation for it afterwards. The most special provisions of all, however, were contained in articles which are found neither in Martens nor in Schöll. Austria promised, as compensation for the Tyrol and Salzburg, the best part of the possessions of the Grand Duke of Baden, viz., Mannheim and Heidelberg, without considering that the Emperor of Russia would never consent to this, if it were only on account of his wife. Austria further promised all the land belonging to the Grand Duchy of Frankfort, without considering that this included Hanau, which Prussia would certainly claim for the Elector of Hesse.

The defection of Bavaria was not, however, as French writers wish to make us believe, the cause, but rather a consequence, of the weakening of the French military power beyond the Rhine. How this weakening and final destruction happened, will be best understood from considering at one view various points which have been previously mentioned. Rumours were rife on all sides, even before the defection of Bavaria was generally known, of the desertion of bodies of German troops, and of defeats of French troops by irregular corps belonging to the allies, favoured as they were by the citizens and the peasants. Between the Elbe and the Weser the light cavalry of the allies rendered all proceedings very unsafe, and Thielemann, Wartensleben, Walmoden, Scheither, Mensdorf, Platoff, Fabeky, Marwitz, and Czernitcheff took more than 10,000 prisoners and forty-seven guns between the 11th and the 28th of September, by the superiority of their light troops. About the same period the German troops deserted in smaller bodies, as they saw very clearly that the French no longer trusted them, and even, as one of their officers plainly said to a Westphalian, exposed them on all occasions in the advanced guard, and in the rear to the bullets of the

enemy, in consequence of this distrust. Colonel von Hammerstein was the first, and he went over in Saxony on the 21st of August. This made some sensation, because his brother, General von Hammerstein, was one of the most important persons in Cassel, and was suspected of having had some share in his brother's desertion. That portion of the Westphalian troops which had served under the colonel were dismissed with disgrace, and General Hammerstein was sent to Ham. At a later period the Saxons went over; the Saxons who served under Regnier refused to serve against the Prussians at Dennewitz, and on being led against them separated entirely. The Wirtembergers deserted.

Czernitcheff, Thielemann, and Platoff, with their hussars and Cossacks, rendered the whole district along the Saale exceedingly unsafe for the French; they captured couriers, officers travelling alone, or with few attendants, and so on; carried off military chests, and prevented the transmission of despatches and correspondence. The Westphalian General Klösterlein was driven out of Brunswick by a small troop of Prussian militia, and fled with some hundred men to Wolfenbüttel; but his escort left him, and fled in all directions on the 25th, when they saw ten mounted militiamen at some distance. The inhabitants of the Elbe district were much embittered against the French, because they had burnt down the suburbs of Magdeburg, leaving the inhabitants without shelter, and had entirely ransacked the whole neighbouring country to victual the town. Czernitcheff heard at that time that there were no troops in Westphalia; he marched, therefore, with 3000 cavalry and 2000 infantry, by Eisleben and Rosla to Heiligenstadt, where some Westphalian cuirassiers under Bastineller were stationed; these he however did not immediately attack, but advanced suddenly by Sonderhausen and Mühlhausen to Cassel. Even Malchus, who in his MS. remarks on the history of the kingdom of Westphalia, which we have often quoted, constantly defends the government, confesses here, that the first report of Czernitcheff's approach was not received till the evening of the 27th of September, and that several other accounts followed in the course of the night. Whilst Allix defended Cassel, and Czernitcheff turned his attention first to Bastineller, courtiers, ministers, and generals retreated with the king from the city. Czernitcheff in the mean time completely routed Bastineller's force, and took possession of the city on the 30th. His proclamation of the dissolution of the kingdom of Westphalia was, however, somewhat premature; for this did not actually happen till some weeks later. Czernitcheff himself was obliged to quit the town some days after, and the Westphalian troops, with some French reinforcements, took possession of it, and the king returned. About this time, and shortly before Napoleon quitted Dresden, Benningsen with his reserve, among whom were Baskirs and Calmucks with bows and arrows, arrived on the Elbe. He crossed the Elbe on the 26th of September, with this so-called

Polish army at Leutmeritz, and joined Schwarzenberg; whilst Blücher, who had crossed the Elbe on the 3rd of October at Wartenburg, knowing that Cherbatoff at Bautzen, Bubna at Stolpen, and Schwarzenberg in Northern Bohemia were able to observe at a distance the French army in Dresden, encamped with 64,000 men and 322 guns on the Mulda, and joined the army of the Crown Prince of Sweden on the 8th of October. Napoleon hoped, when he left Dresden on the 9th, to surprise them both. He left Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr with 30,000 men in Dresden,\* for which he was afterwards blamed, although he left him a command to retire in case of need to Torgau and Magdeburg, and left directions with the officers of the artillery and of the sappers and miners as to the best mode of destroying the fortifications of Dresden, and burning all the waggons. Napoleon breakfasted on the 7th at Meissen, and arrived the following day by Oschatz at Wurzen; he failed, however, in his object of bringing Blücher to a battle on the 9th. Blücher had retired beyond the Saale, but had left the road to Berlin open. The Emperor appeared inclined at one time to take this road, and by uniting all the garrisons of the fortresses in Poland and on the Oder, to change the theatre of war entirely. He had even sent Ney, Bertrand, and Regnier forward over the Elbe. It appears to us, however, rather as if he wished to threaten Berlin than to attack it, inasmuch as this town had no manner of importance for him in a military point of view. He perceived, however, at this time, that his situation was a very critical one, and was puzzled to find some means of rescuing his honour as a military commander; and a proof of this we have in the description which Odeleben, his great admirer and then companion, gives of his residence in the little castle of Düben. The Emperor remained there from the 11th to the 13th, at a time when every moment was of importance,† without finding any other means of escape than that of staking the fate of his empire on a single card—a battle in the neighbourhood of Leipzig.

Schwarzenberg's army came down at length from the mountains to the plain; Wittgenstein, Kleist, and Klenau, were pressing

\* Fain, ii., p. 376, gives the position at the time in the following words: "Les Généraux Regnier et Bertrand qui n'attendaient plus que l'ordre de s'avancer sur Berlin sont rappelés. Pour arriver à Leipsic avant l'ennemi, il n'y a pas un moment à perdre; il faut laisser le Maréchal St. Cyr à Dresde, le Prince d'Eckmühl à Hambourg, le Général Lemarrois à Magdebourg, le Général Lapoype à Wittenberg, le Général Narbonne à Torgau.

† Odeleben, as a witness who had admission to the Emperor, tells us, at p. 204, "The three days which the Emperor spent before the morning of the 14th of October in the little half-isolated castle of Düben, were probably the most tedious that he had met with for several campaigns. There were no objects of a military or of a geographical character to divert his attention and to occupy him, and his attendants were at a loss what to do to amuse and engage his Majesty. I myself saw the Emperor waiting for despatches from the Elbe, sitting upon a sofa in his room beside a large table entirely unoccupied, abstractedly covering a clean sheet of paper with old-fashioned ornamental letters. His geographer d'Albe and another of his assistants were sitting equally unemployed in the corners of the room, awaiting his orders."



forward from the other side; and Murat in vain attempted to stop the two former. Wittgenstein advanced by Altenburg, Schwarzenberg by Borna, and drove back Murat's cavalry. On the morning of the 14th, Murat was compelled to alter his position at Gröbern and Gossa; on the afternoon of the same day he was again attacked at Wachau and Lieberwolkowitz. The allies only conquered in this skirmish between the Prussian, Russian, and French cavalry, in which Murat, according to his custom, both commanded and fought in person, because Klenau appeared upon the field during the contest. Wittgenstein would not allow the victory to be followed up, and even evacuated Wachau and Lieberwolkowitz, because Napoleon had given up all thoughts of anything else, and was hastening to rescue Leipzig. On the following day, the 15th, preparations were made on both sides for a pitched battle, which was fought during the three following days.

Although Napoleon had taken all possible precautions for securing correct reports of the proceedings of the allies, he never heard that Blücher was advancing, and that Benningsen was not far from the field of battle.

The first day of the great battle of the nations (the battle of Leipzig), the 16th, was on the whole favourable to the French, for at three o'clock in the afternoon the three allied monarchs, who were observing the battle from a rising ground, whilst Napoleon was stationed on an eminence opposite the Galgenberg, in the farm of Meisdorf, believed the battle to be lost. Latour Maubourg, at the head of the cavalry, had broken through the centre of the allies at Gossa, had taken from them their cannon and their position, which Rajewsky with the grenadiers in vain endeavoured to recover, until the Emperor Alexander despatched Count Orloff Denisoff with the Cossacks of the imperial guard to stop the course of the French, and these troops were fortunate enough to recover the position and the guns. The allies were, however, obliged to be contented with retaining their position, and were unable to pursue their advantages any further. On the other hand, Schwarzenberg, whom Napoleon was especially observing, committed a great error. He ordered from Connewitz General Meerfeld to cross the Pleisse at the ford of Delitsch, so as to separate one portion of the French line from the other; the Emperor had, however, a reserve of his old guard posted in that neighbourhood, and the Austrians were driven back, Meerfeld himself remaining a prisoner. Also at Lieberwolkowitz the allies were obliged to be satisfied with retaining their position. Blücher's arrival on the field of battle on the following day, however, brought about a decided result.

This would not have happened either, had Blücher not disobeyed the orders of the Crown Prince of Sweden, under whose command he certainly was at the time, and acted in accordance with his own ideas. He had some idea of what was about to happen on the 13th, and therefore refused to follow the crown prince to Köthen: on

the 14th he heard that Napoleon had commenced his march from Düben to Leipzig, and communicated this information immediately to the allied army and to the Prince of Sweden. He himself hastened to Leipzig in order to join the army of the allies there, having discovered that a battle was to be fought on the 16th. He had been able to inspire his troops with the same feeling of enthusiasm for the national honour of Germany which Napoleon encouraged among his troops in reference to the honour of France, and arrived on the evening of the 15th at Skeuditz, nine miles from Leipzig. The Crown Prince of Sweden also approached in the night of the 15th to within twenty-five miles of Leipzig. The Emperor had originally stationed Souham and Ney's corps on the Partha to the north of his army, in case Blücher and the crown prince should arrive; but not having heard anything of Blücher's approach, he recalled them both; and Marmont, with a division of Poles under Dombrowski, was left to meet Blücher's violent onset at Möckern. Marmont made a brave resistance, but the Prussians finally conquered, leaving between 5000 and 6000 men on the field of battle. They took, however, 40 guns, 2000 prisoners, and an eagle; the principal advantage of the victory was, that it served as a set-off to the repulse the Austrians had suffered through the carelessness of Schwarzenberg. On the 17th both armies rested; the allies were strengthened by the forces under the Crown Prince of Sweden, General Benningesen, and Count Colloredo, and the French army by the arrival of Regnier, under whom the Saxon contingent served, from Eulenburg, where he had remained on the 16th. On the 16th, however, Napoleon had determined to secure for himself a retreat from Leipzig by the Lindenau bridge, and to garrison some of the principal points in Thuringia, which he might require in case of his retreat towards the Rhine. General Bertrand was despatched through Leipzig and over the Lindenau bridge to secure the road to Lützen and Erfurt. The French would undoubtedly have been entirely destroyed had not Bertrand, after a well-contested struggle with Giulay, secured the Lindenau and the high road on the 16th. Napoleon also endeavoured, on the evening of the 16th, to open a special negotiation with the Emperor Francis, by means of General Meerfeld. He treated Meerfeld, whom he knew very well, with much distinction, and wished to make use of him as a mediator. He dismissed him upon parole, and gave him a letter with him, containing reasonable and peaceful proposals, and the assurance of his readiness to make considerable sacrifices to secure peace. This time, however, Francis did not allow himself to be deceived, for he not only refused to listen to Napoleon's proposals for an armistice, but the letter was not answered till three weeks later, when the monarchs were in Frankfort. Odeleben is wrong when he says that Meerfeld returned to Napoleon on the 17th.

That the Emperor Napoleon had determined to begin his retreat on the 18th appears to us clear, from the exact account which



Odeleben gives of the various measures adopted by him; it is clear, however, at the same time, that he hesitated as to whether he ought not rather to fight, as his measures were adapted for this course also. He had just completed a *chef d'œuvre* in the art of war—that is to say, he had changed his entire position within sight of the enemy, when he perceived the whole allied army at a distance of some three miles, near Wachau and Lieberwolkowitz, advancing to the attack. When he perceived that retreat without a battle was impossible, his right wing touched the Pleisse at Connewitz, his left the Partha at Schönfeld. What was most important for him was the maintenance of the position at Probstheida, which was confided to Victor and Lauriston, and where he himself took up his position near an old tobacco-mill. The advancing Prussians were to be met and kept back by Dombrowski, in the suburbs of Leipzig, between the Partha and the Elster.

At eight o'clock on the morning of the 18th (October) the decisive battle began, and it was an unfavourable omen for the French that, almost immediately afterwards, the Saxon cavalry, which served with Ney's corps, deserted to the Prussians. In the afternoon, after the appearance of the Crown Prince of Sweden on the field of battle, the rest of the Saxon contingent, under Rüssel and Brause, which Regnier commanded, left the French, and the Wirtembergers, under Normann, followed the example. It is worthy of remark, that the same French writers who loudly testify their approval of their own revolution, of all the revolts of the Poles, of the revolution of July, of the desertion of Louis XVIII., and of the 18th Brumaire; who, and with reason, prefer revolt to a fidelity which violates the rights of man and the common voice of nature, and who find nothing to blame in Napoleon's conduct during the Hundred Days, are yet quite inexhaustible in opprobrious epithets and declamatory phrases against those German nations which determined no longer to observe an oath of allegiance taken by their princes who were bought by the enemies of their country. The old king had exposed his Saxons to all the miseries of war, and could not well blame them for leaving him to his fate; and the three monarchs very properly refused to listen to him when, having been left behind by Napoleon in Leipzig, he wished to appeal to them. He was sent to Berlin under an escort, that is, a sort of honourable captivity, when the allies entered Leipzig.

The French were, however, in point of fact, not entirely beaten on the 18th; but they foresaw a total defeat on the next day, as they were entirely surrounded on every side except one, where the road passes over the Elster through Leipzig, and through the Lindenau to Erfurt. They maintained their position till evening, and kept up a continual fire until it was discovered that their ammunition was exhausted. A fresh supply could only be procured in Erfurt, where the magazines were. It was found necessary to retreat; and it was then discovered that Berthier had committed a fatal error. When



the Emperor perceived that besides the bridge over the Elster in Richter's garden, which was too slightly built to be of much service, and which actually broke down during the retreat, there was only a single solid bridge which could be used, he had ordered on the 17th several bridges to be built across the Elster and the Pleisse. The chief of the engineers of the 5th corps had offered his assistance in carrying out the order, but Berthier had refused it.

When the French left their position in order to retreat through Leipzig to Erfurt, the Prussians followed them closely, and the troops of Baden, which had the guard at the gates, went over and let the Prussians in. The press and the confusion of the French retreating under the enemy's fire, and pursued by the enemy's cavalry, is indescribable, as one bridge over the Elster broke down, and the one which led to Lindenau was not sufficient for all. The Emperor himself visited the King of Saxony before quitting Leipzig, but was obliged to leave hastily, in order to get into the stream of the fugitives, and to be carried along with them out of the city; the arrangements which he had made for covering the retreat failed completely. Regnier, Poniatowski, Lauriston, and Macdonald were directed to hold out until all had passed over the bridge to Lindenau; they were, however, overtaken, and the great bridge blown up, because the Prussians were pressing forward irresistibly, and it was deemed advisable to purchase the safety of the rest of the army by the sacrifice of the three corps which were still defending the suburb. Every one was afterwards amused at Napoleon's ascribing this accident to the carelessness of the miner who had blown up the bridge, long before prepared for the purpose, sooner than he ought to have done, as he did in his published bulletin of the battle. Macdonald saved himself by swimming; Poniatowski, who had received the marshal's baton in the course of the battle, was drowned, because he had overloaded his horse with money; two hundred guns and nearly the whole of the baggage remained behind. The crowding of the fugitives, the pursuit of the Prussians first, and afterwards of the Austrians from the other side, had changed the retreat into a disgraceful flight; the terrible fire of the pursuers, the crush and the trampling, not merely the blowing up of the bridge, were the causes of the death of thousands who perished thus, or who were drowned in the river.

The allies had, however, purchased their victory very dearly; they had lost 21 generals, 1800 officers, and 45,000 men. Fifteen thousand Frenchmen were taken prisoners, and among them Regnier and Lauriston. Besides these, the allies found 23,000 French sick or wounded in the hospitals and private houses, and captured 300 pieces of cannon and 900 waggons. Fortunately for the flying army, Bertrand had occupied Weissenfels, and it became possible to introduce some slight degree of order into the retreat, because, until Blücher took up the pursuit vigorously, the pursuers had been all Cossacks. These troops found the road covered with the ruins of the army, but delayed very long, as the author himself saw,

plundering and securing what they had taken. The army which followed the Emperor was considered to amount to 100,000 men, and Napoleon stopped in Erfurt on the 23rd and 24th, to collect the fugitives, to rearrange them, and to supply them with necessities. This he found to be impossible, and saw his army pass through in total disorder, and in a most wretched condition. He was much struck by the misery of his soldiers, by the disorder and hasty flight of many thousands who flung away their arms, and threw themselves down to die of hunger and exhaustion. The road from Erfurt to Hanau was covered with spoil, with cannon, waggons, dead bodies of horses and men, when suddenly an army of Bavarians and Austrians appeared at Hanau to intercept the fugitives, and the Emperor was only able to draw up a force of 60,000 men to oppose them, so much had the fatality increased among them since Erfurt.

This army was that of the Bavarian General Wrede, who had set off immediately after the conclusion of the treaty of Ried, taking a division of Austrians also under his command. Wrede was stationed at Anspach, when he received on the 22nd the news of the battle of Leipzig: he hastened, therefore, to intercept the fugitives on their retreat. The business, in itself a dangerous one, of cutting off the retreat of a brave army rather superior in numbers to his own, was very unsuccessfully performed by Wrede: he was accused of having committed grave faults, and was, as we well remember, much blamed at the time, both for his march and for the battle at Hanau. We do not venture to decide whether deservedly so or not, but merely give the facts. It was said that he ought to have marched quickly past Würzburg, and taken up a position along the Kinzig between Gelmhausen and Salmünster; instead of which he delayed before Würzburg till the 28th, in order to compel the garrison to retreat into the citadel, and consequently reached Hanau too late to be enabled to cross the Maine immediately with his whole force. This was done, however, immediately afterwards. A hard-contested struggle took place on the 29th and 30th, but not exactly to the advantage of the Bavarians, as one corps of the French came up after the other, and strengthened those who had previously arrived; Wrede, however, took Hanau by storm. The whole French army and the Emperor arrived in the mean time, and Wrede was imprudent enough to offer battle to the French, who were well aware that if defeated they must necessarily fall into the hands of the allies, who were pursuing them closely, in the wood near Hanau, on the 31st. He was defeated and wounded himself in the battle. The French boast of this victory of Hanau most immoderately, and reckon it amongst their most brilliant exploits: the only advantage they derived from it was that Napoleon's fame, which had been rather dimmed at Leipzig, was a little brightened again by this victory; but the road from Hanau to Hochheim presented a frightful spectacle. We can testify, from our own experience, that the retreat



was in every respect as bad as the description given of the retreat from Moscow, except that the sick and wounded who sank to the ground weakened with fatigue and hunger did not suffer in the same degree from cold. The Bavarians had taken possession of Sachsenhausen when the French reached Frankfort, and the author saw two French dragoons shot down as they endeavoured to reach the bridge, the middle of which was broken down by the Bavarians.

Blücher, in the mean time, hastened straight by Eisenach to Coblentz; Schwarzenberg with the Austrians advanced by Fulda; the Russians by Aschaffenburg. Between the 4th and the 6th of November the Emperors of Russia and Austria, the King of Prussia, Prince Schwarzenberg, Barclay de Tolly, and Wittgenstein arrived in Frankfort; but it was not till the 9th of November that the French were driven from the heights of Hochheim to Mayence. Then the usual diplomatic game was played at Frankfort for two months, and a wide field opened to cabals and intrigues of all kinds; the interests of nations were sacrificed to the convenience of the privileged classes, of princes and of their ministers, and negotiations for peace commenced with Napoleon, which the Emperor only intended to make use of as a blind to the French nation, and which the allies themselves did not intend to lead to anything further. Bulow's army was spread over Northern Germany and Holland, and the Dutch recalled the son of their former hereditary stadtholder as a sovereign prince, the English landing troops to secure his recognition. Blücher was on the point of crossing the Rhine when he received orders to remain. He spread his army, therefore, over the district between Mayence and Coblentz; Schwarzenberg's troops occupied the country between the Maine and the Neckar, and Benningsen's army was ordered to blockade Magdeburg. If the terms of the capitulations had been observed which St. Cyr in Dresden and Rapp in Dantzic concluded on the 11th and 30th of November with the Austrian and Russian generals, who conducted the siege of those towns, the Emperor of the French would have received back an excellent army of 60,000 men; it was pretended, however, that the generals who had granted these terms were not justified in acting contrary to the general rule laid down in Frankfort. This rule was, that no army left in any fortress should be permitted to retire free by simply giving their word of honour not to serve against the allies.

The fate of having surrendered a strong position in return for favourable terms of capitulation, and being afterwards unable to obtain a fulfilment of these terms, first fell upon St. Cyr, who afterwards rejected as a mockery a proposal that he should return into the city, and that everything should resume its former position. St. Cyr's force of 30,000 to 35,000 men was inferior to General Tolstoy's in October; and on the 15th he had marched out of the town, and might probably, in spite of a reinforcement which Tolstoy



received from the Marquis Chasteller, have made good his retreat to Torgau, if he had not hesitated in his proceedings, and, instead of venturing on such a course, returned to Dresden. After the battle of Leipzig, Klenau was despatched to Dresden, and since the 4th of November, St. Cyr had several times attempted in vain to cut his way through the German troops to Torgau. In order to spare the town much misery, Klenau afterwards granted terms of capitulation on the 11th of November, according to which the 35,000 men should return to France by Strasburg, pledging themselves first not to serve against the allies until an equal number of prisoners had been exchanged for them. One column had already marched out, when a message arrived from head-quarters that the monarchs would not recognise any capitulation of the kind. The French then complained loudly of faithlessness, and their books are even now full of declamations against the offer of the *status quo*. The case of Dantzig was quite similar. Rapp capitulated on the 30th of November, on condition of being allowed to retire, which condition was not fulfilled. We shall mention very shortly the fate of the other fortresses which had received French garrisons, as the minute history of the war does not come within the province of this work. Dresden, with 36,000 men and 250 guns, capitulated on the 11th of November; Stettin, with 8000 men and 351 guns, on the 21st of November; Dantzig, with 15,000 men and 1300 guns, on the 30th of November; Zamosk, with 4000 men and 130 guns, on the 22nd of December; Modlin, with 3000 men and 120 guns, on the 25th of December; Torgau, with 10,000 men and 250 guns, on the 26th of December. In order not to return to this subject, we shall add here the account of the surrender of those fortresses which held out till 1814. Cüstrin, with 2500 men and 90 guns, surrendered on the 7th of March. In Glogau, Commandant Laplace was obliged, on the 21st of January, to dismiss 2270 men from his garrison, Frankforters, Saxons, Croats, and Spaniards; and on the 10th of April he left it himself, with 3000 men, leaving 200 guns behind. On the 13th of January, Wittenberg was taken by storm; on the 16th of May, Erfurt surrendered, with 2000 men and 180 guns. On the 24th of May, the citadel of Marienberg, near Würzburg. On the 31st of May, Hamburg, with 15,000 men. Quite at the last, a month after the peace, Magdeburg, with 18,000 men and 841 guns.

#### 4.—LAST MONTHS OF THE YEAR 1813.

##### A.—GERMANY: ITALY TILL APRIL, 1814.

As early as November, 1813, but still more in the two following months, it was quite clear to any one at all versed in historical prognostications, that the whole of the advantages of the immense exertions made during this period of war in Germany would fall to the share of the princes, to the officials, always opposed to any freedom, to the courts, the nobility, and the diplomatists, and that the

people would have not only to endure all their former burdens, but to submit to the imposition of new ones in addition. A short sketch of what had taken place in 1813 will make this sufficiently clear. When Mecklenburg separated itself from the Rhenish alliance in the early part of this year, a state of things was established there under the pretext of protecting vested rights and restoring to every one his own, which in Russia, Livonia, Courland, Poland, and Westphalia, reduces one portion of the citizens, and that portion the more numerous, to the condition of beasts of burden to the other part. After the battle of Leipzig, the Duke of Cumberland, a violent Orangeman and Tory, hated for many and good reasons in England, hastened to Hanover, to deprive the people of all the advantages which they had owed to their condition of subjection, and to restore the bureaucracy, feudality, pride of nobility, corruption of justice, serfdom, torture, &c. The Duke of Oldenburg also returned immediately, and manifested much more anxiety respecting his own rights and privileges than those of his people. He continued to be, as he had always been, a noble and benevolent prince, but thought that he had been ungratefully treated; his government, however, notwithstanding his closeness and fondness for foreign nobility (for he had none of his own), was a paternal one. In the Hanse Towns, as soon as the pressure from without was removed, the whole of the former constitution, including the systematic superiority of certain classes and the inferiority of others, was restored in full force.

The Emperor of Austria and his minister, Metternich, showed themselves zealous protectors of the princes of the Rhenish alliance, although the most of these had not quitted it till their troops had deserted them, and their subjects threatened to throw off their allegiance. In all special treaties, the princes only, and not the people, were provided for: and if the latter case sometimes apparently happened, out of regard for Von Stein, Von Humboldt, Hardenberg, and the Emperor of Russia (as for example in Frankfort, where a new constitution was granted, and in Hanover and Hesse, where parliaments, *i.e.*, the old ones, were spoken of), we had ceased to be deceived by these appearances in 1815. Only Saxony, whose king had been a sort of prisoner of war since the battle of Leipzig, the Grand-Duke of Frankfort, and the Prince of Leyen and Isenburg, were made to suffer, not because they were more guilty than others, but because the diplomatists wanted their possessions for other purposes. Baron Stein, with every justice, and with a deep sense of what alone could make Germany powerful for all time, had cast his eyes on Saxony for Prussia. The Grand-Duke of Frankfort was disliked by the Austrians and the clergy, and had been sacrificed to Bavaria in the treaty of Ried. Austria got back from Bavaria, Salzburg and some other districts, and promised as compensation territory belonging to other powers. Not only the grand-duchy of Frankfort, whose sovereign was at any rate merely a kind of tenant at will, was to be divided and the largest portion of it to go to Bavaria, but

Baden was to be deprived of all the territory it had acquired by French influence.

King Jerome of Westphalia, when Czernitcheff first drove him from his capital the first time, had only fled as far as Wetzlar, and had then returned to Cassel, where he received, on the 19th or 20th of October, the news of the battle of Leipzig. He caused everything to be sold for which he could find a purchaser, and left Cassel a second time in the night between the 25th and 26th, never to return. The unfortunate Hessians immediately received back their old elector, who had no idea of mildness or generosity, who knew nothing of his duties to his subjects, of the rights of humanity, or of the demands of the times. He made his public entry into Cassel on the 8th of November, to the immense delight of his Hessians, who, as we remember, were then called by the Conservatives *faithful Hessians*, and by the Liberals *blind Hessians*, and immediately afterwards declared everything null and void that had taken place during his absence. All expenditure and salaries were again measured out according to the electoral rule of former times—whoever from being a corporal had become a general, or from a barrister a chief justice, was required to return to the position he had previously held in 1807; pigtails obtained again their due influence in military affairs; all purchases of electoral property were declared void, and the money expended was not repaid to the purchaser, nor were they reimbursed for money spent in improving the property: all the changes, however, which had been to the advantage of the elector or of his revenue were scrupulously retained. As the troops of Baden had left the French before the battle of Leipzig, and as the old duke had the same sort of good character as the Duke of Oldenburg, every one was pleased when the Emperor of Russia interposed to protect him, and to keep off the vultures already hovering over his land and prepared to tear it to pieces. The despotic King of Wirtemberg showed himself the most shameless among the princes; and upon the whole he got off very well. He made his peace with the allies on the 2nd of November, and was allowed to retain his title of king: he was even promised to be recompensed at the expense of the innocent for any sacrifices he might be called upon to make. We have designated his conduct as shameless, because he had dared openly to express his disapprobation at actions which the whole of Germany considered meritorious, and which his Swabians especially admired; and had declared that he rejoiced at the dominion of the foreigners, which every true friend to his country regretted and deplored. When the allies, therefore, announced a rising *en masse*, he felt so clearly that he, as his people's greatest enemy, had more occasion to fear this than the French, that he quite refused to countenance it. In raising recruits also, which according to treaty he was bound to furnish towards the national army, he proceeded so slowly that his contingent was of no use. He broke the regiments which had patriotically joined their countrymen



against the national enemy, and took back from their officers the orders of merit which had been conferred on them; nor could the allies induce him, during his stay in Frankfort, to recal this action.

Bignon states this with great satisfaction in a secret report to his Emperor, which he drew up whilst detained in Germany by the discussions respecting the capitulation of Dresden, which had been disallowed by the allies.\* Bignon further informs us in this report that the Grand-Duke of Baden, at the very time he was joining outwardly with the allies, had repeatedly and earnestly expressed to the Emperor his real sorrow at being compelled so to act. On this point Bignon appears deserving of credit, as he mentions, moreover, that he himself, on his return to France, received from the grand-duke a verbal message to the Emperor to the same effect. The King of Denmark also, whose German possessions were in possession of the enemy, was obliged to come to terms. He issued a proclamation on the 17th of January, 1814, in which he states that he had found it necessary to give up Norway.

After what we have here shortly stated, no one but extreme enthusiasts and theorists, of whom there are always, unfortunately for the people, too many in Germany, could believe in any new organisation, or hope for anything favourable from the freedom from foreign oppression; and, in fact, the oppression at home became worse than this had been. The central commission and the influence of Baron Stein certainly still existed; but all North Germany, Hesse Cassel, Hesse Darmstadt, Baden, Wirtemberg, and Bavaria, had been detached from the central commission, and the whole of the aristocracy, who looked up to Metternich, were using their influence against Stein's friends and himself. The influence of the central commission had been already considerably limited, by means of a treaty agreed to at Leipzig on the 21st of October by Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England. Its duties were there defined to be: "*To unite and bring together all the disposable force of Germany—to take all possible measures during the war—to seek all means, and to cause all the territories occupied by the allied troops to contribute towards carrying on the war.*" This was not exactly all that the commission had intended itself to be; it had intended to create a kind of central government for Germany: but this neither suited the policy of Metternich and his diplomatists, nor that of the English Tories, who had still to provide for the sons of the king, and for the future Duke of Brunswick. The commission had proposed two plans. According to the one, the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine should be entirely suspended and excluded from all share in the government until the new arrangements should be complete; according to the other, the sovereigns or their eldest sons should continue to reign, but should be under the control of the central

\* He says there respecting the king, who was just returning home from Frankfort: "Les princes alliés n'ont pas été contents de lui, et il est revenu mécontent d'eux. Les Bavaïrois, font leur cour à ses dépens."

government. The diplomatists, as all mediocrities in the world generally do, chose a middle path, which was intended to satisfy everybody, but led to nothing, and, in fact, satisfied nobody. Nothing was left to the central commission finally, except the government of the countries occupied by the allied troops which were to change masters, and the arrangements for furnishing the armies with provisions and necessaries; and the princes were only required to engage, not to offer any opposition to, a future new organisation of Germany, which should settle all disputed points.

The fate of Italy was decided immediately after the battle of Leipzig, by the intrigues in which Count Mier and Lord William Bentinck engaged for the purpose of gaining over King Joachim of Naples. The populace of Milan were afterwards roused against the Viceroy Eugene, who had hoped to be able to maintain himself in Lombardy by the assistance of the Italians. King Joachim had returned to his capital at the end of 1812, dissatisfied with his brother-in-law, and had despatched his adjutant, Prince Cariati, with complimentary messages to the King of Prussia and the Emperor Francis in February, 1813. The adjutant was charged also with the ribbon of King Joachim's order for the King of Prussia; but having learned his defection from the French alliance, remained in Vienna, instead of proceeding into Silesia. Whilst Cariati was induced in Vienna to commence negotiations with Austria as to the acceptance of her mediation, the Austrian *chargé d'affaires* in Naples, Count Mier, gained over the king himself. Murat was pleased with the prospect of being enabled to unite the whole of Italy under his government—a prospect somewhat similar to that held out to him by the Carbonari—that his dominions should be extended at least as far as the Po. On the 30th of May, 1813, after the arrival of a courier from Cariati, Count Mier was summoned to the king, who at the same time entered into relations with Lord W. Bentinck, notwithstanding his lordship's personal dislike. Queen Caroline, Ferdinand's wife, had been brought into connexion with the French Emperor through his Empress, Maria Louisa, and Lord William had consequently broken with her: he negotiated, however, with the plenipotentiaries of Murat by deputy on the island of Pouza. The consequence of this negotiation was a serious misunderstanding between Murat and his brother-in-law, although no results were attained, and even nothing definite was arranged with Austria. The whole affair, in fact, came to a stop when Murat was persuaded by the queen, M. de Baudrus, and his minister of finance, Count Mosburg, to go back to the French army at Dresden on the 2nd of August, 1813.

The negotiations were apparently entirely broken off, when Austria shortly afterwards declared war; but it was, at least, very suspicious that neither Prince Esterhazy nor Count Mier, the Austrian representatives at Naples, left for Vienna, nor was Prince Cariati recalled till September. After the battle of Leipzig a final



and serious attempt was made to detach the Viceroy Eugene and Murat from Napoleon by the prospect of their being thus enabled, like the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, to maintain themselves in their former dignity. The whole of Illyria and Dalmatia had revolted; Hiller had driven the army of the viceroy from point to point; Dalmatians, Illyrians, and Italians were deserting in crowds; the citadel of Trieste had capitulated on the 31st of October; and when the armies were drawn up on the Adige on the 4th of November, nothing remained to the French except Usopo, Palma Nuova, and Venice. The King of Bavaria attempted, therefore, to induce his son-in-law, the viceroy, to follow his example, and, as he himself had done by the treaty of Ried, to give up what he could no longer keep, and to accept instead the compensation offered by Austria. The Prince of Thurn and Taxis, the King of Bavaria's adjutant, presented himself at the outposts, and caused a packet to be delivered to him containing the documents which were to secure to the viceroy the kingdom of Lombardy under the guarantee of Bavaria and of the allied powers. Eugene refused this offer: we are, however, unable to decide whether he did so because he would not act the traitor towards his stepfather and his country, or because he was wise enough to see that the Italians would never endure him, and that the Austrians had no intention of keeping their promise.

Murat had put his head in the noose immediately after the battle of Leipzig. It was not, as most accounts say, Count Mier who renewed the negotiations with Austria which had been commenced by Prince Cariati, and afterwards broken off, for he had remained in Naples, and the negotiations were renewed when the French army was in Erfurt: the real agent was the Duke of Rocca Romana, who had been in Vienna, and who had gone to meet the king, but whose name even Bignon does not give in his account of these events. (He says merely "*un agent Autrichien.*") This individual had had a short conference with Murat on the 22nd of October (two days consequently before he parted from his brother-in-law for ever at Erfurt) at Ollendorf on the Ilm, and had merely said to him, "*that he might place every confidence in Count Mier at Naples, and conclude everything with him.*" On the 5th of November Murat was again in his capital, and negotiations were again commenced: a declaration of neutrality was expected with the more certainty, as two proclamations appeared on the 11th, considerably at variance with the system pursued in Germany. Count Mier then left, and probably took with him an outline of a treaty of alliance. Fouché, who had been driven out of his government of Illyria, was at this time in Rome: the French Emperor despatched him to Naples to endeavour to prevent the king from proceeding to extremities, but Fouché was at this time indulging in visions of a regency of Maria Louisa, and his behaviour was at least equivocal. On his return to Rome he wrote to the Emperor that he believed the king intended, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, to hasten to the assistance



of the viceroy with the army he had raised; and we cannot give credit to such a proficient in the arts of spying and intriguing for believing this, when we know that on the 12th of December a courier had brought Count Mier's treaty with Metternich's marginal notes to the Marquis de Gallo, Murat's minister of foreign affairs, and that from that time the conferences with Lord William Bentinck's representatives in the island of Pouza were resumed. The Neapolitan army, in the mean time, entered the States of the Church and Rome, apparently as a friendly power, though Miollis refused to admit them into the castle of St. Angelo, and the gates of Ancona and of Civita Vecchia were shut against them. Immediately after this, Count Neipperg arrived in Naples as the Austrian ambassador, and Lord Bentinck sent his adjutant, Colonel Graham; thus confirming the king in his opinion that he had full powers from his government to conclude a treaty, which was by no means the case. Count Mier was sent back to Naples to conclude a peace with Austria; and upon the 11th of January, 1814, the conditions upon which a peace might be concluded between Austria and King Joachim were accepted by the latter. We agree with Bignon, that the king, if he had not been quite blinded, must have seen that he was being deceived, and that the conditions of the treaty would never be fulfilled.\*

The king proceeded to fulfil his part of the treaty even before it was ratified. He went to his army at Bologna, and entered Tuscany and the States of the Church. He left Naples, therefore, on the 23rd of January as an enemy of the French, without waiting for Lord Bentinck's arrival, whom he had sent an adjutant to meet. Lord Bentinck arrived in Naples shortly afterwards, and concluded a treaty for a cessation of hostilities with the minister De Gallo, without having any authority so to do. On the 30th of January the king made known to the army his intention of taking the field with England and Austria against France by a very unskillfully composed proclamation:† the declaration of war came somewhat later. The

\* Bignon, vol. xiii., pp. 191-192: "Ce traité trop avantageux pour être jamais ratifié par les alliés, quand ils n'auraient plus besoin de lui, était en effet tout différent de celui qui a été rendu public sous cette date, et auquel Joachim dut souscrire plus tard. L'alliance entre les deux cours avait pour but le rétablissement d'un juste équilibre politique d'après les bases de Francfort, acceptées par l'Empereur Napoléon. Un article spécial stipulait que les troupes Napolitaines ne pourraient être obligées de servir hors de l'Italie ni en France. L'Autriche promettait au Roi Joachim ses bons offices pour lui obtenir la renonciation de la maison de Bourbon au royaume de Naples et la paix avec tous les souverains alliés, y comprise l'Angleterre. Cet article était basé sur une garantie que cette dernière puissance aurait donnée aux Bourbons de la reprise de Naples ou d'une indemnité; garantie qui n'existait pas. De son côté Joachim renonçait à tout prétension sur la Sicile, moyennant une indemnité encore indéterminée à prendre dans les légations."

† Botta (vol. vi., p. 276) sums up the contents of this proclamation against Napoleon, which one could sooner excuse in any one than in Joachim Murat, in the following words: "Il primo ad uscir fuori, fu il re medesimo col dire a suoi soldati, avvertissero bene, che insinoaché egli aveva potuto credere che Napoleone imperadore combatteva per la pace e per la felicità della Francia, aveva a favor suo combattuto; ma che ora siera chiarito di tutto, e che bene sapeva che Napoleone

castle of St. Angelo, Ancona, and Civita Vecchia were attacked, and a Neapolitan governor sent to Tuscany; Joachim himself was in Bologna, and his proclamations summoned the Italians in Rome, Ancona, Modena, Pisa, and Florence to independence. The French in Upper Italy were hemmed in on all sides, and with difficulty kept possession of a portion of Lombardy and Piedmont. On the one hand, Bellegarde, who had taken the command of the Austrian troops, forced the viceroy to give up his position on the Adige, and to take up another on the Mincio. There one of his wings touched Mantua, and the other Pescheira; and he was enabled, supported by a flotilla on the lake of Guarda, to stop the Austrians on the Mincio, and to prevent the Neapolitans from carrying out their intentions in regard to Reggio, Parma, and Cremona. On the other side, towards Piedmont, Staremberg's brigade and the corps of General Nugent formed the *avant-garde* of King Joachim's army. This was opposed by the division formed by General Gratien in Alessandria, which had arrived at Placentia on the 28th of January.

Napoleon had resolved, on hearing of the defection of the King of Naples, of the dissatisfaction of the Italians at the French rule, of the revolt of the troops, and of the armament of English ships and troops which Lord William Bentinck was arranging in Sicily in order to land in the Genoese territory, to withdraw his army from Italy. He had given orders, as early as the 18th of January, to make arrangements for evacuating the country and for concluding an armistice. This order was several times repeated during the month of February, but the viceroy, who would willingly have been chosen by the Lombards for their king, did not obey it, as it was always more or less conditional. The conditions were, that he should conclude an armistice and should procure permission for the garrisons to withdraw unmolested to France; and as he could not obtain these conditions, he remained. Besides this, he trusted for himself a good deal to the Bonapartists in the senate of Milan, or perhaps wished to get as much in the way of robbery and confiscation as he could. The viceroy, therefore, refused a second offer which his father-in-law made him on behalf of the allies; he remained faithful to his stepfather, and even fought a battle with Bellegarde on the Mincio on the 8th of February. In this battle the Austrians lost some thousand men, and Eugene claimed the victory: but nothing was gained by it, and both parties remained in their positions.

The King of Naples did not declare war upon the French Emperor till the 15th of February, after he had been deserted by all the

non voleva altro che guerra, che tradirebbe gl' interessi della sua antica patria, quei di suoi soldati, se tosto non separasse le sue armi delle Napoleoniche e se non congiungesse a quelle dei principi intenti con magnanimo disegno a restituire ai troni la loro dignità, alle nazioni la loro indipendenza; due sole bandiere esservi, ammoniva, in Europa; sull' una leggersi le parole religione, costume, giustizia, moderazione, leggi, pace, felicità; sull' altra persecuzioni, artifizzi, violenze, tirannide, guerra e lutto di famiglie, scéglissero."



French in his service, and the Emperor, in a decree, had designated him a rebel. Even in February it was clear to him that he had been mistaken in believing that he could obtain for himself by his defection the government of the whole of Italy, or even of Tuscany and the States of the Church. The Emperor Francis had never yet ratified the treaty of the 11th of January, and Lord William Bentinck manifested his dislike of Murat in such a manner that even Lord Castlereagh was displeased at it. Lord Bentinck had not yet received full powers, either from his own court or from King Ferdinand of Sicily, to recognise Murat's rights, and Bellegarde even issued a proclamation on the 4th of February, in which he not only promised the return of the Pope, the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, and the King of Sardinia into their dominions, but announced, in a style which set civilisation at defiance, that *the roads also should be destroyed which the Gauls and their Brennus had made in different places over the Alps*. Nugent occupied Modena, not for Murat, under whom he was serving, but for the princes of the house of Este. Notwithstanding this, the Gascon, who considered himself cunning, allowed himself to be again deceived by those who then managed the Austrian emperor. Francis wrote a letter to the king, which was to be delivered or not according to circumstances, and which was so conceived that it might be regarded as a sort of compensation for the ratification which had not yet been received. This letter was delivered after the unfortunate result of the battle on the Mincio, and the king allowed himself to be duped. Murat had certainly not a good conscience in reference to his course of action, for he endeavoured all through to please both parties. Fouché too, as governor of the States of the Church, and representative of the Emperor, arranged his conduct upon the anticipation of the failure and fall of his master. He concluded the treaty with Naples respecting the evacuation of the fortresses, under the condition, which no one but himself would have allowed, *that the garrisons should not serve against the allies for a year*; he also urged on the evacuation of the fortresses in Tuscany, especially Leghorn, merely in order that the Anglo-Sicilian expedition might be directed to that point. In the course of the month of March, Ancona and Civita Vecchia were evacuated.

During the whole of the month of February, Murat's conduct was in the highest degree equivocal, and neither the French nor the Austrians trusted him; the latter, indeed, attributed to him the not inconsiderable loss which Nugent suffered from General Grenier in the beginning of March in Parma, by means of which the latter was enabled to occupy for King Eugene the lines on the Mincio at Guastalla and Borgo Forte. He was even accused of having acted the part of a traitor in the bloody battles at Reggio, although he advanced on the 6th and 7th of March, and assisted in driving back the French behind the Taro. About the time of this advance the king received (on the 8th of March) the ratification of the treaty



from Vienna; but the treaty itself was entirely altered. The Emperor of Austria promised his good offices to obtain for the king peace with England, and the renunciation of the Bourbons. This, however, was not contained in the original treaty, but merely in the secret articles; the whole of his compensation was, on the other hand, to consist of a district containing some 400,000 inhabitants, to be taken from the territories of the Pope. Lord William Bentinck never attempted to conceal his hostility to the King of Naples, though it was entirely owing to him that the army embarked in Sicily, and consisting to a very small extent of Englishmen, was enabled to land at Leghorn. Lord W. Bentinck claimed Tuscany, and caused his tool, the hereditary Prince of Sicily, whom he had brought with him, to issue a general order, setting forth that the English troops were intended to give effect to the claims of his family upon the crown of Naples. At a meeting between Lord William, Murat, and Bellegarde, in Bologna, a contest of some violence arose between the king, who wished to garrison Tuscany for Austria, and the English minister, who required it to be given up to him for the Sicilian Bourbons. King Joachim's treaty was not ratified till the 8th of April; and even then he was obliged to content himself with the slight compensation before mentioned. On the 15th of April he had advanced in concert with Lord William Bentinck, who had induced the Genoese to revolt by the promise of a restoration of their independence and former privileges, as far as Placentia, when he received from the Prince Borghese and Bellegarde documents which proved to him that his brother-in-law's fall was complete, and that the Bourbons had returned to Paris.

From this time the King of Naples could not be mistaken as to his fate; and from the manner in which the Pope, without paying any attention to him, re-established himself in his temporal power, he was unable even to reckon with any certainty on the slight extension of territory which was promised to him by the treaty. Napoleon had concluded a treaty with the Pope on the 10th of March, 1814, in accordance with which he was to leave France and return to Italy. His journey thither resembled a triumphal progress, for he was everywhere followed and accompanied by the inhabitants of the towns he passed through, and even the soldiers and men of every rank regarded him as a martyr to his faith. Murat attempted in vain to have him stopped at Reggio: all gave way before him, and, indeed, it was hardly to be expected that soldiers could be found to obey the orders of the king against the Pope in the States of the Church. As soon as Pius had taken possession of the States of the Church, the plenipotentiaries of the King of Naples found themselves obliged to restore Tuscany to the former ruler, the Archduke Ferdinand.

On the 16th of April the Viceroy Eugene entered into negotiations with General Bellegarde respecting the evacuation of Italy and the surrender of the fortresses and arsenals, and immediately

afterwards repaired himself to his father-in-law, the King of Bavaria, who had procured for him compensation in Germany, and had arranged that he, although a stranger and an enemy, should rule over Germans. This was certainly a very favourable specimen of the arrangements which the diplomatists of Vienna intended making, and of the conscientiousness with which the princes purposed to fulfil their promises so flourishingly proclaimed to the people of Germany. Eugene at first delayed setting off, because he was informed that a powerful party in Milan was prepared to offer him the elective crown, and that the Emperor Alexander was not disinclined to recognise an independent kingdom of Italy under his government. The majority of the senate had, in fact, been gained over by this party; the Austrian party, however, brought about an *émeute* among the populace of Milan on the 20th of April: scenes of disorder and violence ensued, which rendered the introduction of Austrian soldiers necessary, so that Metternich and his diplomatists were enabled at a latter period to claim Venice and Milan as reconquered Austrian provinces.

#### B.—NEGOTIATIONS AT FRANKFORT, AND AFFAIRS OF SWITZERLAND.

As soon as the allies had arrived at Frankfort, the contending views of the diplomatists manifested themselves for some time, showing that they had long been terrified at the possible effect of their own manifestoes, and that they feared much more the freedom of the people than Bonaparte's oppressions. Pozzo di Borgo as the friend of the Russian Emperor, Aberdeen and after him Castlereagh, as representatives of the most terrible portions of the English aristocracy, entirely practical, and never distorted by any theoretical doubts, were even then considering how they might best restore to power in France the emigrants and their king—that is to say, the old aristocracy and all their prejudices. They were obliged, however, for some time to keep their intentions secret, as Metternich and the Emperor Francis continued for a period to act as if the family alliance had still some weight with them, which was by no means the case. The two former principal tools of Napoleon, who were at this time secretly undermining his power, and, without conspiring or giving cause to suspicion, were collecting around them, the one the old republicans, the other the legitimists, Fouché and Talleyrand, were acting the one for the Bourbons, the other for a regency under Maria Louisa; Austria sought, therefore, once more to obtain its own special objects, by inducing the allies again to enter into negotiations with Napoleon. These negotiations were brought about by a very roundabout way. A M. Rousseau, whom Napoleon had made Baron de St. Aignan, was made use of in the affair, in order not to excite suspicion. This gentleman was the ambassador at Weimar, and when the allies entered that city on the 24th of Octo-

ber, was sent to Bohemia, notwithstanding his protest and his appeals to the rights of ambassadors. There he had an interview with Metternich, who told him that he intended to forward through him certain proposals of peace to the Emperor, and advised him, in the mean time, to remain at Töplitz.

As soon as the monarchs and their ministers had arrived in Frankfort, St. Aignan was sent for from Töplitz, and arrived on the 8th of November, when he immediately had a second personal interview with Metternich. This interview is of great importance in reference to the jesuitical system of Austrian policy at the time of the Emperor Francis. The particulars were given, with all the letters and documents referring to these negotiations, in the first impression of the *Moniteur* for January 20, 1814. We shall show, however, why Napoleon found it advisable to suppress this first impression for the 20th, and to have a second impression printed instead. This second impression has been made use of in most accounts of the negotiations without regard to the fact that it was a mutilated account, because at the time it was not considered advisable to offend Austria: we are obliged to have recourse, therefore, to Fain's "*Manuscrit de 1814*," and to the thirteenth volume of Bignon's work, to learn the whole extent of Metternich's diplomacy and cunning. Metternich himself led the conversation with St. Aignan entirely, inasmuch as there was no intention of giving anything in writing, and gave him to understand that they would rather have to do with Caulaincourt than with Maret (Duc de Bassano).<sup>\*</sup> Count Nesselrode was present at this interview, and after they had verbally communicated the points which Napoleon was expected to yield unconditionally, St. Aignan was allowed to retire into another room and write them down for himself. Lord Aberdeen afterwards arrived, and St. Aignan read his notes of the points demanded, which they all three acknowledged to be correct;† so that Caulaincourt himself declared, that if the

<sup>\*</sup> Bignon, vol. xiii., p. 27, quoting from the suppressed impression of the *Moniteur*, says that Metternich requested St. Aignan, "De dire au Duc de Vicenze qu'on lui conservait les sentiments d'estime, que son noble caractère avait toujours inspiré et qu'on avait une telle idée de sa loyauté, qu'on lui remettrait volontiers si l'on pouvait, les intérêts de l'Autriche et ceux de tout le monde, pour en décider selon les principes d'équité qu'on lui connaissait."

† St. Aignan's note contains the following principal points: "1. L'union des puissances est indissoluble; 2. Elles ne veulent par consequence pas d'autre paix qu'une paix générale; 3. Elles sont d'accord pour laisser à la France ses limites naturelles, le Rhin, les Alpes, et les Pyrénées; 4. L'indépendance absolue de l'Allemagne, et le rétablissement de l'ancienne dynastie en Espagne sont deux conditions sine quâ non; 5. L'Italie et la Hollande seront de même indépendantes de toute puissance prépondérante. Le mode de leur gouvernemens sera discuté dans les négociations, ainsi que les limites de la frontière que l'Autriche devra avoir en Italie; 6. L'Angleterre est prête à faire les plus grands sacrifices pour la paix fondée sur ces bases, et à reconnaître la liberté de la navigation et du commerce à laquelle la France a droit de prétendre; 7. Si ces principes généraux étaient agréés par l'Empereur Napoléon, on pourrait neutraliser sur la rive droite du Rhin tel point que l'on jugerait convenable où les plénipotentiaires de toutes les nations belligérantes se rendraient sur le champ, sans cependant que les négociations suspendissent le cours des opérations militaires."



Emperor had *immediately* accepted, the allies would have been unable to find any pretext for taking back their word, as they afterwards did.\* The Emperor, however, unfortunately left the Duc de Bassano, who was a mere instrument and a blind admirer and flatterer of his, too long in possession of the ministry for foreign affairs; and the duke, who knew with what unwillingness his master made the slightest concessions, sent back, instead of an unconditional acceptance of the proposals, an answer which appeared like an evasion.† This vague answer, received on the 26th of November, gave an opportunity to the party, which intended Napoleon's entire destruction, and the restoration of the old monarchico-aristocratic government in all countries, to declare in a manifesto published by the monarchs on the 7th of December, that they were making war on Napoleon, not on France. This took place at the very time when Napoleon, whom Metternich had again summoned on the 25th of November, to accept unconditionally the proposals made through St. Aignan, had yielded, and had appointed Caulaincourt minister for foreign affairs.

Caulaincourt was allowed to announce the Emperor's unconditional acceptance of the proposals made by the ministers in Frankfort through M. de St. Aignan. This, however, only took place on the 2nd of December; and on the day before, in a meeting at Frankfort, the result of which was the manifesto of the 9th, the continuation of the war had been resolved on. The manner in which esteem and good-will towards the French, together with hostility to the Emperor, were expressed in this manifesto, are plainly enough to be referred to the cabals which Talleyrand had been long engaged in in Paris. By means of his tool and creature, who had been made by Bonaparte, in consequence of his large possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, Duc de Dalberg, and who had formerly represented Baden at Paris, he stood in the closest connexion with the allies. That Caulaincourt himself perceived clearly that the people who were accustomed to get up revolutions in France were tired of the Emperor, is proved by the answer, which we are informed from a good source he gave to Count Molé, after he had entered the ministry.‡ The manifesto of the 7th of December sounds exactly

\* In an autograph report of the Duc de Vicenze, which Bignon quotes, we find the words: "Les alliés ont avoué depuis, que si dès l'instant où l'Empereur connut les bases de Francfort, il avait fait partir un plénipotentiaire autorisé à les signer (comme l'avait proposé le Duc de Bassano) ils n'auraient pas osé se rétracter, ou peut-être n'en auraient pas eu l'idée. Mais l'Empereur a perdu ce dernier moment favorable, il a donné aux ennemis le tems de connaître sa situation et leur a fait naître l'envie d'en profiter."

† The Emperor caused the Duc de Bassano to write: "That he could give assurance, qu'une paix, basée sur l'indépendance de toutes les nations, tant sous le point de vue continental, que sous le point de vue maritime avait été l'objet constant de la politique de l'Empereur."

‡ Bignon, vol. xiii., p. 41, says: "Caulaincourt était convaincu que la dernière occasion de salut venait d'être perdue; il prit le portefeuille des affaires étrangères avec de sinistres pressentiments." And he adds in the note: "Il rencontra à la porte même du cabinet de l'Empereur le Comte Molé, qui allait, à son tour, prêter

as if prompted by the party of which Talleyrand had been the soul for some time even in December. "The violence alone was unsatisfactory to the allies which had been used by Frenchmen out of France; there was no intention of reducing the limits of France, nor of depriving it of its military fame, but rather it was intended to leave it greater and more powerful than it had ever been in the time of the kings." The declaration of the acceptance of the proposals of the allies was, however, not entirely rejected, for a readiness was shown to enter into the matter; and although the proposal for a congress at Mannheim was refused, and Caulaincourt, who was coming to head-quarters as mediator, was refused admission at the outposts, the negotiations were resumed with apparent seriousness, as we shall see presently, in February.

Whilst the negotiations in Frankfort were at a stand, great efforts were made from Frankfort to make use of the friends of aristocracy in Switzerland to destroy the influence of France there, and by means of the formerly privileged classes who were opposed to all reforms and innovations, to deprive Switzerland of its neutrality, and to include it in the alliance against France. This was the more necessary, as it was proposed to invade France suddenly from the east, from Geneva to Düsseldorf. At this time, indeed, no definite conclusion had been come to as to the ultimate fate of France; but every one perceived that the arrangements which had been made in the course of December could not possibly be carried out, so long as Napoleon remained at the head of the government. The Prince of Orange was again sovereign Prince of Holland, and pressed upon Belgium, supported by English troops.\* Russia had occupied the duchy of Warsaw as if it had been already ceded to her; and Prince Repnin governed Saxony like a province, whose fate was to be decided by the allies, whilst its king was regarded as a prisoner of war. The German provinces, as Oldenburg, Hanover, Hesse, Brunswick, which had not been claimed by the expelled princes as personal property bestowed on them by the grace of God, were governed and managed by the central commission as common property. Switzerland, although it had expressed its gratitude to Napoleon by calling him the *Mediator* of its new condition, and had partly acknowledged him as its master by the title of *Protector*, yet endeavoured at the same time to preserve its neutrality; and the Emperor, to whom this was an advantage, did what he could to further this plan. Whilst all the friends of progress and of the development of the internal and external relations of states as well as of men in Switzerland were attached to Napoleon, the old patricians and friends of the aristocracy assembled on their

serment comme grand juge. Caulaincourt lui dit: *Nous entrons au ministère pour assister à la catastrophe.*"

\* When Prussia, towards the end of 1813, blockaded Wesel, there were but few places in Holland occupied by the French. These were Delfzyl in Groningen, Deventer, Narden, Gorcum, Nimeguen, Bergen-op-Zoom, Bois-le-Duc, and Flushing.

frontiers or in the head-quarters of the allies, to endeavour to obtain the annulling of the act of mediation. This party found powerful supporters in men like Senft-Pilsach, who had passed from the Saxon to the Austrian service, where he was practising his jesuitical arts, in Pozzo di Borgo, and in Count Lebzeltern; they would, however, hardly have succeeded in separating Switzerland entirely from France, had not Napoleon, by his arbitrary and unsparing conduct, very much weakened the enthusiasm for his cause, which, however, soon afterwards revived.

According to the terms of the treaty by which the French Emperor became their protector, the Swiss were required to furnish to the French armies 16,000 men, and to keep this contingent always complete. This last condition became very difficult, in consequence of Napoleon's continual wars—a circumstance very easily to be explained, when we consider that the Swiss were at the same time hiring out soldiers to the Kings of Naples, of Spain, and to the English. From 1807 this keeping up the contingent had become an intolerable burden, so that Napoleon had been compelled, in 1811, to diminish the number of men to be supplied to 12,000. At the discussion respecting the lessening of this burden, it is interesting to remark how naturally the practical French diplomatist and the genuine Swiss patriot meet in reference to this trade in human beings on the common ground of profit. The French diplomatist represents to the Swiss representatives at the Diet at Soleure in 1811, that the French service had always been the best means of providing for young men of good family; to which the Swiss patrician replies, that the profit was by no means so great as it had been.\* The unfavourable circumstances of the military service in France, which had formerly been so profitable and so little dangerous, and at the same time honourable and highly privileged, were not, however, the only complaint the Swiss had to make; they were still more offended by the interference with their trade, by measures hostile to their manufactures in favour of French ones, by the occupation of the Valais in 1810, and by the separation of this canton from the confederacy. Besides this, French troops had already entered the canton of Ticino, and the Emperor was about to separate a large portion of this canton, too, from Switzerland, when the result of the war in Russia rendered it necessary to moderate these harsh measures in regard to Switzerland.

When the armies of the allies were directed towards the Rhine in 1813, Prussia, whose army was on the Lower Rhine, remained quite passive, and even Austria and Russia seemed at first not disinclined to allow Switzerland to preserve its neutrality, at any rate so

\* Talleyrand (the ambassador in Switzerland, not the old minister) said in the Diet of 1811: "Que feriez-vous de vos jeunes gens, si vous n'aviez le service étranger?" The Swiss deputy replies: "Le temps des Pfyffers, Affrys, Erlachs est passé. Les grandes places sont réservées aux nationaux, et pour un individu, qui y fait quelque fortune, il y a deux autres qui épuisent la leur."



far as it did not interfere with the plan of the campaign; but Austria and Russia soon began to follow quite a different system. Russia promised in November to respect the neutrality of Switzerland, because Colonel Laharpe, Alexander's tutor, and General Jomini, who was a kind of military Mentor to him, used their influence to this effect with the Emperor. Austria, on the other hand, made use of Senft-Pilsach and his party of the old patricians, the aristocracy, and especially the patrician families of Berne, for its own purposes. Count Senft-Pilsach had passed the summer in Switzerland as Saxon minister, nominally for the benefit of his health, but, in reality, in order to intrigue against the existing order of things with the malcontents. He passed his time principally in Berne, at Interlaken, and in the Pays de Vaud, and kept up his connexion with the patrician friends of the old system after he arrived in Frankfort. On the 19th of December he suddenly returned to Switzerland as Austrian minister. The Landammann of Switzerland at that time was Reinhard of Zurich, a kindred spirit with the well-known Burgomaster Muralt, who has published his life, and from this life we shall derive some few facts. Both were friends of the new system and admirers of Napoleon, but only in so far as he assisted and retained in power all the supporters of the old system. Reinhard tells us himself that he received, seven days after the battle of Leipzig, a communication not exactly official, but at the same time confidential and worthy of credit, to the effect that Austria would not object to the neutrality of Switzerland. He immediately summoned a Diet.

The Diet met on the 15th of November, and the French Emperor endeavoured to make the assertion of the neutrality, by which the weakest side of France would be protected, as easy as possible. He had already conceded, that in communicating with him the title of *Mediator* or *Protector* might be omitted; and the Diet resolved on the 18th, relying on his consent, "*That it would maintain its neutrality conscientiously and impartially towards all the high contending powers.*" In consequence of this resolution, a proclamation was issued to the confederates, announcing to them, "*That to maintain the neutrality by all the means in their power, to preserve the freedom and independence of their country, to support their present constitution, to maintain their territory inviolate, was to be the only but important object of all their endeavours.*" They were ordered at the same time to furnish their first contingent of 15,000 men to the confederated army, and to get ready a second, and, if possible, a third immediately. Landammann Aloys von Reding and Escher of Zurich were to proceed to Frankfort; Landammann Rüttimann and Burgomaster Wieland to Paris, in order to notify this resolution officially to the allied powers and to the Emperor. Landammann von Wattewille was appointed commander-in-chief of the army of neutrality stationed at Basle. It must, however, have been impossible for any one acquainted with the history and

opinions of these gentlemen, to believe them capable of resisting the temptation of seeing the old Swiss families reinstated in their former rights and privileges; and very little unanimity was shown in other respects in supporting the constitution introduced by Napoleon's influence.

The Grisons declared at once that it could not furnish even a second contingent, and that a third was not to be thought of; among all the cantons, only Pays de Vaud, Berne, and Zurich, manifested any readiness to arm; and money was furnished very sparingly. When the diplomatists were satisfied that there was a large party ready to join the allies, out of dislike to the united government introduced by Napoleon, Lebzeltern as Austrian plenipotentiary, and Count Capo d'Istrias as Russian, appeared suddenly at Zurich. They had taken up their abode at a third-rate inn, as travelling merchants, announced themselves to the Landammann as ambassadors, had no distinct diplomatic character, but brought credentials from their several courts. The whole business was part of the general system of deceit, for they made no difficulty about promising things of which they knew well that they could not be fulfilled. The statements which the two ambassadors made were in direct contradiction with the conversations which they, supported by Senft-Pilsach's former intrigues, had with the party which desired to restore the influence of the ruling families. In somewhat the same manner the deputation sent to Frankfort was deceived by the Russian emperor, who knew very well what was going on, when he told them, on the 15th of December, "that the neutrality should be respected, provided the allies were allowed the use of the bridge at Basle." By this time a kind of opposition Diet had been formed by the men who wished to do away with all the innovations, and the allies were in constant communication with the committee of this Diet, which sat at Waldshut. All the leading men from Reding and Reinhard to Wattenwille, who commanded the troops, would have rejoiced at the return of the good old times when they had figured at courts. Besides all this, the town council of Berne, which would gladly have become the council of the canton, opposed the Diet openly, and only allowed their proclamations to be very partially made known, and all the small cantons were decidedly in favour of the old system.

Persons like Metternich, Senft-Pilsach, Pozzo di Borgo, Capo d'Istrias, and others of the kind, are never in want of sophists and sophistries when the advantage of their party requires the employment of such means; the Swiss, therefore, were made to believe, as the Germans had formerly been, that their freedom was the object in view, whilst new chains were being forged for them; and it was proved most satisfactorily, that a defence of Switzerland would be an attack upon the allied powers.\* In this document reference was

\* "Toutefois," says the declaration of the powers, "les alliés s'arrêteraient devant une neutralité véritable; mais une semblable neutralité ne saurait exister

openly made to the intrigues formerly carried on with the friends of the old system, and to the internal disunion which had been the result of these intrigues.\* On the 20th of December the Austrians began to pass the Swiss borders, after Senft-Pilsach, to whom Metternich had given his instructions shortly before at Friburg, had made his appearance on the 19th as Austrian plenipotentiary, accredited to the Swiss government.

A large number of the old families, the towns of Zurich and Basle, and especially Berne, and all the small cantons, would have been very glad to have availed themselves of the help of foreigners to restore entirely the old state of things; and Uri, Lucerne, Zurich, Glarus, Zug, Friburg, and Schaffhausen, even formed a union for this purpose on the 29th of December, to which they did not indeed exactly give the name of a Diet, though they intended it to represent one; but their plans neither suited the Emperor of Russia, nor even a large party in the union itself. This party never intended, even after the entrance of the allied armies, to restore the old system unconditionally, although the arrangements made by means of French mediation were declared to be no longer in force. The declaration to this effect set forth, that as the confederative system introduced by Napoleon could no longer be sustained in operation, care must be taken to preserve with the more exactness the old confederated system, and even to carry it better into effect.† The cantons above mentioned declared at the same time that no servile relation, inconsistent with the rights of a free nation, should ever again be introduced.

On the 21st, Schwarzenberg's troops advanced to the bridge of Basle, the wood-work of which had been destroyed and required to be repaired, and Wattewille, who had been formerly the leader in the aristocratic revolution suppressed by Napoleon, and since then a

sans une indépendance réelle. . . . Toute mesure politique prise par le gouvernement fédératif (c. à. d. actuel) de la Suisse, quand même elle n'aurait été provoquée par le dominateur étranger, doit nécessairement se ressentir de son influence originaire. Elle n'est pour les puissances, qu'une tentative maladroite pour entraver son entreprise, et *par conséquent* un acte d'*hostilité*."

\* In the declaration of the 21st we find: "L'acte de neutralité perd toute sa validité si les autorités qui doivent veiller à son maintien ou à son exécution refusent d'y accéder. . . . L'opposition de quelques cantons, dans une affaire si importante, devrait même être regardée comme une démarche qui dissoudrait immédiatement et de faite toute la constitution fédérale; et dans ce cas, les souverains alliés auraient indubitablement le droit de se déclarer pour le parti dans lequel ils espéraient trouver de l'accord avec leurs principes et leurs vues."

† For this purpose the following proposal was drawn up, which was to be laid before the other cantons not named above for their approval and acceptance. "1. The cantons secure to one another, according to the spirit of the old confederacy council, support and assistance; 2. All the cantons are formally invited to join this revived confederate alliance; 3. *No servile relation inconsistent with the rights of a free nation shall be restored*; 4. For the present the former presiding canton, Zurich, is requested to undertake the management of affairs; 5. The subscribing cantons are ready to enter into negotiations respecting an answer to the declaration of the allied powers of the 28th inst., in respect to the future position of the cantons till the general peace."



great man in the new system of things, and who was at the head of the force stationed there to preserve the neutrality of Switzerland by force of arms, was glad that he had an excuse for not even attempting any resistance. It would have been certainly ridiculous, and even irregular, after the new executive and the several governments had agreed with the intriguing ministers as to the changes to be made in the constitution, to have defended the old constitution with the sword; but Wattewille might at least have used in his proclamation dismissing his army to their homes, a somewhat less absurd form of words. He encouraged them to do, what they had that time at any rate not done, "to uphold the honour of Swiss courage," and recommended them to the protection of God. For seven days, beginning in the night between the 20th and the 21st, the Austrians were marching over the bridge at Basle, and other divisions of the army were entering Switzerland by Lauffenburg and Schaffhausen. Bubna's corps marched straight through Switzerland to Geneva, where there was a good deal of private feeling, and a strong party for the new system, inasmuch as the recollections of freedom survived there.

The entrance of the allied armies roused the aristocracy everywhere. No respect whatever was paid to the existing central government, and the smaller council of Zurich, as the leading canton, was requested again, as in old times, to undertake the management of affairs. By the 31st, most of the cantons had agreed to the changes in the government; but Berne held out for a long time. In all the cantons the formerly privileged classes were secretly encouraged, and on the 9th of January, those who had been formerly called the civic council had re-established themselves in Soleure, and on the 14th the same thing happened in Friburg.

## § V.

### FROM JANUARY, 1814, TO THE FALL OF NAPOLEON'S EMPIRE.

#### A.—AFFAIRS OF FRANCE TILL NAPOLEON'S DEPARTURE FOR THE ARMY ON THE 25TH OF JANUARY.

THE French Emperor perceived in December, 1813, that in the course of the following month he would be restricted to France, and that very probably a considerable number of the eighty-three departments would be occupied by foreign troops. For this reason he intended to have recourse to extraordinary measures, such as those by which the enthusiasm of the people had been excited in 1793; he hesitated to do so, however, when he perceived that the people were no longer willing to submit to his dictation. He perceived, and even said as much to those who advised him to hold by the nobility and the higher ranks, that this was exactly the party in

which he had least confidence;\* and yet he showed shortly before his departure, *à propos* of the organisation of a national guard in Paris, that he was afraid to entrust the defence of the country to the powerful hands of the lower classes. On the 8th of January he organised indeed a Parisian civic guard, but this was by no means suited to defend the capital against a hostile attack, though very well fitted to preserve the internal peace of the city. About 30,000 men were furnished with arms, but they were all dependents of the Emperor, and the officers were all officials, titled members of the aristocracy, or courtiers. The Emperor himself was commander-in-chief, but he made Marshal Moncey his representative, and immediately appointed all the superior officers.† He hardly expected that this guard would make any great sacrifices, or fight very desperately to support his rule; for he intended to have formed regiments of *Voltigeurs* from among the Parisians, but time did not admit of his doing so.

He began to feel, generally, in January, 1814, that the time was past in which his orders and their execution followed one another like lightning and thunder. First of all, his order for the formation of a new army of more than half a million could not be carried out, because the enemy prevented it, and people sought to avoid military service by every means in their power; then his plan of raising the people *en masse* by means of their representatives failed through his own fault. As long as the Emperor was fortunate and successful, no one ventured to speak of the rights of the people; but when France was threatened with the loss of all it had obtained since 1789, the old republicans murmured in the streets and in the army, and blamed the Emperor for rashly venturing all that they had gained. In the families formerly royalist, the thought again revived, that, in spite of his coronation by the Pope, Napoleon was not a ruler by the grace of God, but by his own merit and by the will of the people, and appeared to them as intolerable as ever. At such a time as this, and very shortly after he had imposed the heaviest burdens on the people, without paying any respect whatever to the mere shadow of popular representation which he had left, he hit upon the unlucky idea of making use of popular representation as an instrument to bring about his objects! By his decree of the 9th of October and the 15th of November, a levy of 580,000 conscripts, who had not been required in the years from 1803 to 1814, was ordered; the oppressive tax upon salt and the hearth-tax were

\* Dans ma position il n'y a pour moi de noblesse que dans les faubourgs, de canaille que dans la noblesse.

† Thibaudeau says with justice: "C'était comme pour les cohortes urbaines, une élite des habitans riches et aisés, bons pour protéger les propriétés et faire la police, mais incapables de se dévouer à la défense de la ville contre l'ennemi. Là où il fallait des commandans et des officiers populaires on nommait des hommes de cour ou du pouvoir, des hommes titrés pour diriger des bourgeois. La force de cette garde nationale prise dans une population d'environ six cent mille âmes était réduite à trente mille hommes; les plus propres à se battre, les plus capables de dévouement restaient en dehors et desarmés."



arbitrarily increased in this same month of November, and in the same month he endeavoured to regain the confidence of the people and to rouse their enthusiasm!

We shall not inquire whether he chose the right time for summoning the legislative assembly, when, by a decree dated from Germany immediately after the battle of Leipzig (on the 26th of October), he required the assembly to meet in Paris on the 15th of November: but it is certain that it was a great error just at this time to treat the assembly with particular caprice and despotism. The assembly was, first of all, prorogued on the arrival of proposals for peace till the 1st of December, and again till the 19th; and the deputies were allowed to remain all this time in Paris exposed to the influence of the cabals and intrigues at this time agitating the capital. The opening of the assembly was postponed, because the Emperor wished to, prove, by laying before them the documents in relation to the proposals made to him from Frankfort, that the nation was required to make concessions which it could not possibly do. There was at the time in Paris great anxiety and much dissatisfaction among the principal people, because the Emperor was entrusting the principal offices of state to men who had always allowed themselves to be used as his tools, however distinguished their talents might be in other respects. He had removed, for example, M. de Cessac from the direction of the army, and had entrusted this branch of the public service to Daru: he had, when Maret had been removed from the ministry of foreign affairs in order to make a peace easier, appointed, not Talleyrand, whom he suspected, but Caulaincourt, whose leaning to the Bourbons was at this time the more remarkable, as he had formerly given great cause for suspicion to his comrades of the old nobility by his participation in the murder of the Duc d'Enghien. Count Molé, who was a very young man and no lawyer, but a member of one of the old families, had been placed at the head of the administration of justice. This Count Molé was of use afterwards, in forcing upon the legislative assembly one of his creatures as president.

The senate was obliged, even before the assembly was summoned, to make certain changes in the existing order of the legislative proceedings, which hinted at an intention of making the whole scheme of national representation a mere empty form. It was decreed that the deputies, who, according to the existing law, should have become ineligible, should retain their seats; and another decree of the senate transferred the choice of the president of the legislative assembly from that body to the Emperor. This arbitrary exercise of power, by which the Emperor made one of his court sophists and jurists, Regnier, formerly an advocate and recently created by him Duke of Massa and Carrara, president of the legislative assembly, which desired to have nothing to do with him, was made more offensive by the reasons which Count Molé, since almost as celebrated in reference to his relations to Louis Philippe as Thiers himself, brought



forward in support of this alteration, and which might be regarded as an insult to the nation and its representatives.\* Napoleon was further mistaken in supposing that he could at such a moment dazzle the eyes of the representatives, offended as they were in their rights, by empty show and pomp. It was usual for deputations from the senate and the council of state to be present at the opening of the legislative assembly; but this time the whole of these bodies attended; the only result of this, however, was to increase the dissatisfaction which the appointment of their president had caused. He was received with loud murmurs, and some bold remarks were made in his presence, because the government had not, according to right and custom, named three candidates for selection, but had simply named the president at once. As if to express this dissatisfaction more plainly, the majority of the assembly chose Lainé, who, if not then attached to the Bourbons, was, at any rate, very decidedly opposed to Napoleon's system, for vice-president; and another man, no less favourable to the existing state of things, for secretary. Later again the Emperor made another mistake, out of cunning and foresight applied in the wrong place. He caused his commissioner to lay before the assembly all the documents referring to the proposal for peace by means of St. Aignan's note, letters, answers, and notes; but the most important of all, St. Aignan's note, written at Frankfort, was not among them; and the Emperor even struck out from the speech his commissioner made on the occasion, when it appeared in the *Moniteur*, everything which seemed to him to imply a too eager desire for peace. His minister for foreign affairs entreated him in vain to act quite openly. We give under the text the commencement of his letter, which Bignon gives entire.† This presentation of papers, however, failed entirely, because the Emperor had incorrectly imagined that the legislative assembly would follow the example of the senate. This was by no means the case, how-

\* "Il est," says this thorough-going courtier, "des formes dans le palais, des étiquettes, des formes, qu'il est convenable de connaître, et qui, faute d'être bien connues, peuvent donner lieu à des méprises, à des lenteurs que les corps interprètent toujours mal. Tout cela est évité par la mesure que nous proposons."

† The Emperor wrote to the duke on the 23rd of September: "La commission du sénat se réunira chez l'archichancelier à cinq heures. Vous vous y rendrez. . . . Regnaud et d'Hauterive pourront faire la même communication demain à midi à la commission du corps législatif. Il pourrait être convenable de ne pas montrer la pièce de M. de St. Aignan." The duke answers: "Le rapport est tel que V. M. l'a définitivement approuvée. Avant de le porter me permettra-t-elle encore de revenir sur les observations que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui faire? *La demi-vérité à laquelle V. M. veut réduire les communications ne satisfera personne.* Ce qu'on veut connaître, ce sont les propositions qu'on propose et que V. M. exige; enfin les prétentions que le sang Français aura à soutenir. Une demi-confiance faite à huis clos, dans un moment où il faut exalter la nation autant par ses espérances que par ses dangers, me paraît si loin d'atteindre ce but que j'écris à V. M. pour ne plus l'importuner quand j'aurai l'honneur de l'approcher. Sire, veuillez réfléchir au bon effet d'une complète publication qui aurait le double avantage de donner à la France et à l'Europe un gage de votre modération et de proclamer l'engagement public et réciproque pour les alliés de ne pas exiger plus et pour V. M. de ne pas accorder moins." For the remainder, see Bignon, vol. xiii., pp. 48-49.

ever. The senate, according to its servile custom, named, for appearance sake, a committee to test the genuineness of the documents; but this committee consisted of persons named by the president, who gave exactly such a report as the Emperor wished for, to use in his newspapers against the allies; but the legislative assembly proceeded differently. They rejected the persons proposed by the president, and chose others from among themselves, who were generally known to be opposed to Napoleon's autocratic mode of government.\* These five men left it to Lainé to draw up the report, but determined, as is clear from the note-book of one of them, *to insist seriously on peace, and that certain rights of which the nation had been deprived should be restored, and also to insert some grievances.*

The report which Lainé afterwards presented to the secret committee was, upon the whole, moderate, and took a mild tone, and the Duke of Massa and Carrara and the commissioners contrived afterwards to soften it still more; but it was, after all, very different from the report of the senate, drawn up by Chateaubriand's friend Fontanes, the rhetorical belletrist of Elise Bonaparte. In the course of the debate the president had to hear a few expressions not a little harsh respecting himself and the proceedings of his Emperor. Among other things, when he wished to call the deputy Raynouard to order, by reminding him that what he was saying was opposed to the constitution, he was answered *that there was nothing unconstitutional in that room except his presence.* In the report as approved by the committee, we find a decided and earnest expression of the wish of the whole people for peace, and of the dissatisfaction felt because the government interfered capriciously and arbitrarily with the course of law and with the free action of the tribunals, and because Masséna, who had been appointed commander-in-chief of the coast of the Mediterranean, had taken forcible possession of a large private building at Marseilles. It is true that neither the place nor the matter itself were expressly referred to in the report, but such allusions were made as could not fail to be understood by everybody. All this, says the report, must be done away with before the Emperor can hope that his war can become a war of the nation; so, at least, we think the words quoted in the note must be understood.†

This report thus agreed to in the secret committee produced such violent debates in the assembly on the 28th, that the decision was postponed till the 30th, when the assembly voted, by a majority of four-fifths, for a serious address to the Emperor, and for the printing of six copies of Lainé's report for each deputy. And now the vio-

\* Lainé, Raynouard, Flaugergues, Le Gallois, Maine de Biran.

† The words are: "L'Empereur ne peut espérer de rendre la guerre nationale qu'en s'engageant formellement à ne continuer la guerre que pour l'indépendance du peuple Français et l'intégrité de son territoire, et qu'en maintenant l'entière et constante exécution des lois qui garantissent aux Français les droits de la liberté, de la sûreté, de la propriété, et à la nation le libre exercice de ses droits politiques."



lence of the Emperor ruined everything, and deprived him of the only means of placing the enemy in a position of danger, by the rising of the French people *en masse*. He refused to receive the address: he forbade the printing of the report, and caused what was already printed, and the proof sheets, to be suppressed. He then summoned his council of state to meet at the palace, and matters went on there as they usually do at court. The Duc de Bassano read in the assembly a report; then one said this, and another said that, and finally the Emperor, in a few words, expressed which resolution he wished to be adopted. All present were of course, as always, of the same opinion as himself, and declared that as the legislative assembly had expressed such views, it could not with safety to the state remain longer together. It was immediately dissolved, and the deputies, offended as they were, and partly already Bourbon, dispersed among all the departments. They circulated everywhere the opinion, which the allied powers had also expressed in their manifesto of December 1, that the Emperor would never sacrifice any of his conquests in order to procure peace for France.

Even yet the quarrel might easily have been settled, for no one had been prosecuted for his opinions: but Napoleon once more ruined his cause by his violence on the occasion of the new year's audience on the 1st of January, 1814, when the deputies presented themselves respectfully to offer their congratulations. The Emperor, in a public audience, attacked the representatives of the people, and the defenders of its (whether real or imaginary) rights, in a manner and style as coarse and rude as he had formerly attacked Whitworth, Markof, the ambassador of Naples at the coronation at Milan, Metternich, and numberless other celebrated diplomatists, and, according to Odeleben's testimony, also marshals, generals, and officials of high standing. The violent, broken, and apostrophising sentences of the Emperor are nowhere officially preserved; we quote them therefore according to the authority which seems to us the best. The form of the speech seems in favour of its genuineness, as it is the same as that of all his similar addresses.\*

\* Bignon, from whose book we quote the speech, says, in reference to the following words: "On a publié diverses versions de cette boutade si fameuse. Quelques historiens ont eu le tort de la travestir en harangue académique. Le texte que nous en donnons, très différent, au moins dans la forme, de tous ceux qui ont paru jusqu'à ce jour, est celui d'une brochure publiée en Avril, 1814, et devenue très rare." "Je vous ai appelés," he is there reported to have said, "pour faire le bien, vous avez fait le mal. Vous avez parmi vous des gens dévoués à l'Angleterre, à l'étranger. . . . Les onze douzièmes parmi vous sont bons, les autres sont des factieux. Retournez dans vos départemens, je suivrai de l'œil ceux qui ont de mauvaises intentions. Vous avez cherché à m'intimider! Je suis un homme qu'on peut tuer, mais qu'on ne saurait déshonorer. Quel est celui d'entre vous qui pourrait supporter le fardeau du pouvoir? Il écrasa l'assemblée constituante, qui dictait des loix à un monarque faible. . . . Vous avez cherché à me *barbouiller* aux yeux de la France, c'est un attentat. Qu'est ce que le trône au reste? Quatre morceaux de bois doré recouverts de velours. Et moi aussi je suis sorti du peuple et je sais les obligations que j'ai contractées. Ce n'était point au moment où les étrangers entrent en France, où ces Cosaques sont prêts d'inonder nos plaines qu'il fallait faire des rémonstrances. Je sais qu'il y a des abus et jamais je n'ai souffert ceux que j'ai connues. M.



After the dissolution of the legislative assembly, the deputies, who had been regarded as the dumb and servile tools of the government, obtained great influence as the victims of its despotism. The old republicans, the old nobility, and the adherents of the Bourbons again took courage; it was therefore of little use that the Emperor sent extraordinary plenipotentiaries into the departments to expedite the conscription, and the furnishing of clothing, equipment, arms, and provisions for the 580,000 men, and to see that the provisioning of the fortresses was completed, the necessary contingents of horses furnished for the army, and the national guards organised and drilled. The commissioners who were sent into districts threatened by the enemy, were even empowered to raise the people *en masse*, or to make use of any other measures which might seem to them of use for the defence of the country. They were further empowered to appoint military commissions, and to condemn all persons consorting with the enemy: all tribunals, whether civic, legal, or military, were under their control. Thibaudeau says that all these commissioners, except three members of the council of state, were senators, generally speaking persons very little liked by the people, men who only cared for their own personal comfort, and who were very much cooled in their devotion to the Emperor by the mischances which had befallen him, and terrified at the prospect of the impending changes. They were afraid, says Thibaudeau, of periling their property or their titles. The sending of these commissioners was, therefore, with very few exceptions, a mere farce.

Savary also asserts in his *Memoirs* that men's feelings were very much excited, and that all the many counter-statements in opposition to the opponents of the government produced no effect, because appearances were strongly against them. He adds, that the conscription lists were exhausted, and the arsenal empty; that in order to arm the soldiers, it had been necessary to take the arms from the national guard, and that these had all to be repaired before they

Raynouard a dit que le Prince Masséna avait volé la bastide à Marseille, il a menti, le général a pris possession d'une maison vacante, et le ministre fera indemniser le propriétaire. Humilie-t-on ainsi un Maréchal de France qui a versé son sang et blanchi sous la victoire? . . . . Je vous avais indiqué un comité secret; c'était là qu'il fallait présenter vos doléances. . . . On a mêlé l'ironie aux reproches, suis je fait pour être humilié? Je sais supporter l'adversité avec noblesse. Vous me demandez des concessions que nos ennemis mêmes ne me demanderaient pas; s'ils voulaient la Champagne, vous demanderiez pour eux la Brie. . . . . Je vous le répète, vous avez parmi vous des factieux. . . . . Ne sais-je pas combien il est facile de remuer une grande assemblée? L'un se met là, l'autre ici, et la délibération est conduite par des agitateurs. Au lieu de nous réunir tous, vous nous avez désunis. Vous m'avez mis seul en face des étrangers, en disant, que c'est à moi seul qu'ils font la guerre; c'est une atrocité. Vous avez nommé votre commission extraordinaire, celle de finance, celle de l'adresse, et vous avez choisi mes ennemis. M. Lainé est un méchant homme; les autres sont des factieux. J'attendais que vous feriez d'intentions et d'efforts, pour chasser l'ennemi; vous l'avez appelé. J'aurais perdu trois batailles que cela n'ait pas fait plus de mal à la France. . . . . Retournez dans vos départements, je ferai quelque jour imprimer le rapport de votre commission; et il sera jugé ce qu'il est. S'il paraît dans vos départements je le ferai imprimer dans le *Moniteur* avec des notes," &c.

could be used. That there was no money in the treasury, and no credit on which to raise any: for the thirty millions, which the Emperor with so much flourish furnished from his private treasury, which he had filled from the effects of the public, were merely a drop in the ocean. The confiscated property was immediately sold, says Savary, but found few purchasers, and was sold at low prices, because every one was afraid to buy.

The Bourbons in England began to rouse themselves; Talleyrand, Larochevoucauld, Montmorency, Larochejaquelin, Fitzjames, and other legitimists, conspired; and when Louis XVIII. gave full powers to his brother, the Count of Artois, to act for him, he was allowed to land in the north, and the Duc d'Angoulême in the neighbourhood of the Pyrenees. The allies and the English had not yet, it is true, come to terms with them; but in place of Lord Aberdeen, who would have nothing whatever to do with them, his successor, Lord Castlereagh, as soon as he became English plenipotentiary, was as active in favour of the Bourbons and their adherents as Pozzo di Borgo.

#### B.—END OF THE SPANISH WAR, AND RESTORATION OF FERDINAND VII.

Even before the French Emperor had entirely lost Holland and Belgium, he had determined to give up Spain and Italy: we think it necessary, therefore, to mention here the conclusion of the Spanish war, as we formerly referred to the fate of Prince Eugene and the King of Naples. We have already mentioned how, after King Joseph's defeat at Vittoria, Suchet was only able to maintain himself in Valencia, Catalonia, and Arragon, and even there was obliged to give up one fortress after another, partly to the miserable Spanish armies, partly to the Anglo-Sicilian troops. These latter were commanded, after Lord William Bentinck's removal, by General Cotton, who again was under Wellington's orders. Wellington, after his victory, had penetrated as far as the borders of France, and even several times beyond them, but had deferred any serious attack on France till the fortresses of San Sebastian and Pampeluna should be in his power. Towards the end of June, 1813, General Graham, with 40 pieces of heavy artillery, had been despatched to conduct the siege of San Sebastian, the principal town of Giupuscoa, situated at the foot of a promontory connected with the mainland by a long sandy neck of land. About the same time, Napoleon quite gave up the cause of his brother Joseph, and sent Soult into Spain to carry on the war against the combined forces of the Spaniards, Portuguese, and English. Soult had rendered the Emperor important services in the battle of Bautzen and immediately afterwards, and after Joseph's recall to Paris, and before the 14th of July he now organised an army, which is said to have amounted to 77,000 men, to prevent, if possible, the capture of San Sebastian, and to compel the English to raise the siege of Pampeluna. Wellington had about

80,000 men to oppose to the French, who held St. Jean Pied de Port, Bayonne, St. Sebastian, and Pampeluna: but these were separated from each other by valleys and impassable mountains and ravines. The English attempted to storm St. Sebastian on the 24th of July, but were driven back with great loss. On the same day, Soult commenced his operations for raising the siege of Pampeluna. He advanced on the 25th with his whole army upon the celebrated passes of Roncesvalles and Maya, but left Drouet at the latter with a corps of observation. Soult, at the head of 35,000 men, drove the English from Roncesvalles as far as the walls of Pampeluna, and then sent for Drouet, thus allowing Picton, who had been observing him, to rejoin Wellington, who was advancing to the assistance of the blockading force. On the 28th, he began an advance upon the French along their whole line, and although they disputed every inch of ground, and the contest continued till the 31st, Soult was at last forced to fall back upon his original position on the 1st of August. The loss on both sides was considerable: Soult is said to have lost from 12,000 to 15,000 men, and the English give their own loss at 7500. The siege of St. Sebastian had been changed into a blockade after the unsuccessful assault of the 24th of July, but was recommenced on the 24th of August. The garrison only consisted of 2000 men, and the town was cannonaded with 117 pieces of artillery till the 31st, without the garrison giving any signs of surrender. A breach was made on the 31st, and the English stormed again: they lost, however, a large number of soldiers and officers of every rank by the determined resistance, and would have been again beaten back but for an accident unfavourable to the garrison. A quantity of powder and of combustibles of various kinds were strewn about over the walls; these took fire by accident, and by the explosion frightened the defenders from the walls, when they were closely followed by the enraged English soldiers. Both French and English writers agree that no pen could describe the horrors which were perpetrated in the few days following the capture of the capital of Giupuscoa by the victors. Murders, robberies, crimes of every description could not even be prevented by the officers; and many of these latter, who endeavoured to interfere, were ill-treated, and, in some cases, murdered by their own soldiers. No age nor sex was spared, the most barbarous and cold-blooded atrocities were perpetrated, and it was shown that the Irish, Scotch, and English, serving in the British armies, taken as they are from the refuse of society, and kept in check by corporal punishment alone, are as morally corrupt as they are physically strong and brave. Lord Wellington had said the same thing to his soldiers the year before in his general orders, and the same thing was said lately in parliament by all the officers, as a ground for their opposition to the abolition of corporal punishments in the army. One is the more inclined to believe they were right, as at the storming of Badajoz and of Ciudad Rodrigo similar atrocities occurred. It was unjust and unfair, on the other



hand, for the Spaniards to accuse the English generals of having taken good care that St. Sebastian should be entirely ruined and devastated, because that town had been especially concerned in trade with France. Soult had endeavoured to raise the siege, he had fought for two days, and lost two generals and 2000 men, but was obliged to give up the attempt on the 31st, and to confine his attention to guarding the frontier of France.

Suchet had still maintained his ground in Arragon and Catalonia after he had given up Valencia; he had quite an army distributed among the fortresses which he still held,\* and Soult had, therefore, conceived the bold idea of joining his forces to his and attacking Wellington in the rear, and thus compelling him to turn his attention to the army of the two marshals, which was numerically superior to his own, and to give up his projected invasion of France; but Suchet avoided any junction with Soult, whom he would have been obliged to obey. He had, therefore, given up his position at Saragossa, and always appeared on the point of quitting Spain altogether, which, however, he did not do. Suchet is as much praised by both English and French writers (and by himself, but this would be no authority for us) for his military skill, as he is blamed and execrated by English and Spaniards for the unheard-of extortions which he practised. As examples of this, we may mention that, as soon as he heard he should be obliged to give up the revenues of the enormous domains at Abufera, which had been presented to him, and to return to France, he contrived to exact, by the most unreasonable means, the incomes of the next seven or eight years in advance from the occupiers. Further, he took the town of Martorelli by storm on the 3rd of December, 1813, whilst negotiations were going on with King Ferdinand VII., in order that he might be enabled to plunder it, and did not leave for France till he had secured in a safe place all the amount of this robbery.

Wellington did not at first intend to invade France, because the English ministry acted often very imprudently, and often was unaccommodating or ungrateful; because he was continually engaged in quarrels with the wretched Portuguese government, the Spanish Cortes, and the regency; and because the French garrison at Pampeluna, though shut up and exposed to great sufferings, endured want of all necessities and other evils for a long time patiently; and he did not venture to leave this fortress in his rear. There was so much difference between Wellington and the Portuguese government, and between the English and the Portuguese generally, that forcible measures were necessary to preserve peace: this gave rise to rudeness on the part of the English officials and officers, even of the highest tribunals. The English officers could not prevent the rude and ill-trained people, of whom the English armies consisted, from

\* Sandona, Pampeluna, Jaca, Venasque, Monzon, Fraga, Lerida, Méquinenza, Figueras, Girona, Ostalrich, Barcelona, Tortosa, Morella, Pénsicola, Murviedro, Dénia.

committing excesses now and then. This latter formed also a ground of complaint to the Spaniards; and though Wellington would willingly have hindered it if he could, the Spaniards went so far as to lay all the blame unjustly upon him and his officers.

In Portugal the English governed immediately, and the native government was a mere shadow; the government and the clergy were, therefore, reduced to intrigues; but in Spain all this was different. The Cortes and the regency appointed by their authority were very jealous of their independence, and terrified by the examples of Ireland, of Portugal, and Sicily, feared that, in the end, Spain might be made a province of the highest aristocracy and bureaucracy. The Cortes had been, from the beginning, divided into two parties: the majority wishing to leave to the king only the title, and to found on the constitution a sort of democracy, which was unsuitable to the country, and impossible; the minority wishing to retain absolute monarchy, hierarchy, intolerance, and all the evils of kingdoms governed by Bourbons. The regency appointed by the extraordinary Cortes at Cadiz, with the old Cardinal of Bourbon at its head, was powerless and weak; and the English were as little satisfied with the wild democratic party as with the supporters of the old system and its abuses; and there was consequently perpetual disagreement.

The liberal party in the Cortes was continually becoming more radically democratic, and was, therefore, an abomination to Wellington, Stewart, and the leaders of the aristocratic party among the English government. The leaders of this party, therefore, connected themselves with the Spaniards, and through them with the French: this support was, however, on the one hand, from the very commencement, weak and dangerous, and, on the other, it was easy to foresee, in the year 1813, that it must soon fail altogether. The position of the liberal deputies in Cadiz became, therefore, very critical in the summer of 1813, for the absolutist party terrified the government by means of the municipal government of the city, which, in the same way as the civic council of Paris excited disturbances by means of a fanatic mob, ruled by the influence of terror, and, even when the yellow fever broke out and the French had left Madrid, prevented the government by force from making this a pretext for transferring the seat of administration to the latter city. Finally, however, when the yellow fever was at its height, and when the new, regularly chosen Cortes, or, as it is called, the first ordinary Cortes, had assembled, a formal decree was passed on the 29th of November, 1813, transferring the new government and the legislative assembly to Madrid. The party-contest still continued, although the new Cortes behaved with more courtesy and gratitude towards Wellington than the former one. This had given Wellington, whom they had chosen their commander-in-chief, so much unnecessary trouble and annoyance, that he had declared his intention of resigning his command, and of only retaining it till the

meeting of the new Cortes. The feeling had changed, however, before that time even in Cadiz, and the new Cortes did away with several of the difficulties which had arisen between Wellington and the regency. By a decree of December, Wellington was requested to retain the command, and the regency was required to fulfil all that had been promised by their predecessors.

Wellington had, in the mean time, at length reduced Pampeluna, had been informed of the resolution come to by the allies at Frankfort to invade France, and was ordered to cross the frontier on his side also, and to inquire, at the same time, whether it was really true that there were so many adherents of the old government and religion of France to be found in the south and east as the Polignacs, Larochevoucaulds, Choiseuls, Larochejaquelins, and their party, asserted. When Wellington advanced beyond the French frontier, Soult was in position beyond the Nivelle, and had thrown up defences which rendered the passage of the river a matter of great difficulty to the enemy. Soult's right wing extended to the sea, and rested on St. Jean de Luz. This town was taken on the 10th of November, after a hard-contested fight, in which the French lost 1500 men and fifty guns, together with all the magazines in the town, and Soult was compelled to retreat behind the Nive and the Adour. Wellington, as the allies afterwards did when they penetrated into the western departments, endeavoured entirely to separate the cause of the Emperor from that of the people: he therefore soon sent back the Spaniards whom he had brought with him, inasmuch as they proceeded to act in France as the French had acted in Spain previously; the Portuguese, who were disciplined in the English manner, he retained with him.

Until the commencement of December, Wellington was preparing for a fresh attack, which was carried into execution on the 10th. The French defended their position bravely and skilfully for five days, but were finally obliged to yield after much bloodshed. They then retired to a fortified camp, which Soult had erected near Bayonne. The English, shut in the town with a corps of 14,000 men, remained quiet for some time. During the fighting in the five days of December, two regiments of Nassau, whose commanders had heard of what had taken place in Germany, and a regiment of the grand duchy of Frankfort, found an opportunity of going over to the English. There were also German regiments stationed in the fortresses of Arragon and Catalonia, but these, when Suchet heard of what had happened at Bayonne, were for the most part disarmed in good time.

The events of the Spanish war and the English invasion of France had, before Wellington's last victory, turned the attention of the French Emperor to the attempt, by releasing Ferdinand VII., who was confined in Valançay, of separating the Spaniards entirely from the heretical English, and to introduce quarrels and civil war among



themselves. If he had released Ferdinand as soon as the idea occurred to him, and caused him to be escorted to Valencia, his stratagem would probably have been successful: he wished, however, to be too cunning and to be certain of his point, and Wellington was thus enabled to counteract his plan. The so-called servile party in the Cortes, which endeavoured in every way to please Wellington, had again disagreed with the second regency which they had recognised, and which had transferred its seat of government to Madrid, and would very willingly have set aside the ultra-democratic constitution, according to which the members were chosen. The extraordinary Cortes had been chosen according to the old regulations, or at any rate in accordance with their spirit; the ordinary Cortes, on the other hand, according to the democratic spirit of the constitution, according to which every 75,000 Spaniards were represented by a deputy: the reactionary element was, however, very strong in them: and they were, therefore, in a constant state of disagreement with the government. Wellington, too, had been at constant strife with the government at Madrid; and the absolutist party in the Cortes reckoned confidently, therefore, on his support. They deceived themselves, however, in this expectation, for as soon as Wellington heard of Napoleon's negotiations with Ferdinand, he behaved in a very friendly and compliant manner towards the regency, and gave way in reference to demands which he had previously firmly refused to listen to. We may mention especially in reference to this, that he entirely withdrew the English garrisons from Carthagen and Cadiz, and allowed these towns to be garrisoned entirely by Spaniards.

The negotiations of the Emperor with Ferdinand were, in the mean time, carried on with such secrecy, that even the commandant of Valançay was not intended to know of them; but nothing could escape Talleyrand. He heard of them and gave information in the proper quarter. In order to convey his proposals to the captive king at Valançay, Napoleon first of all employed the Duke of San Carlos, who had been the king's tutor. This latter and a former master of Ferdinand's, the Canon Escoiquiz, had been removed from Valançay in 1809, and sent to different places, on information received from one of the country people, that they were carrying on secret intrigues in favour of the prisoner. The Duke of San Carlos lived henceforth at Lons le Saulnier, the canon at Bourges; and the former was summoned to Paris at the same time as Laforêt, the former ambassador at Madrid and at the Prussian court, was despatched with a letter of the Emperor's to Valançay on the 11th of November, 1813. The letter which Laforêt brought to the most wretched offshoot of the Bourbons, appears to us quite unworthy of the Emperor, inasmuch as he therein professes himself the defender and protector of the system of administration and government everywhere exploded since the revolution, reviles the new system, of

which he was the creature, and represents himself as the protector of the privileged classes.\*

The cowardly and suspicious king showed distrust; he would not enter upon any negotiations, referred the question as to the time of his liberation and restoration to the regency, or at any rate demanded that a certain number of deputies should take part in the consultation; and he insisted on this till the arrival of the Duke of San Carlos on the 21st. The duke showed him the way to deceive the deceiver by promising everything and fulfilling nothing, and this had always been Ferdinand's morality and policy, and remained so till his end. Under the direction of San Carlos a treaty had been prepared by the 11th of December, and falsehood and deceit had been carried so far that there had been some talk of the marriage of Ferdinand with a daughter of King Joseph, then thirteen years old.† By this treaty the French Emperor acknowledged Ferdinand as King of Spain, and promised to restore him to his kingdom, and to leave to this the same limits it had had before the war. The fortified places still held by French troops were to be given up to the Spaniards. Although it was not distinctly stated, those articles were evidently directed against the English, by which both parties pledged themselves to uphold the naval rights, which, curiously enough, Napoleon deduced from the peace of Utrecht, and by which Ferdinand promised not to give up any portion of the Spanish territory, and to effect the evacuation of Spain and its dependencies by the English. Ferdinand never hesitated a moment to promise things which neither his own petty jealousy and revenge, nor the feeling of his whole people, would ever permit him to perform. He promised, for example, a complete amnesty, and in such a manner that all the supporters of King Joseph were to be allowed to retain their property, their offices, and honours. He promised further to pay his father and mother yearly the sum of thirty millions of reals.

The treaty was not to be fulfilled and Ferdinand set at liberty till it had been ratified by the junta at Madrid and by the Cortes: but San Carlos knew very well that this would never be done, not to say within the short period of six weeks, which was laid down in the treaty. First of all, Ferdinand himself wished to go with the treaty to Madrid to procure its ratification; then his uncle Antonio

\* The letter is as follows:—"Mon cousin, les circonstances actuelles de la politique de mon empire me portent à désirer la fin des affaires de l'Espagne. L'Angleterre y foment le Jacobinisme et l'anéantissement de la monarchie et de la noblesse, pour y établir une république. Je ne puis qu'être sensible à la destruction d'une nation si voisine à mes états et avec laquelle j'ai tant d'intérêts maritimes communs. Je désire donc ôter tout prétexte à l'influence Anglaise et rétablir les liens d'amitié et de bon voisinage qui ont existé si longtems entre les deux nations. J'envoie à V. A. R. sous un nom supposé le Comte Laforêt. Elle peut ajouter foi à ce qu'il dira. Je désire que V. A. R. soit persuadé des sentiments d'estime et d'attachement que j'ai pour elle," &c., &c.

† Quite unsuccessfully false and faithless is a letter of Ferdinand's to Napoleon at this time:—"Au moment où mon plenipotentiaire va signer le traité de paix conclu avec V. M., que je me félicite d'avance. . . . Mes premiers soins en arrivant à Madrid seront de rétablir le calme du royaume, et de rendre aux liens qui doivent unir les deux couronnes leur ancienne stabilité."

was selected for this office, and finally San Carlos himself was sent : Napoleon, however, allowed himself to be caught in his own net, forgetting that Spaniards and priests had always been more treacherous and faithless than even Corsicans and diplomatists. He thought that Escoiquiz would assist him in inducing Ferdinand to keep his word, and that Palafox, the defender of Saragossa, would allow himself to be employed in urging the Spaniards to ratify the treaty.

However much he was deceived in Escoiquiz, it is obvious, from the Memoirs of the latter, how great a pleasure he thought it to repay like for like. (*C'étoit une bonne œuvre de tromper un homme aussi fourbe que Napoléon.*) Palafox was sent to Valançay to support San Carlos' efforts in Madrid, or rather, in order to assist them in guiding Escoiquiz and Ferdinand. Although the affair was kept strictly secret, the negotiations could not have so remained for a single month even though the English had not possessed persons enough to purchase for them all secret intelligence and documents of every description. The English drew the attention of the liberal party in the regency and the Cortes to what was going forward ; and this party was more afraid of the treacherous Ferdinand and his autocracy than even of the power of Napoleon, already partially broken. The Duke of San Carlos was obliged to make a great *détour* in order to reach Madrid ; he was obliged to travel first of all to Suchet in Catalonia, to make him acquainted with his designs, and by his aid to get access to Madrid, where he arrived on the 8th of January, 1814. The Cortes kept the whole affair secret, and declared that, instead of purchasing the king's freedom by confirming the *treaty of Valançay*, they would only agree to receive him as king on his agreement with the decree of the Cortes of the 8th of February, 1811. In this decree, it was especially declared that every document signed by Ferdinand VII., as long as he was not a free agent and in the full exercise of his power, was to be regarded as null and void. It was further declared, that no peace could be made with the French until the whole Spanish territory was evacuated by them and the royal family reinstated. And finally, all the civil and military authorities were forbidden to obey the king till he was at perfect freedom in his own kingdom.

The Duke of San Carlos was obliged to take his departure from Madrid at the end of four days without having accomplished the object of his mission. Palafox, who had been sent to his aid, was received with as little attention as San Carlos. The Emperor afterwards set the king at liberty, which he should have immediately done, without waiting for the ratification on his word, which Ferdinand without a moment's thought as treacherously broke, as he set at nought all his obligations to the Spanish people, which had made such heroic sacrifices for his cause. Ferdinand's release, however, was delayed till the middle of March, and in the mean time the Cortes had passed a resolution, which was an evident proof that



they put no confidence either in the king, or in the courtiers and priests by whom he was surrounded. By this decree of the Cortes, the renunciation of the old absolute monarchical system, and the adoption of the new ultra-democratical constitution, was to be a necessary preliminary to his taking possession of the throne.\* The turn which the war in the south of France had taken under Wellington and the adherents of the Bourbons, contributed not a little to the release of the king by Napoleon in March without any ratification of the treaty of Valançay.

The allies had no sooner crossed the Rhine, than a number of the old nobility and *émigrés* tried to excite the feelings of the people in favour of the exiled family. They found, however, but a limited response, and the great mass of the people either knew nothing of a Louis XVIII., or were still filled with that contempt and hatred for princes and nobles with which they had been inspired in 1792 and 1794. It is true that individuals among the old families exhibited a degree of enthusiasm which we can admire without being able to comprehend. Louis XVIII. issued the most insinuating proclamations from his retreat in Hartwell. Arnould de Vitrolles first entered into communication with Talleyrand, and then went to the allies, who would not have trusted him and his compeers alone. At length the English, after long hesitation, allowed the Duke of Berry to go to Guernsey, in order that he might be in close proximity to La Vendée and Brittany; the Count d'Artois was suffered, on the 2nd of February, to go to Holland with full powers from his brother, and Wellington gave permission to the Duke d'Angoulême to come into his camp, where, however, he played a very sorry part. As is well known, he was neither distinguished for external nor internal qualities; he found no adherents in the department of the Lower Pyrenees, was always obliged to remain with the rear-guard, and was not allowed to make any demonstration, because the English, as well as the allies in general, wished to avoid the appearance of coming to intermeddle in the internal affairs of the French.

The Marquis de Larochejaquelin having come to the English army and given assurance that there was a party formed in Bour-

\* Bignon, vol. xiii., p. 105. "Art. 1. Conformément au décret de 1811, le roi ne sera pas regardé comme libre et il ne lui sera obéi à ce titre que quand il aura prêté dans le sein du congrès national le serment prescrit par l'article 173 de la constitution. Art. 2. La régence prendra les mesures pour qu'à l'arrivée du roi sur la frontière il puisse recevoir une copie de ce décret et une lettre de la régence qui lui fasse connaître l'état présent de la nation et les résolutions prises par les Cortes pour assurer l'indépendance nationale et la liberté du monarque. Art. 4. Aucune force armée ne pourra entrer en France. Art. 5. Si cette force armée se compose d'Espagnols. . . Concilier les égards dus à des prisonniers de guerre avec la sûreté de l'état. Art. 10. and 11. Le président de la régence se rendra au devant de S. M. et lui présentera la constitution afin qu'elle puisse en prendre connaissance et après une mûre délibération prêter le serment que la constitution prescrit. . . Il fixera la route que suivra S. M. Art. 12, 13, 14. Le roi prêterá serment sans délai à son arrivée dans la capitale; ensuite trente députés des Cortes accompagneront S. M. au palais, où la régence régulièrement assemblée lui remettra le gouvernement; enfin le même jour, les Cortes annonceront par un décret à la nation entière l'acte et le serment en vertu desquels, le roi constitutionnellement placé sur le trône."

deaux in favour of the Bourbons, Wellington resolved to avail himself of the hostile feeling towards Napoleon's rule in the town, which had suffered severely in its trade by the war; but he showed no favour to the designs of the partisans of the Bourbons, and merely suffered them to undertake what they pleased at their own risk. Since the last engagement, from about the middle of December till the 5th of January, 1814, the armies of Wellington and Soult had lain opposite to each other, and almost daily skirmishes had taken place. The great object which the English had in view was to compel the French to give up their position in Bayonne. Soult had fortified the whole neighbourhood of the town on the Adour admirably; but he had at the same time enraged its inhabitants against the government by the complete destruction of their trade, and his engineers devastated and destroyed the precincts of the town by the situation and extent of their trenches. At length, in February, the French were obliged to relinquish their position. At the same time, Napoleon also weakened Suchet's army on the further side of the Pyrenees as well as Soult's on the Adour. From the latter he took away for his own use two whole divisions, and a great number of old soldiers, whom he wished to incorporate in his guard. It is said that Soult's army was deprived of from 10,000 to 15,000 men of old troops, whereas Wellington, on the other hand, had received no inconsiderable reinforcements, and on the 14th of February began his movements in order to surround Soult. From the 14th of February till the 2nd of March, when Soult began to withdraw, the two generals exhibited the whole bent of their talents; their troops emulated each other, and they themselves put into practice all the devices which the science of war has enabled her most favoured sons in modern times to adopt.

Wellington's right wing marched in sixteen days, continually exposed to the most obstinate and hard-fought resistance, a distance of nearly ninety miles, wading through rivers, breasting mountain-torrents, and surmounting difficult heights. No less than five considerable rivers lay on the line of their march, over which they were obliged to make their way; and two strongly fortified *têtes du pont*, with several trenches, were obliged to be wrested from the enemy. In order to invest Bayonne and to threaten Soult from the side towards the sea, Wellington, under very unfavourable circumstances, caused a bridge to be thrown across the Adour below the town, which enabled him afterwards to bring his troops and means of transport into the road to Bourdeaux without being in possession of Bayonne, and at the same time completely to surround the town. When Soult drew still further to the east, Wellington gained a victory at Orthez, and compelled the French to retreat in two other engagements, took six pieces of artillery, a thousand prisoners, and the magazines at Dax, Aire, and Mont de Marsan; the chief thing, however, was, that he drove Soult away from Bayonne, which he was obliged wholly to give up, and obtained an opportunity of sending Beresford to Bourdeaux.

After the victory at Orthez, Wellington continued to pursue Soult, who directed his course to Toulouse. Beresford marched to Bourdeaux with 12,000 men, but was strictly commanded not to mix in political affairs, although Larochejaquelin and the Duke of Angoulême hastened to the city in order to excite the royalists to a rising. In his proclamation, Beresford made not the slightest mention of the Bourbons and their partisans, and his orders were merely to take possession of the town and harbour for the English. Wellington even declared publicly his displeasure at the conduct of the duke and his partisans, who in their proclamations had appealed to England. The duke had arrived immediately after Lord Beresford on the 12th of March, and had, in fact, found the Mayor of Bourdeaux, afterwards distinguished as a royalist in Paris, well disposed to proclaim Louis XVIII. as king. He would, however, have had occasion to repent of his own precipitation as well as of that of his friends, had not the allies made considerable progress towards Paris. The Bourbons mistook the prevailing dislike to the later measures of Napoleon for the manifestation of a liking for the Bourbons, the *émigrés*, and priests; and therein they were greatly mistaken.

Soult's retreat to Toulouse after his defeat at Orthez has received the universal commendation of all great military authorities, English as well as French. Wellington, on the other hand, who continued to follow him, was compelled to recal Beresford and the greater part of his troops from Bourdeaux. After Beresford's withdrawal, Lord Dalhousie remained with 5000 men in Bourdeaux, and would hardly have been able to protect the fanatical aristocrats and royalists against the rage of the still democratic multitude, had not a revolution taken place in Paris. Immediately after the unfortunate battle of Orthez, Soult collected together his scattered forces, and kept Wellington, with an army far superior to his, at bay for a whole month between Orthez and St. Gaudens; and during this time despatched a number of able officers in every department to make ample provision for his army in Toulouse. This was no sooner accomplished than Soult broke up from his quarters in St. Gaudens, and, inasmuch as he was able to take the shortest road, got to Toulouse three marches before the English, who were also on their way thither. Soult had long wished to draw Suchet's army to himself; the latter, however, constantly hesitated from all sorts of reasons, and probably rather wished to hold an independent command to the end in Spain, than to be dependent upon Soult and serve to add to his glory in France.

Soult awaited Wellington in and around Toulouse, where he had taken up a very strong position. He had availed himself of the town itself, the canal, and Mount Rave, in order to protect himself against the English, who ventured an attack on the 10th of April. The bloody engagement which followed might have been avoided had not Soult been anxious to make a last attempt to restore the failing fortunes of the Emperor, thinking that by a victory over Wellington he might compensate for what had taken place in Paris.



As early as the 7th of April, orders had been sent from Paris to both the commanders to put an end to hostilities; and Soult is greatly blamed for having obstinately and wilfully sacrificed the 10,000 men killed and wounded in the battle, since he knew on the 10th what had occurred in Paris.\* As this is a very grave accusation, we ought to add that Napier, the English historian of the war (a great admirer of Soult, which the author of this history neither is nor can be), whose papers he was permitted to use, gives no sanction whatever to the blame. Beauchamp, on the other hand, as well in his own History of the Campaign in Spain and Portugal in 1814 and 1815, as in his notes on Jones's History of the War in Spain, alleges decidedly that Soult hoped, by a victory, to raise the dethroned Emperor's cause, as he knew he was still in Fontainebleau. He alleges that Soult knew this so well, as to have caused all the couriers on the road to be seized and detained. The Bonapartists of the regency and the Emperor's relations placed their hopes at that time certainly upon Soult, and it was they who obstructed and detained the commissioners sent by the English and the French government. It was they, too, who obstructed the progress of Colonels Cook and St. Simon at Blois, on their way to the armies, so that they did not arrive at Toulouse till the afternoon of the 13th, Soult having already withdrawn on the 12th.

The battle of Toulouse is reckoned both by Wellington and Soult as one of their most splendid exploits; and its issue, of which we have no doubt, has given rise to long and earnest disputes, the Bonapartists being unwilling to allow that Soult was not the conqueror. The engagement was very bloody; it lasted the whole day; and the victory was purchased by the sacrifice of many thousand English, Portuguese, and Spanish lives. Soult lost fewer men than Wellington, and he was not, properly speaking, defeated, but at five o'clock withdrew behind the canal and maintained the outworks at Cacarie and Cambron. The other outworks were occupied by the Spaniards in Wellington's army, and he also got complete possession of Mount Rave. Soult soon came to the conclusion that he was not able to hold the town, and he evacuated it on the night of the 12th, leaving behind him six pieces of artillery and 1600 wounded. Wellington having marched in, the royalists proceeded, with great rejoicings, to proclaim Louis XVIII., while he persevered until the arrival of the commissioners in declaring that all such steps were taken at their own risk, and Soult refused to pay any attention to their proclamation. Even when St. Simon brought to him on the 13th orders from the provisional government, he refused to acknowledge their authority, and made an application for a suspension of arms, which Wellington refused. The English general believed

\* Much blood was also unnecessarily shed before Barcelona and about Bayonne after the cessation of hostilities in other quarters. On the 14th, the whole garrison of Bayonne made a sortie, and fell upon the English before the town. The assault was at length repulsed, but the English lost above 800 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. Major-General Hay was killed; and Sir John Hope, the commander of the besieging army, was among the prisoners.

that Soult was anxious for a civil war, because he treated all orders with contempt which did not come from the Emperor; a new engagement would, therefore, have taken place on Wellington's advancing against him, had he not, on the 17th, received an official despatch from Napoleon through one of his major-generals. The French commander then yielded to the necessity of the case, and concluded an agreement with Wellington, in which Suchet was included. The latter, however, had previously submitted to the new order of things, having been obliged, after exhausting all his means of defence, to evacuate Catalonia. We must now briefly notice Suchet's undertakings after his retreat from Valencia, inasmuch as they are closely connected with the issue of the Anglo-Sicilian expedition to Spain, and with the return of Ferdinand VII. into his kingdom.

After the battle of Vittoria, Suchet, as has already been observed, united all his forces and distributed them in the strong places of Catalonia. Lord William Bentinck had returned to Sicily, having left General Cotton behind him with an Anglo-Sicilian army, which, in conjunction with a Spanish force under General Copons, was to carry on the war. Wellington, it is true, ordered General Cotton to join him in France, because he presumed that Suchet would obey Soult's command and form a junction with him; as this, however, did not take place, Cotton remained behind. Suchet having remained in Spain during the whole months of November and December, 1813, Cotton could not leave the Spaniards to carry on the war alone with so able an opponent as the French commander. In December, Suchet received orders to facilitate the return of Ferdinand VII. into his kingdom, and was detained beyond the Pyrenees in order to negotiate with the Spaniards. The Duke of San Carlos having in December arrived at Suchet's head-quarters with the treaty of Valançay, matters were soon arranged with Copons, and a military convention concluded between the two generals, which was only frustrated by the Cortes and the regency, under whose orders Copons acted, firmly refusing to accede to any part of the treaty. Ferdinand's release without any condition having taken place, Suchet fortified himself in all the strong positions along the coast. He placed 8000 men in Barcelona, strengthened the garrison of Tortosa, and maintained all the other strong places, although he had sent away two divisions of his army to France, and the very best of his troops to the imperial army. One of the divisions designed for France was destined for Lyons, to be followed by the second to the same place; but when Wellington appeared on the Garonne it was sent against him. Suchet, in order to be able to send an army of men well practised in war to France, had offered to Copons to evacuate all the strong places in Spain except Figuierras and Rosas, if he and Cotton would consent to allow the garrisons to march with their arms to France. Copons was very willing to accede to the conditions, but Wellington, Cotton's superior in command, and the Spanish regency, from whom Copons held his authority, would not



agree. Suchet then caused the works of the smaller fortresses, including even those of Girona and Rosas, to be blown up, and marched with his army to Figueras, whither Copons followed him, whilst the Anglo-Sicilians and Spaniards by whom they were joined laid siege to Barcelona. The Spaniards, as long as they were alone, were quite unequal to the French garrisons; Cotton could, therefore, in compliance with Wellington's wishes, leave the prosecution of the war in Catalonia to them alone. He had received orders from Wellington to send back all the foreign soldiers in his army to Lord William Bentinck in Sicily, and with his English troops to join Wellington in France, because the latter believed that Suchet had left Spain. This was not the case, and therefore Cotton remained to assist in the siege of Barcelona. In the mean time, the Emperor, in order to lay the foundation of all kinds of disputes in Spain, had released Ferdinand VII., merely upon his assurance of fulfilling the treaty of Valançay, and on the 19th of March he arrived at Suchet's quarters, who offered to Copons to escort him, with his army, to Barcelona.

At length the Emperor, in order to sow all sorts of disunion in Spain, had allowed Ferdinand VII. to go at liberty upon the faith of his own word alone to fulfil the treaty of Valançay; and, on the 19th of March, he joined Suchet, who besought Copons, with his army, to accompany him to Barcelona. This the Spanish general felt himself bound to decline; and Suchet therefore accepted the king's promise to send back to him the garrison of Barcelona, although, in reality, he had received orders not to part with his majesty until the garrisons had withdrawn to France.

Suchet did not insist upon the French being allowed to march till the arrival of the king, because he thought it prudent to act as if it were possible to come to some sort of binding engagement with Ferdinand, although the king had given already abundant reason to conclude that, as his whole subsequent life proved, he could not be bound by his word, his written promise, or even by his oath. Ferdinand having given solemn assurance that he would send back the garrison, Suchet accompanied him with his whole army to the river Fluvia, which forms the boundary of the two countries, and there took leave of him in presence of the two armies; the Spanish troops solemnly received him as their king. He was not, indeed, received in Barcelona, and the French did not appear at parade on the fortifications on his joining General Cotton before the city, whilst the latter received him at a full review of the English and Spanish troops. Suchet now at length crossed the Pyrenees, and merely left a single division behind in Figueras. Cotton then wished to follow Wellington's orders, but was kept back by Copons, who was afraid a junction might be formed by the strong garrisons of Tortosa and Barcelona, whom he would be unequal to resist, when they had united with the division at Figueras.

In Catalonia, as well as in the south of France, the officers of Bonaparte's troops could not bring themselves to submit to the idea



that the French nation was to cease to exercise military rule over others; for Habert, the commandant of Barcelona, caused a fearful slaughter to be perpetrated even after the conclusion of the peace, under the pretence that he had received no official notice of Bonaparte's overthrow. A sally was made by the whole of the garrison, which, however, was repulsed; but above 800 Spaniards were killed or wounded. Four days after he received official notification that all hostilities were absolutely to cease. Notwithstanding, neither Suchet, who had yielded acquiescence to the new order of things even earlier than Soult, nor the new minister of war, could prevail upon Habert to evacuate Barcelona; he maintained himself in the city till the 18th of May, when he learned that all the places in Valencia had been evacuated. He then appealed to the fact that neither the King of Spain, the Spanish generals, nor the regency, had ever kept their promises.

#### C.—THE WAR TILL MARCH, AND THE CONGRESS OF CHATILLON.

The differences of opinion among the various powers who had carried on the war against France, but especially the disputes among the generals with regard to the mode of conducting the war and the division of the spoils, contributed much more to the lengthened quiet of the concluding months of the year 1813, than the desire to allow the armies to have some repose after the fearful exertions and labours to which they had been subjected. Russia met with opposition in consequence of her desire to incorporate in her territory the duchy of Warsaw; and Prussia, because she desired to absorb the whole of Saxony into her provinces; England combined with Austria to prevent, if possible, the realisation of these plans. We see, therefore, that at the very moment in which the combined armies entered France, Russia and Prussia held a special meeting at Basle and concluded an agreement, although Bonaparte's hesitation in not at once accepting the proposals made to him through M. de St. Aignan, had already led the caballing diplomatists to contemplate, at the close of November, a new and general combination against their still insolent foe. The contents of this new manifesto, issued on the 1st of December, were an invitation, as it were, to the French people to withdraw from obedience to Napoleon, and a declaration, made in the most solemn manner, that the hostilities were directed wholly against the military dominion of Napoleon, and not at all against the French nation, whom they honoured and esteemed, and whose greatness and integrity they were willing to maintain when confined to the *natural* limits of their country.\* The allied

\* We subjoin the leading points in this declaration, which was issued from Frankfort:—"Les puissances alliées désirent parvenir à une paix générale solide-ment établie, promulguant à la face du monde les vœux qui les guident, les principes qui sont la base de leur conduite, leurs vœux, et leurs déterminations. *Les puissances alliées ne font point la guerre à la France, mais à cette prépondérance que pour le malheur de l'Europe et de la France, l'Empereur Napoléon a trop long tems exercée*

powers had by no means at that time recalled the proposals of peace issued from Frankfort, to be subsequently mentioned, although the answer received from the Duke of Bassano on the 25th of November rather vexed than satisfied them, because Napoleon, while expressing his readiness to submit the various questions in dispute to a congress, said not a single word on the grounds on which these questions were to be settled. He proposed Manheim as the place of the congress; but the allies had already resolved on crossing the Rhine, and negotiating concerning France on French ground; they, therefore, declined the proposal.

The success of the war in the north, where, on the one hand, Denmark had been compelled to make a peace in consequence of the irruption of Bernadotte's army into Holstein, and, on the other, Bülow's incursion into Holland, which led to a rising in Amsterdam, and the recal of the Prince of Orange, encouraged the allies to push forward into France; and the English also, 4000 strong, under Graham, effected a landing in Holland, and in conjunction with the Russians and Prussians pressed hard on the fortresses on the Meuse and Schelde—even on Antwerp itself. Blücher, as early as November, had he not been prevented by the diplomatists from pursuing his career of victory, would have freed Germans, Belgians, and Dutch from French dominion. This general reckoned more upon the newly-awakened enthusiasm and national spirit, which was encouraged and maintained by him, than upon the cold, tedious, and calculating strategy of Schwarzenberg and his companions. He continued to press forward with the second or Silesian army, of which Sacken and Langeron, with a Russian corps, formed a part, and kept on his course towards the Rhine after the battle of Leipzig. On the 3rd of November he reached Giessen, where he learned that the French army had withdrawn further from the Rhine into the interior, with the exception of some 60,000 men in and around Mayence, who were in the very worst condition, and completely exhausted by their efforts; he, therefore, marched from Giessen on the 7th, and ordered the Russian army, under St. Priest and Cherbatoff, to join him on the 15th, at Müllheim, opposite Cologne. He had accomplished one-half of the distance, when he received orders,

*hors de limites de son empire. . . . Les souverains alliés désirent qu'elle soit forte et heureuse que le commerce y renaisse, que les arts y refleurissent, que son territoire conserve une étendue qu'elle n'a jamais connue sous ses rois, parceque la puissance Française, grande et forte, est en Europe une des bases fondamentales de l'édifice social, parcequ'un peuple ne saurait être tranquille qu'autant qu'il est heureux; parcequ'une nation valeureuse ne déchoit pas pour avoir à son tour, éprouvé des revers dans une lutte opiniâtre et sanglante, où elle a combattu avec son audace accoutumée. Mais les puissances aussi veulent être heureuses et tranquilles, elles veulent un état de paix qui, par une sage répartition des forces, par une juste équilibre, préserve désormais leurs peuple des calamités sans nombre, qui depuis vingt ans ont pesé sur l'Europe. Les puissances alliées ne poseront pas les armes sans avoir atteint ce grand et bienfaisant resultat. . . . Elles ne poseront pas les armes avant que l'état politique de l'Europe ne soit de nouveau reffermi, avant que les principes immuables n'aient repris leurs droits sur de vaines prétentions, avant que la sainteté des traités n'ait enfin assuré une paix véritable à l'Europe."*

on the 11th, not to cross the Rhine, but to distribute his army in the country between Dusseldorf and the Mayne.

We have already related the manner in which afterwards the grand army of Russians and Austrians under Schwarzenberg, to which the Bavarians under Wrede belonged, was facilitated in its march into Switzerland by a cabal between the members of the old Swiss aristocracy and the diplomatists of the monarchical states. The Emperor Alexander always acted as if the violation of the neutrality of Switzerland was an object deeply to be regretted; and Danielewski states that the emperor exclaimed, when he heard of the incursion of the Austrians into the Swiss territory: "*This is one of the unhappiest days of my life.*" The Swiss general Herrenschward, after a journey to the head-quarters of the allies at Lorrâch, evacuated Basle; and the allied armies therefore pressed forward into France along the whole line from Geneva to Basle. In the same manner as matters were arranged with Watteville and Herrenschward, some friendly relations were established with persons in Geneva, by which the taking of the city was facilitated. The whole army, the Bavarians inclusive, were divided into eight corps, of which the most southerly under Bubna and Giulay pressed forward through Geneva into the former Franche Comté; whilst the most northerly crossed the Rhine at Sollingen, not far from Fort Louis. This corps met with some resistance in the Vosges, but Mortier, who opposed its advance, was not strong enough to continue to withstand a force so superior to his own; and the army occupied the country between the Saone, the Doubs, and the Upper Moselle, left some of its troops behind before Strasburg, Huningen, Besançon, and other strong places, took Vesoul and occupied Langres. As early as the 20th of January, the army under Blücher was contiguous to the main force without having formed an actual junction with it. Blücher's corps crossed the Rhine in four directions, and rapidly pushed forward over the Saar, the Moselle, and the Meuse, but was materially weakened by being compelled to leave strong divisions in its rear to observe the fortresses still in the hands of the French: Langeron watched Mayence, other generals Saar-Louis, Thionville, Luxemburg, and Metz. Blücher had pushed forward far into Lorraine, while Schwarzenberg was far behind. Winzigerode, who was to have reinforced Blücher, did not cross the Rhine till the 13th at Dusseldorf, and Schwarzenberg, who had been in Langres on the 18th of January, delayed there in a most unaccountable manner till the 23rd, instead of pressing forward to Troyes, as he ought to have done. This led Napoleon to hope that he might surprise Blücher on the Aube before Schwarzenberg could come to his aid. His military eye at once led him to see, at the first glance, that Chalons on the Marne was the centre from which he must start, in order to prevent the complete junction of the two armies; he therefore concentrated all the troops at this place which he proposed to take under his own immediate command. Schwarzenberg, who was more of a diplomatist than a general, first received the Emperor of Russia and



then his own impérial master, as well as Metternich and Castlereagh, with all becoming honours at his head-quarters, and then proceeded on the 24th to drive the Duke of Treviso from both banks of the Aube; so that when Napoleon appeared in the centre of his forces at Bar on the Aube, the Crown Prince of Wirtemberg and Giulay were already in possession of that place, Collorodo of Dijon and Wittgenstein and Wrede were on their march to Joinville. Blücher had passed the Marne and was marching upon Brienne, when Napoleon hoped to cut him off.

The Emperor of the French having established the national guard, as has been stated above, appointed a regency before he left his capital. To the regency, however, he gave a very small degree of power, and placed his wife at its head, and for assistants his brother Joseph, who had given proofs of his incapacity for government in Spain, and Cambacérès, whose god had been his belly, ever since the time in which he was employed in forging Robespierre's thunderbolts. King Joseph bore the pompous title of Lieutenant-Governor of the Empire; the Empress was called Regent, and was assisted by a council of regency; but according to her patent of office, she could neither propose decrees for discussion and adoption in the senate, nor cause any law to be proclaimed. On the evening of the 25th of February the Emperor reached Chalons, but on the previous day he still played one of those comedies which make us weep, and furnished the newspapers with a world of sentimental declamation, but which are only calculated in the end to make the people absolutely obdurate when they become convinced that ambitious men of every kind and class are merely making them tools of their scandalous pursuits.\* Napoleon first of all called a meeting for the solemn reception of the oath of fidelity, and recommended to their loyal affection his wife and son. It is probable he himself was really affected on the occasion, and therefore called forth some symptoms of feeling on the part of others. He could scarcely have ever believed that a time would come when he should be obliged to have recourse to mere feeling, and yet he did not even then anticipate that this would be his final leave-taking of his wife and son!!

When the Emperor set out from Chalons on the 26th, the Prussians were on their way to Troyes, where they were to form a junction with Schwarzenberg's army; but Blücher's four corps with which he had crossed the Marne were by far too much scattered. Langeron's corps alone was with Blücher—that under Sacken was separated from

\* Even Thibaudeau cannot conceal from his readers that he had become too familiar with republican comedies during the revolutionary times, in order to lay great stress upon monarchical follies of the same description. He says quite coolly: "*L'Empereur reçut le 23 Janvier, accompagné de l'Impératrice et du Roi de Rome au palais de Tuileries, le serment des officiers de l'état major et des douze légions de la garde nationale. 'Je pars avec confiance,' leur dit-il, 'je vais combattre l'ennemi, et je vous laisse ce que j'ai de plus cher, l'Impératrice et mon fils!' Ils acceptèrent le dépôt avec enthousiasme. Ce fut une scène touchante.*" Think of what followed at the end of March!!!

him, and would have been fallen upon on the further side of the Aube on the 28th, had not the staff officer been made a prisoner whom Napoleon had sent to give information to Mortier of his near approach; Blücher, however, had a very narrow escape from being taken prisoner on the 29th in the castle of Brienne. Napoleon had pressed forward to Brienne, and severe fighting had been kept up during the whole of the 29th; Blücher thought himself quite secure on the evening of the day, and went to dinner in the castle, when General Chateau, having made his way through the park behind the castle, pushed forward to the house. The Prussian general had a very narrow escape, and with difficulty succeeded in gaining his own men, whom he had sent forward to Tannes. The Russians continued to maintain their position in the lower town, and covered the retreat. In the mean time, Blücher by a rapid retreat fortunately joined the main army at Bar, and again immediately advanced, on his part to assume the offensive. This led to the engagement at La Rothière on the 1st of February.

It may be readily admitted that the French fought gloriously on the 1st and 2nd of February at La Rothière, and that Napoleon was far superior to all the generals of the allies, both in ability and experience, without giving credit to all the rhodomontade of the French accounts. The allies were by much too superior in numbers to leave Napoleon any hope of victory, for Schwarzenberg had not only placed the corps commanded by Giulay, Wrede, and Wittgenstein, under Blücher's command, but the Wirtembergers under the command of the crown prince also took part in the battle; and although the corps under Collorodo, Kleist, Wittgenstein, and York, took no part in the engagement, they were so near the scene of action as to be able to render help if necessary. Without giving implicit credit to the French accounts of the number of killed and wounded, we may conclude that the allies lost one twenty-fifth part of their whole number, whilst the French only lost a seventh. The allies made a thousand prisoners and took seventy pieces of cannon, which the French proved unable to remove in consequence of the depth of the roads. The most important circumstance, however, was that Napoleon was obliged to evacuate the unfortified town of Troyes on the 6th of February, where he had spent three days: on the 7th he was at Nogent, only four-and-twenty hours from Paris, and the whole of France was terrified; the want of ability on the part of the allies and Schwarzenberg's tediousness gave courage to the French once more, who still continued to look on their Emperor as a miracle-worker.

The monarchs, generals, and diplomatists, among whom Lord Castlereagh, the English minister of foreign affairs, presented himself in January, held a grand council after the battle in the castle of Brienne, respecting the prosecution of the war; and it was resolved to march to Paris, not in a united body, but by different routes. The want of confidence which the Russians and Prussians felt towards Schwarzenberg no doubt contributed in a considerable degree to



produce this separation: the Austrians and Blücher carried on war in a very different manner. Blücher was to march along the valley of the Marne by Chalons and Meaux to Paris; Schwarzenberg proceeded on both banks of the Seine by Troyes to Nogent, where Bonaparte was. It appears as if the Emperor, who never suspected the allies would afford him such openings as they actually did, was at that time extremely anxious respecting the fate of his capital, and therefore at length was disposed to enter into serious negotiations for peace.

Napoleon, in his answer to the proposals made to him on the 23rd of November, through M. de St. Aignan, having taken no notice whatever of the grounds on which the negotiations were to be entered upon, the allies on their part issued the manifesto of the 1st of December, wherein the Emperor was represented as the only hindrance to the conclusion of an advantageous peace with the French nation; and they were by no means satisfied with the manner in which he received the propositions of the 2nd of December; they therefore declined acceding to the congress at Manheim, but did not at the same time recal their proposals. The Emperor had sent his minister, Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, to the advanced guard at the time in which the allies were making preparations to cross the Rhine; Caulaincourt, however, did not at once receive his passport, under the pretence that it was necessary to wait for Lord Castlereagh; and in the mean time he went to Luneville, from whence he renewed his application on the 6th of January, 1814. Metternich was at Freiburg in the Breisgau, from whence he sent his answer on the 8th, and expressed his pleasure at Lord Castlereagh's expected arrival; but the latter did not really reach Basle till the 21st of January. The circumstances were at that time favourable, for great differences of opinion existed with respect to Poland and Saxony, between Austria and England on the one hand, and Prussia and Russia on the other; and although the conditions of the agreement concluded at Basle on the 6th of January, between Prussia and Russia, respecting the more detailed particulars of the treaty of Kalisch are not known, it is nevertheless certain that they referred to the plans of Russia respecting the duchy of Warsaw, and the views of Prussia on the kingdom of Saxony. The answer sent by Metternich from Freiburg to Caulaincourt on the 8th of February, appeared to prove that the allies were not in earnest with respect to the proposals of peace, and of this Napoleon wished to avail himself in order to rouse the whole French nation. He was desirous of throwing the blame of the continuance of the war upon Metternich's evasive answers, by a publication of them and his own attempts at peace since the 2nd of December. At the very moment, however, when the documents were printed, there arrived a note from Metternich of the date of the 14th of January, accepting the proposal of a congress, and determining the place of its sitting. The *Moniteur* of the 21st, in which all the documents were actually printed, and which, in fact, contained the



whole correspondence, was suppressed as soon as Metternich's note arrived. The sheet substituted for the former, which came into very few hands, has led many persons astray with respect to much which has been written respecting the congress of Chatillon. Pons has written a special book on the subject; Vaudoncourt mentions it, and gives some of the documents; Fain, in his *Manuscrit*, publishes the documents at full length; and we might, besides, quote a whole series of smaller notices of the congress; and yet Bignon, in the 13th part of his work, has collected very considerable remains of original and previously unprinted information.

In his note to the Duke of Vicenza, whom Napoleon had appointed minister of foreign affairs, although Maret still remained with him, Metternich invited him to proceed to Chatillon, where the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England were also to assemble. The members of the congress who were to represent the allied powers on this occasion would appear, with perhaps the exception of William von Humboldt from Prussia, to have been especially selected to give offence to Napoleon. Count Stadion, concerning whom Metternich wrote on this occasion that he might be regarded as his second self, and was to appear for Austria, had been the special object of Napoleon's hatred ever since the year 1808. The Emperor of the French contrived to keep him out of the Austrian ministry from 1809 till 1813, and his recall in 1813 had been, as it were, a signal for war. Rasumowski, who was sent by the Emperor of Russia, had, for seven years long, been busily engaged in organising and directing conspiracies among all the old European aristocracy against the New France, and Lord Castlereagh was of the opinion at that time, which he at a later period openly expressed in parliament, that the whole efforts of the allies should be directed to working out the restoration of the Bourbons and the *émigrés*. This was also the opinion of the whole English aristocracy, although they did not make the same public manifestation of their views. Lords Aberdeen and Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart, were commissioned to take part in the negotiations, Lord Castlereagh being present merely as the representative of the English ministry, in order to remove difficulties as they arose, to promote in every way the cause for which he was interested, and to avoid the necessity of tedious correspondence. Napoleon could have had no objection to Humboldt, except that he had been always represented to him as a member of the *Tugendbund*, and this body had always been represented to him by his spies as one of a very dangerous character. Metternich and Talleyrand, moreover, had their own especial minister at the congress, although the latter was not only kept far away from business of all kinds, but Savary often urged upon Napoleon the necessity of his arrest. Talleyrand, as vice-grand elector, was, by virtue of his office, a member of the regency without being especially appointed; but he was an object of such great suspicion to the Emperor himself, that he forbade the

English newspapers to be delivered up to him from the department of foreign affairs, where they were to be retained.

Metternich, professedly with the view of sending to the congress a man more agreeable to Napoleon and Caulaincourt than Stadion, had especially recommended M. de Forêt to the Duke of Vicenza. Forêt, who had formerly been *chargé d'affaires* in Paris, took Metternich's interests especially under his care, as Stadion had interests of his own. Napoleon sent to Chatillon La Besnardière, the director of foreign affairs, a man of the Talleyrand school. He kept up an understanding with Talleyrand, which was in the highest degree dangerous under the then existing circumstances. Napoleon dictated a special letter to Metternich to M. de Besnardière before his departure for Chatillon. In this letter he proposes an armistice, and by promising to evacuate Mayence, Palma Nuova, and Vena, he hoped to obtain permission from the allies to withdraw his garrisons from these towns, and thus to get possession of a very considerable army. The selection of Pozzo di Borgo to hold the pen on this occasion was characteristic of the fate of the congress, and of Napoleon.

Metternich, in reply to the letter of Besnardière of the 19th respecting the armistice, wrote, with good reason, on the 29th, "*that he was convinced it would not lead to anything.*" Metternich's letter so clearly intimated to Napoleon a no very distant overthrow of his empire, that nothing remained to him but to accept of what was offered. The idea of the possibility of the Emperor Francis, for the sake of his daughter and her son, being still induced to enter into separate negotiations, prevented Napoleon from perceiving and profiting by the favourable opportunity. He knew also, as appears from Danielewski's account, that the Emperor Alexander and his advisers had very different military views from those of Schwarzenberg, who, during the whole months of February and March, played the waverer in a very dangerous manner. Napoleon, therefore, suffered himself to be misled by a ray of success which shone on his arms in the month of February, to delay sending a decisive answer, and to refuse the full powers to his minister which the latter desired, and to deny him the liberty of subscribing to the principles laid down by the allies.

The hope placed by Napoleon in his father-in-law appears to us the more surprising, as Schwarzenberg had expressed himself with great hesitation in the year 1813 on the subject of the relationship, and as Metternich, in a letter to Caulaincourt, preserved by Fain, speaks without hesitation on the subject. "Should," he writes, "such an unhappy blindness lead the Emperor of the French to reject the voice of the French people, and that of the whole of Europe, the emperor, my sovereign, will indeed lament the lot of his daughter, without, however, delaying the march of his army to Paris."

The allies had at that time come to the decision in Langres to



adopt totally different grounds as the basis of their negotiations at the congress at Chatillon from those offered at Frankfort. They now required that France should be confined within the limits of 1792, and the whole advantage of the war be conceded to England.\* It obviously appears, from the instructions given to the whole of the plenipotentiaries of the powers allied against France, that that controlling power of all seas, coasts, and islands, was to be formally conceded to England, which had been regarded as a crime on land in the case of France. They were commissioned completely to exclude from their consultations any consideration of the rights of neutrals, and to confine themselves to the question of the countries newly ceded by France, and to be partitioned among the other powers, or restored to their former possessors; and therefore indirectly to acknowledge *that* as a general maritime right which had hitherto been regarded as usurpation, and against which the alliance of the armed neutrality of 1781 and 1800 was formed.† Besides this, the English obtained a decisive voice in the consultations respecting the new distribution of the countries from which France was excluded.

The first sitting of this congress was holden on the 5th of February, and the conditions were undoubtedly very harsh which were required by the ambassadors of the allies, and which, according to the before-mentioned instructions, were proposed, and their immediate acceptance required. In Germany, the old system of independent principalities was to be restored; the neutrality and independence of Switzerland were to be fully recognised by each of the powers, and all those portions of it which had been forcibly seized upon by France were to be restored. In Italy, the independent states, which operate as a sort of equipoise against Austria and Sardinia, were to continue to subsist, together with the territorial possessions of Austria and Sardinia. Spain was again to revert to Ferdinand VII., which was to be as before the war, and of which he was

\* The six points written down at Langres by Pozzo di Borgo were the following:—"1. A congress shall be holden at Chatillon; 2. The four allied powers shall negotiate in common on behalf of the whole of Europe with France; 3. France shall be limited to the boundaries of 1792, with some exceptions, such as to both parties may seem meet; 4. The Emperor Napoleon shall be informed of the arrangements which shall be made in Europe, without, however, any further negotiation being allowed; 5. The ministers of the allied powers shall receive common instructions; 6. As soon as the congress is concluded, the conditions are to be conveyed to the knowledge of the Emperor of the French, which are to be proposed to his government."

† It was said:—"Les instructions du gouvernement Britannique portent: Que toutes discussions relatives au code maritime seraient contraires aux usages précédemment observés dans les négociations telles que cette actuelle; que le cabinet de Londres ne demande ni accorde aucune concession par rapport à ses droits qu'il regarde comme obligatoires, et ne devaient être réglés que par le droit des gens (déclaration à laquelle les cours alliées adherent), considèrent toute insistance à ce sujet de la part de la France comme contraire à l'objet de la réunion des plenipotentiaires." Thus the whole system of what was called the armed neutrality in the years 1781, 1800, and 1801, was at once quietly set aside.



to be the independent king. The extent of Holland was to be greatly enlarged, and the whole restored to the Prince of Orange as an independent principality. In case these conditions were not immediately accepted, the powers reserved to themselves the right, as the war also was to continue to be carried on during the congress, of increasing their demands, if their arms were attended by success.

Napoleon's representative was fully aware of the hardness of the conditions and of the necessity of their immediate acceptance, especially seeing that the Emperor, since the battle of La Rothière, had been obliged to retire to Nogent. Caulaincourt, therefore, was no sooner made acquainted with the issue of the battle, than he wrote to the Emperor on the 3rd, as follows:—"Your majesty does not inform me to what sacrifices you are willing to submit, for circumstances absolutely demand that sacrifices must be made, in order, if possible, to save the greater part of the empire. A *single* day, nay, a *single* hour, may expose to the greatest danger all that your majesty holds most dear. Three hundred thousand men, sire, are on their march against, and threaten the complete overthrow of, all existing institutions. The energy of the people is altogether exhausted, and I therefore am greatly afraid that even your majesty's supereminent abilities will fail to discover any means of conquering adverse fortune. I am as much indisposed as any other to concede even the smallest portion of the territory of France; but I feel more strongly than any other, and have been long convinced, that the best terms which can be obtained ought to be made in order that FRANCE MAY REMAIN FRANCE."

The Emperor, in reply to his minister, refers in language as brief as it is clever to the whole of Metternich's objects and course of action.\* In this same letter, however, very little hope is left to Caulaincourt, who was earnestly endeavouring to promote the best interests of the Emperor, that he should obtain his concurrence in what he deemed the proper course. Caulaincourt had given it as his opinion, that it was for the time advantageous to avoid consulting or advising with the Duke of Bassano; to this Napoleon would not accede. At the same time, in a letter of the 4th and two others of the following day, he gives intelligence and orders which placed Caulaincourt in the greatest difficulty, inasmuch as they were contradictory to one another.

Instead of informing his plenipotentiary of the true state of affairs, the Emperor writes to him respecting the battle of La Rothière as if he was composing a bulletin for his soldiers and the loungers of Paris.

\* "La lettre de M. de Metternich du 29 Janvier est tout-à-fait ridicule, mais j'y reconnais ce que j'ai vu depuis long temps; *c'est qu'il croit mener l'Europe et que tout le monde le mène.*" The manner in which the French deal with history may be seen from Fain's "*Manuscrit de 1814*," in which the whole of the documents are given, but the words "*il n'y a pas eu de bataille à la Rothière*," are silently omitted from the Emperor's letter, and the notorious letter of the 19th is denied. This Bignon affirms only to have been interpolated, and ascribes the interpolation to Talleyrand.

Speaking of the engagement, he alleged "*that no battle had been fought at La Rothière, for the young guard had never come into the engagement, and the old guard was not there at all.*" The letter written by the Emperor himself was completely contradictory to that which he allowed to be written by the Duke of Bassano, and both letters reached the minister at the very moment in which he was called upon to give a decisive answer to the proposals made by the allies at their first sitting. Napoleon himself wrote to his plenipotentiary to accept of the proposals, in case they were what he calls capable of being received; and if not, he would risk a battle, and would not hesitate to venture the loss of Paris, and all the consequences which might follow. In the letter which at the same time he caused to be written by the Duke of Bassano, he gave *carte blanche* to the Duke of Vicenza to accept whatever was offered to him, in order to enable him to secure the safety of Paris without risking a battle. Was Caulaincourt not right, when he alleged, that if he had made use of the permission thus given, the Emperor would have denied it? We shall go no further into particulars, inasmuch as our object is merely to indicate the general facts, and we refer to other works for the detailed history of the congress;† our object is to touch upon those points alone which are of importance in relation to the events which took place in the field, and to the catastrophe of the 30th of March.

The French minister, hesitating between the wish of coming to a quick conclusion and the hope of secretly effecting something through the instrumentality of Metternich and the Emperor Francis, admitted that he was inclined, after the reception of the two letters, to go into the proposals of the allies, provided they agreed to a suspension of arms; on the other hand, he wrote a letter to Metternich on the 8th, that he was not serious in his concession. Metternich, it is true, immediately communicated the letter: the relations, however, between England and Austria on the one side, and Russia and Prussia on the other, created such a degree of caution since the time of the more minute details of the treaty of Kalisch of the 6th of January, that the Emperor of Russia was afraid of Metternich playing him some diplomatic *ruse*, whereupon he recalled Rasumowski from Chatillon. The disputes among the allies were, nevertheless, kept very secret; the

\* In a note in vol. xiii. of Bignon's papers, it is expressly alleged that Caulaincourt stated, in a conversation with the author, "Qu'il eût la certitude que malgré la lettre du Duc de Bassano la paix signée aux conditions proposées serait en tout cas refusée par l'Empereur;" with which Fain entirely agrees, pp. 93-96.

† No German writer sufficiently familiar with the nature of history and of men, and who was in a situation to evolve the truth from the diplomatic correspondence and the slippery papers connected with the congress, has written its history. Among the French, Fain as well as Vaudoncourt and Bignon were intent merely on giving the whole affair such a turn as might be favourable to Bonapartism; the "*Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat*" contain the documents only imperfectly; Montveran is not always trustworthy; and Pons de l'Herault, throughout his "*Congrès de Chatillon*," which has gone through several editions, appears to do continual injustice to Caulaincourt. Schöll has the documents, but goes no further into the subject; Koch, in his "*Geschichte des Jahrs, 1814*," may be used with advantage. Moreover, Bignon, in the 13th part of his work, has brought to light much which is not to be found in Fain, and indeed, when the latter published his work, could not have been put in print.



minister of France was merely informed on the 20th that the conferences were for the present wholly suspended.\*

It was a very unlucky circumstance for the Emperor of the French that the turn of the war appeared favourable to him precisely on the 10th, and that he was not, therefore, eager to accept the conditions offered him before the Emperor Alexander changed his mind. We stated above that Napoleon retired to Nogent when Schwarzenberg was marching on towards Paris by the valley of the Seine, and Blücher was pursuing the most direct route from Chalons on the Marne through Meaux. Blücher's divisions, however, were too much scattered and not kept in sufficiently close array. When Napoleon, on the 9th, was informed by Macdonald of the nature of Blücher's march, he hoped by a quick movement from the banks of the Seine to those of the Marne, to surprise and overpower the single divisions; and on the 10th he did in fact fall upon and destroy or completely rout 7000 or 8000 Russians under General Alsufieff at Champaubert.† On the 10th he left Oudinot and Victor to stand against Schwarzenberg on the Seine, and took Marmont, Ney, and Mortier, with himself to act against Blücher, who was only ten hours from him. The chief gain of the victory of Champaubert was that Blücher's army was separated into two parts, and that Sacken's corps as well as York's division was obliged to return to Montmirail. The one had proceeded considerably beyond Epernay towards Château Thierry, and the other had marched from Montmirail to La Ferté sous Jouarre. They immediately formed a junction on the news of Alsufieff's unlucky defeat, and on the 11th fell in with Napoleon's army at Montmirail. Sacken had hoped to reach Montmirail before Napoleon, where he found the position occupied, when he was obliged to give way; and York, who hastened to his assistance, proved unable to detain the enemy. The two generals having joined their forces, crossed the Marne to Château Thierry, and suffered a considerable loss in the latter town, as the French report that the inhabitants fell upon the Prussians and Russians. The advantages gained on these occasions by the Emperor of the French were trumpeted forth by his newspapers and partisans in a manner very suitable for the ears of the multitude, but no little ridiculous to persons of common understanding; the French also allege, that Macdonald alone was to blame for suffering Sacken and York to escape without being completely defeated on the 12th, on which we must allow them to speak for themselves.‡

\* The note is as follows: "Que l'Empereur de Russie ayant jugé à propos de se concerter avec les autres alliés sur l'objet des conférences desirait qu'elles fussent provisionnellement suspendues."

† In the *Moniteur* of the 13th it was alleged that Blücher's army had been surprised. "Les résultats seront immenses, l'armée Prusse est détruite."

‡ It is wonderful to observe in what manner the French were at that time scandalously deceived. Every page of the *Moniteur* spoke of nothing but victories, and the otherwise accurate and official report of the *Moniteur* of 1814, p. 186, concludes in the following boasting phraseology: "Ainsi cette armée de Silésie, composée des corps Russes de Sacken et de Langeron, et des corps Prussiens de York et de Kleist,



In the mean time, Blücher had drawn in to himself the corps of Kleist and Langeron, which were at this time replaced by the new troops which had been left behind for investing the fortresses left in the rear. The Prussian general, with his usual rapidity, again appeared on the 13th, on the plain of Montmirail; Napoleon hastened to meet him, and the two armies met on the plain between Montmirail and Champaubert at Vauxchamp. Although we cannot give full credence to the French accounts of the battle of Vauxchamp, it is undeniable that the result was the retirement of Blücher to Chalons. The French writers allege that the Prussians lost from 10,000 to 15,000 men; we know, however, that the Emperor also was obliged to sacrifice many of his troops, and that the Prussians were receiving reinforcements every hour, while he received none. On the 14th, the same day on which Blücher was driven from Vauxchamp to Chalons, Winzigerode took Soissons, on which occasion the French not only suffered great loss, but they even allege that the taking of Soissons was alone the cause of the failure of the magnificent plan of victory which the Emperor had fully developed in a very remarkable letter to his brother.\*

Blücher had retired in order to form a junction between Rheims and Chalons with the corps formerly separated from him; Schwarzenberg had, however, in the mean time, made such progress along the Seine, that when he received intelligence of Blücher's retreat to Chalons, he was within a single day's march of Paris, and the

et forts de près de 80,000 hommes, a été en quatre jours battue, dispersée, anéantie, sans affaire générale et sans occasionner aucune perte proportionnée à de si grands résultats." It is obvious that when *immediately after* Blücher was again threatening Paris, every Frenchman must have seen that he was shamefully deceived. French writers of every class lie as shamelessly out of patriotism. In the engagements fought at Vauxchamp, for example, they allege that the Prussians and Russians lost 7000 men in killed and wounded, and 2000 prisoners, while the victory cost them only 600 men. It is unnecessary to add another word.

\* The letter, dated the 9th, to his brother Joseph, then governor-general in Paris, is as follows:—"Je pars pour me rendre à Sézanne, et j'espère attaquer demain l'armée de Silésie. Sacken se trouve à Montmirail avec une quinzaine de mille hommes. Je débouche sur lui par Sézanne et Champaubert. *Si cette opération a un succès complet la campagne peut se trouver décidée.* Si je réussis en deux ou trois jours à écraser l'armée de Silésie, je déboucherai sur Nogent ou sur Montereau. Je pourrai, avec vos réserves, avoir quatre vingt mille hommes, et donner aux affaires une tournure inattendue. Mon armée est donc divisé en trois corps. A droite le Duc de Reggio avec 25 mille hommes; au centre le Duc de Belluno avec quatorze mille; j'ai avec moi trente mille hommes, ce qui compose la totalité de mes forces de toute arme de soixante à soixante dix mille hommes y compris le génie et l'artillerie. Je compte, que j'ai affaire à quarante cinq mille hommes de l'armée de Silésie et cent cinquante mille de Schwarzenberg, mais en y comprenant Bubna et les Cosaques; de sorte que si j'obtiens un succès sur l'armée de Silésie et que je la mette pour quelques jours hors de la lutte, je pourrai me retourner sur Schwarzenberg avec soixante dix ou quatre vingt mille hommes y compris les renforts que vous m'enverrez de Paris, et je ne pense pas qu'on puisse m'opposer sur un point plus de cent dix ou cent vingt mille hommes. Si je ne me trouve pas assez fort pour l'attaquer, au moins le serrerai-je assez pour le contenir pendant quinze ou vingt jours, qui donnera lieu à de nouvelles combinaisons." Every one must recognise in this letter a great creative mind, which has no other aid than that of reading romances.

Emperor was therefore obliged to turn his immediate attention to him. When Napoleon set out to hasten to the assistance of the two marshals whom he had left behind him to resist Schwarzenberg, these had been driven successively from Nogent, Bray, and Montereau, and their baggage had reached Charenton on the 16th; he therefore caused his infantry to be conveyed by extra post, and his cavalry to continue their march night and day, hoping to come up with Wittgenstein's corps, which was in advance of the rest. In this he was partly successful, when he fell in with the enemy at Guignes, eight miles from Paris, and fell in with single divisions of them at Mormant, Nangis, and Donnemarie. Bianchi, with his division, occupied far too much ground, and occupied Fontainebleau; Napoleon hoped to cut off his retreat, and therefore ordered Victor to take possession of the bridge at Montereau; when, however, the latter delayed at Salins, and the Crown Prince of Wirtemberg anticipated him by an hour, the Emperor was in a furious rage. Napoleon himself appeared at Montereau on the 18th, and a fearful struggle took place, as Victor's attacks on the previous days had been repulsed with great loss, and his son-in-law, General Chateau, had fallen. The Emperor levelled the cannon with his own hand, sacrificed a great number of men, and took Montereau by storm, but failed in effecting his object. The Crown Prince of Wirtemberg had been long in possession of the bridge of Montereau, and maintained it till Bianchi was enabled to effect his retreat on the road to Salins. Napoleon's want of success against Blücher was ascribed partly to the ability of Gneisenau and his disciples, and partly to the want of skill of the young army which he had under his command.\* His severity towards Macdonald on account of the loss of Soissons, to Victor respecting the bridge at Montereau, and afterwards the blame which was often and loudly cast upon Marmont, contributed in no small degree to make these marshals so easily separated from him in April.

The whole of the Emperor's operations at that time were very glorious, but they were productive of no real advantage, except that Schwarzenberg was driven back to Troyes, whence he, with a rapidity quite unusual on other occasions, united all his forces on the 19th, and sent forward his baggage to Langres, but stationed his army on the Seine. On the 20th and 21st, the Emperor of the French collected and arranged his army, which had suffered very severely from the engagements of the past week, and on the 22nd

\* On this point we shall quote a passage from "Vaulabelle's Histoire des Deux Restaurations jusqu'à la Chûte de Charles X. en 1830.," vol. i., p. 187: "La veille de cette bataille (de Montereau), à Villeneuve le Comte, une fausse manœuvre du Général l'Heritier, commandant une division de dragons, avait fait avorter un mouvement que devait amener la destruction du principal corps Bavarois; pendant la nuit un parc d'artillerie, confié au Général Guyot, avait été surpris et enlevé; dans la journée au plus fort du combat l'artillerie par la faute du Général Digeon avait manqué de munitions, enfin le général de brigade, Montbrun, chargé de defendre avec 1800 hommes la petite ville de Moret et la forêt de Fontainebleau, les avait abandonné sans résistance et s'était replié sur Essonne."



set out for Mery on the Seine, where he met with a very unexpected resistance. The allies were desirous of offering battle on the 22nd or 23rd, but it had been determined in a council of the monarchs and generals, holden in the King of Prussia's quarters, to evacuate Troyes. Fears were entertained lest Augereau, from Lyons, might cut off their communications with Switzerland, and news also arrived that the division sent from Catalonia by Suchet had arrived in Lyons. On the 23rd, Napoleon was already before Troyes, but he put off his entrance till the next day, because the Russians entered into an agreement with him to evacuate the town. The headquarters of the allies were removed to Langres. Just at this time Regnier, who returned from his imprisonment,\* had that long audience with the Emperor of Russia, in which the emperor informed him that he did not mean to conclude a peace with Napoleon. Negotiations, however, were still carried on respecting an armistice, and for this purpose officers were sent from both parties to Lusigny; Napoleon's habit of raising his pretensions the moment fortune seemed to smile upon him frustrated all attempts to agree upon a suspension of arms. In order to withdraw Belgium from the English, he wished to have the line of demarcation drawn from Antwerp to Lyons, to which the allies could not at that time accede; the generals, therefore, withdrew from Lusigny without bringing their deliberation to any result. As Schwarzenberg's army still continued to return for fear of being attacked in the rear, Blücher again withdrew from it, and again had recourse to his system of acting constantly on the offensive, as soon as considerable reinforcements had arrived. Blücher did for Schwarzenberg's army on the Marne what that army should have previously done for itself; he drove the Dukes of Ragusa and Trevisa, who were posted to guard the country between the Marne and the Aisne, from position to position, till they, on the 24th, formed a junction with the force at La Ferté sous Jouarre, at the distance of fifteen hours from Paris, and seven on this side Meaux. The Emperor was made acquainted with Blücher's advance the day after, when the allies had resolved to retire further from him. Blücher having insisted upon no longer following the system of retreat, but forcing his way direct to Paris along the Marne, a grand council of war was held on the 25th at Bar, on the Aube, at which it was resolved: 1. That the whole army should retire to Langres, and there all the reserves were to be assembled; 2. Inasmuch as the army of Silesia had withdrawn from the main body, it was to draw in to itself Bülow's and Winzigerode's corps, and to march to Paris; 3. A southern army was to be formed in the rear of the main body to act against Augereau, to relieve Lyons, and to protect Geneva; 4——; 5. The main army was to remain quiet, and the war to be carried on by the wings. Notwithstanding this, however, the main body advanced again on the 26th, the following day, be-

\* He died at Paris on the 6th of March, of suppressed gout.



cause Blücher had informed the King of Prussia that the Emperor of the French had left behind only a small part of his army on the Aube, in order to hasten with the rest of his forces to the Marne to render aid to Marshals Mortier and Marmont. Napoleon, with his army, reached Sézanne on the 28th, when he learned, at the same time, that Mortier and Marmont had retreated still further—that they were in Meaux; Blücher, in La Ferté sous Jouarre, had at the same time united the whole of his army between Langres and Bar, and was pursuing his march along the Seine.

Napoleon would not willingly have compelled Blücher to a battle at La Ferté sous Jouarre, but when he himself arrived at La Ferté Gaucher on the 12th of March, he had the vexation of seeing from the heights above the town that the Prussian army had withdrawn, and deprived him of the possibility of following, by breaking down the whole of the bridges. On the 2nd of March, Blücher was obliged to cross the Aisne; Napoleon had crossed the Marne, and was between Soissons and Rheims, whilst Marmont and Mortier pressed hard upon the Prussians from the other side. Had Soissons, which was the key to the passage of the Aisne, remained in the hands of the French, Blücher would have been placed in a very critical position. Destiny regulated it otherwise. Soissons having been given up by Generals Woronzoff, York, and Sacken, after the junction of their forces, was occupied by the Duke of Treviso, and furnished with a garrison commanded by a General Moreau. Bülow and Winzigerode now summoned this general to capitulate, and as he said, in order to save the artillery and garrison, he determined on a capitulation, which, according to the evidence not only of the French but of the Prussian general Plotho, saved Blücher's army, which marched rapidly through Soissons to the heights between Laon and Craonne. The French utter the most vehement accusations against this General Moreau; they compare this capitulation and that of La Fère, concluded some days previously with Bülow, with the capitulation of the Prussian commandants of the year 1806.

Blücher was able to recover himself behind the Aisne, and again to draw his forces together; it is alleged therefore, of which we are no judges, that Napoleon would have done better, instead of exhibiting his talents and the bravery of his army against Blücher from the 4th to the 8th, to have directed all his energies against Schwarzenberg. The Prussians having occupied Soissons, the Emperor was unable to cross the Aisne at that town, and was obliged to make a circuit in order to cross the river at Béry-au-Bac, ten hours above Soissons; and on the 7th he drove the Russian troops from the heights of Craonne. Although the French can scarcely find language strong enough to celebrate the victory of Craonne, they confess, nevertheless, that the victory was bought too dear, and was altogether useless: the whole object of the Russians and Prussians was to prevent the French from occupying the heights of Laon before them, and that was attained. For, the first murderous storm against the

heights of Craonne was completely repulsed, and the second, which led to the sacrifice of a much greater number of men, was only successful lest the town of Laon should be occupied during the engagement. The French, moreover, at Craonne, neither made prisoners nor took artillery, but they recovered Soissons; in return for this, however, Blücher, in the night between the 8th and 9th, wholly annihilated Marmont's corps.

Marmont with the 6th corps was destined to support the attack which was to be made by Napoleon upon Blücher on the heights of Laon; but on the 8th Blücher sent Generals York and Kleist against him, who fell upon his troops on the night before the 9th, took several thousand prisoners, and 40 guns, together with 130 powder waggons, and on the following day drove the scattered troops completely across the Aisne. It is impossible to avoid a smile on reading the manner in which all the French writers turn and twist the events in order to excuse the Emperor for not giving up the attack which he was just about to make upon Blücher on the heights of Laon, after having received intelligence of Marmont's defeat early on the morning of the 9th. He may be presumed to have thought that Blücher had so weakened his force by sending away York and Kleist, that he would be more easily conquered; but it is hard to give any excuse for continuing the battle on the 10th, which had already proved so destructive on the 9th to an army which it was his duty to have spared. The French writers, animated by feelings of military and glorious renown, will by no means admit that the attack upon the heights of Laon terminated in a complete defeat, and that the three days in which, according to their account, they gained a series of splendid victories, were in the highest degree ruinous to them; they are, however, obliged to confess that Napoleon retired to Soissons on the 11th, remained there on the 12th, and on the 13th proceeded to Rheims, in order to drive St. Priest and the Russians from that town. We may appeal to the testimony of a Frenchman quoted below,\* when we allege that from the 6th till the 11th the strength of the army was wasted, which at that moment more than ever should have been spared, in order to maintain the empty glory of a commander and his troops, and to be able to announce this to the world in boasting and ostentatious language. The Emperor, having got possession of Rheims, and St. Priest having fallen on this occasion, at length, as it appears to us, became very anxious respecting the cabals of the adherents of the Bourbons, whom he had always despised; and this more especially, when he afterwards learnt what had taken place in Bourdeaux. He had already learnt, on his again occupying Troyes, where he ordered the execution of a royalist, that the Comte d'Artois

\* The words are: "On combattit (devant Laon) toute la journée sans succès pour aborder la position de l'ennemi. L'Empereur se decida à la retraite. Les journées de 8, 9 et 10, lui coûtèrent cinq mille hommes. La perte de l'ennemi ne fut pas moindre, elle n'étoit rien pour les alliés; celle de l'armée Française étoit désastreuse."



had gone from Vesoul to Nancy, and was conspiring with Talleyrand.\* He also issued an edict from Fâmes calling out the whole nation *en masse*; and at a later period announced the severest punishments against every public officer who did not show himself ready to provide the people with arms of every description, in order to fight against the enemy. All this was known too late, to attempt to arm the lower classes against the higher; eight months before he might have had recourse to this measure with advantage. In spite of the declaration of the allies of the 1st of December, directed against him, and in spite of the expression of the Emperor of Russia in his conversation with Regnier, the conclusion of a peace would still have been possible. The Emperor Alexander had declared to Regnier his willingness to conclude a peace, not with Napoleon, but with the French people; and on the latter having replied that Napoleon was the legal ruler, he answered, "Merely because you have chosen him—you might also elect another." We may also further intimate that he might still have concluded a peace in March, had he been willing to make some sacrifices at the right time.

The negotiations of peace at Chatillon had, as we have mentioned above, been broken off by the recal of the Russian plenipotentiary on the 18th of February; but the latter had returned, and Count Stadion on the 17th, in the re-opening of the conferences, had *read* to the Duke of Vicenza the conditions agreed upon by the allies, although he refused to communicate them in writing. The duke forthwith sent the information to the Emperor, and begged for his sanction immediately to accept them; the Emperor, however, just received the duke's letter the day after he had proved victorious at Montereau. He therefore wrote to him: "I perceive from your letter that you are in a situation, or rather in a place, where you cannot have any correct idea of the nature of our relations. Everything that people tell you is false. The Austrians are defeated in Italy, and instead of their imagining themselves to be in Meaux, I shall speedily push forward to Chatillon. *Under these circumstances I must repeat my orders to you, to take no step without first making me acquainted with it, and being informed of my views respecting it.* I regard you as so completely shut up, that you know nothing of my opportunities, and are misled by pure inventions." Instead of suffering his minister to hand in his own ultimatum as a reply to the demands made upon him, he writes that he will send it himself, which he

\* This we feel bound to extract from Bignon, vol. xiii., p. 351, because, at p. 352, an original testimony is produced which will be interesting to the reader: "A l'époque où nous arrivons, c'est à dire le 20 Février, tout semblait confirmer dans l'esprit de l'Empereur l'opinion que les alliés ne voulaient plus traiter avec lui. Il en trouvait la preuve, et dans la teneur même des propositions du 17 Février, et dans les refus qu'opposait à Paris M. de Talleyrand aux propositions réitérées que lui faisait faire Napoléon d'aller à Chatillon seconder ou remplacer le Duc de Vicence." In the note it is stated that Bignon learnt this by word of mouth from Talleyrand, and it is further said: "Cé fait curieux était resté jusqu'ici complètement inconnu. Il est attesté de la manière la plus solennelle dans une note autographe, qui fait partie des matériaux sur lesquels nous travaillons."



failed to do. The minister's difficulties were still more increased by a letter from the Emperor, in which he states to him, that he looks upon the harsh conditions of the allies as the best means of rousing the whole nation to take a lively part in the war,\* and for the maintenance of the national honour.

The Emperor was at that time so fully convinced of his being able to annihilate Blücher's army, that, on the 21st of February, he wrote a letter to the Emperor Francis, which was very injurious to him. He always continued to think that he might be able to gain over Austria by the special advantages he might be able to secure her, and says plainly in the letter in question, that he would never consent to the concession on which England mainly insisted. (*Je ne cedrai jamais ni la Belgique ni Anvers.*) Metternich communicated this letter to the allies, from which they concluded that the Emperor of the French was determined not to accept their conditions; they therefore pressed Caulaincourt so much the more warmly to send in his counter-project, but Napoleon sent it not. The matter was delayed till the generals, Ranche on the part of Prussia, Duca of Austria, Scherwaloff of Russia, and Flahault of France, met at Lusigny on the 24th of February, respecting a suspension of hostilities, and although it was expressly determined that no questions except those of a military nature should be discussed, it was nevertheless expected that this might perhaps be an introduction to a peace. The parties having also failed in their endeavours to conclude an armistice on the 27th, Count Stadion pressed for a new conference at Chatillon, which was holden on the 28th. At this meeting Count Stadion insisted upon an answer, in the shortest possible time, to the demands made in the sitting of the 18th.

The delays of the Emperor of the French and his minister, combined with the expression used by Napoleon in his letter to his father-in-law respecting Belgium, and his refusal to consent to an armistice on the conditions of the allies, induced the sovereigns to form a new and closer bond among themselves. This was done on the 1st of March, by the treaty of Chaumont. The English had already, on the 15th of February, in return for the money spent by them, bargained for special advantages in any future peace. These were the usurped dominion of the seas, the sovereignty of Holland and an augmentation of territory for the Prince of Orange, and compensation was secured to King Ferdinand of Sicily for the loss of Naples. In the treaty of Chaumont all the previous treaties were expressly recognised—that of the 6th of January between Russia and Prussia; that of the 15th of February between England and the three other powers; and afterwards a new treaty was agreed upon, which contains sixteen public and three secret articles. The sixteen articles all relate to the continuance of the war, in case, as the four powers take for granted, the conditions laid before the Emperor of

\* "*Je rends grace au ciel d'avoir cette note, car il n'y aura pas un Français dont elle ne fasse bouillir le sang d'indignation.*"

the French at Chatillon be not unconditionally accepted. The main point is, that Russia, Prussia, and Austria, agree each to keep the full number of 150,000 men in the field, and England was to pay subsidies to each of the three powers, but was allowed to keep a commissioner with each of the armies, to observe their movements and to see that the determined number of troops was kept up.

One of the articles contained in the treaty received a peculiar importance in the year 1815, on Napoleon's return from Elba. The powers mutually agreed, that in case any one of them should be threatened by France at any future time, all the others were bound to come to its aid with 60,000 men, and that in case of necessity this number should be increased. In such a case England was to take foreign troops into her pay—to give for each foot soldier 20*l*., and 30*l*. for every trooper. The results of victory were to be equally divided; peace only to be concluded with the consent of all the parties; and engagements could only be entered into with other parties in so far as they fell in with the object of this treaty. It was decided by the first of the secret articles that each of the German states should be independent and self-governing, which was for Germany an unspeakable evil; but these states were altogether to form one common body, whose management was to be entrusted to the plenipotentiaries of German states, or rather to a congress of German ministers, who were to be instructed by their several courts to take care of the interests of the princes, and not to watch over those of the people. As all participation on the part of the people was excluded, this article formed the root of a combination amongst the old existing governments against all progress on the part of the people. In the same manner it was decided with respect to the Swiss confederation, to Italy, Holland, and Spain—everything should be established as agreed upon in the conditions read by Count Stadion to the Duke of Vicenza. Italy should remain divided—the former princes and their despotism be restored—Spain be subject to King Ferdinand VII., after the former fashion—Holland to be enlarged and formed into a new kingdom for the Prince of Orange. In the second of the secret articles, it was reserved to the Kings of Spain, of Portugal, and of Sweden, and to the Prince of Orange, to join the league. The third article we quote at length in a note, inasmuch as it served to defeat the very skilfully contrived plan for reviving Bonaparte's empire the following year.\*

Caulaincourt had already written to the Emperor that he believed himself in a position to announce to him with certainty that the only result of his hesitating any longer to give a positive answer to the

\* Considering the necessity which may exist after the conclusion of a definitive treaty with France for keeping in the field a sufficient force to protect the arrangements made by the allies among themselves for the re-establishment of the state of Europe, the high confederate powers are determined to agree not only upon the necessity, but upon the number and distribution of the troops to be kept on foot, agreeably to the exigency of the circumstances. None of the high contracting powers shall be held bound to furnish troops for the object above stated for more than a year without its own express and voluntary consent.



proposals of the allies, or of his endeavouring still further to induce the Emperor of Austria to enter upon any separate negotiations, would be to unite the allied powers still more closely together ; he now urged him most earnestly (March 3) to let him know his full intentions, or at least to allow him not to insist on the proposals made by the allies in St. Aignan's note from Frankfort. Unfortunately for Napoleon, he received this letter just at the time when he had driven back Blücher for the second time, and fully believed that he should be able to annihilate his army before he could reach Laon. Even at this last moment, therefore, he gave no decisive answer, and thus gave every advantage to the cabals of the noble families who were intriguing for the Bourbons, to the conspiracies of Talleyrand, and to the plots of Castlereagh and the English Tories. The Emperor of Russia continued to affect a dislike of the Bourbons, for whom Alexis de Noailles had endeavoured to gain him over in 1812, after he had gained over Nesselrode; he had, however, already declared to Regnier, that if they wished for peace in Paris they must first of all have a new governor; and he was now informed of Talleyrand's intrigues in Paris. M. de Vitrolles, who had been engaged in negotiations with Dalberg, a creature of Talleyrand's, hastened from thence, merely furnished with a couple of lines from Talleyrand to Stadion, to Chatillon, and from thence to Troyes to the Emperor of Russia, explained to him the state of affairs at Paris, went from thence to the Comte d'Artois at Nancy, and would have returned to Paris had he not been arrested and been obliged to save himself by flight. The Comte d'Artois had long been in Vesoul, from whence he went to Nancy, having first visited the Austrian camp. In order to induce the French Emperor not to allow the last date fixed upon (the 10th of March) to pass over without some decisive answer, Metternich had written a letter to Forêt, which the latter was to show in confidence, and as a friend, to the French ambassador. In this letter it was stated, but very politely and diplomatically, what was the intention of the permission, which had been granted after many refusals, to the Comte d'Artois to make his appearance in public.\* We see, at the same time, from a passage from the speech of Lord Castlereagh in the House on the 10th of June, 1814, that whatever might be the views of Austria and Russia respecting the future government of France, England and Prussia had at any rate made up their minds.

Lord Castlereagh in that speech declares, in his own name and that of the Tories, whom he represented, "That he and his colleagues had long been convinced that any pacification of Europe would be incomplete until the old family of the Bourbons should be restored to the throne of France; that any peace with the man who had placed himself at the head of the government of France could lead to nothing else but the exposure of Europe to fresh disturbances and convul-

\* Metternich wrote: "*L'Autriche a tout fait pour empêcher que les choses aillent à la dernière extrémité; mais si les négociations sont rompues, la guerre se fera avec plus d'animosité que jamais, et l'on ne pourra plus répondre de rien.*"



sions; and that such a peace could neither be safe nor durable." He adds afterwards, "That negotiations had notwithstanding been continued, solely lest a refusal to carry them on might have caused a disagreeable feeling throughout Europe, and because it was advisable to avoid this."

It must be allowed further, that even in the month of March the Emperor Francis and Metternich did all that was possible to induce Napoleon to accommodate himself to the circumstances of the time; and this is especially proved by a circumstance which only came to light on the publication of Bignon's papers in 1847. Prince Esterhazy had remained with Metternich since the commencement of the campaign; and just about this time he was despatched by the minister, without any official character, to Chatillon (a thing till then unheard of), to tell the Duke of Vicenza, in strict confidence, things\* which, according to his opinion, must have induced the Emperor of the French to come to terms as soon as possible. Napoleon, who, however, was not informed of Esterhazy's mission, and of many other things which went on at Chatillon, because messages and their bearers were intercepted, insists, in a letter of the 8th of March, on the conditions offered him from Frankfort; the ministers, therefore, received orders from their courts on the 9th to the effect, *that even if the plan, for which the Emperor of the French had been waited upon since the 19th of February, should quite agree with their proposals, they should still only receive it ad referendum*. As further, on the 10th, the minister felt himself only justified in giving an evasive answer, the congress would have been broken up, had not Caulaincourt at last declared himself ready, without any special orders from the Emperor, to give a decisive answer about the acceptance of points, the cession of which was afterwards permitted to him by a letter which arrived too late. The sitting of the 13th, in which Caulaincourt dictated his statement, should have been the last; but as it was indispensable that the proposals of the French minister should be handed in in writing, another was fixed for the 15th. In this sitting the minister handed in a preliminary proposal in twenty articles. In the first article the duke agreed, in the name of the Emperor, that France should give up all she had conquered since 1792. This article was, however, followed by limitations which could not possibly be received, and which did not even admit of discussion. It is, for example, allowed that the Pope shall be restored, but he is not to have Benevento, which Talleyrand is to retain; Lucca and Piombino are to belong to Napoleon's sister Elise; Berthier is to retain Neufchatel, Warsaw is to remain the property of the King of Saxony, and the grand duchy of Berg is to be retained by the son of King Louis of Holland, to whom Napoleon had given it. We may be saved the trouble of repeating the rest of the demands; one will suffice, that France was to have a voice in the new division of the ceded countries and provinces.

As the French minister had still remarks to make, and as the

\* "Ce n'est pas de la politique que je fais, c'est le dernier effort d'un ami."

ministers of the allies wished to draw up formally, for publication, their reasons for refusing to continue the congress, a conference was held for this purpose on the 18th of March, and another on the 19th, for Caulaincourt to dictate and draw up his reasons on the other side. Almost at the same time with the dissolution of an assembly at which, in spite of the assertion of the 1st of December, 1813, and its repetition in the proclamation to the French people, and in spite of the harsh language used by the Emperor of Russia in his conversation with Regnier, serious negotiations were once more entered upon with Napoleon, he experienced, one after another, many omens of his approaching downfall. On the 9th and 10th of March he was himself driven back from Laon and retreated to Soissons; on the 12th, the Duke of Angoulême, surrounded by legitimists and formally received by the mayor, made his entry into Bourdeaux. On the 18th of March, M. de Vitrolles returned to the head-quarters of the allies at Troyes, and obtained by Nesselrode's influence a private audience of the Emperor of Russia, who conversed with him for three hours. On the 21st, Augereau was compelled, or at least found it advisable, to retire from Lyons to Bienne. From this time all the numerous members of the old nobility, whom Napoleon had again brought to great honour and dignity, sighed for the complete return of the good old times of privilege, and all those, who feared the loss of the honours, dignities, orders, property, and riches obtained since the revolution, or from Bonaparte himself, began to prepare for treachery and desertion, in order to retain them.

#### D.—END OF THE WAR.

When Napoleon had retreated before Blücher towards Rheims, the Emperor of Russia, dissatisfied at Schwarzenberg's delays, carried in a council of war, on the 19th of March, that the army under Schwarzenberg should march upon Paris down the Seine, whilst Blücher should advance upon the same point down the right bank of the Oise. Schwarzenberg had previously collected and arranged his army at Bar sur Seine and Bar sur Aube, had again besieged Troyes, and was driving Macdonald's and Oudinot's corps before him down the valley of the Seine. On the 16th, the main army was again in Provins, at two days' march from Paris; but it required all the influence of the Emperor of Russia to prevent Schwarzenberg from again turning back. Napoleon had not heard of the march of the main army till the 17th, at Rheims, and hastened by Eprenay to attack it in the rear, as he was too far off to throw himself between Paris and the advancing forces. The terror which this caused was very great, and Schwarzenberg had at first intended to turn back and go to meet Napoleon's army. Wilson, who in his report of this affair is quite as much for Bonaparte as he was against Bonaparte in what he says of Egypt ten years before,



exaggerates the matter ridiculously, for the Emperor Alexander, instead of being, as he says, seized with a mortal terror, was exactly the one who three several times insisted in the council of war on pursuing the march to Paris. Only the Emperor Francis, who had remained in Troyes, and the whole of the *corps diplomatique* which remained with him, broke up in the utmost haste, and fled back. They retreated from town to town, and did not consider themselves in safety till they arrived in Dijon. Quantities of ammunition, baggage, and artillery of the allies, were conveyed into the fortresses situated near the borders, so that we in Germany believed at the time that the French had obtained some important advantages of which the papers were not permitted to speak.

Even the King of Prussia was at first of the opinion of Schwarzenberg, that it would be necessary to turn round and to cease advancing upon Paris, in order not to be attacked *en flanc* by the Emperor of the French. The Emperor Alexander, however, insisted on arriving in Paris at the same time as Blücher. The Emperor of the French did afterwards attack them in flank, but was not strong enough to carry on a battle that threatened to be very bloody. In order to attain his object he was obliged to keep his lines of operation clear, which extended over Chalons and Vitry, and, in order to do this, he required to have possession of the road over the Aube at Arcis. For this purpose he attacked the allies, on the 20th, at Arcis on the Aube. The battle lasted the whole of the 20th, and was renewed on the 21st; both sides suffered severe losses without either obtaining a decided victory. The Emperor, however, perceived it to be impossible for him to offer any serious resistance for any long time, with an army of at most 40,000 men, to the allied army; he retired consequently, and appeared inclined to leave Paris to its fate. He turned to Lorraine, and appeared to wish to organise the whole population of this district, which was entirely devoted to him, into a militia, and to unite the garrisons of all the fortresses, including Mayence and Strasburg, so as to march upon the Seine at a later period with an army of veterans. He hastened from Vitry to St. Dizier, and from thence to Vassy, where he arrived on the 24th.

Blücher had, in the mean time, again advanced upon Paris, and upon the same 24th besieged Chalons. Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, was again hesitating. He and a number of the generals held a long consultation on the 23rd as to whether he ought not to follow Napoleon into Lorraine, rather than leave him in their rear, and march to Paris. At a general council of war, however, held in the quarters of the Emperor of Russia, he and the King of Prussia insisted upon the march to Paris; Winzigerode and the cavalry, however, were to make a demonstration in the direction of St. Dizier, in order to induce Napoleon to believe that the whole army was advancing in that direction. On the 24th another council of war was held on the road to Vitry, at which Diebitsch and Barclay de Tolly were present,



and at which the Emperor of Russia again carried the advance upon Paris. It is proved to be false that Alexander was induced to take this view by a note from Talleyrand informing him of the conspiracy in Paris, but there is no doubt that an intercepted letter of Napoleon's to his wife confirmed the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia in their decision to unite Schwarzenberg's army with Blücher's. Blücher was already at Chalons, and Winzigerode at Vitry, which is not far off. Winzigerode now followed the army of Napoleon as far as St. Dizier, Schwarzenberg advanced to Vitry, and from thence to Sézanne, and Blücher from Chalons to Vertus. The Emperor of the French had ordered Marshals Marmont and Mortier, after they had failed to arrest Blücher, to join him before the armies of the allies were united, by way of Vitry, because he intended to attack Schwarzenberg's army in the rear. They attempted this, but found the passage already stopped, and having ventured too far, suffered considerable loss on their way back to Paris.

The people had risen in arms in many parts of Lorraine and Champagne, and had attacked the transports and separate travellers belonging to the allies. A caravan of diplomatists, staff-officers, and other persons of rank, travelling with an escort, had fallen into the hands of these peasants just as Napoleon was advancing from Epernay. Among the prisoners who were brought to him was M. de Vitrolles, who had been at Nancy with the Comte d'Artois, and who afterwards contrived to make his escape, disguised as a servant. Among other prisoners whom Napoleon dismissed was M. de Wessenberg, to whom he gave proposals to the Emperor Francis, in the hope of inducing him to a separate negotiation. Several authors assert that Napoleon himself was to blame for Marmont's being unable to join him, inasmuch as he left Vitry, and afterwards St. Dizier, too early; others say that an accidental circumstance prevented Marmont from receiving the Emperor's orders until it was too late to execute them.\*

When Marmont and Mortier reached Fère Champenoise, they met different corps of Blücher's army, and were shut in on the other side by Schwarzenberg's troops: they suffered, therefore, considerable loss. Their loss is stated at 9000 men and thirty guns; they collected, however, their dispersed troops, and hastened to defend Paris. Fortune had by this time deserted the French, for about the same time with the defeat at Fère Champenoise, a similar misfortune befel Generals Pacthod and Amey. They were escorting with 6000 or 7000 men—or, as some say, with 11,000 or 12,000 men—a very considerable convoy destined for the Emperor's army, and were completely hemmed in by Blücher's troops. They at last left the train of waggons, and fought their way through to Fère Champenoise, where Schwarzenberg's hussars and Cossacks completed what

\* Colonel Vincent, who was posted in Epernay with 600 men to keep open the communication between the Emperor and the two marshals, ought to have forwarded the order. But on the 21st he was attacked by Winzigerode's advanced guard, and driven into the wood of Vautienne.

the Prussians had begun. The whole division was taken prisoners or cut to pieces, and the whole convoy became the prey of the allies.

From the 26th, Paris itself was threatened. Compans was driven from Meaux on the 27th, and suffered a second defeat at La Claye before reaching Bondy. On the 29th, the Emperor of Russia fixed his head-quarters at Bondy, and on the following day the Empress and the regency left Paris. On the 28th, King Joseph had summoned the council of the regency to a meeting at the Tuileries. This council consisted of sixteen persons besides the Empress—namely, King Joseph, Governor-General and Generalissimo; the Princes Talleyrand, Cambacérès, and Lebrun; the Dukes of Massa (Regnier), of Gaeta (Gaudin), of Rovigo (Savary), of Feltre (Clarke), of Cadore (Champagny); Counts Montalivet and Mollier; and, besides these, Daru, Boulay, Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angely, Defermont, and Sussy. The subject of deliberation was whether the Empress and the King of Rome should remain in Paris, or should retire to Blois. The most of those present were of opinion that they should remain; but Joseph decided the question by the production of a note from the Emperor. In this note, written under very different circumstances, however, it was distinctly ordered that in case the allies should advance against Paris, the Empress should not await them there.\* On the 29th the council of regency left Paris in a row of carriages, and with absurd pomp, and 3000 of the best troops, who were very necessary for the defence of Paris, were obliged to accompany the court and the royal personages. Talleyrand found a pretext for remaining in the city. King Joseph looked on during the battle on the 30th, and fled on horseback as soon as he anticipated the unfortunate event; but his consent to the capitulation was obtained the same evening, whilst he was *en route*.

The measures for the defence were badly concerted; the heavy cannon, which had been brought to the neighbourhood for the defence of Paris, were not sent for; there were no batteries and no defences on Montmartre, and Hülin, the commandant of the city, had deprived the greater part of the national guards of their muskets in February. Marmont, Mortier, Compans, and Moncey, however, with that portion of the national guard which still retained their arms, appeared determined to defend the city till the arrival of the Emperor. The means of defence which had been provided, but which King Joseph, Clarke, Hülin, Ornano, and Compans did not understand how to use, has been most completely enumerated by Vaulabelle in his History of the Two Restorations; and he has also most competely proved the incapacity of one part of the generals-in-

\* The orders were: "Vous ne devez permettre, en aucun cas, que l'Impératrice et le Roi de Rome tombent entre les mains de l'ennemi. Vous serez plusieurs jours sans avoir de mes nouvelles et l'ennemi avance sur Paris avec des forces telles que toute résistance devienne inutile, faites partir dans la direction de la Loire la régente, mon fils, les grands dignitaires, les ministres, les officiers du sénat, les présidents du conseil d'état, les grands officiers de la couronne, le Baron de la Bouillerie et le Trésor. Ne quittez pas mon fils, et rappelez que je préférerais le savoir dans la Seine plutôt qu'entre les mains des ennemis de la France. Le sort d'Astyanax, prisonnier des Grecs, m'a paru toujours le sort le plus malheureux de l'histoire."



chief, and the want of good intention of the rest. Napoleon had hastened by a roundabout road to Fontainebleau; his troops, who were following him quickly, might be near Paris on the 1st of April; it was only a question, therefore, of one or two days. On the 29th he was in Troyes; in Villeneuve sur Vannes he left his army, which followed as quickly as possible, and came in a post-chaise to Sens. There he heard on the 30th that his wife had left Paris, hastened to Fontainebleau on the 31st, and from thence the same evening to Fromenteau, five leagues from Paris, from whence he sent Caulaincourt to Bondy to the Emperor Alexander, and awaited his return at the post-house.

The French writers do not venture to assert that 12,000 national guards, and about as many regular troops, could have withstood the allies in the so-called battle of Paris; they seem to think, however, that the inhabitants of the *faubourgs* and the workmen should have been armed and allowed to fight in the streets; later events have, however, shown how dangerous it is to arm and excite the masses, and to loose the bonds of civil order. The leading men, who had seen the revolution, were afraid of such a step; but the troops fought a more glorious fight, seeing that they could only expect fame, not victory.

The two marshals had crossed the Marne, at Charenton, and had united on the 29th, and encamped not far from Paris, when the allies advanced upon the town in three columns; the one occupied St. Mandé, Vincennes, Charonne, and Montreuil, the other Charenton, Conflans, Bercy, and the suburb Picpus. Vaulabelle and Vaudoncourt assert that the entrances to the city might have been fortified, and that there was no want of heavy artillery, if it had been sent for and drawn up early enough. However this may be, Vaudoncourt is quite right to amuse himself at the expense of the German writers, who speak of the tremendous fortifications of Montmartre;\* but he, and most Frenchmen of his party, are quite as ridiculous when they tell us that the people were able and anxious to fight, and the national guard numerous.

When the so-called battle of Paris began on the 30th of March, Schwarzenberg held Romainville already in his power, the occupation of which was decisive as to the result of the battle; all that the French could hope to do was to defend the heights of Belleville and Montmartre. This they did with distinguished courage until the Prussians advanced against Montmartre. From that time the battle assumed so unfavourable an aspect, that King Joseph, who was looking on from a rising ground near Montmartre, fled from the city on horseback, and sent a permission to Marmont, at eleven o'clock,

\* Vaudoncourt, "Campagnes de 1814-15," vol. ii., liv. v., p. 308, note: "Les relations Allemandes parlent des retranchements presque inexpugnables qui couvraient Montmartre et des redoutes qui étaient sur toutes les hauteurs. *Et les Allemands y croient?*" The same author says, very bitterly, p. 309: "Il semble que la même main qui livrait, en 1812, les états de situation et de mouvemens de nos troupes à la coalition [he means the minister of war, Clarke, Duke of Feltre] ait continué en 1814 à prendre ses ordres pour l'armement de la capitale."



to capitulate on behalf of the Parisians. Marmont was posted at Menilmontant, and had been driven back to within the barriers of the city, when he made use of King Joseph's permission, and sought for a cessation of hostilities. General officers, who endeavoured to arrive at the quarters of the general of the enemy, were shot down or were unable to effect a passage, until at last the brother of the Archbishop of Paris (De Quelen), adjutant of General Compans, arrived at Bondy, where the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia had their quarters. A verbal agreement was made with Schwarzenberg for a cessation of hostilities for four hours, during which the conditions of the capitulation should be written down. A preliminary condition was, that the heights of Belleville and Montmartre should be given up to the allies. These heights had, however, been captured by Blücher by means of Langeron; he was very much astonished to find there neither troops nor heavy artillery. In a miserable village inn, "Le petit Jardinnet," Colonels Fabrier and Denis de Damremont (who afterwards died as governor of Algeria before the walls of Constantine) on the part of Marmont, and Counts Paar and Orloff on the part of Schwarzenberg, agreed upon the conditions under which the town should be given up. The purely military convention was signed at one o'clock in the morning, and was immediately carried into effect. The troops were permitted to leave Paris during the night until seven o'clock in the morning; they were allowed to take their guns and ammunition with them, and hostilities were not to recommence till two o'clock. The national guard and the *garde urbaine* were to be entirely separated from the army, and to retain their posts.

As nothing was said in this convention respecting the city itself, Chabrol, Prefect of the Seine, and Pasquier, Prefect of Police, with some members of the municipal council and three officers of the national guard, among whom were Laborde and Tourton, repaired to the head-quarters of the allies, where they were allowed to retain the national guard; protection of property was secured to them; further, possession of the museums and of the public monuments and the civil authority were guaranteed to them; and the more readily, as the allies wished to gain over the nation so as the more easily to get rid of Napoleon. From this moment a number of men of the times of the first monarchical constitution endeavoured to improve the opportunity, so as to get rid of the oppressive government of a military conqueror and his generals. For a long time only the old nobility thought of the old monarchy, or even of the Bourbons; but they had better supporters in Pozzo di Borgo, in Nesselrode, and in the intriguing Duke of Dalberg, than in the absurd and powerless royalists of the olden time, who afterwards flourished about Paris in white sashes, cockades, and crosses of St. Louis.

On the evening of the 30th, Marmont assembled in his house the *intriguants* of the times of the Bourbons, among whom were many very worthy men, but with whom was associated the notorious

Bourrienne, under whose name, at the time of the restoration, the so-called Memoirs were fabricated, which have often been referred to, in the same manner as the Memoirs of St. Helena, as really historical and trustworthy. The chief instruments of Talleyrand, who did not yet show themselves openly on the stage, were the Duke of Dalberg, who is principally known in Germany from the fact that Bavaria, after having been so well taken care of by Napoleon, was obliged to pay him four millions of francs, without any reason being given for it; De Pradt, whom Napoleon, after his absurd embassy, had sent to his archbishopric of Warsaw; the senator, Jaucourt, and two celebrated members of the constitutional assembly, Messieurs Louis and Montesquieu, who had held important offices under Napoleon. The Polignacs, Rochejaquelins, Rochefoucaulds, and others, became celebrated at a later period. Every one was tired of the war, and the men who had become great by the revolution, from Cambacérès and Fouché, through all the variations of opinion down to the marshals, wished for the end of the system of conquest. If Fouché had been there, he would have intrigued for a regency, for this would have suited the majority as well as the restoration of the Bourbons. For the time, however, Talleyrand alone was master, collected all parties round him, and had organs everywhere; he did not, however, as yet pronounce himself, but followed the stream.

Eighty or a hundred senators, and as many members of the legislature who were in the city, all those whose activity was interfered with by the system of conquest, all the high officials, all the millionaires, and all the speculators who feared for the public credit, on which their luxury and their wealth depended, wished for quiet at any price. The Ouvrards, and men like them, the merchants and bankers, whom Napoleon was in the habit of treating like sponges, were afraid of being again squeezed out by him; the purchasers of the national property were threatened with being obliged to pay back rents. All these persons had considerable interest in the capital. The theorists of the time of the revolutions, the belletrists of the moment, the liberal talkers of the *salons*, could only realise their ideal, that is to say, English constitution and English wealth, with English elegance and aristocratical haughtiness of one class towards another, if the government was weak; these, therefore, also preferred a regency. Talleyrand long hesitated; he permitted Dalberg to use his influence for the Bourbons, reserving to himself the power of joining their party later, as he did; but, in the mean time, he was the soul of all the cabals against the Emperor. If the Bourbons came in, or if the regency were established, Talleyrand remained either as a member of the government, or as the head of an opposition in the atmosphere of cabal and intrigue which was necessary to him; but if Napoleon returned he was lost. Talleyrand was well known to, and trusted by, the foreign monarchs, ministers, and generals. As a member of the family of the Perigords, he was as dear to the absolutists as he was to the constitutionalists, by his friend-



ship for Mirabeau, and by the part he had played in the revolution since the beginning of 1793; one cannot, therefore, be astonished that Pozzo di Borgo and Nesselrode employed him to bring about a counter-revolution. In this counter-revolution, which afterwards degenerated into a restoration, the really powerful part of the people and the army, who lived very well upon the fame of Bonaparte and his generals—that is to say, upon air—were as much deceived as were the declaimers and idealists of the *salons*, who had been undermining Napoleon's empire, and carping at his fame, since his quarrel with Benjamin Constant, Madame de Staël, and Chateaubriand. We insert some remarks on this subject here, because we are now speaking of the fall of a colossal power.

In the first place, as concerning the constitutionalists and the *salons* which produced Narbonne and Lafayette, Madame de Staël and her Wilhelm Schlegel had during the last few years travelled through Europe, and this rhetoricising *salon* had at last established itself in Stockholm, where at that time a Gascon reigned who had belonged to the ultra-democratic party. From Stockholm, as a centre, a regular conspiracy was organised among the fashionable chivalry, the diplomatists, and the belletrists, against the military empire in France. This union was absurd and unnatural, and its elements, therefore, fell asunder under Louis XVIII., although De Staël's theory had, in the person of Guizot, followed the royalists to Ghent; and under Charles X. the *Doctrinaires* withdrew entirely from the Bourbons. The Bourbons were much better served by Chateaubriand's poetic prose—a form without a substance—than by the doctrines and speeches of De Staël. This had in late years made its way into the circles of high society, and its votaries had become convinced that the old ecclesiastical institutions were inseparable from the old forms of government. Royer Collard's philosophy was wholly unsuitable to the system of Napoleon, whilst the restoration accommodated itself to its views; and on the very same grounds the *Doctrinaires* produced all the sophistry of Louis Philippe's ministerial tools. Napoleon, by his conduct to the Pope, had driven all the pious members of the Church to become conspirators, and in the churches and confessionals they worked zealously for the cause of the Bourbons, of whom, although Louis XVIII. was notoriously profane, the Count d'Artois and the Duke and Duchess of Angoulême were regular devotees, and diligent at prayers and confession. The zealous Alexis de Noailles, the friend of De Staël, and a refined courtier, had been in Petersburg, and there found that the Emperor Alexander, who was not then a religious enthusiast, as he afterwards became, was not to be gained over for the cause of the Bourbons. He had, however, secured Nesselrode; and we shall see that Nesselrode and Pozzo di Borgo, on the 1st of April, succeeded in withdrawing Talleyrand from the party of the regency.



## E.—OVERTHROW OF NAPOLEON AND HIS EMPIRE—RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS.

As early as February, 1813, the claimant of the throne, who called himself Louis XVIII., issued a proclamation from Hartwell, which was circulated extensively in France by the numerous agents who for years past had been caballing in favour of the Bourbons. It ran as follows:—"The king will be ready to forget all past errors, to reward all services which have been rendered to the state during his absence, and to recognise the rank which has been attained by each, and to regard the property acquired as a just and rightful possession." The announcements dated from Vesoul, by the Count d'Artois, at the time of the congress of Chatillon, and before his departure from Nancy, and circulated by the instrumentality of Mathieu de Montmorency, were all to the same effect. The effect of the count's presence was very small, for the chief members of the old nobility, who lived in Nancy, took good care not to commit themselves by taking part in such demonstrations as were made by less cautious and prudent friends of the old cause. When indeed the allies occupied the town of Troyes, Messieurs de Vidranges and De Gouault got together a dozen royalists, who paraded the place and loudly proclaimed the king; when, however, Napoleon again returned and occupied the place in March, he was received with extraordinary rejoicing, and the few royalists who had been previously so clamorous were put upon their trial. De Vidranges, by his good fortune, had gone on a journey to the Emperor of Russia, but Gouault was shot.

In the proclamations circulated by De Montmorency, the Count d'Artois, without permission or sanction of his brother it is true, assumed the title of general governor of the kingdom, and called himself MONSIEUR. This led men's minds immediately back to the time before the revolution, though they too are full of forgetfulness respecting past errors and promises of all sorts of favours. One of these proclamations, however, contained language such as this:—"Frenchmen, the day of your deliverance is near. The brother of your king has arrived. Away with the tyrant, away with the conscription, away with indirect taxation. Your sovereign, your father, encourages you to forget your misfortunes, and brings to you new hopes; he will not think of your errors, but endeavour to change your internal disputes into union—a union of which he himself is the pledge. He burns with desire to fulfil the promises which he has given, and for the happy moment in which his children shall be restored to him, and in which he may give proof of his desires by his love and his beneficence." The Duke d'Angoulême pursued the same course in Bourdeaux. He announced "oblivion of all those errors which have been the result of love of freedom; his desire to maintain all liberal institutions, and to recognise the right of

Frenchmen not to be taxed without their own consent; as well as full religious liberty to all those who worshipped a God of peace and reconciliation." Even Benjamin Constant, since his difference with Napoleon, had become a kind of legitimist, and had put a note to his pamphlet, just published, "*De la Conquête et de l'Usurpation*," written expressly against the Emperor and the Empire, which would have done honour in those times to Chateaubriand, and in ours to Montalivet and other descendants of the Crusaders, which, however, was wholly unsuitable to the character of Constant, who had never served under the flag of St. Louis. In this note he appeals *to the brave defenders of the monarchy, and exhorts them not to suffer the holy oriflamme to be replaced by a flag trickling with the blood of crimes and cruel victories.*

It happened by accident that the Emperor of Austria and Metternich, who had fled to Dijon, were not with the army at the time of the taking of Paris. The Emperor of Russia, therefore, and the King of Prussia, were more at liberty to deal as they thought right with the Empress of Napoleon and her son, especially as Schwarzenberg agreed with their views, and the Emperor Francis declared that he should be satisfied with whatever was agreed upon by his allies. The Emperor Napoleon arrived just at the moment when his troops, on the night and morning of the 31st, had withdrawn from Paris, and, as has been already stated, from the post-house at Fromenteau sent the Duke of Vicenza over to the left bank of the Seine, at Bondy, to the head-quarters of the Emperor Alexander. Danielewski relates with great glee on this occasion, how different the proud duke appeared from what he had formerly done in Petersburg, and how he was obliged to dismount before he could be admitted into the castle-yard. The emperor conversed with him for a full hour, persisted, however, in his resolution no longer to negotiate with Napoleon, but willingly acquiesced in his going to Paris. He was first obliged to go to Fontainebleau, for Napoleon had waited for his messenger only till four o'clock in the morning, at Fromenteau, and then returned to Fontainebleau.

Caulaincourt found the Emperor of Russia busy with preparations for his entry into Paris, which was to be made with great pomp. The cavalcade was to be preceded by a great number of trumpeters, who were to be followed by the emperor, the King of Prussia, and the whole of their respective staffs; Nesselrode, however, had gone before the emperor as early as daybreak. He first drove to Talleyrand's, and both agreed that the latter should persuade the emperor to take up his residence in his palace. Talleyrand removed immediately to the ground floor, and by this means the execution of the plan in favour of the Bourbons, to which Nesselrode and Pozzo di Borgo influenced Talleyrand, was facilitated. The Emperor Alexander was unwilling to enter the Tuileries, but proposed to go to the Elysée Bourbon, where he spent the first night, before taking up his quarters in Talleyrand's palace, which he did on the 1st of April.



Whatever the French may say to the contrary, the splendid military spectacle, the guards and uniforms, excited the admiration of the Parisians, and the legitimist families gave full expression to their hopes by all sorts of rejoicings and festivities. The ladies expressed their delight at the appearance of the splendid guards and other troops, waved their handkerchiefs, flags, and ribands, and were, as it appeared, deeply moved; many of the men wore white cockades; all this, however, means very little in Paris. The next scenes in the drama proved that the gentlemen and ladies, who had made such noisy rejoicings at the entrance of the emperor and King of Prussia into Paris, deceived both themselves and the allies. In order to have some idea of the difference between the views of the chiefs of every reaction and of those who suffer by the reaction, we have only to consult such a ridiculous account as that given by the present Marquis of Londonderry (then Sir Charles Stewart), one of the most light-minded of all the aristocrats and Tories, and to compare his account with almost everything which has issued from the French press. Sir Charles heaped all sorts of praises and commendations on the heads of the rejoicers; the French speak of them with the greatest contempt; the Bonapartists go so far as to affirm that it was merely the *fashionable world* who made this clamorous rejoicing, that the townspeople uttered no sign; those of the faubourgs shouted for Napoleon, and had taken a threatening attitude; whilst Marmont was at Essonne with 10,000 men, and the Emperor's army was at Fontainebleau. The very names of those who were forward in giving such a reception to the foreign princes, and shouted for Louis XVIII. on the *Place de la Concorde*, indicated the conclusion that a fearful reaction impended over the French.\* Some notices, however, which we find in the *Moniteur*, and other matters, prove that the imperial government had altogether degenerated. It is, for example, recorded in the *Moniteur*, that 800 Spanish peasants who had fought against the French for the honour of their own country were found among the galley-slaves; that Hammerstein and Lutzow's brave companions were in prison at Saumur; and that no less than 236 members of the priests' college in Ghent were among the artillery corps at Wesel as common artillerymen. The whole of the chapter of Tournay were in prison at Cambray, and many cardinals and clergymen of various ranks, especially Belgian, were either in banishment or in prison without ever having been tried.

The Emperor of Russia, having spent the night of the 31st in the palace of the Elysée Bourbon, afterwards proceeded to the house of Talleyrand in the Rue St. Florentin. Here assembled the King of

\* The following is a specimen: "Thibaut de Montmorency, Gustave de Hautfort, le Chevalier de Theil, le Chevalier de Crisnoy, Cæsar de Choiseul, Laferté Meun, le Duc de Mouchy, le Duc de Fitzjames, Florian de Kergorlay, le Vicomte de Chateaubriand, Maurice d'Adhemar, Sosthènes de Larochevoucauld, le Duc de Luxembourg, le Duc de Crussol, le Comte de Froissard, le Vicomte Dubois de la Motte, Chevalier de Bethysi, le Marquis de Pinodau," &c.



Prussia, Princes Schwarzenberg and Lichtenstein, and Counts Nesselrode and Pozzo di Borgo, in order to consult and advise on the proper steps to be taken with regard to Napoleon: it ought to be added, that the Duke of Dalberg and Beurnonville, the former Girondist, were present at the sitting. Beurnonville had been in diplomatic employment, and was on very friendly terms with the King of Prussia, who sat next to him at the parties last mentioned. Talleyrand left the proposal of bringing forward the subject of the restoration to Beurnonville and the Duke of Dalberg, he himself being apparently influenced by other views. Dalberg had long previously been busy in favour of the Bourbons, and sent Vitrolles to Chatillon. Prince Lichtenstein, Nesselrode, and Pozzo di Borgo, who were present at these things, were wholly favourable to the cause of the Bourbons; the ante-chambers were filled with the members of the old nobility, and the whole affair was obviously a mere comedy played with the French, and of which Talleyrand was the skilful manager.\*

The Emperor Alexander proposed the questions, which the above-named gentlemen, Beurnonville, Dalberg, and Talleyrand, were to answer. He first asked "Whether peace might be made with Napoleon, and any certainty had that such a peace would continue?" Then, secondly, "Whether, in case it was decided that a peace could not be made with Napoleon with any such expectation, the regency should be conferred upon his wife or his son, or the government be committed to Louis XVIII.?" Schwarzenberg and the King of Prussia said nothing; the emperor himself, as it were, answered the first question, by stating what none of the others could contradict, that Napoleon could not be allowed to remain at the head of the government if there was to be peace in Europe, because, however great Napoleon might be, he could not live without war. A long discussion then took place on the question of the regency or the restoration of the Bourbons, till at length Talleyrand and Dalberg said that the Abbé Louis and Archbishop de Pradt were in the ante-chamber, who were able to give the best account of the feelings and wishes of the French. They were forthwith called in, and invited by the emperor to state "what sort of government they believed the French themselves would choose, were the choice left to them?"

\* This is also Vaulabelle's opinion. In his 1st vol., p. 311, he states that Nesselrode, when he came to Talleyrand in the morning, said: "L'Empereur est à peu près fixé; la régence ce serait encore l'empire avec l'Empereur derrière le rideau. Nous profiterons de l'absence du père de Marie Louise pour l'écarter. Ces révolutions, l'exclamation d'Alexandre en entrant à l'Hôtel St. Florentin [Talleyrand's], porteront un coup assez rude aux secrètes espérances du Prince de Bénévento. Un seul homme, le Duc de Dalberg, avait sa pensée; il résolut de la laisser s'aventurer pour plaider la cause de Marie Louise et du Roi de Rome dans le conseil qui se devait tenir le soir même, se réservant, si le plaidoyer ne réussait pas, de se prononcer pour le parti que le Czar sembla décidé à adopter. Ce conseil avait été convenu le matin entre les souverains et leurs principaux généraux; on devait y examiner la sollicitation nouvelle faite aux alliés par la prise de Paris et arrêter un plan politique en rapport avec cet événement."

The shameless and reckless phrase-maker, De Pradt, was quite ready with the answer which the emperor desired; he replied, "*We are all royalists, and the whole of France is as much royalist as ourselves.*" "Now then," said the emperor, "shall we publicly declare, that we are resolved no longer to carry on any negotiation with Napoleon?" Talleyrand, who was engaged in making minutes of the proceedings, observed, as he wrote down the sentence, that "*nor with any member of his family*" was wanting to complete it. The emperor repeated the sentence with this addition, asked the King of Prussia and Prince Schwarzenberg if they agreed to the principle, and then, through the Duke of Dalberg, left the declaration to be dictated to Roux Laborie, who was editor of the *Moniteur*, and from that moment played an important part; this declaration the emperor signed, and it was placarded throughout all Paris.\*

On the same evening some hundreds of royalists assembled at the house of M. de Morfontaine in the *faubourg* St. Honoré, and resolved on sending a deputation to the Emperor of Russia. The deputation consisted of Messrs. Ferrand, César de Choiseul, and Sosthènes de la Rochefoucauld, who took with them M. de Chateaubriand, whom they met accidentally on their way. At the time of their arrival in the Elysée Bourbon, the emperor had gone to bed, and they were, therefore, received by Count Nesselrode. He stated to them that he had the emperor's authority for saying, that they might assure the old friends of the house of Bourbon, by whom they were sent, that the emperor would restore the crown to him to whom it was due, and that Louis XVIII. should mount the throne. The emperor and his minister, therefore, gave their decision as to what ought to have been the future affair of the French. On the 1st of April he called the senators, who were then in Paris, to a meeting, at which a provisional government was to be named, and, on the same day, the emperor made, after a four hours' conversation, the same declaration to Caulaincourt, which he had already made to the royalists. Caulaincourt, immediately after his return from Bondy, had been sent to Paris with another message to the Emperor Alexander.†

\* Declaration. "Les armées alliées ont occupé la capitale de la France. Les souverains alliés accueillent le vœu de la nation Française. Ils déclarent: que si les conditions de la paix devraient renfermer de plus fortes garanties lorsqu'il s'agissait d'enchaîner l'ambition de Bonaparte, elles doivent être plus favorables, lorsque par un retour vers un gouvernement sage la France elle-même offrira l'assurance du repos. Les souverains proclament en conséquence qu'ils ne traiteront plus avec Napoléon Bonaparte, ni avec aucun membre de sa famille. Qu'ils respectent l'intégrité de l'ancienne France, telle qu'elle a existé sous ses rois légitimes. Ils peuvent même plus parcequ'ils professent toujours le principe que pour le bonheur de l'Europe il faut que la France soit grande et forte. Qu'ils garantissent et reconnaitront la constitution que la nation Française se donnera. Ils invitent par conséquence le sénat à désigner sur le champ un gouvernement provisoire, qui puisse pouvoir aux besoins de l'administration et préparer la constitution, qui conviendra au peuple Français. Les intentions que je viens d'exprimer me sont communes avec toutes les puissances alliées. Paris, le 31 Mars 1814, 3½ après midi. Alexander. Nesselrode."

† With respect to this mission, the *Moniteur* of the 2nd of April contains the following notice: "Le Duc de Vicenze s'étant présenté auprès des souverains alliés, n'a pu parvenir à s'en faire écouter; ses propositions n'étaient pas celles que les



As the senate had always been used by Napoleon as an organising body, so was it now employed by Talleyrand. As vice-president and vice-grand elector of the king, he caused the ninety senators of the one hundred and forty, of which the whole consisted, then in Paris, to be called together on the 1st of April, and of those ninety a considerable number attended to the call. If we can put any belief in what the Archbishop of Malines has related in his malicious work,\* even Talleyrand, as he took the chair on this occasion, was, for once in his life, greatly perplexed. He caused two addresses to be drawn up for him, one by De Pradt, and a second by some one else, and read one of them from a paper. It is brief, inconsequent, and obscure. Immediately afterwards he proposed the nomination of a provisional government, and named the five individuals on whom he had fixed as those of whom it should consist. He himself was to be president, and the Duke of Dalberg, Beurnonville, Jancourt, both members of the senate, and the Abbé Montesquieu, formerly member of the constituent assembly, were to complete the number. The provisional government so named was then commissioned to draw up an address to the people, explanatory of the grounds on which the Emperor was superseded, and they were also to prepare the draft of a new constitution. To all this the senate willingly agreed; at the same time, however, its members sought to secure their own advantages, and to force their services upon the nation, and this made them contemptible to all parties. It was decreed that the provisional government, in preparing the draft of the constitution, was to bear in mind:—1. That the senate and legislative body were to be retained in the constitution, with such changes only as should serve to secure freedom of opinion and vote; 2. That the army, officers and soldiers, and their widows, were to be confirmed in their rank, honours, and pensions, which they respectively enjoyed; 3. That the public debt was to be secured; 4. That the sale of national estates was to remain undisturbed; 5. That no Frenchman was to suffer loss or punishment on account of any opinions formerly expressed; 6. That freedom of conscience and religious worship was to continue, and that of the press to be introduced. The assembly then adjourned to have minutes of their proceedings regularly drawn up, and assembled again at nine o'clock to have the minutes read over, corrected, regularly confirmed, and subscribed. The evening sitting was held under the presidency of Barthélémy. The result, however, was made known immediately after the conclusion of the

puissances avaient droit d'attendre surtout d'après la manifestation éclatante des sentiments des habitans de Paris et de toute la France. En conséquence, le Duc de Vienne s'est remis en route pour se rendre au quartier-général de Napoléon." It then states that the Emperor Alexander received Napoleon's deputy with these words: "Il est trop tard; ce qui tranche toute discussion, c'est, qu'après la déclaration que vous voyez, je me croirais autant de fois assassin qu'il périrait d'hommes pour une cause que j'aurais abandonnée."

\* "Decret Historique sur la Restauration de la Royauté en France." 31 March, 1814, published 1816.



first sitting, and printed in a second edition of the *Moniteur* of the 2nd of April. The document was signed by sixty-one members, and countersigned by Talleyrand as president, by Count de Valence and Pastoret as secretaries.

Up to this time no public mention whatever had been made of the Bourbons; but, in the supplement to the *Moniteur*, quite at the end, it is expressly observed:—"Various copies of the *Journal de Paris* contain a proclamation from Louis XVIII. of France; such a proclamation, however, is not authentic." The advocate, Bellart, a member of the municipal council, and thirteen of the twenty-four members of the common council, in their legitimist zeal, as early as the 3rd of April, went further than Talleyrand and the senate. Bellart was blamed by the former for his excessive zeal, while the prefect, De Chabrol, approved in quiet, but did not wish to take any part in the affair; notwithstanding, a proclamation was stuck on all the walls in Paris, in which the deposition of Napoleon and the recal of the Bourbons were demanded in the name of the corporation.\* In consequence of this appeal to the people, the provisional government was compelled to go a step further than it at first intended, as it took means for having the proclamation pulled down.

In a sitting on the 2nd, the senate wished to make up for what it had omitted on the 1st, and to publish a decree, wherein Napoleon should be declared to be deposed and the people released from their oath of fidelity. This was actually done, but it was reserved to the meeting of the 3rd, to give a statement of the ground of the deposition. This task was undertaken by Lambrechts, who, like Garat, Lanjuinais, Gregoire, Destut de Tracy, and others, belonged to the so-called republican, or, as Bonaparte called them, ideological senators. The senate brought the decree late in the evening to the Emperor Alexander, and, together with his answer, it was inserted in the *Moniteur* of the 3rd. The same paper of the 4th first gave the name of the minister of the provisional government, followed by the minute of the sitting of the previous day. In this paper there is first an address of thanks to the Emperor of Russia for his promise of releasing all the French prisoners of war; then follows the deposition, together with the considerations, on which, as the grounds, they had finally agreed. It does not appear to us worth while to cite the grounds, since all those to whom an appeal was made were previously satisfied, and suffered themselves to be used merely as

\* This appeal to the people is to be found in "Vaulabelle," vol. i., pp. 329-331, and he adds an observation in which we fully concur: "Ce plaidoyer déclamation où la vérité était étouffée sous l'enflure et l'hyperbole fut le premier cri jeté officiellement en faveur des Bourbons. Ce cri contrariait trop fortement la politique expectante de M. de Talleyrand pour qu'il ne s'efforçât pas de l'étouffer. Pendant la nuit la police arracha tous les exemplaires affichés dans les rues; le *Moniteur* du lendemain et des jours suivants ne lui accorda pas la courte mention; la censure força les autres journaux à garder également la silence; seul le *Journal des Débats*, rendu, comme nous l'avons dit, à ses anciens propriétés, ose reproduire l'œuvre de M. Bellart. Cette publicité suffit pour contraindre le gouvernement provisoire à faire un nouveau pas."

tools. The legislative body, at least such members as were then in Paris, amounting to from 80 to 100 persons, were summoned at the same time as the senate; and at this meeting Felix Faulcon, the vice-president, was in the chair. The assembly concurred in the decree of the senate, and declared Napoleon deposed, but simply because he had violated the constitution. Subjoined to this minute we find eighty-four names; this is followed by the concurrence of the Court of Cassation, subscribed by the name of each of its members, and each of the courts of law and boards of authority hastened to send in their adherence even from afar. Napoleon could not complain; he had carried out the game of flattery and lies so long, and so used the arts of Fouché and Talleyrand in his own favour, that he ought to have regarded it as quite natural for them also to be employed by the Bourbons.\*

In the *Moniteurs* of the 5th and 6th, the name of the Bourbons was not yet mentioned, because matters were not absolutely arranged with respect to Napoleon; it was not published until the 7th that the new constitution had been submitted for consideration as early as the 5th, that the senate had immediately named a committee, which had examined a report, accepted the constitution, and, after having twice read the same, had called Louis Stanislas over (Louis XVIII.) to the throne. This was expressed after a manner somewhat constrained, for it is said: "The prince is restored to the wishes of the French people by a constitution, as advantageous for the people as for the exalted family appointed to rule over them." Fuller particulars were given in the official portion of the journal of the 8th, where it is announced: "The provisional government has prepared the draft of a constitution, which the senate examined and amended on the 5th, and, having consulted those best qualified to give advice, finally adopted, under the presidency of M. Talleyrand." This patchwork constitution was printed in the *Moniteur* of the same date, and is sufficiently characterised by the fact that in its very commencement their old titles are restored to the ancient nobility, and those of the new are made *hereditary*; that the senate imposes its own services upon the nation, and resolves that the senate shall consist of at least 150 members, and is never to exceed 200, with a number of other such articles. All this was correlative with what, in the meantime, was taking place in Fontainebleau.

The Emperor having waited a long time for the Duke of Vicenza in the posthouse of Fromenteau, whither the latter came back without any decision from Bondy, he betook himself to Fontainebleau,

\* Jesuits and pietists—bureaucrats, miserable courtiers, and egotists—such as the bearded and insolent republicans of our own days, and as the philanthropists and friends of enlightenment of the time of the revolution, regarded, and regard, it as no offence to deceive and betray the people. All defend themselves as Tasso did:

"Cosi a l'egro fanciul porgiamo aspersi  
Di suave liquor gli orli del vaso,  
Succhi amari ingannato intant ei beve  
E de l'inganno suo vita riceve."



and there took possession, not of the magnificent rooms on the first-floor, but of a species of military quarters, to be ready as it were to march forth. He then collected all the troops about him in Fontainebleau, so that he is said to have placed 40,000 men in the road from Fontainebleau to Paris. The advance-guard under Marmont was at Essonne, twenty-four miles from Paris; at a distance of twelve miles behind it lay Mortier; Moncey, Lefèvre, Ney, Macdonald, Oudinot, and Berthier, the grand marshal, arrived one after another; and Caulaincourt and Maret were also present. On the second interview between Alexander and the Duke of Vicenza, the former is said to have declared, that if Napoleon were to renounce the government, a regency might still be possible; this we very much doubt. Certain it is, that after Caulaincourt's announcement to him on the night between the 2nd and 3rd, Napoleon visited all the quarters of his troops, and gave every indication of being about to attack the allies, and reckoning, as he did, upon the rising of the people of Paris in his favour. On his return, the regiments of guards formed a circle around him, and he having previously heard all that had taken place in Paris, delivered a speech,\* which showed that the worst was to be feared. He called the soldiers to *revenge*, and they merely shouted, "*Vive l'Empereur!—à Paris, à Paris!*" Marmont having communicated the documents concerning the deposition, and Caulaincourt having told the marshals that the Emperor Alexander had given him some hope of the establishment of a regency, provided Napoleon renounced the government in favour of his son, they held a council immediately after the scene to which we have just referred. They resolved to oppose the Emperor's resolution, and to resist any attempt at a civil war. Besides, Oudinot (Duke of Reggio) and Marmont had already entered into direct communication with the provisional government. General Lamotte, brother-in-law to Roux Laborie, secretary of the provisional government, received a communication from Oudinot, whose adjutant he was, assuring him that the allies were ready to make any concession except the continuance of Napoleon's rule. He, therefore, on the 3rd, urged the necessity of compelling the Emperor to resign. On the morning of the 3rd, or even that of the 4th, no one ventured to give open expression to this determination; but when orders were given in the course of the 4th, to remove the imperial head-quarters nearer to Paris, the whole of the marshals, and the Dukes of Vicenza and Bassano, assembled around the Emperor after the parade to announce their resolution.

Macdonald spoke first; he delivered to the Emperor a letter from Beurnonville, wherein the deposition was announced. This Napoleon

\* "Soldats, l'ennemi a derobé trois marches et est maître de Paris, il faut l'en chasser. D'indignes Français, des émigrés auxquels nous avons pardonné, ont arboré le cocarde blanche et se sont joints aux ennemis. Les lâches, ils recevront le prix de ce nouvel attentat. Jurons de vaincre ou de mourir, et de faire respecter cette cocarde tricolore qui depuis vingt ans nous trouva dans le chemin de la victoire et de l'honneur."



caused to be read aloud. The scene which followed has been very variously described—even by the marshals themselves. We follow the account which appears to us the most probable:—everything which Savary has written with respect to the events of this time, as well as concerning Talleyrand and Marmont, is, in our opinion, in the highest degree to be suspected. Napoleon, it is said, after the reading of the letter, declared that on the following day he purposed to take vengeance on his enemies, and added, “IN THIS, GENTLEMEN, I RECKON ON YOU.” Ney and Lefèvre replied, “That they were undoubtedly devoted to him, but that a march upon Paris was a desperate undertaking, to which they could be no parties.” “THE ARMY, AT LEAST, WILL FOLLOW ME,” replied the Emperor. Oudinot and Ney, together with Lefèvre, retorted in a firm and resolute tone, “THE ARMY WILL OBEY ITS GENERALS.” “What shall I do then?” “RESIGN,” replied Oudinot and Ney; “resignation alone can save us all and the cause.” The Emperor now gave way, and wrote a short letter of renunciation in favour of the King of Rome, which it was at first determined should be taken to Paris by Marmont and Caulaincourt; but as it was not known whether Marmont, who had his head-quarters at Essonne, could be dispensed with there, Caulaincourt, Ney and Macdonald undertook to convey the letter to Paris. A moment afterwards the Emperor wished to recal his renunciation. Ney, however, was resolute and coarse, and the Emperor was obliged to consent to the course recommended. Caulaincourt, Ney and Macdonald proceeded to Paris with the letter of renunciation, in order to work out the establishment of a regency. They did not then know that Marmont had been already gained by the allies, although both they and the Emperor knew that as early as the 3rd he had been in communication with Schwarzenberg. They invited him to accompany them to Paris. This he did; but before his departure, and on the way, he adopted measures to be able to effect a complete secession, on the morning of the 5th, of the corps under his command from Napoleon’s army.

As early as the 2nd of April, Marmont had entered into a close correspondence with Beurnonville, Talleyrand, and General Dessoles, to whom the command of the national guard had been given, because he was known long since to have been at issue with Napoleon: on this correspondence we shall not dwell, because no documentary proofs are to be had. With respect, however, to the correspondence which he had with Prince Schwarzenberg on the 3rd of April, the documents are printed in the *Moniteur* of the 7th of April. First comes the letter from Schwarzenberg, accompanied by all the documents connected with the deposition of Napoleon. In the night between the 3rd and 4th, Marmont answered, that he was ready to give his adhesion to the senate and legislative body, and withdraw wholly from Napoleon, should the prince by his hand guarantee two conditions: First, that his corps with arms, baggage, and ammunition should be allowed to march to Versailles, and thence into Nor-

mandy; and, secondly, that should Napoleon fall into the hands of the allies, he was neither to be injured in life or freedom, but to receive some small territory, such as might appear suitable to the powers.\* Schwarzenberg having, under his hand, agreed to these conditions on the 4th, Marmont immediately entered into an agreement with Souham, the oldest general of division, and General Bourdesolle, as to the means whereby the troops were to be conducted to Versailles; Schwarzenberg first commanded his forces to draw to one side, and afterwards to close up their position again behind Marmont's corps.

Napoleon's representatives being detained in Chevilly, professedly to obtain leave from the Emperor Alexander for their further progress, Marmont contrived to carry on communications with Schwarzenberg. They visited the Crown Prince of Wirtemberg, whilst Marmont waited for them in the carriage. Having arrived late in Paris, they proceeded immediately to Talleyrand's residence, then occupied by the Emperor Alexander. About a quarter of an hour after midnight they were introduced into the emperor's cabinet; Marmont did not, however, accompany them, but went to Ney's residence, there to await the issue of the interview. The Emperor Alexander, as usual, played his part admirably; he conversed freely with the ambassadors, and indicated that he might perhaps be disposed to concede the question of the regency. In an audience on the next day, at which the King of Prussia was present, he gave them some consoling expectations, and held them in conversation until the general of the day came in, said something to him in Russian, and handed him a note from Schwarzenberg. This note he showed to the deputies; it contained the news of Marmont's corps having deserted Napoleon, although, properly speaking, the soldiers and subaltern officers were deceived by their generals. The emperor then observed to the deputies from Napoleon, that this changed the whole position of affairs; he still, however, continued firm to his promise of granting a second audience on the 5th.

Whilst the three deputies were with the emperor, Marmont had gone to Ney's residence; thither the others also afterwards came, having been indeed informed by Marmont of his correspondence with Schwarzenberg, but wholly uninformed of its contents. At eight o'clock in the morning, Marmont received a message from Colonel Fabvier, that his corps was on its march to Versailles. This, too, he communicated to the deputies, and acted as if he was

\* "M. le Maréchal,—J'ai reçu la lettre que V.A. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire ainsi que tous les papiers qu'elle renfermait. L'opinion publique a toujours été la règle de ma conduite. L'armée et le peuple se trouvent déliés du serment de fidélité envers l'Empereur Napoléon par le décret du sénat, je suis disposé à concourir à un rapprochement entre l'armée et le peuple, qui doit prévenir toute chance de guerre civile et arrêter l'effusion du sang; en conséquence je suis prêt à quitter avec mes troupes l'armée de l'Empereur Napoléon aux conditions suivantes, dont je vous demande la garantie par écrit."



extremely surprised at the intelligence. Great difference of opinion prevails with regard to his behaviour, and, at all events, the contradiction between his behaviour, between the documents printed on the 7th, and his subsequent justification, cannot be denied.\* The fact of this desertion having been made known in Fontainebleau, and of the senate having at length recalled the Bourbons, Napoleon published an order of the day, in which he expresses his thanks to the army for its fidelity, and lays bare the conduct of the people by whom he had been overthrown. Instead of defending himself against the accusations of the senate, he merely proves, that if all which was alleged against him by the senate were true, they were far more guilty than he. The meanness of the senate was made still more obvious by the articles of their quietly-manufactured constitution itself, than even by the order of the day of the 5th. From this moment judgment of death was pronounced against both the senate and the constitution.† Napoleon's plenipotentiaries, who had been sent to Paris to treat concerning a peace, had, in the mean time, received the most solemn assurance that everything possible should be done for the Emperor, and Elba assigned to him as a possession, provided he gave in an unconditional instead of a conditional abdication. Ney undertook to announce this message in Fontainebleau, and to carry it out in such a manner as to compel Napoleon's acquiescence. What, indeed, could he do, when all those whose names filled whole pages in the *Moniteur* had forsaken him; when Berthier and those who surrounded Napoleon and Fontainebleau had submitted to the new order of things; and when, still further, Champagny (Duke of Cadore), whom the Empress had sent from Blois to her father, returned with the answer, THAT HE QUITE AGREED WITH ALL THAT HIS ALLIES HAD RESOLVED? On their journey back through Chevilly, the plenipotentiaries came to an agreement with Schwarzenberg for a truce of forty-eight hours; and Ney himself proves, that, on this occasion, he played the chief part. The proof of this fact is to be seen in a letter of Ney's, which he wrote from Fontainebleau at half-past eleven o'clock on the 5th, to the president of the provisional government (Talleyrand), and which was printed in the *Moniteur*. He comforts him by the assurance that he would undoubtedly receive the document from the Emperor on

\* The authorities in this case are very obscure; in essentials, however, they agree. Savary does not mention the main points; his object being always to accuse Talleyrand, he writes as if Marmont were not to blame. Almost all the other authorities take pains to represent the affair as if the desertion of Marmont's corps had saved the allies. This is obviously ridiculous: to the Bourbons it was undoubtedly advantageous—to the allies wholly indifferent. We shall not, however, enter into any minute investigation of what Colonel Fabvier relates concerning the affair, nor of Marmont's defence. Marmont's "Mémoire Justificatif," which is dated on the 1st of April, 1815, first appeared in the *Moniteur de Gand* of the 18th of April, and, as it only consists of a few pages, was afterwards printed and circulated as a pamphlet by the marshal in France.

† The document itself may be seen in the eleventh volume of Venturini's "Chronicle of the Nineteenth Century," p. 287.



the next morning. We subjoin the letter in a note,\* characteristic as it is of the class of men to which Ney belonged, and refrain from any further judgment on this celebrated dragoon, so often accused and blamed by the French. Easy to obtain the unconditional abdication of the Emperor it was not; and the provisional government found it necessary, on the 9th, to publish a decree in the *Moniteur*, in which it was declared, that everything done by Napoleon since the decree of deposition had been published against him, was to be considered as null and void. The difficulty really experienced in prevailing upon Napoleon to consent to an unconditional abdication, may be seen stated at length in Fain's MS. for 1814, in one of the many special accounts of this transaction. We believe, that from the instantaneous acquiescence of the French people, the marshals were right to insist upon its completion. The Empress, with the King of Rome, hastened to Rambouillet, where the Emperor Francis then was, and where she soon contracted other very intimate relations for her personal gratification. The Emperor Francis went to Paris, where he arrived on the 11th of April, a day earlier than the Count d'Artois.

The French speak of generals and armies who still adhered to the Emperor; but Marmont had already deserted him; Berthier afterwards forsook him in an insolent and scandalous manner, when the command of the army was given to him by the Emperor on his abdication; Oudinot, Ney, and Lefèvre tormented him till he signed the act of abdication, and the commanders of the distant armies were engaged in negotiating respecting a change. Augereau had already gone over; Suchet was about to declare himself; Soult was listening which way the wind blew; Eugene Beauharnais was negotiating about the advantages which the allies would be willing to bestow on him for the pleasure of his step-father, the King of Bavaria; Maison was about to close with the new government.

The act of abdication having been at length extorted from the Emperor, Ney, Caulaincourt, and Macdonald hastened to Paris with the draft, and fully commissioned to conclude, in Napoleon's name, a formal treaty with Metternich, Stadion, and Castlereagh. They had no sooner departed from Fontainebleau, than all those who had hitherto followed the Emperor's fortunes, with a few honourable exceptions, hastened to Paris to recommend themselves to the new

\* *Moniteur*, No. 97, p. 381. "Monseigneur,—Je me suis rendu hier à Paris avec le maréchal Duc de Tarente et M. le Duc de Vienne, comme chargé de pleins pouvoirs pour défendre près de S. M. l'Empereur Alexandre les intérêts de la dynastie de l'Empereur Napoléon. Un événement imprévu ayant tout-à-coup arrêté les négociations, qui cependant semblaient promettre les plus heureux résultats, je vis dès lors, que pour éviter à notre chère patrie les maux affreux d'une guerre civile, il ne restait plus aux Français qu'à embrasser entièrement la cause de nos anciens rois, et c'est pénétré de ce sentiment que je me suis rendu ce soir auprès de l'Empereur Napoléon pour lui manifester le vœu de la nation. L'Empereur, convaincu de la position critique où il a placé la France, et l'impossibilité où il se trouve de la sauver lui-même, a paru se résigner et consentir à l'abdication entière et sans restriction; c'est demain matin que j'espère qu'il m'en remettra lui-même l'acte formel et authentique; aussitôt après j'aurai l'honneur d'aller voir V. A. S."

government. French writers seem unable to find words enough to complain of meanness, faithlessness, and ingratitude; but Napoleon continually kept his own interests, and those of his family in his eye; he purchased men, and, if he were consistent in his ideas, he must have expected, some time or other, to be outbid. Shakspeare, in "King Lear," has laid open the whole case; and it is better to dwell on the rare examples of fidelity and attachment than to blame and complain. We pass over everything relating to the affair, with remarking, that the original act of abdication differs, in a slight degree, from that actually signed by Napoleon after the conclusion of the treaty.\* Immediately after Ney's, Macdonald's, and Caulaincourt's departure for Paris, with the act of abdication, in order to conclude an agreement respecting the advantages to be secured to him and his family, Napoleon repented of the deed, and sent Gourgand to require the return of the document. The answer was: it was now too late. On receiving this message, Caulaincourt returned to Fontainebleau, and brought the treaty, when the Emperor again required the return of the document. The duke evaded the demand, and showed him clearly, that before being able to commence the negotiation, he must hand in the act of abdication. The inward struggle which the greatest man of the 18th and 19th centuries had to endure, may be imagined from the fact, that in the night between the 12th and 13th of April, he attempted to escape from the power of his enemies in the same way as Condorcet did in the reign of terror. For the latter, a morphiae was prepared by Cabanis; Napoleon carried a similar one with him on the Russian campaign, but this, on being now taken, produced only temporary stupefaction.

The treaty of Fontainebleau concluded by Ney, Caulaincourt and Macdonald on the part of Napoleon, and by Metternich, Humboldt, and Nesselrode on the part of the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, contains twenty-one articles. The first declares the abdication. By the second, the titles of Emperor and Empress, are reserved to him and his wife, and those of Prince and Princess to the various members of his family. In the third, the island of Elba is conceded to him as a possession, and two millions of francs yearly to be paid by the French treasury; of this sum one million was to be allotted to his wife. Napoleon asked for six millions, but even the two was not paid by the Bourbons. By the fourth article, it is agreed that the island of Elba shall be protected against the Barbary powers—which means, in fact, that the English are to keep guard on the island. The fifth article ensures to the Empress and her son

\* The act, as printed in the *Moniteur* of the 12th of April, runs as follows: "Les puissances alliées ayant proclamé que l'Empereur Napoléon était le seul obstacle au rétablissement de la paix en Europe, l'Empereur Napoléon, fidèle à son serment, déclare qu'il renonce pour lui et ses héritiers aux trônes de France et d'Italie, et qu'il n'est aucun sacrifice personnel, même celui de la vie, qu'il ne soit prêt à faire à l'intérêt de la France. Fait au palais de Fontainebleau le 11 Avril, 1811." In the original, which still exists, and which is to be found in Fain and Vaulabelle, it runs *pour lui et ses enfans*, and after *sacrifice* the word *personnel* is wanting.



possession of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla as hereditary states. The sixth article we shall subjoin in a note, although it was never carried into execution.\* By the seventh article, the Empress Josephine's allowance is reduced to the sum of one million in *rentes*. By the eighth article, it is decided that Prince Eugene is to obtain a suitable establishment beyond the bounds of France. From the ninth to the eleventh follow the resolutions respecting the monies, payments, crown diamonds, &c., on which Napoleon was not to make any claim above the sum of two millions, which were to be divided in gratuities among the generals and adjutants named in article 9. We cannot be surprised that this the Bourbons did not fulfil. By the twelfth article, it is agreed that Napoleon's debts shall be paid from the sums due to the civil list. The thirteenth article provides for a proper suite and guards to be provided for the Emperor. By the fifteenth, from 1200 to 1500 of the imperial guard are fixed as the number to accompany Napoleon to the place of embarkation. In the sixteenth, it is determined that a corvette shall be placed at the disposal of the Emperor to convey him and his court to their place of destination, and afterwards to be his property. According to the seventeenth article, the Emperor is to be allowed to take with him and retain 400 men as a guard. By the eighteenth, it is decided that all Frenchmen who may accompany the Emperor are to return within the space of three years, or otherwise to be deprived of their civil rights as French citizens, unless, indeed, on the express permission of the government. The nineteenth article relates to the Poles in the French service. These are to be allowed to return with their arms, baggage, and ammunition to their own country, and to retain all their honours and pensions. In conclusion, the allied powers bind themselves to guarantee, and to see all the articles of the treaty carried into execution. The treaty was followed by a declaration of acceptance made by the provisional government on the 11th of April; and Louis XVIII. could only be constrained, by the allied powers, to confirm this declaration on the 31st of May.† Lord Castlereagh, in a letter

\* "Il sera réservé, dans les pays auxquels Napoléon renonce pour lui et sa famille, des domaines, ou donné des rentes sur le grand livre de France produisant un revenu annuel net, et deduction faite de toutes charges, de deux millions cinq cent mille francs. Ces domaines ou rentes appartiendront en toute propriété et pour en disposer comme bon leur semblera, aux princes et aux princesses de la famille, et seront répartis entre eux de manière à ce que le revenu de chacun soit dans la proportion suivante, savoir: à Madame Mère trois cent mille francs, au Roi Joseph et à la Reine cinq cent mille francs, au Roi Louis deux cent mille francs, à la Reine Hortense et à ses enfans quatre cent mille francs, au Roi Jerome et à la Reine cinq cent mille francs, à la Princesse Elisa trois cent mille francs, à la Princesse Pauline trois cent mille francs. Les princes et princesses de la famille de l'Empereur Napoléon conserveront en outre tous les biens, meubles et immeubles quelque nature que ce soit qu'ils possèdent à titre particulier et notamment les rentes dont ils jouissent également, comme particuliers sur le grand livre de France ou le Monte-Napoléone à Milan."

† "Declaration au nom de S. M. Louis XVIII. Le Soussigné, ministre secrétaire d'état aux affaires étrangères, ayant rendu compte au Roi de la demande que LL. EE. Messieurs les Plenipotentiaires des cours alliées ont reçu de leur souverains l'ordre de faire



to Lord Bathurst, declares that, for several reasons, he could take no part in the agreement, and could not now recognise Napoleon as Emperor, which the English government had never yet done. He states, that he has only taken part in the business so far as referred to the possession of Elba, and what related to England. To this extent alone goes his accession to the arrangement.\*

On the 16th of April, the commissioners of the three powers met, under whose protection Napoleon, in accordance with article 4 of the treaty of Fontainebleau, was to undertake the journey to Elba: on the 20th he took his departure for Elba.

## § VI.

### BRIEF REVIEW OF EVENTS FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE PEACE OF FONTAINEBLEAU TILL THE SECOND PEACE OF PARIS.

WE should, properly speaking, conclude our history, as indicated in the title-page, with the fall of Napoleon. This course we ought so much the more to pursue, as the succeeding events were all of such a description as necessarily to have led to a catastrophe such as that which has happened in our own days. Everything which has taken place in Europe from May, 1814, bears, therefore, an intimate relation to the struggle between the principles of democracy and the prejudices and privileges of aristocracy, between diplomatic deception and the rights of the people, which, although apparently enlarged, were, in fact, more limited than ever by means of police, autocracy, and bureaucracy. All these things bear so close a relation to the events of the year 1848, that we cannot venture to separate them; and, in the conclusion of our history, must add a few indications with respect to the affairs of 1814 and 1815, to point out the inevitable course of events.

relativement au traité du 11 Avril, auquel le gouvernement provisoire a accédé, il a plu à S.M. de l'autoriser de déclarer en son nom que les clauses du traité à la charge de la France seront fidèlement exécutées. Il a en conséquence l'honneur de le déclarer par la présente à leurs excellences. Paris, le 31 Mars. Le Prince de Benevento."

\* "Act d'accession donné au nom du Gouvernement Anglais par Lord Castlereagh: Attendu que LL. MM. II. l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Bohême et d'Hongrie, l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et le Roi de Prusse, sont intervenus au traité conclu à Paris et signé le 11 Avril de la présente année, à l'effet d'accorder pour les termes respectivement fixés, tels qu'ils sont mentionnés dans le traité à la personne et à la famille de Napoléon Bonaparte la possession en souveraineté de l'île d'Elba et des duchés de Parma, de Plaisance, et Guastalla, et pour régler tous autres objets. Lequel traité a été communiqué au Prince Régent de la Grande Bretagne et Ireland par les ministres de LL. MM. II. et RR. sous nommé lesquels ministres au nom de leur souverains ont engagé le Prince Régent ayant une pleine connaissance du contenu du dit traité y accède au nom et pour S. M. *pour autant que la chose regarde les stipulations de la possession en souveraineté de l'île d'Elba, et des duchés de Parma, de Plaisance, et Guastalla, mais S. A. R. ne doit pas être considéré comme étant partie contrevenante aux autres conditions et stipulations y contenues.* Donné de ma main et sous mon sceau à Paris, le 17 Avril, 1814."

## A.—FRANCE UNDER LOUIS XVIII.

Napoleon having been completely put aside, the allies first directed their attention to the establishment of the new government for France, which could not stand without their support, and to the conclusion of a peace; for then, for the first time, they thought of the partition of the various countries ceded by France. The main point was altogether forgotten; the often and earnestly expressed desire of the people to participate more largely in the public administration of affairs than they had hitherto done, was only very partially and apparently satisfied; and, in fact, every one who was an advocate of free institutions became a suspected character. The family of Napoleon had separated on the 9th; the Empress and the King of Rome left Blois; Cardinal Fesch and Napoleon's mother had gone to Rome; Louis, Joseph, and Jerome, into Switzerland; and, notwithstanding the retention of the title, Marie Louise again became an Austrian princess. Lichtenstein and Esterhazy accompanied her to Rambouillet, where she was met by her father, and remained till she commenced her journey to Vienna on the 23rd of April. Menneval, Napoleon's private secretary, has given, in his Memoirs, a courtly account of her journey and her reception in Vienna.

Talleyrand had been the soul of the government since the 31st of March, and, however little we can commend his character, he nevertheless strove incessantly that the institutions established since 1789 should not only be maintained at that present time, but during the reign of Louis XVIII., and that some restraint should be put on the urgent demands of the emigrants, courtiers, and priest-ridden advocates of the old *régime*.\* He had filled all the places and offices in the provisional government with his creatures; and by means of the hastily-prepared constitution, and the favours bestowed upon the contemptible senators therein referred to, excited the displeasure of the nation. He was considered as the originator of all the plots against Napoleon, and would, therefore, immediately after the arrival of the Count d'Artois, have lost all influence, had he not been supported by the foreign monarchs. The newly-prepared constitution, favourable to the senate alone, and which he had caused to be drawn up, was necessarily an object of hatred to the royalists, be-

\* This is abundantly proved by the letter of the Archbishop de Pradt, who, in a letter of the year 1836, gives a characteristic notice of the man, and proves how little confidence can be placed in all the documents of French writers, and especially in the writings of the archbishop. In a note in "Vaulabelle," vol. ii., p. 83, he writes as follows: "On a beaucoup menti sur cette époque [April and May, 1814], et moi même j'ai menti comme tout le monde. Je savais à quoi m'en tenir sur le roi législateur. J'étais alors près de M. de Talleyrand; c'est moi qui ai rédigé le discours qu'il prononça au sénat le premier Avril et si je n'ai fait partie du gouvernement provisoire, c'est qu'il y avoit déjà trois abbés et qu'un de plus eût été trop. M. de Talleyrand conduisit cette affaire comme il les conduit toutes; il n'arrive à de grands résultats que par des petits moyens, de petites intrigues, et du petit esprit."



cause all the chief positions were conferred upon senators of liberal tendencies, such as Barbé Marbois, Destut de Tracy, Emmery, Lambrechts and Lebrun, Duke of Placenza; while to the republicans and Bonapartists it must have had all the appearance of a Russian law, because, contrary to the usage in such cases, Count Nesselrode had a seat and vote in the committee by which it was drawn up. The constitution published in the *Moniteur* of the 8th of April was therefore still-born, especially because the senate voted a liberal allowance to itself,\* and raised its members to the rank of a hereditary aristocracy. The Count d'Artois, who adopted the title of governor-general without any commission from the king, by whom he was distrusted, had come as far as Vitry le Français, when the act of the constitution was communicated to him by M. de Vitrolles. Vitrolles protested in his name against the constitution, and the prince continued his journey to Paris. When he was about to enter the French capital, the provisional government, in a note conveyed by Choiseul Gouffier, informed him that he could only assume the office of head of the government by the nomination of the senate, and that it could not acknowledge or receive him until his brother had officially accepted the constitution. The provisional government, however, showed itself courteous—received and greeted the prince on his solemn entry into Paris on the 12th. He was allowed to take up his residence in the Tuileries; the Emperor of Russia left Talleyrand's house, and went to the Elysée Bourbon; and, on the 13th, by a decree of the provisional government, the white cockade was resumed as the natural colour instead of the tricolor.

Talleyrand and Beugnot, preparing a short answer to be delivered by the prince on his entry, but which, in fact, never was really given, invented the following witticism:—"He had said, that nothing was altered in France, except that there was one Frenchman more"—and they caused this to be inserted in the *Moniteur*. This idea of Beugnot's was extremely well received in France, but it was not till after a visit had been paid to the prince on the 13th by the Emperor of Russia, that he could be induced to accept the constitution. On the evening of the 14th, the prince received the senate in the Tuileries, suffered himself to be nominated by this body as governor-general of the kingdom, and, in the name of his brother, promised to acknowledge the constitution. The declaration given and published by the prince was drawn up in Fouché's own handwriting, and corrected by Talleyrand, as appears from the still-existing original; Fouché had, in fact, returned to Paris the previous day. In the mean time, M. de Vitrolles induced the prince to make a slight alteration, whereby a door of escape was left open to the king.† Every step which was henceforth taken, and

\* Hence the pun—that it was a "constitution de rentes."

† Fouché and Talleyrand had caused him to say: "Je ne crains pas d'être désavoué en jurant en son nom d'observer et d'en faire observer les bases." M. de Vitrolles induced him to say and write: "Je ne crains pas d'être désavoué en assurant en son nom, qu'il en admettra la base."



all the persons by whom the prince were surrounded, or who were promoted by him, were decidedly hostile to the liberation of the people; even the agreement concluded with the allies with respect to the evacuation of the territory of France, and a suspension of arms to be immediately followed by a peace, caused a universal outcry throughout the whole kingdom. The agreement was undoubtedly in the highest degree disadvantageous and humiliating; but in order to be free from foreign troops, the new government was obliged to pay the penalty of the sins of its predecessors. Of the nine articles of which this agreement consists, only three are of any importance in the relation just mentioned. By one of them it is determined that the territory of France, such as it was before 1792, is to be immediately evacuated; and that all the fortresses occupied by the French beyond those limits are to be given up to the allies. In another it is promised by the governor-general of the kingdom, that he will immediately issue orders to the officers in command of the fortresses beyond those limits to evacuate the same, so that they might all be given up by the 1st of June. The garrisons were to be allowed to march out with their arms and baggage, to be suffered to take their field-pieces with them, at the rate of one gun for every thousand men, sick and wounded inclusive. The third article runs as follows: "Everything appertaining to the fortresses, and which is not private property, must be left in the fortresses and (*en entier*) be given up to the allies without any diminution whatsoever. To the fortresses are to be considered as belonging, not only artillery and ammunition, but stores of all descriptions, with the archives, inventories, plans, charts, and models."

It was determined by a special and secret article, that the sum of more than 140,000,000 francs, paid by the King of Prussia to the Emperor Napoleon, was to be repaid, and that the city of Hamburg was to receive full compensation for the loss sustained by the plundering of its bank, committed by Davoust. It is alleged that by this treaty, properly speaking concluded by Talleyrand, 53 strong places, actually occupied by the French, 12,600 guns, arsenals full of arms and ammunition, immense foundries, harbours, ships of war upon the stocks and lying at anchor, vast quantities of arms and provisions, all of which were exclusively French property, were given up by a stroke of the pen. The fact is true, but the blame rests neither upon Talleyrand nor the Bourbons. The loss sustained in money by France on the sacrifice of these immense materials was computed at 1500,000,000 francs.

However contemptible Talleyrand may have been as a man, and however much he availed himself of the misfortunes of his country to promote his own private speculations, and attempted to force his relations, especially Edme de Perigord, afterwards the Duchess of Dino, so famed for her beauty, and notorious for her course of life, upon Louis XVIII., he was still the only one of the king's ministers who called his attention to the manner in which he was deceived by the creatures by whom he was surrounded. The *émigrés*, and among them such

men as Dambray, Blacas, and the Count de Bruges, who accompanied the king, and was inseparable from him on his journey from London to Paris—seeing he could neither ride nor walk—led him to believe that every one was delighted at the near prospect of a speedy return to the old *régime*; whilst Talleyrand, Montesquieu, and even Pozzo di Borgo, whom the Emperor of Russia had sent to Calais to meet him, assured him in vain that he could never enter Paris as a king by the grace of God, that he must give pledges to the people of the enjoyment of their political rights. During the journey, and even when he had arrived at Compiègne, Louis continued to insist upon entering Paris, as in our own days the elector has done at Cassel—as if everything which had happened since 1789 was merely a dream. In this he supported himself on the opinions of his brother, who in every letter exhorted him not to acknowledge the constitution, because it was universally disapproved, and was merely advantageous to Talleyrand and his senate. He still, therefore, persevered in his egotistical design on the 29th and 30th in Compiègne; and he was still further encouraged by the conduct of the Emperor Francis, who drily answered the complimentary address of the senate on his entry into Paris: “*That for twenty years past he had carried on war not only with Napoleon, but with those principles which constituted the misfortune of the world.*” The King of Prussia and his court were of the same opinion, but they were more prudent than Francis, and did not give public expression to their feelings.

Audiences were given in Compiègne; the legislative body appeared among the rest, and, in the absence of the senate, made no mention whatever of the constitution, but rather flattered the prejudices of the king.\* The deputies, therefore, were addressed by the king as representatives of the nation, whilst sentence of death was in silence passed upon the senate. The king and his evil adviser, M. de Blacas, at length went so far as openly to allege that no attention whatever would be paid to the constitution. This declaration was already made known in Paris on the evening of the 30th, and the senate immediately turned to the Emperor of Russia to seek for his aid and protection; this request was supported by Pozzo di Borgo, and on the 1st of May the Emperor himself, accompanied by his adjutant, proceeded to Compiègne. He then had a long interview and conversation with the king, at which no one was present. The conversation ended by the king's rejecting the constitution, but promising, of his own free will, to bestow a charter upon the nation, and, by means of Talleyrand, to issue a declaration, wherein he caused the great principles he was ready to secure to the people to be announced. Even with regard to this declaration they were not agreed when the king had arrived at St. Ouen at four o'clock; and it is said that the

\* We shall merely quote a single phrase in order to show how such phrases are to be understood: “*Venez, descendant de tant de rois, montez sur le trône, où nos pères placèrent autrefois votre illustre famille et que nous sommes si heureux de vous voir occuper aujourd'hui.*”



king was obliged to be threatened by another Russian mission, wherein it would be intimated to him that he could not be allowed to enter Paris till he had declared his acceptance of the leading points of the new constitution: this was communicated to him by M. de Blacas and the Abbé Montesquieu. This communication at length led him to agree to the proclamation, which was placarded in Paris on the 3rd. The constitution, prepared by the senate was therein declared to be rejected, but on the condition of granting another; the king is made to say, "we are resolved to grant a free constitution, and wish that it should be fully adapted to the necessities of the case; we hereby proclaim our intention of summoning the senate and the legislative body for the 10th of June, in order to lay before them the draft of a constitution prepared by the aid of a committee of both bodies. We hereby acknowledge the following as the principles on which such a constitution is to be founded:

"The representative form will be retained as it at present stands, legislation being committed to two chambers—the senate, and the chamber of deputies. No taxes to be raised, except such as are voted by the representatives of the nation. Public and private liberty to be secured. The freedom of the press to be respected, with the reservation of such measures as may be necessary for the preservation of the public quiet. Religious liberty to be fully guaranteed. Property to be regarded as sacred and inviolable; and the sale of national domains to remain undisturbed. The judges to be independent and irremovable. The public debt to be guaranteed. All military pensions, promotions, and ranks, to be retained, as well as the old and new nobility. The legion of honour to continue, but its decorations to be differently distributed. Every Frenchman to be equally entitled to the enjoyment of all public offices and employments; and no man to be prosecuted or damaged on account of his opinions."

The people, at least the higher and middle classes, who trusted in its words, and knew nothing of the secret history of the constitution of the charter of Ouen, gave loud expression to their rejoicing, and were full of the most sanguine hopes, although everything that took place in the Tuileries gave intimation of the return of the old ceremonies, persons, manners, prejudices, and customs. Talleyrand, who on the establishment of the first ministry under the restoration on the 13th of May, was appointed minister of foreign affairs, entertained a strong suspicion that, notwithstanding the declaration, an intention was entertained of delaying the constitution, as the King of Prussia afterwards did, when he had made a similar promise. The secretary, therefore, took means to prolong the negotiation respecting the peace, in order to bring the consultations respecting the new constitution completely to an end before the departure of the Emperor of Russia, because his presence alone could give weight to the advice of Count Pozzo di Borgo, who was earnestly favourable to a free constitution. The king's want of an honest purpose respecting the constitution was so much the more evident, as the commission



which was to prepare the draft was not even named on the 17th. Whether it be true or not, as was said, that a new hint given by the Emperor of Russia of his determination not to sign the peace till the constitution was determined, contributed to this result, we must leave undetermined; certain it is, however, that the commission came to life on the 18th. This committee was composed of eighteen members, nine of the senate, and nine from the legislative body—in both cases chosen so as to avoid those belonging to the extreme right, and those belonging to the extreme left. The king named as his commissioners—as president, the Chancellor Dambray, formerly advocate-general of the parliament and a stiff feudal jurist; with him were associated the Abbé Montesquieu, Ferrand, director of the post, and Beugnot, director-general of police. The consultation of the commissioners was merely apparent, for any changes introduced in the draft were altogether immaterial, and Fontanes even introduced some sentences into the document which were first employed by the despotism of Napoleon. The consultations, commenced on the 22nd in the chancellor's residence, were suddenly brought to a close on the 27th, because the Emperor of Russia demanded that, without reserve or delay, the constitution must be complete before his departure. There can be no doubt that the charter so loudly applauded was admirably calculated to deceive, as appears from the declaration made by the chancellor with respect to the relation of this new constitution to that existing before the revolution,\* from what he proposed in the name of the king in reference to the system of elections,† and from the introduction of a few words, enabling the king, in the case of necessity, to act as if there were no constitution at all.‡ The formal sitting of the senate and the legislative body, before which the draft was to be laid, was at first determined for the 10th of June; on the 6th of May, however, a decree appeared, according to which it was to be holden on the 3rd; on the 30th, however, it was announced that the opening of the session was postponed till the 4th. The form of having two chambers, as determined by the new constitution, was observed in the calling of the first assembly; but at the same time the unconditional will of the king was proclaimed, and his disinclination towards those whom Napoleon, on account of their services in the time of the revolution, had named to the greatest eminence in the kingdom. In the ordi-

\* “Il n'entraît point dans la pensée du roi, répondit M. Dambray, de reproduire dans la charte toute l'ancienne constitution du royaume; cette constitution, ajouta-t-il, continuait de subsister dans toutes celles de ses parties aux quelles il ne serait pas formellement dérogé.”

† “M. Dambray déclara que d'après les ordres du roi la commission devait laisser à des lois qui seraient ultérieurement rendues le soin de régler l'organisation des collèges électoraux ainsi que les formes de l'élection.”

‡ Among the rights conceded to the king, it is said: “Il nomme à tous les emplois d'administration publique,” which is quite plain; but this is followed by a sentence which assumes an absolutish appearance: “Il fait les règlements et ORDONNANCES nécessaires,” not alone à l'exécution des lois, which would be quite right, but also à la sûreté de l'état.

nance of the 30th of May, the legislative body, which was to form the chamber of deputies, was alone mentioned; the senate was to form the chamber of peers; but no mention was made of it, because a great number of the body of senators could not possibly be admitted into the chamber of peers. Talleyrand had prepared for the king such a list of senators as ought to be summoned. All those who had voted for the death of Louis XVI., even then called *regicides*, were treated as criminals; that such were excluded may be presumed from the fact, that the only member of the legislative body who had voted for the king's death (Bonnet de Treyches) was constrained to relinquish his seat. Those, also, who were called republicans, or ideologists, were not summoned. The manner in which the king thus put aside the senate, and on the other hand admitted into the chamber of peers, and placed in the first rank and nobility, all that remained of the old court nobility, proved abundantly, as well as the arrangements of the court and etiquette adopted by the new monarch, that the old *régime* was to be honoured and protected, and that everything new was at most merely to be favoured by endurance and toleration.

Among the 154 peers constituting the first chamber, and whose names were partly read by the king himself and partly by his chancellor on the 4th of June, there were twenty-six who had formerly sat and voted in the old parliament, eleven old hereditary dukes, and five new ones created by the king himself; so far the names were read out by the sovereign, all the rest by the chancellor. The peers of the new creation were the fourteen marshals, of whom four were senators,\* twenty-one senators and six generals of the time previous to Napoleon. Fifty-seven senators, who held office under Napoleon, of whom, it is true, twenty belonged to the ceded provinces, were wholly passed over. The contents of the royal charter was good, but the form belonged to the school of the old Frankish empire, and threatened reaction; for the king appealed to his ancestors of the middle ages, who had also frequently reformed the existing constitution, and he called himself Louis XVIII., and dated his ordinance from the 19th year of his reign, which was altogether absurd. The address and answer of the chamber of deputies of the 15th, in reply to the king's patent, was so couched, that there was no difficulty in recognising a concealed protest against the presumed intentions of the *émigrés*, and a reassertion of those points in the constitution, the non-observance of which excited the fears of the assembly. The king's first steps were conciliatory. At first he kept the *émigrés* far from office, and was highly dissatisfied with the course pursued by his brother; his own feelings, however, those by whom he was surrounded, and his court, constituted completely after the old *régime*, soon led him from one retrograde step to another. The priests, too, became powerful; for Louis XVIII.'s brother and

\* Of Bonaparte's marshals, Brûne, Davoust, Jourdan, Massena, Soult, and Victor, were passed over.



Louis XVI.'s daughter, the Duchess of Angoulême, were both superstitious, and the king himself behaved as though he were papistical, which he really was not. The extent to which he carried this kind of behaviour, appears from his striking out Volney's name from the proposed list of senators, because *he was an Atheist*, and yet he himself made a jest of believing in a God!! His first ministry consisted of men who, with the exception of Dambray, had the best intentions, and determined to adhere closely to the proclamations and the charter; but they proved unable to carry out their views, because De Blacas, that weakest and most miserable of all the courtiers, was the king's favourite, and was used to sign his name to public documents, Louis himself suffering so much pain from gout, that he was unable to move his hand, and so incapacitated by its violence, that he could not even walk.

Talleyrand was the only one among the king's ministers who was able to form any correct judgment of the age and its requirements; but he was so completely absorbed by his own well-being, that he never thought of what his duty required, or what would be advantageous to the nation. Dambray drew down all sorts of reproaches upon himself, and exposed himself to the hatred both of the law-courts and the people;\* and almost severer charges were made against the theological minister of the interior, formerly a mild and gentle man, than against the chancellor himself.† Of Dupont, the minister of war, infamous ever since the capitulation of Baylen, it was commonly said that he was weak, indolent, and irresolute—a man without character or capacity; that he was not minister of the nation, or even of the king, but only of the court, inasmuch as he was ever ready to do what was acceptable to those who were in favour. Three days after the publication of the new constitution, Beugnot, director-general of police, made the new government ridiculous by the issue of an order for the strict observance of Sundays and holidays, because no human being in France believed in the holiness of the Sabbath, as every man in England who aspires to a respectable position in life does. Greater dissatisfaction still was awakened in the public mind by a detestable law against the freedom of the press, which was forged in the beginning of August in the sophistical manufactory of Guizot and Royer Collard. Guizot was

\* As the object here is not really to consider what kind of men the ministers were, but what was thought of them in France, we shall give a quotation on the subject from Fleury de Chaboulon in his *Memoires pour servir, &c., en 1815*, in which we entirely agree. With respect to Dambray he says, vol. i., p. 17: "A peine revêtu de la simarre qu'il devint l'oppresseur des tribunaux et des juges, l'antagoniste des lois nouvelles, et le zéléteur stupide de formules serviles, des coutumes et des édits barbares, que l'ascendant des lumières, de la raison, et de la liberté, avait plongé depuis un quart de siècle dans le néant et dans l'oubli."

† Chaboulon, l. 100: "Il devint dédaigneux, irascible, intolérant. Un seul principe, haine et mépris pour la révolution, j'aurais presque dit pour la France, dirigeait son administration. Il n'examinait pas, si telle et telle institution était bonne et utile, si elle avait coûté à établir, si elle pouvait être modifiée, appropriée aux circonstances actuelles, il regardait seulement l'époque de la création, et cette époque décidait tout."



a worshiper and disciple of Royer Collard, who had kept up an uninterrupted correspondence with Louis XVIII. during the whole time of the empire. By this means he was first recommended as private secretary to Montesquieu, minister of state, and he afterwards made him secretary-in-chief to the home department, of which he was at the head.

Guizot, by his papers which appeared in the *Journal des Débats* of the 29th and 30th of July, proved himself to be the logical defender of despotism, and showed himself worthy of the game which he played under Louis Philippe, to the great joy of Metternich and the English aristocracy. The law upon the press, which was the joint product of these two eminent dialecticians, was indisputably worthy of the philosophy of both. We shall subjoin four of the articles of this law,\* but the introduction is by far too characteristic of the whole science of *doctrinaire* statecraft, French and German, not to claim a place in the text. They audaciously make the king to say: "Inasmuch as we desire to secure the well-being of that constitutional charter which guarantees to the people the right of giving free expression to their opinions when they continue observant of the laws designed to guard against the abuse of this freedom—we have regarded it as our first duty to give laws to all subjects without exception who are not excluded from the exercise of this freedom by the constitution." And then follows the most absurd sentence, which affirms the impossibility of exercising this right without the institution of the censorship. (A défaut de ces lois le DROIT accordé par la charte RESTERAIT sans effet).

#### B.—EUROPEAN EVENTS.

The agreement entered into with the Count d'Artois on the 23rd of April had effectually removed all the obstructions to a peace, and the foreign troops left France. The monarchs, and about 40,000 of their troops, remained in Paris till the peace was formally concluded. The conclusion took place on the 30th of May; and although France by the 2nd article of this treaty is confined to the limits of the year 1792, some small places in the departments of the North, the Sambre and Meuse, the Moselle, Saar and Lower Rhine, are still allowed to remain for the purpose of conveniently settling the boundaries. The French further retained Mühlhausen, Avignon, Mumpelgard, and the sub-prefecture of Chambéry. By the 5th article the free navigation of the Rhine is determined, but the particulars of the arrangement reserved for a congress to be held in Vienna. The restoration of the kingdom of Holland, with an

\* Art 1. Tout écrit de plus de trente [twenty was afterwards substituted] feuilles pourra être publié librement et sans examen ou censure préalable. Art. 9. Les journaux et écrits périodiques ne pourront paraître qu'avec l'autorisation du roi. Art. 11. Nul ne sera imprimeur ni libraire s'il n'est breveté du roi et assermenté. Finally, 12. Le brevet pourra être retiré à tout imprimeur ou libraire qui aura été convaincu par un jugement de contravention aux lois.

augmentation of territory, is provided for in the 6th article, as well as the partition of Germany into a number of small independent states. Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 decide that England is to be allowed to retain Malta, but is to restore to France all the colonies taken during the war, with the exception of the islands of Tobago, St. Lucia, the Isle of France, and the Spanish portion of St. Domingo. Of the ships of war seized by the English in Antwerp, two-thirds are to be restored; but of those taken in the Texel, none. By article 18 the allies renounce all claims upon France, whilst she, on the other hand, binds herself, by article 19, to liquidate and pay all sums due to foreign governments by virtue of any contracts or other agreements entered into by the proper authorities. By article 20, commissioners are named on both sides to determine such claims as belong to the category in the preceding article. In article 32 it is specified and agreed that a congress is to be assembled in Vienna within the space of two months, to which all the powers who had taken part in the war are to send their plenipotentiaries. Such are the essential contents of the public articles of the treaty, which, unhappily, like all the treaties of our times, had its secret articles also.

By virtue of these secret articles, France bound herself, firstly, to give her consent to the partition which the allies might agree to make of the provinces ceded by France; secondly, promised an extension of territory to the King of Sardinia; and thirdly, agreed to sanction the free navigation of the Rhine and Scheldt. The fourth article runs as follows: "The French government—which binds itself, by the secret articles of the agreement of the 23rd of April, to use all possible diligence, and to apply all possible means, to realise the design—promises to restore the moneys of the Bank of Hamburg,—to set on foot the strictest investigation to discover the authors of the wrong, and to prosecute all who have been guilty of the plunder." Fifthly, the powers declare that the renunciation of all claims on France, declared in the 18th article, takes for granted that they will make no claim whatever for dotations, presents, incomes attached to the legion of honour, or pensions imposed upon the ceded provinces. In addition to these things, it was agreed, in special and secret articles—1. That a mixed commission should be appointed by France and Russia to adjust the mutual claims of France and the duchy of Warsaw; 2. That France should bind herself to England; *a.* To use all her interests in the congress of Vienna for the abolition of the slave-trade; *b.* To arrange the debts of the French prisoners of war in England; *c.* To satisfy the claims made by the English against the French since the embargo of 1792; *d.* To enter into negotiations for a commercial treaty. An especial agreement was entered into between Prussia and France, whereby everything which had been agreed between these two nations, either publicly or secretly, should be reckoned null and void.

This peace was proclaimed on the 1st of June, the day on which the allied monarchs left Paris. From that moment began a new



period of oppression of the people, for the honour and benefit of kings, princes, aristocrats, priests, and diplomatists. With regard to the diplomatists, France was obliged to pay very dear for their care of her cause. Metternich, Castlereagh, Nesselrode, and Hardenberg each received a million in French *rentes*, and the other plenipotentiaries half that sum, or thereabouts. This would have been more endurable, inasmuch as the people are accustomed to one sort of luxury or another in their leaders, but here an attempt was made to rob them of that which they had formally gained by the imperial oppression, and they were cheated out of the advantages which had been promised as the result of their freedom from this oppression. We shall cite a few examples, and commence with some notice of the behaviour of the King of Spain. Ferdinand VII. had already been received as a sovereign ruler in Saragossa; in Valencia, where he arrived on the 16th of April, he was speedily surrounded by the old nobility, and by all those who detested both the regency and the Cortes. The Cortes were disunited among themselves; and whilst the majority insisted upon the king's swearing to the constitution before he entered upon the government, the minority sent deputies to him to entreat him not to surrender his ancient privileges and rights. Generals, with their armies, offered their adherence, and a threatening and coarsely-worded address of the Cortes handed to him at Valencia, as well as the certainty that the troops which he had sent forward had reached Madrid, contributed not a little to bring him to the resolution to restore in its full extent the Spanish *régime*, which in fact he did by a proclamation published on the 5th, before he set out on his journey.\* On the 10th, the troops beset the chambers of the Cortes and the regency, both of which were declared to be dissolved. Forty members of the Cortes were arrested, the rest escaped. Madrid and the whole of Spain looked quietly on or applauded their absolute king. On the 14th the king made his entry, and then immediately commenced the general persecution of all those who, from their love of freedom and patriotic enthusiasm, had saved his dominions for this cowardly king. He caused all appointments to public offices to be declared null, threatened every enlightened

\* Inasmuch as many such proclamations have been issued from this time down to the year 1848, we shall here present our readers with the essence of this, which may be regarded as the pattern of all the rest. The king, after giving some account of what had been done with him and concerning him, then gives expression to his hearty dislike to all those who, under the name of *ordinary or extraordinary Cortes*, had made themselves masters of the government, and purposed to annihilate the ancient laws, and to impose *the yoke of an illegal constitution on their sovereign*. He then, indeed, promises that he will immediately summon the legal Cortes, and with their aid give a constitutional organisation to Spain, such as is suitable to the interests of the nation, and grounded upon the civilisation of European nations. This constitution was to embrace freedom of person, freedom of the press under legal limitations, the right of voting taxes, and the separation of the civil-list from the public treasury, &c. All this was merely the deception and falsehood of Escoiquiz. The king, however, was thoroughly in earnest when he added: "That the constitution of the Cortes was abrogated, that all who should acknowledge it would be tried for high treason, and if found guilty be condemned to be hanged."



man with some cruel persecution, removed all lovers of freedom from their stations, and appointed servile men in their stead. Lists of suspected characters were made out, and the king became the prosecutor and executioner of his people. The allies having concluded peace with France on the 30th of May, Louis XVIII., before entering into negotiations with Ferdinand, turned to Charles IV., and only when Charles recalled everything which he had formerly said, and declared the act of renunciation made by him at Aranjuez to be valid (what meanness and falsehood!) did Talleyrand, as had been agreed upon with the powers, enter into negotiations with Don Pedro de Gomez de Labrador to obtain the accession of Spain to the peace concluded on the 30th of May. Preliminary to this agreement it was necessary to adjust the mutual claims of the two nations, and the act of adhesion was not signed till the 20th of July.

The return of the kings of Spain and Sardinia, the Duke of Modena, and other absolute princes, such as the Elector of Hesse, into their states, was a natural consequence of the victory of the allies. The Grand Duchy of Würzburg had been already transferred by Austria to Bavaria, but all the other measures to be adopted for the transforming of the other states were reserved for the Congress of Vienna, although many of the changes had already been decided on. The fate of the people fell anew into the hands of the courts and their diplomatists, who partitioned territories and people just as it pleased them, or in proportion as their dearly-paid intrigues, cabals, and tricks were successful or the contrary. Inasmuch as Austria preferred being powerful in Italy, and wished to retain Vienna and Milan to recovering Belgium, she had long since come to an understanding with the English aristocracy to give up Belgium into their hands in order that it might be conferred upon their favourite, the Prince of Orange. The prince was, indeed, again presented to the Dutch. The English, however, retained the Island of Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope, and the ships stolen from the Dutch—that is, the Dutch fleet, which had been surrendered to the English without a struggle by the partisans of the House of Orange. Belgium, Liège, Limburg, and Luxembourg were to be united to Holland. This union of the Walloon provinces was merely calculated to bring the Belgian and Dutch trade under the influence and guidance of a speculating English favourite; and this would necessarily produce discontent and internal divisions, which also must result from the diversities in descent, language, customs, laws, and religion prevailing in those provinces.

The King of Prussia and Emperor of Russia went from Paris to London to pay a visit to the Prince Regent of England, as they said; but their far more important object was to regulate everything which related to the new kingdom of the Prince of Orange, the favourite of England and near relative of the King of Prussia. This also involved some arrangement with the other members of the house of Orange, in whom the English had no interest, and the whole affair

relating to Belgium and Holland was settled in London. The debts and possessions of the two provinces were to be in common; the religious parties in both divisions were to be on an equal footing, politically, in each; the king was to reside alternately in Brussels and the Hague. Denmark, having neglected at the proper time to separate itself from France, was now obliged to cede Norway to Sweden, or rather punished by being compelled to exchange Norway for Swedish Pomerania. A great effort was made to submit to the necessities of the case, and after the battle of Leipsic, Schleswig and Holstein had been very harshly treated by Swedish and other troops. At the close of the year Denmark, pressed also by England, was compelled to enter upon negotiations which eventually led to the peace of Kiel, in January, 1815; and, by virtue of this peace, Denmark ceded Norway in exchange for Pomerania and the island of Rügen. In the mean time, the Danes did everything possible to prevent the carrying into execution of the stipulations of the peace, under the pretence that the Norwegians themselves were unwilling to consent to become Swedes. The main instrument in this operation was the heir to the Danish crown, and as such the legitimate successor to the government of Norway; and he was especially effective, as he was greatly beloved by the Norwegian people. With this view, Prince Christian Frederick, heir presumptive of Frederick VI. of Denmark, had been sent to Norway, and had continued there as governor since the 21st of May, 1813. The peace of Kiel being concluded, and Frederick VI. having relinquished all claims to Norway, it appeared that there was a party in the country not disinclined to a union with Sweden, but a much larger one was in favour of the prince's declaring himself by a proclamation to be regent, as heir to the country, and calling a national assembly for the 20th of April to meet at Eideswolde, in the province of Aggerhus, in order to establish a new form of government. The assembly was called and met at Eideswolde accordingly; a constitution of a mixed monarchical and democratic form was agreed upon, which, in fact, constitutes the essence of the present constitution of Norway, and the choice of a regent resolved upon. The King of Sweden obtained some votes, but the great majority was in favour of Prince Christian Frederick. England, however, as well as Sweden, had recourse to new threats, that Schleswig and Holstein should be again occupied, unless the King of Denmark gave up the fortresses and compelled the prince to leave Norway. On the 18th of April, therefore, Frederick VI. issued a proclamation, in which he called upon all his officers and authorities, civil and military, to take their departure from Norway within the space of four weeks. The prince refused or neglected to obey the proclamation, whereupon the Crown Prince of Sweden (Bernadotte) assumed the offensive, collected an army at Lübeck in the end of May, caused the town to be fortified, and appeared as if he was about to advance into Holstein, when Russia, Prussia, and Austria sent commissioners to co-operate with some already sent from England for the settlement of this question. Notwithstanding



all this, the fortresses were not given up, nor was the prince prevailed upon to leave Norway.

Negotiations were carried on during the whole month of June to no purpose, and Prince Frederick did not lay aside the title of regent till the representatives of the allied powers brought him an express order from the king, on the 30th of that month, to lay aside the title and to issue a manifesto to the Norwegians, urging them to relinquish their attempt to resist the will of the allied powers. The prince was at the same time distinctly commanded to give up the fortresses to Sweden. In the mean time, it became obvious that the same course could not be pursued with the Norwegians which had been taken with the Spaniards, French, Germans, and Italians—that is, to feed them with hopes: it was resolved that the constitutional freedom of Norway should remain unaffected under the Swedish rule; and the allies pledged themselves to effect this important end. Even these measures proved fruitless; and therefore the Crown Prince of Sweden left Stockholm on the 17th of July to join his army on the Norwegian frontier, and pressed forward into that kingdom. War was then carried on till the 14th of August, when, for the first time, Prince Christian agreed to a stipulation at Moss, by virtue of which he submitted himself to the will of the united powers of Europe, and called a *storthing* at Moss, at which he renounced all claim to the throne of Norway, and the King of Sweden was chosen in his stead. The Swedes next took military possession of the country. The *storthing* did not meet till the 7th of October, and Prince Christian was detained by contrary winds till the 26th of that month. After the opening of the *storthing*, Swedish commissioners appeared in this national assembly, in order to come to an understanding with the representatives of the people respecting their constitution, and to receive the necessary act of homage to King Charles of Sweden.

The affairs of Italy were much sooner and more easily arranged than those of Norway. Shortly before the taking of Paris, Lord William Bentinck had occupied Genoa, and restored a sort of shadow of the old republic; the English government, however, disapproved of the precipitate promise then made to the Genoese. According to the policy of the allies and their ministers, nationality and freedom were regarded as the mere fancies of ideologists; they again transferred the dominion of Genoa to the restored Sardinian government, and subjected it also, as they did Piedmont, to the despotic authority of a sovereign who, in his exile, had proved himself to be an unhesitating patron of monks and priests. Everything old and absurd was again introduced into Savoy, Piedmont, and Genoa, as well as into France. Some compensation in Germany having been long since promised to the Viceroy Eugene, in compliment to his father-in-law, the King of Bavaria, he now hoped, after the departure of the French, to be able to maintain himself by means of the senate of his Italian kingdom. On the 16th of April he had a meeting at Schiarino Rizzino, near Mantua, with Bellegarde, then



in command of the Austrian army, and concluded a suspension of arms with him, until representatives of the senate should go to Paris in order to negotiate some understanding with respect to the future destiny of Italy. For this he was obliged to send back all the French, both in the garrisons and the army, to France, and to give up the fortresses which had been occupied by French garrisons to the Austrians. The French troops were led over the Alps by General Grenier, and Prince Eugene believed that, at the head of the Italian army and with the aid of the senate, he might be able to establish himself as the elected king of Italy; in this, however, he was opposed not only by the adherents of the Austrians, but also by the parties of the Duke of Melzi and of General Pino, who wished for a king, but were not favourable to him. The senate at length resolved to send three deputies to consult the allied powers, and to entreat them to put an end to hostilities, and to recognise the independence of the kingdom of Italy. They were at the same time to express their admiration of the virtues of the viceroy, and their gratitude for his admirable government; in Paris, however, they were very coldly received, because Austria, in the mean time, had occupied Milan.

The mission of this deputation was the signal of a rising in Milan, in which the leaders of both the anti-French parties were easily induced to take part, because the people were as weary of the dominance of the French, as they had been before, and again became two years afterwards, of the Germans. On the 20th of April the whole mass of the people of Milan, without distinction of age or rank, stormed the palace of the senate, drove the senators out of their chambers, and compelled them to flee from the city. The governor, the richest of the tradespeople, and the first members of the nobility, all took part in this tumult, and especially because the viceroy had set on foot cabals in his own favour through the hated instrumentality of his French adherents, Méjean and Darnay. The enraged populace sought for these men in their houses, but they were not to be found. Melzi also fled for refuge. Prina, minister of finance, the most hated of them all, was seized, and, after cruel treatment, put to death. At the same time, commotions also took place in the army. At last Eugene availed himself of this as a pretence for delivering up Mantua to the Austrians. In return for this, Bellegarde suffered him to carry off to Bavaria the treasures on which he had seized. The Austrians then marched into the Milanese, seized upon Venice, and carried into effect beforehand what the congress was first to conclude upon in Vienna. Ten Austrian regiments were formed out of the Italian army. On the 28th of April Bellegarde entered Milan, and on the 23rd of May took possession of the kingdom of Italy in the name of his master. The Grand Duke of Wurzburg returned to Tuscany, as the Pope did to Rome. Maria Louise had retained Parma, but at first remained in Vienna. The Duke of Modena began anew to play the tyrant in his

dominions. Murat, King of Naples, when he had led back his army, retained possession of the Marches; but everything indicated that the congress of Vienna, to whom the new arrangement of the states of Europe was to be referred, would deprive him not only of the Marches, but would take away from him all claims to the kingdom of Naples itself.

We cannot here go into the manner in which the patient Germans were rewarded for their long endurance, their immense exertions, and absurd admiration of their hereditary rulers, their families and countries, to which perhaps we may again recur. We only mention now, that the promise of a free constitution in Prussia was not fulfilled—the old abuses were all restored—the counts, the squirearchy, and feudal law remained as they had ever been,—and the old Elector of Hesse become more covetous than ever. In Hanover and Brunswick the proud nobility again raised their heads, the whole class of officials again resumed the insolence of their caste, and merit was again placed in subordination to rank. The Romish canon law was not merely restored to its former ascendancy with all its tediousness and chicanery, but in Mecklenburg feudal supremacy was revived, and in Hanover the torture. Worst of all, the congress went to work with Germany, and with human beings in general, in the most arbitrary manner. No national plan or measure whatever was established for the distribution of the provinces and their inhabitants to be given away, but mere numbers were taken as a guide; the most detested and egotistical diplomatists determined on the partition just as suited their convenience, and Frenchmen, such as Berthier and Beauharnais, of whom neither the Swiss nor the Italians would hear any thing more, were forced on the acceptance of their good-natured and still patient, because yet unexcited, Germans, by their princes.

#### C.—CONGRESS OF VIENNA, AND RETURN OF BONAPARTE FROM ELBA.

Our object being only to give some short notices of the events in Europe till the second fall of Napoleon, we cannot here enter into the complicated history of the congress of Vienna; we shall therefore briefly touch upon some traits of the splendid assembly of kings, princes, diplomatists, and high nobility in Vienna, which is so closely connected with Bonaparte's attempt to resume his empire. The splendid festivities, the distinguished personal qualities of the Emperor Alexander, as well as those of the old Prince de Ligne, which even at his advanced age he exhibited as he did in his youth at the court of Catharine of Russia, in jests, *bon mots*, and witticisms of various kinds before the courts and in the high society of Vienna, we shall leave altogether untouched. We refer, on these points, to such historians as take pleasure in describing balls and processions, masquerades and sledging parties, horses and equipages, imperial extravagance and royal pomp—men who express their admiration of all those



things—of which we must express the strongest condemnation—and who have described these matters with an easiness of style and lightness of disposition to which we neither can nor desire to make any pretensions whatever. We shall not even venture to name the most distinguished of all these writers, because, by so doing, we should go completely beyond our sphere, and because the most frivolous of such writers have obtained the greatest degree of favour, and are to be found in every court library. Still further, we shall not even make one general remark, but quote a passage in the notes from one of the shallowest of the set, distinguished only for the number and variety of his compilations, and to whom we should not otherwise refer.\*

The congress of Vienna was not opened at the end of July, notwithstanding the promises made to the people, whose destiny depended on its decisions, for the monarchs first took various journeys. Later still, in September, their ministers engaged in strifes on various subjects, and in October the princes were full of dances and balls; so that the assembly, which was apparently opened on the 1st of October, did not really sit for the despatch of business till the 1st of November. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia had gone from Paris to London. The special object of their journey was to renew and strengthen the bonds of the alliance, which, as we learn from Sir Charles Stewart's courtly Memoirs, had become rather loose in Paris. This was effected by the treaty of the 29th of July, designed to confirm that of the four chief powers agreed upon in Chaumont. From England the King of Prussia went through France to Neuchâtel, which he had already reoccupied in January, 1814, and from thence to Berlin. The Emperor of Russia first made some stay in Poland, where he announced the speedy restoration of the kingdom, and acted as though it had already been given into his hands. The ministers of the allied sovereigns met in Vienna as early as September, because the meeting of congress for despatch of business was

\* Capefigue, "*Les Cent Jours*," vol. i., p. 67: "Vienne dès le mois d'Octobre avait vu se réunir les souverains d'Europe, les ministres, et tout ce que la société diplomatique avait de plus élevé, des femmes alors d'une haute célébrité, des artistes mêlés et confondus avec les têtes couronnées; la saison des eaux si attrayante était finie, et on se rendait à Vienne, la ville des plaisirs, pour y passer un ravissant hiver. Les souverains se témoignent la plus intime cordialité, ils se pressaient la main et pourtant des questions sérieuses allaient s'agiter entre eux; les soirs, les plaisirs, et les bruyantes distractions; le matin, les affaires. Le congrès s'était réuni sous la présidence du Prince de Metternich; on devait cette déférence à l'Autriche et au ministre, qui avait si habilement conduit les affaires de l'Europe. L'Empereur Alexandre était comme le roi du congrès, sa popularité l'y avait suivi; sa grâce et sa politesse parfaite avec les femmes, cette espèce d'esprit chivalresque qui cachait la politique sous les dehors de la candeur, lui donnaient une haute popularité à Vienne. François VI., si modeste dans ses manières et dans ses habitudes, était effacé dans sa capitale; la brillante Impératrice d'Autriche recevait les souverains avec cette noble aisance qui la distinguait. Frédéric Guillaume, Roi de Prusse, n'avait point quitté le noir dont il était revêtu depuis la mort de la Reine Louise; il ne pensait qu'à cette chaste et poétique épouse et son front n'avait cessé de se montrer triste et soucieux depuis ce fatal évènement. A Vienne toute l'Allemagne était venue, les mille princes de la Confédération du Rhin, les ambassadeurs, les hommes d'état; on ne voyait que costumes brillants dans les carousels, dans les fêtes de cour, et le spirituel Prince de Ligne put dire le congrès danse et ne marche pas."



announced for the 1st of October; but at that time the number of kings, princes, counts, barons, diplomatists, ministers, ladies, and gentlemen was so great, and balls, assemblies, masquerades, dinners, and suppers took place so constantly, daily and nightly, that no serious business could be dreamt of till the 1st of November.

Talleyrand also was there, accompanied, for general affairs, by M. de Besnardière, who had also assisted the Duke of Vicenza at Châtillon; for German affairs and cabals, by the Duke of Dalberg, one of the high German nobility; for Russian affairs, for Nesselrode and the ladies, by his pious colleague, M. de Noailles; and last of all by La Tour du Pin for Swiss and other affairs. The ministers of Prussia, Austria, and Russia, were with good reason afraid of this army of intriguers commanded by such a general as Talleyrand, and, supported by the first secret article of the peace of Paris, they wished to exclude the French altogether from any consultations which were to be held on the partition of the various provinces torn away from France.\* They had now carried on consultations, with the accession of the English ambassador, since the 17th of September; on the 22nd and 23rd they signed a minute, wherein it was declared that only the four chief powers were to be parties to any conclusions determined on, and it was to be for the others merely to accept or reject.† Lord Castlereagh, however, who arrived on the 24th, refused to subscribe these minutes, and, in a note addressed to the congress, required the admission of eight powers to the consultation.‡ This requirement contributed to give some weight to Talleyrand's demand, that France, Spain, and Portugal, should be considered as parties entitled to be consulted in these arrangements. The consequence was, that the congress of Vienna was composed of the representatives of eight powers; but in the midst of all this mutual heartiness and confidence, and of the announcements and festivities, there speedily arose the bitterest differences, because Austria, England, and France, would not consent that Russia should obtain the whole of Poland, and Prussia the whole of the kingdom of Saxony, as in fact had been already agreed upon by the two powers at Kalisch in February, 1813. At the first, Prussia demanded to have Cracow and Zamosk as the limits upon one side, and Thorn upon the other.

\* "*La disposition à faire des territoires auxquels S. M. T. C. renonce par l'article III. du traité patent, tous les territoires en dehors des frontières le 1er Janvier, 1792, et les rapports auxquels doit résulter un système d'équilibre durable et réel en Europe seront réglés au congrès sur les bases arrêtées par les puissances alliées entre les bases que S. M. T. C. s'oblige d'avance à reconnaître.*"

† "*Que les plénipotentiaires des quatre puissances alliées n'entreraient sur cet objet en conférence avec la France et l'Espagne qu'à mesure qu'ils auraient terminé en parfait accord entre eux la distribution du Duché de Varsovie, celle de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie. Qu'en attendant que ces trois points fussent réglés, les plénipotentiaires des quatre puissances alliées, réunis à ceux de France et d'Espagne, s'occuperaient des autres questions d'un intérêt général.*"

‡ "*Que bien que les quatre puissances eussent seules titre et qualité pour proposer les arrangemens resultant du premier article secret du traité de Paris, cependant il avait été entendu que ces arrangemens seraient soumises à une discussion franche, libre, et à laquelle toutes les autres puissances prendraient part comme parties actives.*"

At that time it would have been possible to have made Germany greater and more powerful than it had ever been even in the middle ages; Prussia might have saved Germany, for all Germans felt themselves under the deepest obligations to the country whence came enthusiasm, civilisation, physical power, and the spirit of order. Saxony had always yielded itself to foreign influences ever since the time of the Thirty Years' War; and this was too well known to Talleyrand, Metternich, Count Münster, and their paltry princes, not to encourage them to enter into cabals. Russia, as early as the 16th of June, had committed the administration of the country on the left bank of the Rhine, as far as the Dutch frontier, to Baron von Stein, on behalf of Prussia; Mayence was garrisoned by Prussians and Austrians in common, and Prussia ceded Hildesheim to Hanover. But what was to be done with Saxony? The whole of the treasures on the Rhine were taken possession of for Prussia, Sack appointed civil governor and Kleist military commander, without any question having been asked of the congress; it almost appeared as if Prussia, strong in its confidence in Russia, wished to take possession of Saxony precisely as Russia had done of Poland, without waiting for any decision of the diplomatists in Vienna. Repnin, who had administered the affairs of Saxony since the taking of Dresden, transferred the whole matter into Russian hands, and by virtue of an agreement between Russia and Prussia, Saxony was, as it were, provisionally united with Prussia. This no sooner occurred than a rapid interchange of notes took place between the English, Austrian, and French ministers on the one part, and the Prussian on the other. The whole of the twenty ministers of the eight courts, and besides them the plenipotentiaries of Saxony and King Joachim of Naples, carried on a bloodless war in minutes and notes, which appeared as if it would become endless or might lead to a bloody war in the field. No one troubled himself the least about the fate of the poor German people, which was left in the hands of one of the three sub-committees composed of the most bigoted aristocrats in Europe.\* The other two sub-committees dealt with Switzerland and Italy, precisely as Count Münster, Prince Wrede, and Count Winzingerode did with Germany. The Germans had great reason to congratulate themselves that Wessenberg for Austria, and Von Humboldt for Prussia, were in this committee; for now at least it was necessary to concede a decisive voice to Russia. The congress having opened on the 1st of November, a strongly-worded note, agreed upon by Metternich, Talleyrand, and Castlereagh, was handed in the next day, protesting against the conduct of Prussia in taking possession of Saxony. The answer to this was the statement of the facts of the transfer already made by Prince Repnin Wolkonski, and the actual reception of the

\* Feudal nobles then sat on these committees. Baron von Wessenberg for Austria, Von Humboldt for Prussia, the newly-created Prince Wrede for Bavaria, and Count Münster, the pearl of all the aristocrats, together with Count Hardenberg, for Hanover, Count Winzingerode and Baron von Linden for Wirtemberg.



same on the part of Prussia on the 10th of November. This step on the part of Russia and Prussia raised a great storm throughout the whole of Europe, and for three weeks employed the minds and pens of all the diplomatists in Vienna; Austria, in fact, threatened that she would have recourse to action. A breach now appeared unavoidable. Austria assembled a considerable army in Moravia; Prussia issued orders for the concentration of the whole of her forces; and the Emperor Alexander, who had already taken possession of Saxon Poland, collected an army of 300,000 men under his brother Constantine in Poland, and on the 11th of December issued a proclamation, in which he called upon the Poles to combine to maintain their *political existence*, and Count Nesselrode declared to the congress that eight millions of Poles were ready to arm in defence of their nationality. The intention was to lay claim to the whole of Poland, with the exception of some districts granted to Austria and Prussia, for the Russian prince, who was destined to be King of Poland. This plan was announced by Count Nesselrode in a note dated on the 31st of December, in which he mentioned the districts designed to be given to Prussia and Austria, and in the name of the emperor offered to recognise Cracow as a free city. On the 19th of December, Talleyrand, by command of the King of France, who was urged on by his brothers, called upon the allies to determine formally upon the expulsion of Joachim Murat, and the restoration of the treacherous, cruel, and imbecile Ferdinand IV.\* This demand gave rise to new difficulties among the diplomatists, especially as Prussia made some scruples about the new proposals of Russia. Metternich, in his dread of Russia, and from fear of Austria being obstructed by the rising power of Prussia, with all its newly-awakened energy, threw all his weight into the scale in favour of the cause which England, out of complaisance for Count Münster's Hanoverian envy towards Russia, and Wellington and other Tories out of pleasure in the princely aristocracy of Germany, were anxious to promote. Metternich and Castlereagh, therefore, on the 3rd of January, entered into an unnatural alliance to resist the claims of Russia and Prussia, in which, however, they were not really in earnest.†

\* Savary (*"Mémoires du Duc de Rovigo,"* vol. viii.), who, however, says all manner of evil of Talleyrand, and accuses him of being the cause of innumerable misfortunes, states positively that he received 300,000 ducats from Murat to prosecute his interests; and that when he had got the money Ferdinand agreed to give him as much, and, in addition to the ready cash, promised to allow him to retain possession of his principality of Benevento, and to confer upon his nephew the duchy of Dino.

† The substance of this treaty, entered into on the 3rd of January, and signed by Talleyrand, Metternich, and Castlereagh, is as follows:

"Les trois puissances contractantes s'engagent d'agir de concert et avec désintéressement pour assurer l'exécution des arrangements pris dans le traité de Paris et à se considérer tous trois comme étant attaqués dans le cas où les possessions de l'une d'elles viendraient à l'être: 1. D'abord si l'une d'elles se voyait menacée viendraient d'abord aimablement et puis d'après le second article activement à son aide. 3. En cas de médiation inutile chaque puissance contractante fournirait un corps de cinq cinquante mille hommes dont cent vingt mille d'infanterie et trente mille cavallerie. 4. L'Angleterre se réserve de fournir son contingent en troupes étrangères à sa solde. 5. En cas de guerre on conviendra aimablement de la



Metternich and Talleyrand, supported by the agreement of the 3rd of January, made a proposal which was quite worthy of them. They proposed to relinquish 800,000 *heads* (as they called them) of Saxons to Prussia, and to give back the remainder to the king. Hardenberg did not exactly accede to this offer in a note dated on the 6th of February, but he did not absolutely decline it, and declared that Russia had given up its claims upon Thorn and Tarnopol. Negotiations, therefore, were entered into respecting the partition of Saxony, the King of Prussia continuing to insist upon retaining possession of Leipzig. As soon as this point was conceded, attempts were made to induce the King of Saxony to submit to his fate. The aged king obstinately refused himself to sign the partition of his kingdom, and he was therefore invited to come from the castle of Friederichsfeld into the neighbourhood of Vienna, and on the 4th of March he removed to Presburg, but there also perseveringly refused to submit to this partition. Two days afterwards (on the 6th) a piece of news was communicated to the representatives of the four leading allied powers, which rendered it necessary to satisfy Russia and Prussia in order to prevent the complete dissolution of the alliance. Lord Burgerssh, English ambassador at Florence, had despatched a courier to Lord Castlereagh, who arrived on the 6th in Vienna, and brought the intelligence that Napoleon had eluded the vigilance of the English cruisers and sailed from Elba towards France. The parties concerned succeeded in keeping their new secret till the 11th, and in the mean time the dispute concerning Poland and Saxony was brought to a conclusion. The congress resolved that Talleyrand, Metternich, and Castlereagh should go to Presburg on the 8th, in order to impress upon the King of Saxony the necessity of submitting to his fate. The king was not to be moved; and on the 12th the whole of the European powers agreed that the terms offered to the king by Prussia should be enforced by arms.\* The festivities, balls, concerts, and dinners continued to be

nature des opérations et de choix du général en chef. 6. De nouveaux arrangements seront pris s'il y a une nécessité de secours additionnels. 7. La paix ne sera faite que d'un commun accord. 8. Le traité ne devra annuler aucun de ceux, qui ne lui sont pas contraires. 9. Les trois puissances regarderont le traité de Paris comme ayant force pour régler l'étendue de leurs possessions respectives. 10. Elles prennent l'engagement d'agir à cet égard d'un commun accord. 11. Elles se réservent la faculté d'inviter d'autres états à accéder au traité. 12. Elles se promettent de repousser toute agression contre le territoire des souverains de Hanovre et des Pays-Bas. 13. Enfin ce traité doit être ratifié dans le délai de six semaines." In the two secret articles of this treaty it is resolved:—"1. Les souverains de Bavière, de Wurtemberg, et des Pays-Bas, seront invités à accéder au traité ci-dessus. 2. Les conventions de ce jour ne devront être communiquées par aucun des puissances signataires sans le consentement exprès de toutes."

\* The congress, that is, the twenty ministers, the king, and the two emperors, decreed as follows:—"Vu la réunion du Roi de Saxe au plus cruel ennemi de l'Allemagne par la remise qu'il lui avait faite de Torgau, la Prusse pouvait se mettre incontinent en possession de la partie de la Saxe, qui lui avait été dévolue; qu'on se réservait de justifier la conduite tenue envers Frédéric August, en publiant un exposé de la sienne et en réfutant ses plaintes de manière à les empêcher de compromettre l'opinion."

carried on in all their pomp and luxury,\* till on the night between the 11th and 12th one of the most splendid of them all was suddenly disturbed and thrown into confusion by the unwelcome news that, on the 1st of March, Bonaparte had effected a landing in the bay of Juan, on the south coast of France.

We cannot enter into the history of the unfortunatè laws and measures to which Louis XVIII., on the departure of the allied sovereigns, was induced to give his consent; otherwise it would be easy to show that the whole French nation, up to December, 1814, must necessarily have become as weary of the new rule of the emigrants, and especially the army, as Napoleon was of his inactive exile in Elba. Blacas, Ferrand, Montesquieu and Guizot, with their *doctrinaire* restrictions on the freedom of the press, reduced even the disciples of Madame de Staël to despair, such men as Benjamin Constant, Dumolard, and others, who had honestly attached themselves to the cause of the Bourbons. The greatest anxiety prevailed among the nine or ten millions of Frenchmen who had more or less taken part in the purchase or sale of great masses of national property. The old soldiers and officers were obliged to make way for the squirearchy and the gentlemen of the *garde du corps*, and the wives of the marshals were treated with neglect or contempt at court. Everything indicated that the Bourbons in Paris would very soon pursue the same course of conduct as the Bourbons in Spain, which is still followed there by the daughter of Ferdinand VII., and which at the present moment daily occurs in Naples under another of the Bourbons. What they pleased to call a purification of the courts of law had been already partially effected, and its completion was impending; the old members of the convention were persecuted, and Gregoire and others, who had been members of the convention at the time of the execution of Louis XVI., were removed from all public offices, and even excluded from the Academy. The army, under Dupont, was grossly neglected; commissions were granted to *émigrés*, or the younger sons of noble families, and the former state of discipline was relaxed because Dupont was merely solicitous to enjoy the favour of the court. When Soult, who had been at first treated very coolly, and not even dignified with a peerage, was appointed minister of war, he had already made himself contemptible by his meanness, and become the blind tool of the insolent and absurd courtiers of the king. He first of all suffered himself to be sent to Brittany, where he figured at the formal interment of the emigrants who had fallen at Quiberon, and aided their relations in the erection of a testimonial to their memory. He next appeared in Paris in processions and church festivals, with his prayer-book under his arm, and thus rendered the old sergeant

\* Thibaudeau remarks very aptly: "Vienne était un lieu enchanteur, une vraie féerie. En se faisant quelque illusion, on se serait cru à l'âge d'or. Les dépenses de ces plaisirs s'élevèrent, dit-on, à environ 30 millions de florins; c'était payer un peu chère les plaisirs royaux et les bons mots du Prince de Ligne."



ridiculous. It was he who helped to organise the *maison du roi*, such an object of hatred to the old guard, and he protected the noble *garde du corps* against the contempt of the old soldiers. We may, indeed, excuse him by the examples of the other marshals, by his total want of political training, and by his boundless covetousness. He had, moreover, no principles to defend, as was the case with Benjamin Constant, who did everything in his power to stimulate the hatred of the people against Bonaparte, and to call in the Bourbons, and then, enchanted as it were by some gentle phrases, suffered himself to be named a councillor of state to the man whom he had denounced shortly before as a cruel tyrant.

The most distinguished generals of the army, as well as Napoleon and his family, alleged that they owed no faith to the Bourbons, because the latter had violated the treaty of Fontainebleau. The two millions which Napoleon had reserved for his generals were not paid, and the payment of the two millions promised to himself was not discharged. It would be unjust to lay upon the Bourbons all the burden of the unfavourable conditions of the peace of Fontainebleau; it was due to them alone that they were not more unfavourable. Napoleon, moreover, became now more than ever the ideal and idol of the people and the army. All who are acquainted with the national character and history of the French, must admit that Louis XIV. and Napoleon, precisely because they were the scourge of other nations, were the exalted and be-praised heroes of the French. The great object, therefore, was to calm the fears of the *grandees* of the empire, who had gone over to the Bourbons, and might, therefore, dread the vengeance of Napoleon. This was easily done, because most of these deserters were indispensable. It was more difficult to remove the apprehensions of men who constituted the essence of the nation, such as Benjamin Constant, Lafayette, Gregoire, Destutte de Tracy, and others, who were afraid that the return of Napoleon would bring with it a return of the arbitrary government of the empire. In this respect, however, the strongest assurances were conveyed to them from the island of Elba. All his old friends in the army were, by means of those who remained with him, kept in constant communication with him. Lavalette in Paris, and Murat in Naples, promoted his interests in every way, the former with all the cunning of a man who had been long engaged as the director of the post-office in inspecting the letters that passed through his hands, and the latter with all that indiscretion and haste for which he was remarkable. The officers had formed all kinds of plans among themselves for effecting his return; the Duchess of St. Leu cherished and promoted the cause of Bonapartism in her saloons with so much the greater boldness as she and her brother had received many marks of especial respect from the Emperor Alexander. The Duke of Bassano conducted himself as if he was still one of Napoleon's ministers, and sent him in January, 1815, a full ministerial report of the state of things in France. His messenger on this



occasion was Harel, who had been auditor of the council of state. Fleury de Chaboulon brought the most decisive news from Elba, and gave the conclusive plans and advice. He has written four small volumes on the history of this secret mission, of his own fanatical adherence to Napoleon, and of the events of the hundred days after Napoleon's return. We shall make as little use of these volumes as of the two large octavos of the prolix Capefigue on the same subject. The very best and most intelligent account of these days and events not set forth in the style of Napoleon bulletins, is to be found in the 7th part of Thibaudeau's History of the Empire, and in the 2nd part of the History of the Two Restorations, by Vaulabelle. We shall be very brief.

The consequences of Napoleon's return might have been very different had he been able to wait for the termination of the congress in Vienna, for the result embittered, and would have roused into action, the minds of the Germans, Belgians, Italians, and Spaniards; nor do we believe that they would have ventured to act on Wellington's hint to remove him to a more distant exile, as is generally alleged in his excuse. The whole course of French literature since 1799, and the history of our own days, prove beyond contradiction that Napoleon, whatever we may think of him, had really more love of his country in him than the luxurious and worn-out king, his abettors and flatterers, the miserable M. de Blacas or the knightly courtier Hofmann, the Count d'Artois, or the anglicised Duke of Berry, the devotee Duchess of Angoulême, or the covetous Duke of Orleans. It so happened that Napoleon coming from Elba arrived at the same place as that at which he first landed on his return from Egypt in 1799. Another accident led to his finding a considerable part of his old army on his way to Paris, and by it he was received with rejoicing. The congress not having expressed any design of proceeding actively against Murat, the King of France had organised an army of 30,000 men on the frontier of Piedmont; but as Murat had also collected his forces on the borders, Soult, instead of 30,000, had stationed 50,000 men between Lyons and the Italian frontiers. The Austrians, indeed, by their threats, had deterred both kings from attempting to carry on war in Italy, but had themselves collected such a considerable force in Lombardy, that no one entertained any doubt that they were about to lend their aid to King Ferdinand of Sicily against his rival, Murat. This, together with the fear that the proposal secretly approved in the congress of removing Napoleon to a greater distance might be carried out, hastened the execution of this long-projected plan of the French of the most different parties and opinions.

There was a general agreement that the system of government and administration of the civil and social arrangements of the time of Louis XV., which his grandsons and their noble and aristocratic partisans threatened to reintroduce, was repugnant to the general feelings, and wholly untenable; but very different opinions were enter-

tained as to whether the nation was to expect a new order of things under the Duke of Orleans or under Napoleon.\* The latter was preferred, Napoleon himself having intimated that he recognised the deficiencies of his system ; he promised to make a complete change, and fell a second time because he did not keep his word. Those Frenchmen of influence, who placed no confidence in Napoleon, had wished, before they were taken by surprise, to avail themselves of the opening of the chambers to obtain a formal resolution of the chambers, setting aside the elder line of the Bourbons and placing the younger in its stead. Many of the discontented officers of the army, to whom the Prince of Eckmühl had pledged his word, wished to occupy Paris, to carry off Napoleon from Elba and bring him back to Paris. Both schemes were chimerical, but they facilitated Napoleon's bold adventure. In a conspiracy, properly so called, we do not believe, for there was not the least necessity for such a measure. The Emperor availed himself of the absence of Commodore Campbell, who was in the habit of visiting Leghorn on some love affairs, and on the 20th of February went on board his corvette, and, accompanied by two smaller vessels, succeeded in reaching the coast of France with the whole of his suite and military guard. Fleury de Chaboulon, who had come to him shortly before, and has written us a precise and circumstantial account of the hundred days, brought him verbal intelligence from those who expected him, and had prepared everything for his reception. On the 1st of March he landed in a district where the fanatical inhabitants should have been excited to attack him *en masse*, instead of which they sent soldiers against him, who were instantly captivated by the Emperor's name, and whom they should have specially kept out of the way. Blacas, who properly speaking governed in Louis's name, had received intelligence of Napoleon's landing as early as the 6th, but regarded the matter very lightly ; he, however, summoned the chambers to hold an extraordinary sitting in Paris, and caused a proclamation of outlawry to be issued against Napoleon Bonaparte, in which the people were com-

\* On this subject we shall quote a passage from Vaulabelle, vol. ii., p. 190, because it is completely sufficient: " Il n'existait ni mystère ni silence dans les projets de renversemens multiples, souvent opposées, que plusieurs millions de personnes agitaient . . . . La masse des mécontents pouvait se diviser en deux catégories principales ; les opposans à la marche réactionnaire du gouvernement royal, et les adversaires de la restauration des Bourbons. Les premiers appartenaient aux chambres, à l'administration, au négoce, à la magistrature, et au barreau. Tout à la fois ennemis de l'empire et de son gouvernement militaire et partisans de la restauration comme gage de la paix avec l'Europe, ils poursuivaient moins le renversement du gouvernement qu'un changement de système politique. Timides autant que formalistes ils entendaient ne faire usage que de la voie légale . . . . Les adversaires des Bourbons, ceux du moins qui s'occupaient activement des moyens de les renverser, se composaient de quelque hauts fonctionnaires de l'empire délaissés par l'ancien gouvernement, de plusieurs généraux sans emploi, de colonels en demi solde, et d'un certain nombre d'officiers supérieurs appartenant à l'armée active. Leur hostilité était absolue; repoussant tout compromis avec la restauration ils voulaient le rétablissement de l'empire et de l'Empereur. Leur plan était exclusivement militaire; l'instrument dont ils comptaient se servir était l'armée; ils se croyaient sûre de la moitié des corps qui la composaient."



manded to rise against him *en masse*. In the mean time, he marched forward, accompanied by his thousand men and numerous veterans who joined him on the way; he succeeded within six days in reaching Grenoble, a distance of seventy-two hours, and there Labedoyère joined him with a whole regiment. From Grenoble he proceeded to Lyons, where Marshal Macdonald, the Count d'Artois, and the prefect attempted in vain to keep the troops steady to their duty, and to prevent them from revolt. In Lyons, Napoleon had already got as many as eight regiments and thirty guns, and all the troops far and near rushed to his standard. Macdonald and the Count d'Artois were obliged to leave Lyons. The king, having become suspicious of Soult, appointed Clarke (Duc de Feltre) minister of war on the 11th of March, all to no purpose; and, as Napoleon drew near to Paris he was obliged to flee to Lille, and when he there found himself forsaken, to press onward to Ghent. The Count d'Artois, and his companion Baron de Damas, attempted in vain to get up a rising in the south against Grouchy, who commanded in Napoleon's name; they were, however, completely hemmed in, obliged to surrender, and, by virtue of an agreement with General Gilly, one of Grouchy's subordinates, conveyed to the frontiers of Spain. The Duchess of Angoulême, Louis XVI.'s daughter, who, in the previous year, had wished to avail herself of the boasted legitimism of the inhabitants of Bourdeaux, was now constrained to congratulate herself on being allowed to sail for England.

Before Napoleon left Lyons he issued a number of decrees of the date of the 13th of March, and countersigned by Bertrand, which were intended to prepare the way for his arrival in Paris. Their special object was to calm the fears of those who had deserted him, or had taken part in his overthrow; they were designed to awaken hopes in the minds of those who were opponents to the empire, and to dissipate the apprehensions of the republicans. It was announced that the imperial constitution would be abolished by the Emperor himself, and a free constitution introduced; and, moreover, a full amnesty was guaranteed to all those who had taken part with the Bourbons and forsaken the Emperor. Several other proclamations were drawn up, all countersigned by Bertrand, and it was decreed:

I. That a general national assembly should be called in Paris (Champ de Mai), and the constitution of the kingdom be altered in the most liberal sense.

II. That all *émigrés* who had returned since 1814, should again leave the kingdom.

III. That all titles of nobility, except those which the nation has bestowed, should be abolished.

IV. That all officers of the old *régime*, and those who had been admitted by favour since April, 1814, should be excluded from the army.

V. That all the authorities of the courts of law, and other legal officers, who had been removed since April, 1814, should be restored.



VI. That all the orders, colours, and other insignia of the Bourbons, and the *maison du roi*, especially an object of hatred to the old soldiers, should be abolished. The property of the royal family to be seized and sequestrated.

The greater part of these decrees was never carried into execution. The amnesty was afterwards most dishonestly altered, and published in another form, by means of which thirteen persons therein named were excluded from its benefit.\* To this change, however, Bertrand declined to give his sanction, and refused to countersign the decree as genuine. Maret also refused to give his signature. We have, however, only given the essential points of these nine decrees, which Napoleon issued, from the 9th to the 13th from Lyons, after he had resumed the government.

Napoleon having on the 16th reached to within 48 hours' journey of Paris, the king went with his family to the hall of the assembly, which had now been in session since the 9th, and caused the oath of allegiance to be repeated; this, too, proved useless; he was obliged to flee, and Napoleon entered Paris on the evening of the 20th. He found everything changed, the treasury empty, the army weakened and reduced to such a condition that it required to be wholly remodelled, and *matériel* again to be provided. Blind confidence in Napoleon was, however, shaken; and in the appointment of his new ministry he was obliged to entrust the police to Fouché, and to Carnot the ministry of home affairs, the former of whom had been long in correspondence with Metternich and the Russians, and since March with Talleyrand also, and the latter was wholly unsuitable to an imperial system, even although he now submitted to bear the title of a count. This was done to win the confidence of the party (the *patriotes*) on which he chiefly relied. Thibaudeau, who enjoyed a distinguished position in the new house of peers of the hundred days, openly acknowledges (vii. 259-60) that Napoleon at first acted in the sense of the greatest liberal, but that he had not slept more than three nights in the Tuileries when all his old feelings and habits completely returned. His brothers had returned, and Lucien, with his suite of chamberlains and lacqueys, had taken up his quarters in the Palais Royal belonging to Louis Philippe, although he alone among all the princes had sold his furniture before his flight. The whole of Napoleon's conduct was utterly out of keeping with his proclamations, which were written in a completely republican tone. One of his decrees, published from Lyons on the 13th of March, annulled, *with a single stroke of his pen*, all the promotions made since his departure from France, and all the changes made by the Bourbons, restored everything to its former condition, and dissolved both the chambers, but indicated the prospect of magnificent things to be effected. The summons of all the electoral colleges to a *Champ de Mai* in Paris,

\* Talleyrand, Marmont, Dalberg, Montesquieu, Jaucourt, Beurnonville, Lynch, Vitrolles, Alexis de Noailles, Bourrienne, Delarochejacquelin, Bellart, and Laroche-foucauld.

with a view to make such changes in the constitution as might seem good, and be for the advantage of the people at large, was done quite in the old French style; the *Champ de Mai* was a romantic and colossal idea derived from the middle ages. The electoral colleges, however, had no constructive power, and their summons was defective; besides, people desired something quite new, and not merely some improvement or change of the imperial constitution. There was also general dissatisfaction at the abolition of the old nobility, whilst the new was retained. The Emperor soon perceived that in France he was popular with the masses only, and stood completely isolated among the princes. Had the King of Naples given heed to any rational advice, he would have seen that Napoleon should have been supported from Italy, but he conducted himself with so much political duplicity that the Emperor, being long before cognisant of his faithlessness, was obliged to give him up.

Austria and Russia having disagreed at the congress, the King of Naples received offers from both, but he neglected the propitious moment to avail himself of them. On Napoleon's return he thought it certain that the powers would be disposed to sacrifice him to please Spain and the King of Sicily. The Austrians sent a considerable army to the Po; the conduct of England was equivocal; both, however, still considered themselves as his allies, and observed the truce. The fear of the French, and of the 50,000 men whom Soult had collected in the south of France, had disappeared, but, on the other hand, King Ferdinand IV. had again come forward, played the patriot, announced reforms in church and state, and a constitutional rule, and caused the Calabrians to be roused in his favour. Only fifty days were allowed to elapse after the death of his wicked wife, Caroline, in Vienna, when the king married the Princess Partana, a woman of very loose reputation. He had lived on very intimate terms with her during the lifetime of her husband and his own wife, and now wished to make some ecclesiastical satisfaction by taking her as his wife. After Caroline's death he resumed the government of Sicily, swore to Bentinck's constitution of 1812, and did everything in his power to recover Naples; while King Joachim had already received all sorts of proposals from the allied powers with a view to compensation for his relinquishment. The Pope, moreover, required the restoration of the *Marches*, and Bellegarde in Milan called upon the Neapolitans to evacuate these districts. King Joachim entertained the fond expectation that the whole of Italy would embrace his cause, should he advance into Lombardy, hunt out the Germans, and construct one great kingdom of the Italian peninsula. Before commencing his mad undertaking, by occupying the States of the Church, a part of Tuscany, and pushing forward to the Po, he called the Neapolitans and French to a grand council. All of them, even his wife, who had much more of the talent of civil government than himself, tried to dissuade him from his design, and to show him how much more prudent it would be to await the issue



of Napoleon's return to France; he, however, persevered, and insisted on following up his design. On the 15th of March he declared himself, on the 22nd set out with two armies, and called all Italy to arms for deliverance from foreign yoke. The Italians, it is true, made him the hero of songs, poems, and speeches, and held meetings and *fêtes* in his honour; but they gave him little or no help in the field. He spared the States of the Church, insomuch that one of his armies destined for Tuscany was not allowed even to touch upon Rome; notwithstanding this, however, Pope Pius VII. fled, and Charles IV., who then lived in Rome, hastened first to Florence, and afterwards to Genoa. The second army also, which marched along the coast of the Adriatic Sea to Ancona, paid for everything which it required, and spared the subjects of the Papal States. The Austrians, commanded by Frimont, who afterwards transferred the command to Bianchi, who had previously, like Neipperg, Mohr, Wied and others, commanded a single division, proceeded northward from the Po, whilst Neipperg, who commanded an army in Tuscany, marched against King Joachim's army, then occupying Florence. On the 30th of March war was declared, and on the 2nd of April the king entered Bologna, but was soon alarmed by the intelligence that he was threatened by the English in the rear; he therefore came to a halt. The delay on the march to Milan was also in no small degree owing to the incapacity of the generals in command of the king's army in Florence. They began to retrace their steps on the 12th of April, after they had first driven the grand duke out of Florence. The king, too, who had then carried his march beyond Modena, turned back.

In Bologna Murat received a letter from Lord William Bentinck, dated Turin, April 5, in which he was informed, "That by virtue of the treaty recently agreed upon by the powers who had united against Napoleon, and since King Joachim, without any reason given, or declaration of war made, had attacked the Austrians, it was the duty of Lord William to regard the suspension of arms between England and Naples as broken, and therefore, with all his forces by sea and land, to give his aid to the Austrians." The army under Bianchi, and a second under Neipperg, both directed their force against the king, to whom Napoleon sent General Belliard when it was too late, in order to support him by counsel and service. The two armies, however, kept him in play till a superior force had been collected, and then they compelled him at the end of the month to take up a position at Ancona, which rendered an engagement unavoidable. The battle was fought at Tolentino, in the States of the Church; commenced on the 3rd, and was renewed and lost on the 4th. The king's army completely fell in pieces on the retreat, the provinces declared themselves for Ferdinand IV., and Commodore Campbell threatened to cannonade the city of Naples. The queen, who, when the king was present, had always shown greater ability than he in all questions of government, now exhibited great capacity and a



truly heroic bearing, such, in fact, as to excite the admiration both of friends and enemies, whilst they never showed anything but contempt for her husband. She soon perceived that nothing was to be expected from the undisciplined force, busy marauding in and around Capua, and she therefore resolved to come to an understanding with the English commodore. By means of this arrangement the city of Naples was saved from fatal injury, and she secured the safety of her mother, of Cardinal Fesch, her uncle, and of her sister, Pauline.\* In the mean time she continued to carry on the administration till her husband found himself compelled to give full power to Generals Carascosa and Colletta to conclude an agreement at Casa Lanza with the Austrian generals and with the representatives of England, the effect of which was to restore the possession of Naples to Ferdinand IV. This agreement, according to the express stipulations of the Austrians and English, was merely military. All the fortresses, citadels and forts were to be given up to the allies, who were in their turn to restore them to Ferdinand IV. The queen and her suite were then conveyed in an English ship to Trieste, and the king fled in a merchantman to the south of France, because he was not allowed to go to Paris. Napoleon would have no intercourse with him whatever.

In the mean time the allies in Vienna, urged on by Talleyrand and the royalists, had again pronounced a judgment of outlawry against Napoleon. As early as the 13th of March, Metternich assembled the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Spain, France, England, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden, in Vienna, in order, at the very time when Napoleon was on his march to Paris, to pronounce a sentence of outlawry against him.† The treaty of Chaumont, agreed upon by the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia when in London, was renewed, and for the second time confirmed. It was therein mutually agreed that all the powers were to unite in order to maintain the stipulations of the treaty of the 30th of March, and to carry into effect the resolutions of the congress. It was also agreed that a common effort should be made by the whole of the powers to prevent Napoleon from disturbing the peace of Europe. For this purpose each of the powers agreed to furnish a contingent of 150,000 men, and to enter into a common arrangement to lay down their arms whenever the specific objects were accomplished. All the powers of Europe were to be invited to join this alliance, and his Christian Majesty was to give his accession to that arrange-

\* It was agreed: 1. That all the ships of war should be surrendered to the English commodore; that in the mean time all their stores and their materials of war should remain in the Royal Dock Yards, in order that at the end of the war the English and Neapolitans might agree respecting their possession. 2. The queen, with her family, their persons, and property, were to find safety and an assylum on board the English squadron. 3. Time was to be allowed to send an ambassador to England in order to negotiate respecting a peace. 4. The English fleet was to put an end to all hostilities, so as to suffer the queen to carry on the business of the government.

† “Napoléon Bonaparte s'est placé hors des relations civiles et sociales comme ennemi et perturbateur du repos du monde; il est livré à la vindicte publique.”

ment. Louis XVIII., however, took no part in the alliance; the King of Spain was very well disposed to join, but his minister, Don Gomez Labrador, proved much more conservative than he. The latter declared merely that the arms of Spain would assist in the war, but that in consequence of the article in the treaty respecting Parma, Placentia, and Tuscany, he could not acknowledge the peace of Paris. Lord Castlereagh alleged that he accepted of and concurred in the treaty so far as it respected Bonaparte, but that the King of England would not consider himself bound to force any particular form of government upon the French.\* The Emperor Francis afterwards made the same declaration. The Swedish government, then completely in the hands of Bernadotte, did not venture to enter into any close alliance with Bonaparte; it, however, broke off all connexion with M. de Rumigny, the minister of Louis XVIII., and declared its *neutrality*.

The measures for carrying into execution the combined action against the return of Napoleon were all taken as early as the beginning of April. On the 31st of March a military convention was concluded, after which the three armies were immediately to march. One of them consisted of 344,000 men, under Schwarzenberg, a second of 250,000 under Wellington and Blücher, and finally a Russian corps of 200,000. This allied army, 794,000 strong, was to march from various sides on Paris. In vain Napoleon put into activity all his own and Fouché's arts in order to calm the fears of the French: Fouché betrayed him and went secretly the same path as Talleyrand, and Napoleon's own arts entirely failed. In vain his council of state, at his request, declared that the people was the source of all power; in vain he himself declared, in answer to an address from the same council,—“ I have renounced all ideas of this grand empire, of which I laid the foundation now fifteen years ago.” Even in France every one smiled when he caused a report to be read upon a declaration made by the congress on the 13th, in which, on Fouché's suggestion, it was said:—“ *That this pretended declaration, intended to lead the French people astray, and so drawn up as to lead to the murder of the Emperor, must be regarded as proceeding from the pen of the French ambassador in Vienna.*” In vain he tried to bring about a union with his wife and his son. She was already in Neipperg's arms, and had previously indicated her disinclination to follow him, and the Emperor Francis caused a strict watch to be kept upon the son. In vain he sent Montrou, Bresson, and Du Fresne de St. Leon to Talleyrand; and in vain he sent Ouvrard to England. The Emperor Alexander, too, who had treated Eugène Beauharnais with very particular attention, paid no attention to his

\* This refers particularly to the 8th article of the treaty, which runs as follows: “Le présent ayant uniquement pour but de mettre la France ou tout autre pays attaqué par Napoléon à l'abri de ses entreprises et de celles de ses adhérens, S. M. T. C. est invité en particulier à donner son assentiment aux mesures au dessous et dans le cas où elle aurait besoin des troupes auxiliaires, qui lui sont promises par ce traité, à déterminer en même tems toutes les forces qu'elle a disponibles pour combattre l'ennemi.”



appeals when he attempted to address him on the subject of Napoleon and his proposals. Many other attempts, and even those of the ladies, to lead the Emperor to other ideas, and innumerable endeavours made to enter into negotiations with one or other of the great powers, were frustrated. Baron Stassart, employed as his messenger to Vienna, was not suffered to proceed to the city, but obliged to send forward his despatches from Ling, and he himself compelled to turn back. From the 19th of April also all connexion between France and Germany was broken off. War became unavoidable, and the great object was to convince the people that their cause and Napoleon's was the same, and it became especially important to bring about a reconciliation between the republicans and the empire. Napoleon, however, could not bring himself to concede any true rights to the people, and, instead of granting a completely new constitution, he merely made some additions to that of the old empire, and had recourse to a new comedy in the *Champ de Mai*.

For a month the people had longingly awaited the promised solemn declaration respecting the change in the constitution and the new rights of the people. At length there appeared on the 20th of April a declaration from Bonaparte, but under a title which was not very encouraging, "*Acte Additionel aux Constitutions de l'Empire*."\* This piece of patchwork pleased nobody; the plan of two chambers as established by the Louis government was retained, and the manner in which, upon Fouché's advice, it was to be accepted by the people, was ridiculous, because every Frenchman knew the result of such former promises and decisions at the time of the revolution and in the early times of Bonaparte. Registries were opened at the public offices of the magisterial courts, the secretary's chambers of all the offices of government and of the various municipalities, in which every man was to record his opinion for or against the constitution. The result of all these collected opinions was to be publicly proclaimed at the public assembly on the *Champ de Mai*, on the 26th of May. It must, of course, be obvious that the great majority was in favour of accepting the constitution, inasmuch as the whole of France and the army had of their own accord withdrawn from adhesion to the Bourbons and become adherents of Bonaparte. Both policy and nationality would have suggested that he should have been allowed to assume the office of dictator, for through him alone was there any possibility of guarding against the incursion of 800,000 enemies under arms. The discontent of the higher classes was, however, so great, that he was obliged to turn his thoughts to the party of the red republicans (*Fédérés*), and for an army to the *sans-culottes* of the first revolution. This disgusted him thoroughly, and he did not conceal his contempt when the inhabitants of the *faubourgs* wished to make him their hero. The

\* The chapters are:—1. Dispositions générales; 2. Des collèges électoraux et du mode d'élection; 3. De la loi de l'impôt; 4. De la responsabilité des ministres; 5. Du pouvoir judiciaire; 6. Droits des citoyens.



extent of his dependence upon these parties may be seen from the *Mémoires* of Benjamin Constant, as well as from those of Lafayette. What could a man of such active genius do with such gossips as these? And yet he took Benjamin Constant into his council of state, although he had uttered the most violent denunciations against him and sworn eternal fealty to the Bourbons. We know, of course, that these people furnished the most admirable reasons for their conduct; and at the present time in Germany we have abundant examples of the same kind.

On the *acte additionel* we do not dwell, inasmuch as we attach no importance whatever to paper constitutions till we have seen them subjected to some years of experience. It is, however, to be found in the 113th number of the *Moniteur*, of the date of the 23rd of April, 1815. We shall merely allude very slightly to a few of the articles. The sixth article of the old constitution respecting religion is altogether wanting. In the eighth the number of deputies is fixed at 629, and twenty-five as a minimum of age. Napoleon, as he proved, contrived to evade the principle involved in the fourteenth article, which determines that no member can be subjected to arrest without permission of the chamber. The article respecting the nobility completely abolishes the old, which *had been* something, and creates a new one which *was* nothing, and had never been. The sixty-seventh decrees the banishment of the Bourbons; that may be defended, but to forbid their return to the country at any time is absolutely absurd. Even before the constitution had been accepted, public affairs were managed in accordance with its principles. The *Champ de Mai* was a *fête* such as those which are now daily celebrated in all corners of Germany; an exhibition for a miserable set of flatterers, women, idlers, sentimental talkers, and people who take delight in figuring in fine uniforms and feathers. At the same time we by no means deny the momentary effect of this popular demonstration; but it must be looked upon as something quite as transitory as fine speeches and newspaper articles. The *fête*, moreover, was too late; for on the 2nd of June the Swiss had promised to get on foot 30,000 as a reserve on the frontiers, in return for which the allies bound themselves not to touch the territory of Switzerland, except in case of absolute necessity.

The parties invited to take part in the grand representation of the *Champ de Mai*, appointed for the 26th of May, but not enacted till the 1st of June, were: 1. All the members of the various electoral colleges. 2. Deputations from the departments, the army, and the fleet. The deputies of each department were to hold an assembly and elect five deputies, who were to examine and report to the arch-chancellor of their department the result of the public voting. These results were to be handed to the Emperor in the *Champ de Mai*, decorated like a theatre for the occasion;\* and to him the oath of

\* "Le Champ de Mai" was said, in the official account of the assembly, "théâtralment décoré."

allegiance was then to be taken. We must leave it to our readers to learn for themselves, from the 115th number of the *Moniteur*, the manner in which such festivities may be pompously described, and shall merely add a few dry notices of the subject. The *Moniteur* reports, that the Archbishop of Tours, assisted by the Cardinal of Bayonne, celebrated a solemn mass; that 15,000 men were seated in the amphitheatre. The members of the central deputation of the electoral colleges, five hundred in number, were conducted to the steps of the throne. The national guards and troops of the line were under arms; then the arch-chancellors of the departments read the results of the registers, and it was announced that there was a million of votes of a majority in favour of the re-election of the Emperor. Napoleon was then proclaimed anew as Emperor of the French, by virtue of the votes of the people; made a speech on the occasion, and boasted that he would have sacrificed himself for *his people*. We are peculiarly struck with what he said respecting the armament of the allies on the frontiers of France, and his rhetorical announcement of his preparations to meet them. The people, however, is in his mouth, as it is in Russia; always HIS PEOPLE, and Paris HIS CITY. Savary, in his *Mémoires*, observes, with great justice, that this phraseology made a most unfavourable impression, and that the Emperor, who still played the liberal and suffered himself to indulge in the most contemptuous expressions respecting the etiquette of the Bourbons, did not appear in uniform, but in the old imperial robes of the old kingdom of the Franks, and his brother Lucien, for the first and only time, figured as a prince.

In obedience to the edict of the 30th of April, the chambers met on the 3rd of June, although called together for the 1st, and at the very first moment there was abundant evidence of the existence of a very disastrous opposition; the power of the Emperor's will was broken, and the energies of the nation were paralysed by opposition. The army was to save the country alone; but that it was not able to do. The peers nominated by the Emperor, amongst whom were all the princes, Count Siéyès, and the Dukes of Bassano and Rovigo, were almost all old soldiers, or declared and open adherents of Napoleon and his creatures. The names and titles of the peerage are to be found in the *Moniteur* of the 16th of July (p. 637), but even these people constructed an opposition, because they had no faith in the duration of the new institutions, and would not be accounted the mere creatures of Napoleon, but wished to gain for themselves such a name as would recommend them to the favour of the Bourbons. The chamber of deputies was completely hostile, and partly republican, because the men of monarchical principles neither were nor wished to be elected. Twenty-nine of the eighty-three departments returned no deputies at all. Napoleon knew these facts, and, therefore, at first wished that his brother Lucien, who had rendered him such eminent services as president in 1799, should be chosen as president. On this account he kept back the publication



of the list of peers for some days, in order to be able to leave him out of the list. This, however, was too palpable, and he was obliged to give up the idea. He then tried to have at least one of his ministers of state—either Regnaud or Merlin, Boulay or Defermon, all members—chosen as president; but the chamber laid before him only the names of Lafayette and Lanjuinais. This provoked him so much that he could only be prevented by the most urgent representations from rejecting them both. He afterwards selected Lanjuinais, and won him over and charmed him by such a conversation as he had held to the same effect in April with Benjamin Constant, who now sat in the council of state, and has preserved and recorded the conversation in his pamphlet on the Hundred Days. In the mean time the chamber continued to prove itself hostile, for all the vice-presidents whom it had chosen were declared opponents of Napoleon. In the very first sittings, even before the imperial sitting, it was obvious that the chamber meant to assert an equal, if not a superior position to the Emperor; great pains were even taken to keep a great number of deputies away, and to declare in the presence of the Emperor, at the formal imperial sitting, that their oath of allegiance to the Emperor and the Constitution was not to be regarded as binding them from attempts to improve the *acte additionel*. The Emperor's speech was a piece of patchwork—as such speeches always are—and the answer of the chamber contained a warning to him not to suffer himself to be deluded by success.\* The Emperor answered justly and correctly that that was not in the first instance to be feared. Even in the quiet and politically insignificant Upper Chamber systematic opposition was formed under Boissy d'Anglas, Latour Maubourg, and Doulcet de Pontécoulant.

All that now took place would have merited no notice at all, had the war taken a different turn from what it really did; in order, however, to be able to form some just opinion of its results, it is absolutely necessary to understand that the two chambers played precisely the same character on the second deposition of Napoleon as the senate did with regard to the first. At the time in which these events were taking place in Paris, the allied armies were on the frontiers of the kingdom, and it was resolved that they should at the same time enter upon their march to Paris. Wellington and Blücher were, therefore, at first to act on the defensive. The Austrians and Russians could not reach the Rhine till the middle of June. Wellington, who was to command the united army of English and Belgians, came early, because the Prussians, as well as the Prince of Orange, with good reason expected that Napoleon would burst into the Low Countries, where there was a great feeling favourable to a union with France. There, too, he might

\* "Si les succès repondent à la justice de notre cause et aux espérances que nous sommes accoutumés à concevoir de votre génie et de la bravoure de nos armées, la nation n'a plus à craindre que l'entraînement de la prospérité et les séductions de la victoire."



meet with the Bourbons, who had fled thither. As early as April Wellington hastened from Vienna to Brussels, and immediately afterwards Blücher came from Berlin to Liège.

As we write for Germans and not for Frenchmen, we must here refer to the posthumous work of Clausewitz on the campaign of 1816, in order to give some correct idea of the boastings made by Napoleon and his adherents on account of the military preparations in the space of three short months, and the greater or smaller probability of maintaining a superiority in the field even for a short period against the combined forces of the whole of Europe. From this work it will be seen, that under the existing circumstances, it was in the highest degree honourable to the Emperor, that at the beginning he drove the enemy in the Netherlands, double to him in number, into a corner. The result of Clausewitz's inquiries is, that Napoleon with 130,000 men marched against the 220,000 under Wellington and Blücher, and that he was only able to send some 30,000 under Rapp, including sixteen battalions of national guards, to oppose the enormous army which was advancing from the Rhine under Schwarzenberg. The whole military levy of the nation is estimated by Clausewitz at 150,000 men.\* Wellington had posted his troops in great strength in Brabant, and Blücher maintained his troops in the walloon country from Liège to the frontiers, and kept them so stationed that he could concentrate the whole in two days in Naumur. Schwarzenberg was almost ready to make an attack, and the Russians only about eight days' march from the frontiers, when Napoleon took his departure from Paris on the 12th, and on the 15th fell upon Blücher with the whole of his forces. He found the Sambre unguarded, therefore forced the Prussians to retreat, and took Charleroi, but met with such a vigorous resistance, and lost so many men, that he soon perceived that circumstances were completely altered. This became further evident from the fact, that Bourmont, whom he had appointed chief of the staff of the 4th corps, together with Colonels Clouet and Viloutreys, went over to the enemy. Although, however, Bülow, who lay in Liège with 35,000 men, had not come up, and Wellington proved unable to concentrate his forces, Blücher ventured to enter the lists with the whole of the enemy's force at Quatre Bras, St. Amand, and Ligny. Even the French admit that the Prussians at Ligny were admirably commanded, and in the fight showed as much courage as skill. Wellington, who was at a ball in Brussels, not being able to bring up his troops to Quatre Bras by four o'clock, as he had promised, Blücher re-

\* Clausewitz, "Campaign of 1815," Duncker, Berlin 1835, p. 15, observes: "The consequence was that the national levy was limited to 248 battalions of select troops, which may be estimated in round numbers at 150,000 men. Of these sixteen battalions were placed under General Rapp, as many more for a reinforcement to General Suchet in Dauphiné, and lastly some 20,000 men were sent to Bourdeaux and Toulouse, so that there were only about 40,000 of the national guard in the field. There remained besides 110,000 national guards, who, with the marines, veterans, and volunteers (consisting mostly of officers and sub-officers), and the dépôts, constituted the garrisons of the fortresses, and in general the military strength of the interior of the country."

tired without being beaten. Fifteen thousand men fell on each side. The French acknowledge that they lost 10,000, and yet failed to gain a victory. They were unable in any case to follow up the victory, partly because it was night and Blücher was still strong enough, and partly because their left wing had not been so fortunate as the right. Wellington hastened from the ball-room to the battle-field, and took his position at Quatre Bras, which, as Napoleon alleges, Ney ought to have occupied.\* Others say that he himself had sent Ney with 40,000 men to Brussels, where he encountered Wellington's army, so that the latter gave this as the reason why he was unable to meet Blücher as he had promised. The Prince of Orange and the Duke of Brunswick suffered very considerable loss on the 16th. Wellington, however, maintained his position at Quatre Bras till he received intelligence accidentally of Blücher's retreat, when he drew back as far as the heights of Mont St. Jean, where the farm of Belle Alliance became renowned in history as the scene of the battle which decided the fate of all Europe. Napoleon has been blamed for not attacking Wellington on the 17th, when he would have had nothing to fear from the Prussians. On the 18th the battle began about twelve o'clock, and the fighting was kept up with equal loss and equal bravery on both sides till five. Wellington continued steadfastly to stand his ground, and to keep up the murderous fight, because Blücher had promised certainly to arrive on the 18th. The Prussian commander had succeeded in leading the French astray as to the direction of his retreat. They supposed him to have retreated on the road to Namur, but he had directed his march towards the English position, and lay at Wavres, on both sides of the Dyle. The battle of the 18th was named after the village of Waterloo, where Wellington had spent the night, but the deadly and decisive battle really took place at the château Goumont, near La Haye Sainte and Smohain, lying immediately below the heights of Mont St. Jean. Bülow's corps of 30,000 men had long been in view at St. Lambert. At five o'clock Ziethen and Blücher's army pushed forward to La Haye, and at the same time Bülow took Planchenit, and occupied the road to Charleroi. This rendered hopes of retreat on the part of the French impossible. Bonaparte and the French in general are always accustomed to allege, when they are beaten or out-manœuvred, that the loss or failure was owing to some unlucky accident, or attributable to treachery; and they allege, that had it not been for the grievous mistakes of a man, whom they make their scapegoat on this occasion, everything would have turned out very successfully, and they would have done wonders. This is especially the case with almost the whole class of French writers when anything relating to their idol Bonaparte is in question.

\* Clausewitz says, what is true of all that proceeded from St. Helena by means of Montholon, Las Casas, and others (p. 77): "We believe, therefore, that this Bonapartist narrative in the solitude of St. Helena is a sort of bombast, and that in the moment of action the ideas of Bonaparte were more simple and natural."



Thus in the Battle of Waterloo the whole blame of the utter defeat of their hero is thrown upon Ney and Grouchy. Ney, as we have already observed, is fully exonerated by Clausewitz from one fault imputed to him; he, however, committed a second in the battle by placing the whole result at stake at an improper time. With respect to General Grouchy, he, it is alleged, as a former marquis, was ill-disposed towards Napoleon. It is alleged that he neither attacked the Prussians with sufficient vigour on the 17th, nor followed up his success with sufficient skill, and that on the 18th he suffered himself to be delayed on his march to the main body by an unnecessary engagement with Thielemann's corps at Wavres. The advantage, it is true, was on Grouchy's side, and Thielemann was just about to retire when the news arrived of Wellington and Blücher's success. The road to Charleroi being then occupied, Grouchy retired to Namur, and in this way saved the only remnant of the army which escaped at Waterloo.

The army having been annihilated, Fouché appeared on the stage as the friend of the republicans, and overthrew Bonaparte as he had done Robespierre. He digged the pit for the one as he had done for the other, and caused them to be thrown in by others, without putting a hand personally to what was his own work. He was Napoleon's minister of police, but at the same time Talleyrand's correspondent; the tool of the court of *émigrés* at Ghent, and the bosom friend of the liberal deputies in the chamber. Since February he had constantly exchanged letters with Metternich, and sent a plenipotentiary to Basle, who carried on verbal communications with the representative of the cunning Duke of Otranto. His policy was to stimulate and encourage the democrats of the second chamber to attack Napoleon. We have already said, that immediately on the 3rd of June, the chamber had declared war against the Emperor, and continued to prosecute it vigorously till his departure to the army. He no sooner left Paris than the strife became open, for the chambers resolved to proceed, without any regard to the *Acte additionnel* of Napoleon, to the construction of a new constitution, availing themselves of all the light which had been thrown on the subject since 1791. This motion aimed against the Emperor was adopted on the very day on which Napoleon compelled the Prussians, under Blücher, to retreat at Ligny, and nearly captured their general, whose horse had fallen under him. On the fatal termination of the battle of Waterloo, of which Fouché received very early intelligence, he sent for the good and honourable Dupont de l'Eure, Lafayette, Manuel, Flaugergues, the elder Dupin, and Lacoste, and made use of their republican feelings and convictions to work for Louis XVIII., and to secure his favour for himself. From Hoesne, Napoleon wrote to his brother Joseph, and commissioned him, Lucien, and Carnot, to endeavour to gain over the deputies; Fouché acted as their able and zealous opponent. On the meeting of the council of state, at which Lanjuinais, the president of the chamber,

was present, consultations were only held respecting the adoption of energetic measures to save the nation; Fouché, however, availed himself of Carnot and Caulaincourt to make preparations for the measures which it was necessary for the chambers to adopt, in order to remove Napoleon and place Fouché himself at the helm of affairs.

Napoleon had a suspicion of what was going on in Paris, hastened thither, and arrived, to the terror of every one, on the 21st of June; Fouché, however, had anticipated even this possibility, and taken his measures accordingly. He was the confidential adviser of the Emperor, and Savary, his opponent, gives us clearly to understand in his *Mémoires*, that he advised the Emperor to dissolve the chambers. This again was prevented by Lafayette, who, upon Fouché's advice, immediately after the Emperor's arrival, when the chamber of deputies assembled at twelve o'clock and that of peers at two o'clock, made use of the strife which had taken place between them and the Emperor on the subject of their address to him and his answer to them, to make several revolutionary proposals. Lafayette thought he should serve the cause of freedom, but it soon appeared, that in fact he had been merely serving Fouché, and the latter contrived to keep him at a distance from Paris whilst he himself was working for the cause of Louis XVIII. The Emperor still continued to hold councils with his ministers; his brother Lucien advised him to follow Savary's advice, to dissolve the chambers, and assume the dictatorship; Carnot, Caulaincourt, and Fouché insisted upon the necessity of a reconciliation with the chambers, when the deputies of the chamber appeared and handed in a resolution, come to upon the motion of Lafayette, to the following effect:—"The representatives of the nation declare that the independence of the country is in danger; the chamber declares itself permanent, and every attempt to dissolve it will be regarded and punished as high treason with death. The troops of the line and national guards, who have fought for the nation, are deserving of the public thanks. The ministers of war, the interior, police, and foreign affairs, are commanded immediately to present themselves before the chamber." This was, in fact, virtually to depose Napoleon, and all his attempts to induce them to alter their opinions made him completely contemptible. He sent Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angely, and caused him to deliver a long rodomontade on the loss of the battle, such rodomontades as are to be found in abundance in the dictations of St. Helena, and which are still regarded as history in Europe.\* Their murmurs were so loud, that Regnaud offered to read to them the supplement to the *Moniteur* of the 21st, in which everything sounds much more tolerable, but they would not listen to him.

Lucien then tried to negotiate for his brother, and went to the chamber at six o'clock; but came back at eight without having

\* For Regnaud's singular address, see No. XXIV. of the Appendix to Vaudoncourt's book, part v.



effected anything. The chamber resolved on the appointment of a committee of fifteen members from each chamber, who should devise and carry into effect whatever measures might appear necessary in the existing contingency. The chamber of deputies named Lanjuinais, Lafayette, Flaugergues, Dupont, and General Grenier, their presidents and vice-presidents; the first chamber acceded to the proposal, and appointed Boissy d'Anglas, Thibaudeau, Drouot, Andreossy, and Déjean. In the commission and in the chambers it was further agreed that Napoleon must be removed; but it was uncertain whether he should be deposed or forced to resign. The latter method was adopted. Napoleon long resisted in vain, till his own brother urged it upon him to resign, in order to avoid the disgrace of a deposition. At length, on the 22nd, he sent, against his will and with great indignation, a letter of renunciation to the chambers, but in the same document he proclaimed his son as Napoleon II. The chambers took no notice whatever of this declaration, because Fouché, through whom the communication was made, did not inform them of it; but Lanjuinais, the president, and a deputation from the chamber, waited on the Emperor to thank him for his voluntary resignation. A commission was then named for the affairs of government, consisting of Fouché, as president, Carnot, Quinette, Caulaincourt, and Grenier. In the mean time Bonaparte withdrew to Malmaison, where Fouché had a strict watch kept upon him by General Becker. The proximity of his place of sojourn appeared to Fouché dangerous, and, as the allies drew near to Paris, he tried, through the Prince of Eckmühl, to urge upon the Emperor, as a friend, to withdraw himself by flight from the danger of being seized upon by the Russians and Prussians. This took place on the 28th of June, and he took his departure for the Isle of Aix, in order to take ship for America. Fouché had given a hint of this movement to Wellington; he was therefore strictly watched by the English ships, and at length he preferred openly to throw himself on the magnanimity of the English to falling into their hands in an attempted escape. He therefore went of his own accord on board of an English ship of war on the coast, was received with respect, though not treated as an emperor, but regarded as a prisoner of war, and eventually conveyed to St. Helena.

And now commenced, under Fouché's government, the time of treachery, deception, and lies; of the insolence of power, and the incapacity of its officials; a time of congresses, protocols, and political persecutions; of conspiracies, hopes, and delusions, which we have seen and experienced since 1815; but the history of this time does not fall within the limits which we have prescribed to ourselves as the extent of our work.

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
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